Steven Russell Wells, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Steven Russell Wells appeals following his guilty plea to stalking, as a Level 5 felony; residential entry, as a Level 6 felony; and invasion of privacy, as a Class A misdemeanor. Wells raises the following two issues for our review:

1. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.

2. Whether his convictions for stalking and invasion of privacy violate the prohibition against double jeopardy.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In 2025, Wells met A.P. at a mutual friend's house. Wells tried to get A.P. to date him, but she “refused[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 25.¹ On February 2, 2026, Wells knocked on the front window of A.P.’s home and then “proceeded to the rear basement window[.]” Id. A.P. then heard “five or six loud bangs,” and she called 9-1-1. Id. While on the phone, A.P. “heard noises from her basement and the basement door opening.” Id. Wells then entered the main floor of the house and advanced toward A.P. A.P. “fled” her house, and Wells followed her. Id. At the same time, the first officer arrived on the scene. Wells fled on foot “and made statements to [A.P.] that he would be back.” Id. Officers located Wells nearby and took him into custody. Upon a search of the residence, officers were able to determine that Wells had “kick[ed] in the basement window[.]” Id.

[4] A.P. informed officers that Wells had “continued to harass her” after she declined to date him. Id. She also stated that Wells had battered her in early 2025 and that she had twice been the victim of invasion of privacy by Wells. A.P. further reported that she had encountered Wells earlier in the day and that Wells “call[s] her from various different numbers.” Id. at 26. On the date of the current offenses, A.P. had an “active Protective Order” against Wells. Id.

[5] The State charged Wells with stalking, as a Level 5 felony; residential entry, as a Level 6 felony; and invasion of privacy, as a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court held a hearing on February 5. At the beginning of the hearing, the court read the charges to Wells, who appeared pro se, and then advised Wells of his options regarding representation. When the court asked Wells if he had any money to hire a lawyer, Wells replied: “Can I just plead guilty today?” Tr. at 5. The court responded by advising Wells to speak to an attorney and stating that it was going to appoint the public defender. But Wells stated: “No. I just want to plead guilty and get this over with.” Id. The court advised Wells of the rights he was giving up and that, by pleading guilty, he was “admitting the charges against” him. Id. The court accepted Wells’ guilty plea.

[6] The court held a sentencing hearing on March 4. Wells again appeared pro se. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court entered judgment of conviction on all three counts. The court then found as aggravating circumstances Wells’ prior criminal history and that he was on bond at the time of the offenses. As mitigating circumstances, the court found that he had pleaded guilty and accepted responsibility for the crime immediately. The court found that the aggravators outweighed the mitigators and sentenced Wells to four years on the stalking charge, with two years executed at the Department of Correction and two years suspended to probation. The court also sentenced him to concurrent terms of two years on the residential entry charge and one year on the invasion of privacy charge. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Appropriateness of Sentence

[7] Wells first asserts that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that “[t]he Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” This Court has held that “[t]he advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Sanders v. State, 71 N.E.3d 839, 844 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. And the Indiana Supreme Court has previously explained that:

The principal role of appellate review should be to attempt to leaven the outliers ․ but not achieve a perceived “correct” result in each case. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). Defendant has the burden to persuade us that the sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind.), as amended (July 10, 2007), decision clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007).

Shoun v. State, 67 N.E.3d 635, 642 (Ind. 2017) (omission in original).

[8] Indiana's flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate sentence to the circumstances presented, and the trial court's judgment “should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222. Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day turns on “our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224. The question is not whether another sentence is more appropriate, but rather whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Deference to the trial court “prevail[s] unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[9] The sentencing range for a Level 5 felony is one year to six years, with an advisory sentence of three years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b). The sentencing range for a Level 6 felony is six months to two and one-half years, with an advisory sentence of one year. I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b). And a person faces a term of not more than one year for a Class A misdemeanor. I.C. § 35-50-3-2. Because the trial court ordered all of the sentences to run concurrently, we concern ourselves only with the most serious offense. Here, the court sentenced Wells to four years on the Level 5 felony, with two years executed and two years suspended.

[10] On appeal, Wells contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses because the “record does not reveal that [he] took any steps more than necessary to meet the basic elements of the crime.” Appellant's Br. at 10. And he contends that he “did not cause any harm to A.P. or the property inside the residence.” Id. Wells also argues that his sentence is inappropriate in light of his character because he “suffers from a variety of mental health issues,” has “been homeless sporadically,” and “took responsibility for his actions and immediately pled guilty.” Id. at 11.

