Thomas Wilson, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Thomas Wilson appeals from the trial court's determination that he is guilty of speeding, a Class C infraction. Wilson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and claims that the trial court's judgment is erroneously inconsistent because the court dismissed another charged infraction. Concluding that Wilson has failed to demonstrate error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On June 22, 2025, Indiana State Trooper Tyler Trueblood was on patrol in Greene County, driving on Interstate Highway 69. He saw a white sport utility vehicle (“SUV”) driving northbound, above the speed limit. Trooper Trueblood confirmed his visual determination by scanning the SUV with his radar. According to the radar, the SUV was going ninety-four miles per hour in an area with a seventy-mile-per-hour limit.

[3] The trooper stopped the SUV. Wilson was driving, and his wife and sons were passengers. Trooper Trueblood gave Wilson a citation for speeding.¹

[4] Wilson appeared in court to contest the citation, and the trial court presided over a bench trial. The court determined that Wilson had committed Class C infraction speeding and entered judgment against Wilson for $159.50. This appeal followed.

Discussion and Decision

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[5] Wilson argues that the State failed to present sufficient admissible evidence to support the trial court's judgment.² Speeding is a Class C infraction. Indiana Code section 9-21-5-2(b) (2018). Traffic infractions are civil in nature, and “the State bears the burden of proving the commission of the infraction by only a preponderance of the evidence.” Coleman v. State, 49 N.E.3d 1043, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). To obtain a judgment against Wilson for Class C infraction speeding, the State was required to prove that: (1) Wilson (2) exceeded the seventy-mile-per-hour speed limit (3) while driving on an interstate highway. I.C. § 9-21-5-2(a)(3).

[6] When reviewing a challenge to the evidence supporting a traffic infraction, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Lehman v. State, 203 N.E.3d 1097, 1104 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. Rather, we look to the evidence that supports the judgment and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Rosenbaum v. State, 930 N.E.2d 72, 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. “If there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting the trial court's judgment, it will not be overturned.” Id.

[7] At trial, Trooper Trueblood said that he had visually determined that a white SUV was speeding in a seventy-mile-per-hour zone, and he confirmed that determination by radar. The radar revealed the SUV was going ninety-four miles per hour. Trooper Trueblood stopped the SUV. When asked if the driver of the SUV was in the courtroom, Trooper Trueblood stated, “He looks a little different now. I believe he had more gray hair at the time. Um I believe it's him.” Tr. p. 8. This is sufficient evidence to establish that Wilson was driving the SUV and was speeding.

[8] Wilson argues that there is insufficient evidence to show that he was the driver, claiming that the trooper did not remember him. The transcript shows that, in context, Trooper Trueblood told the trial court that he did not remember “exactly what was said” during the stop. Id. at 6. The gaps in the trooper's memory go to the weight to be given to his testimony, not its admissibility.

[9] In addition, Wilson did not dispute at trial that he was the driver. To the contrary, he testified that his son had unbuckled his seatbelt to get Wilson's wife some insulin, and his son had not had a chance to refasten his seatbelt “before I was pulled over.” Id. at 10. In addition, Wilson called his wife to testify and asked if she had “observe[d] [his] speed.” Id. at 12. Finally, Wilson offered a letter from his son, who stated that Wilson “was pulled over” and “was given a speeding ticket.” Tr. Ex. Vol. p. 6. Wilson's argument amounts to a request to reweigh the evidence, which our standard of review forbids.

II. Inconsistent Verdicts

[10] Wilson argues that the Court must reverse the trial court's judgment because the court issued inconsistent verdicts. Specifically, the court determined Wilson had committed the speeding infraction but dismissed the infraction for having an inadequately restrained child.

[11] Jury verdicts in criminal cases are not subject to appellate review on grounds that they are inconsistent, contradictory, or irreconcilable. Myers v. State, 221 N.E.3d 694, 698 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. The right of a criminal jury to exercise lenity and decline to convict is well recognized and an important component of our criminal justice system. Id. (quotations omitted).

[12] In the current case, the judge was the fact-finder, but the reasoning in Myers applies here as well. We will not investigate the fact-finder's reasons for its ultimate decisions. Further, the trial judge merely dismissed the charge of driving with an inadequately restrained child. In the absence of a determination of guilt, the issue of inconsistent verdicts is inapplicable.

Conclusion

[13] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trooper also cited Wilson for having an insufficiently restrained child in the SUV, but the trial court later dismissed that infraction.

2.   The State argues that Wilson has waived all of his claims due to repeated failures to comply with the Appellate Rules in the Appellant's Brief and Appendix. Having reviewed the record, we disagree with the State and address the merits of Wilson's claims.

Robb, Senior Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.