Janelle Jean-Claude, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Young Men's Christian Association of Greater Indianapolis, Appellee-Defendant (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] While a Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) facility in Indianapolis was providing daycare for Janelle Jean-Claude, she broke her arm. Through her father and legal guardian, Vanel Jean-Claude, Janelle sued the YMCA of Greater Indianapolis alleging its negligence had caused her injuries. The YMCA filed a motion for summary judgment based on an exculpatory agreement Vanel had allegedly assented to on Janelle's behalf, and the trial court granted the YMCA's motion. Janelle now appeals, arguing factual and legal issues precluded the entry of summary judgment. Because we find that the YMCA failed to show there was no genuine issue of material fact, we reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On June 3, 2025, Janelle, by and through Vanel, filed a complaint against YMCA of Greater Indianapolis. She alleged that on June 17, 2024, she accompanied her mother, a paid YMCA member, to a YMCA facility. According to Janelle, an agreement between her mother and the YMCA required the facility to provide her daycare services while her mother exercised. Janelle alleged that on the 17th, she broke her arm while using the slide equipment in the daycare area because the YMCA negligently failed to supervise her. On August 25, the YMCA filed an answer and asserted various affirmative defenses, including that Janelle's claim was “barred by the legal doctrines of release and/or waiver” and “by written contract.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 13.

[3] On November 3, the YMCA filed a motion for summary judgment and supporting memorandum. In its memorandum, the YMCA argued that an exculpatory contract Vanel had agreed to on behalf of himself and Janelle barred her claim. In support of this theory, the YMCA designated the affidavit of Scott Hite, the Vice President of Finance for the YMCA of Greater Indianapolis. The affidavit read:

1. I am an adult competent to make the representations contained in this Affidavit and have personal knowledge of the facts identified in this Affidavit.

2. I am employed at the YMCA of Greater Indianapolis.

3. On June 3, 2024, Vanel Jean-Claude agreed to all YMCA of Greater Indianapolis agreements as posted at http://agreements.indymca.org.[1]

4. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and accurate copy of Vanel Jean-Claude's assent.

5. On June 3, 2024, one of the agreements posted at http://agreements.indymca.org was a RELEASE, INDEMNIFIC[ ]ATION AND HOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENT.

6. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and accurate copy of the RELEASE, INDEMNIFIC[ ]ATION AND HOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENT applicable on June 3, 2024.

Id. at 23.

[4] Exhibit A (the YMCA of Greater Indianapolis Agreements page) appeared as follows:

Tabular or graphical material not displayable at this time.

Id. at 24.

[5] Exhibit B was a document titled “RELEASE, INDEMNIFICATION AND HOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENT” (the Release). Id. at 25. The Release stated:

In consideration of participating in YMCA of Greater Indianapolis activities and/or programs, and for other good and valuable consideration, I hereby agree to release, indemnify, hold harmless and discharge from liability the [YMCA] and its owners, directors, officers, employees, agents, board members, volunteers, participants, and all other persons or entities acting for them (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Releasees”), on behalf of myself and my children, parents, heirs, assigns, personal representative(s) and estate, from and against any and all liability arising from or in connection with my participation in YMCA activities and/or programs.

Id. Pursuant to the Release, the participant “acknowledge[d] that participating in YMCA activities and programs involves known and unanticipated risks[,]” such as “broken bones, torn ligaments or other injuries or death as a result of falls ․” Id. The Release further provided:

I expressly accept and assume all of the risks inherent in these activities, whether or not those risks may have been caused by the acts, omissions, or negligence of the Releasees․

I hereby voluntarily release, forever discharge, and agree to indemnify and hold harmless Releasees from any and all claims, demands, or causes of action which are in any way connected with my participation in this activity, or my use of their equipment or facilities, arising from negligence․

Id. The end of the Release included a “Parent or Guardian Additional Agreement[,]” which read:

In consideration of the minor in my custody, I am permitting them to participate in this activity/program, I further agree to indemnify and hold harmless Releasees from any claims alleging negligence which are brought by or on behalf of minor or are in any way connected with such participation by minor.

I have read and understand this document and I agree to be bound by its terms on behalf of my minor.

Id. at 26.

[6] On November 25, Janelle filed a brief and designated the affidavit of Vanel in opposition to the YMCA's motion. In relevant part, Vanel attested:

3. I became a member of the YMCA about one year ago. At the time I became a member, I was not presented with any contract to read and sign.

4. When I expressed an interest in becoming a member of YMCA, I was asked to produce my driver's license, evidence of income and pay stubs. I was also asked to state the number of people in my household.

5. The pricing scheme was explained to me. I paid for my membership and began working out at the facility.

6. I have bee [sic] shown a document two documents [sic] described as “YMCA of Greater Indianapolis Agreements” and “Release, Indemnification and Hold Harmless Agreement.” The first document has my name type-written on it. The second document does not have my name. I have never seen any of these documents and surely did not sign any of them. In addition, I do not know and I do not believe that I have ever encountered an individual by name of Scott Hite.

Id. at 38-39.

[7] The trial court held a hearing on the YMCA's summary judgment motion on December 17, and it summarily granted the motion the same day. Janelle now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[8] “We review summary judgment decisions de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court.” Isgrig v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 256 N.E.3d 1238, 1244 (Ind. 2025). Initially, the moving party bears the burden to make “ ‘a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Id. (quoting Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 285 (Ind. 2012)). If it makes that showing, “the burden then shifts to the non-movant to ‘come forward with contrary evidence showing an issue for the trier of fact.’ ” Zaragoza v. Wexford of Ind., LLC, 225 N.E.3d 146, 151 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014)). But “[i]f the movant fails to make [a] prima facie showing, then summary judgment is precluded regardless of whether the non-movant designates facts and evidence in response to the movant's motion.” Monroe Guar. Ins. Co. v. Magwerks Corp., 829 N.E.2d 968, 975 (Ind. 2005). “An issue is ‘genuine’ if a trier of fact is required to resolve the truth of the matter; a fact is ‘material’ if its resolution affects the outcome of the case.” Butler v. Symmergy Clinic, PC, 158 N.E.3d 407, 411 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Henderson v. Kleinman, 103 N.E.3d 683, 686 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)). “In determining whether summary judgment is proper, we consider only the evidentiary material specifically designated by the parties to the trial court and construe all factual and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Isgrig, 256 N.E.3d at 1244.

[9] Furthermore, it is well established in Indiana that “[a] self-serving affidavit is sufficient to preclude summary judgment if it demonstrates there are material facts in dispute[.]” Butler, 158 N.E.3d at 412 (citing AM Gen. LLC v. Armour, 46 N.E.3d 436, 441 (Ind. 2015)). When the evidence designated by the parties requires the trial court to “reconcile the credibility of ․ two accounts[,]” the moving party is not entitled to summary judgment even if the non-moving party seems unlikely to prevail at trial. Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1005. In this regard, “Indiana consciously errs on the side of letting marginal cases proceed to trial on the merits, rather than risk short-circuiting meritorious claims.” Id. at 1004. Simply put, “Indiana law requires a movant to prove their opponent would lose, rather than simply showing their opponent is unlikely to win.” Converse v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., Inc., 120 N.E.3d 621, 625 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[10] Here, the YMCA moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Vanel had assented to an exculpatory agreement which released it from liability for Janelle's injuries. “Generally, parties are permitted to agree that a party owes no obligation of care for the benefit of another, and thus, shall not be liable for consequences that would otherwise be considered negligent.” Wabash Cnty. Young Men's Christian Ass'n v. Thompson, 975 N.E.2d 362, 366 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Marsh v. Dixon, 707 N.E.2d 998, 1000 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied), reh'g denied, trans. denied. Moreover, a parent may execute a preinjury release on behalf of their child. See id. Consequently, if Vanel, on behalf of Janelle, assented to a valid exculpatory agreement releasing the YMCA of liability for its negligent acts, the YMCA might be entitled to summary judgment on Janelle's negligence claims.²