[11] However, Wells has not met his burden on appeal to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate. Regarding the nature of the offenses, Wells went to A.P.’s house, broke her basement window by kicking it five or six times, entered the house, went to the main level, and followed A.P. out of the house as she fled. Wells stopped only because police arrived. And Wells engaged in this behavior despite a protective order that A.P. had obtained against him based on prior harassing acts. Wells has not presented any compelling evidence to portray his offenses in a positive light.

[12] As for his character, Wells has a lengthy criminal history that spans more than thirty years and four states and includes numerous prior felony and misdemeanor convictions. Wells was also out on bond at the time he committed the instant offenses. Further, by Wells’ own admission, he “uses marijuana and was smoking approximately three grams per day at the time of his arrest.” Appellant's Br. at 11. And Wells has never sought treatment for his drug usage, which reflects poorly on his character. Although Wells pleaded guilty, the court already took that into consideration and identified his plea as a mitigating circumstance. Wells has not shown any substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character that would overcome our deference to the trial court. Wells’ sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses or his character. We therefore affirm it.

Issue Two: Double Jeopardy

[13] Wells next contends that his convictions for stalking and invasion of privacy violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. Wells maintains that “this Court may review double jeopardy arguments when a guilty plea is entered without the benefit of a plea agreement.” Id. However, our Supreme Court just reaffirmed “the rule prohibiting a direct appeal [of a conviction] following a guilty plea.” Monroe v. State, 281 N.E.3d 546, 549 (Ind. 2026).

[14] In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty to three counts without the benefit of a plea agreement. The defendant appealed and raised a double jeopardy argument. Our Supreme Court declined to consider the merits of the defendant's claim, concluding that the appropriate avenue following a guilty plea is to move to withdraw the guilty plea as to the lesser included offense and then appeal if the court denies that motion. See id. at 549-50. Because the defendant did not move to withdraw the guilty plea as to the lesser included offense, the Court held that a direct appeal of the conviction was “unavailable,” and that the only remedy was through post-conviction relief. Id. at 551.

[15] Here, Wells pleaded guilty to all three crimes without the benefit of a plea agreement. Based on our Supreme Court's holding in Monroe, a direct appeal of the alleged lesser-included offense is not available to Wells.

[16] Still, Wells argues that Monroe was not decided until “three days after” he filed his opening brief and, thus, should not preclude him from raising his double jeopardy argument. Reply Br. at 3. We acknowledge that Monroe was decided after Wells filed his brief. However, Monroe was not new law, and it was not the first time our Supreme Court held that an appellant cannot directly appeal a conviction following a guilty plea, even when the plea is entered without an agreement.

[17] As the Court in Monroe points out, the “seminal case for the rule prohibiting a direct appeal following a guilty plea is Tumulty v. State, 666 N.E.2d 394 (Ind. 1996).” Monroe, 281 N.E.3d at 549. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty to three crimes and agreed that he was a habitual offender without a plea agreement. Tumulty, 666 N.E.2d at 395. The defendant then appealed, arguing that there was no factual basis for a habitual offender finding. But our Supreme Court affirmed based on the “long-standing prohibition against challenging a guilty plea by direct appeal.” Id. The Court further explained that the appropriate avenue to challenge the conviction was through post-conviction relief. Id. at 396.

[18] Then, in McDonald v. State, a defendant pleaded guilty to multiple counts without the benefit of a plea agreement. 179 N.E.3d 463, 464 (Ind. 2022). The defendant appealed and argued that his convictions constituted double jeopardy. Id. Our Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's convictions. Id. In so holding, the Court relied on Tumulty and again stated that “it is well-established that a defendant who has pleaded guilty may not challenge the validity of his conviction on direct appeal.” Id. (citation modified).

[19] Thus, while Monroe may not have been issued until after Wells filed his brief, the law prohibiting him from challenging his convictions following a guilty plea, even without the benefit of a plea agreement, has been established by Indiana's highest court since 1996. Based on Tumulty, McDonald, and Monroe, we decline to address the merits of Wells’ double jeopardy argument on direct appeal.

Conclusion

[20] Wells’ sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. And a direct appeal is unavailable to Wells on his double jeopardy argument. We therefore affirm the trial court.

[21] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   As do the parties, we base our factual recitation on the probable cause affidavit.

Bailey, Judge.

Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur