State of Indiana, ex rel. Todd Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Appellant-Plaintiff v. William Redman, in his official capacity as St. Joseph County Sheriff, and St. Joseph County Police Department, Appellees-Defendants (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] The State appeals, on behalf of Indiana Attorney General Todd Rokita (“the Attorney General”), the Trial Rule 12(B)(6) dismissal of an action against St. Joseph County Sheriff William Redman, in his official capacity (“Sheriff Redman”), and the St. Joseph County Police Department (“SJCPD”) (collectively, “the Defendants”). The Attorney General challenged policies related to the Defendants’ working relationship with a federal law enforcement agency, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), claiming the policies violated then-effective provisions of Indiana Code sections 5-2-18.2-3 (“Section 3”) and 5-2-18.2-4 (“Section 4”). The Attorney General sought an order enjoining the Defendants from violating the law. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 31 (“The appropriate remedy is for this Court to enjoin the violations.”). While this appeal was pending, our legislature materially amended Sections 3 and 4. Compare Ind. Code §§ 5-2-18.2-3 & -4 (2017) with I.C. §§ 5-2-18.2-3 & -4 (2026). Our legislature also substantially expanded Indiana Code section 5-2-18.2-5 (“Section 5”), which relates to the Attorney General's authority to enforce Sections 3 and 4. Compare I.C. § 5-2-18.2-5 (2024) with I.C. § 5-2-18.2-5 (2026).¹

[2] On appeal, we are asked to “reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings” on the complaint. Appellant's Br. p. 48; see also Reply Br. p. 28 (“The Court should reverse and remand the case to the trial court.”). However, because of the substantial amendments to Sections 3, 4, and 5, mootness principles preclude our review of the merits. “The long-standing rule in Indiana courts has been that a case is deemed moot when no effective relief can be rendered to the parties before the court.” In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 37 (Ind. 1991), quoted with approval in Thomas v. Foyst, 260 N.E.3d 887, 895 (Ind. 2025). When a case is moot, dismissal is proper. See, e.g., Thomas, 260 N.E.3d at 895. “While moot appeals ordinarily are dismissed, Indiana recognizes an exception that may be invoked when the appeal involves a question of great public importance that is likely to recur.” I.J. v. State, 178 N.E.3d 798, 799 (Ind. 2022) (per curiam). “When appellate courts invoke this exception, it results in ‘decisions which are, for all practical purposes, advisory opinions.’ ” Id. (quoting Mosley v. State, 908 N.E.2d 599, 603 (Ind. 2009)).

[3] Here, the amendments to Sections 3, 4, and 5 are material, such that resolution of the appeal would require us to issue an advisory opinion on statutes that no longer exist. Our opinion would not provide effective relief. The trial court dismissed the Attorney General's complaint on three grounds: (1) standing; (2) the alleged conduct did not state a violation of Section 3; and (3) the alleged conduct did not state a violation of Section 4. In each instance, the amendments are so substantial that they necessarily alter grounds upon which the trial court based its ruling.

[4] First, Section 5 now authorizes the Attorney General to seek an injunction and a civil penalty of up to $10,000.00 for each violation, addressing the trial court's rationale that the former authorization merely to compel compliance did not, without more, supply the injury in fact necessary for standing. Compare I.C. § 5-2-18.2-5 (2024) with I.C. § 5-2-18.2-5 (2026); see Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 11–18. Next, the prohibition in Section 3 now explicitly extends to policies “whether written or unwritten,” which is germane to the court's determination that the Attorney General failed to state a claim because the alleged policy was not written or memorialized. Compare I.C. § 5-2-18.2-3 (2017) with I.C. § 5-2-18.2-3 (2026); see Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 19–22. Finally, the amendments to Section 4 broadened prohibitions on limiting or restricting the enforcement of federal immigration law, adding broad qualifying language (“in any way”) and clarifying that the statute applies regardless of whether the enforcement activity is carried out by a federal, state, or local law enforcement agency. These amendments are germane to the trial court's conclusion that restricting communications with ICE—as opposed to the United States Attorney General—did not violate the statute. Compare I.C. § 5-2-18.2-4 (2017) with I.C. § 5-2-18.2-4 (2026); see Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 24–25.

[5] As a result of the statutory amendments, the relief the complaint seeks—an order compelling compliance with Sections 3 and 4 as they existed before amendment—is no longer effective relief. Moreover, because the amendments both materially altered Sections 3 and 4, and added additional remedies in Section 5, whether law enforcement policies violated the former statutes is a backward-looking question that we conclude is unlikely to recur. This case therefore does not support invoking the exception to dismissal for the issuance of an advisory opinion. We dismiss the appeal as moot.

[6] However, because the appealed order is not subject to review, we remand with instructions to the trial court to (1) vacate its order on the motion to dismiss and (2) dismiss the case as moot. Cf. Gardner v. Grills, 175 N.E.2d 696, 697–98 (Ind. 1961) (dismissing the appeal as moot and remanding with instructions to vacate the judgment); Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc. v. Durham, 748 N.E.2d 404, 410–11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“When the principal questions in issue have ceased to be matters of real controversy between the parties, ․ then the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss.”); accord U.S. v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39, 41 (1950) (explaining that when a civil case becomes moot prior to an appellate decision on the merits, the “established practice” is to “reverse or vacate the judgment below and remand with a direction to dismiss,” which “prevent[s] a judgment, unreviewable because of mootness, from spawning any legal consequences”).²

[7] Dismissed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The American Civil Liberties Union of Indiana filed a Brief of Amicus Curiae in support of the Defendants; the brief acknowledged the amendments, stating: “Inasmuch as the Attorney General's complaint focuses onwhether the ․ alleged past behavior violated the two statutes, it is appropriate to focus only on the statutes as they existed at the time that the Attorney General filed its complaint.” Amicus Curiae Br. p. 5 n.1.

2.   Nothing in this decision precludes the State from pursuing relief for the alleged conduct under current law.

Foley, Judge.

Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.