[11] However, the critical issue here is whether Vanel did in fact assent to the contract. And we agree with Janelle that the YMCA did not develop the factual record to the extent necessary to have summary judgment granted in its favor. At the outset, we question whether the YMCA designated sufficient evidence to make a prima facie showing that the Release governed Janelle's injuries. In his affidavit, Hite asserted that Vanel “agreed to all YMCA of Greater Indianapolis agreements as posted at http://agreements.indymca.org[,]” but he failed to give any details about the designated YMCA of Greater Indianapolis Agreements page. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 23. For example, while the YMCA posits on appeal that Vanel clicked an “I agree” checkbox supposedly associated with the page while “enroll[ing] he and his family in a YMCA membership utilizing YMCA's electronic enrollment system[,]” Appellee's Brief at 4, Hite neither detailed the enrollment process, proved the Jean-Claudes had a family membership, nor established that Vanel could not have become a YMCA member without clicking the “I agree” checkbox. See Jallali v. Nat'l Bd. of Osteopathic Med. Exam'rs, Inc., 908 N.E.2d 1168, 1173 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (evaluating a clickwrap agreement and noting unopposed evidence that the appellant could not have taken the examinations at issue without executing the agreement), on reh'g of 902 N.E.2d 902 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied; Satkovich v. Diverse Staffing Servs., Inc., No. 24A-PL-2321, 2025 WL 2886629, at *6-7 (Ind. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2025) (mem.) (finding an employer made a prima facie showing that a former employee affixed his electronic signature to an employment agreement through circumstantial evidence detailing the employee onboarding process).

[12] Likewise, Janelle's complaint alleged that on the day she was injured she attended the YMCA with her mother, a paid member, and that she was injured while receiving daycare services pursuant to an agreement between her mother and the YMCA. Despite having full knowledge of these assertions, the YMCA did not designate any evidence showing the mother and Janelle were part of a family membership Vanel had supposedly obtained, or that Janelle's stay in the daycare area was not governed by a separate agreement between her mother and the YMCA. While the YMCA may have been able to establish such facts had it given more attention to detail, it failed to do so below.

[13] Moreover, even if the YMCA made an initial prima facie showing that Vanel clicked the “I agree” checkbox associated with the YMCA of Greater Indianapolis Agreements page, thereby agreeing that he and Janelle would abide by the terms of “the agreements posted at https://agreements.indymca.org[,]” Vanel's affidavit directly disputes this material fact. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 24. He attested that he “was not presented with any contract to read and sign” during the enrollment process and had “never seen” and “surely did not sign” the YMCA of Greater Indianapolis Agreements page and the Release. Id. at 38-39. And contrary to YMCA's assertions, Vanel's sworn statement was unequivocal; he did not merely assert an inability to “recall seeing or signing” the relevant documents here. Appellee's Br. at 14. While the YMCA also notes that Vanel did not dispute the accuracy of its records or allege “that someone else created the account without his knowledge,” Appellee's Br. at 13, we must construe all reasonable inferences in Janelle's favor. Doing so brings us to the conclusion that Vanel could not have clicked the checkbox if he'd “never seen” or “been presented with any contract ․” Appellant's App. Vol 2 at 38-39.

[14] Because there is a threshold issue of fact as to whether Vanel clicked the “I agree” checkbox associated with the YMCA of Greater Indianapolis Agreements page, YMCA was not entitled to summary judgment notwithstanding the terms of the Release.

Conclusion

[15] For these reasons, we reverse the trial court's entry of summary judgment and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

[16] Reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Based on our review of the underlying cause in our Odyssey case management system, it appears that none of the four identical web addresses listed in Hite's affidavit and Exhibit A were hyperlinked as the evidence was designated to the trial court. The designated evidence also fails to confirm whether the web addresses listed in Exhibit A are hyperlinked and accessible to YMCA participants.

2.   Our analysis does not consider whether, in the absence of a factual dispute, the Release is enforceable. However, because the issue is sure to come up on remand, we briefly note that in addition to the validity of the Release itself, a case-specific and nuanced analysis is required where, as here, a participant executes an electronic clickwrap agreement which purports to secure the participant's assent to any number of unspecified agreements posted at an apparent hyperlink. See Adist Co., v. Gustin, 874 N.E.2d 1018, 1023 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); Jallali v. Nat'l Bd. of Osteopathic Med. Exam'rs, Inc., 908 N.E.2d 1168, 1173-74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), on reh'g of 902 N.E.2d 902 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied; Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029 (7th Cir. 2016); Domer v. Menard, Inc., 116 F.4th 686 (7th Cir. 2024).

DeBoer, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.