Andrew T. Corn, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] While on probation in two separate cases, Corn was charged with Level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine. The morning of his jury trial, the State indicated it had two exhibits it intended to use at trial that had not been previously disclosed. Corn objected to their admission for being untimely, but the trial court overruled the objection and admitted the exhibits. The State also asked the court to take judicial notice of a certain fact during trial, and the court did so over Corn's objection. Ultimately, the jury found Corn guilty as charged. Based on his commission of this new crime, the court subsequently revoked Corn's probation in each of his two other cases. He now appeals,  ¹ arguing the court abused its discretion by admitting the State's untimely exhibits, taking judicial notice, and revoking the entirety of his probationary sentences. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[2] In April 2025, Corn pled guilty to Level 6 felony theft in Cause No. 02D04-2503-F6-384 and auto theft and resisting law enforcement, both Level 6 felonies, in Cause No. 02D04-2501-F6-146. After a joint sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a one-year suspended sentence to be served on probation in F6-384 and an aggregate two-year sentence suspended to probation in F6-146. Those sentences were to be served consecutively.

[3] On the night of July 21, 2025, Officer Benjamin Williams of the Fort Wayne Police Department was on bicycle patrol in and around Freimann Square in downtown Fort Wayne. In his experience, the area was “a high drug traffic area.” CR-86 Transferred Transcript at 106. During his patrol, the officer saw Corn sitting on a retaining wall next to a fenced-in maintenance building. As Officer Williams rode toward him on his bike, he saw Corn throw something shiny through the fence to his right. The item he threw turned out to be a folded piece of tinfoil. The officer approached and repeatedly told Corn to stand up and to keep his hands out of his pockets—Corn complied with neither request. When he refused to take his hands out of his pockets, Officer Williams placed him in handcuffs.

[4] After searching the area where Corn had been sitting, officers discovered a folded, pink bus ticket with a “white crystal substance inside” that later tested positive for methamphetamine. Id. at 109. Detective Amanda Miller from the Fort Wayne Police Department's Vice and Narcotics Unit arrived on scene a few minutes after Corn was detained. Officer Williams gave Detective Miller the bus ticket with the methamphetamine, and she transported it to the police station and prepared it for testing. After the officers arrested and searched Corn, they found a lighter and additional pink bus tickets in his possession.

[5] On July 22, 2025, the State charged Corn with Level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine.² In the charging information, the State alleged Corn possessed the methamphetamine “in, on, or within five hundred (500) feet of a public park, to wit: Freimann Square[.]” Appellant's CR-86 Transferred Appendix Vol. 2 at 11. It further alleged that he committed this crime while a person under eighteen (18) years of age was reasonably expected to be present,” id. which is an “enhancing circumstance” under Indiana Code section 35-48-1.1-18. The next day, the State filed motions to revoke Corn's probation in both F6-384 and F6-146, alleging he had violated the terms of probation by committing a new criminal offense. On September 11, Corn filed a motion for a speedy trial in the methamphetamine case. The next day, the trial court scheduled Corn's jury trial for November 12.

[6] On the morning of trial, the State informed the defense and the trial court that it had certain evidence it intended to introduce during trial that it had not yet disclosed: a map depicting all the public parks in Fort Wayne, Indiana and certification of records signed by the Deputy Director of Fort Wayne Parks & Recreation (Exhibits 2 and 3). Based on their untimely disclosure, defense counsel asked the court to exclude them from evidence. The court denied the request, and after defense counsel stated he was ready to proceed, the trial began.

[7] First, Officer Williams testified consistently with the facts above. During his testimony, the State offered Exhibits 2 and 3 into evidence, and defense counsel renewed his pre-trial objection. The court overruled the objection and admitted the exhibits into evidence. When Officer Williams testified that Freimann Square is a Fort Wayne city park, defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds. The State then asked the court to take judicial notice of the fact that Freimann Square is a public park, arguing it was in the court's territorial jurisdiction and something within the community's common knowledge. Defense counsel also objected to this request, asserting “[i]t's not commonly known, [as] it's not called a park.” CR-86 Trans. Tr. at 101. The State responded that this information was “readily available on [the] City Parks website” where Freimann Square is “designate[d] ․ as a public park[.]” Id. Defense counsel argued, “There's ․ a lot of information on the internet ․ that doesn't lend itself to judicial notice.” Id. The court overruled defense's objection as to judicial notice, took judicial notice as requested by the State, and instructed the jury that it “may or may not accept the noticed fact as conclusive.” Id. at 102. The court also overruled defense counsel's hearsay objection to the officer's testimony that Freimann Square is a city park.

[8] Detective Miller testified next consistent with the facts above. She described Freimann Square as a “park” that, in her experience, was “a typical location where homeless individuals go to either use, trade, [or] buy drugs[.]” Id. at 127. She also explained that tinfoil is often used as a mechanism by which someone consumes drugs like methamphetamine. Other evidence introduced by the State consisted of: (1) Officer Williams’ and Detective Miller's bodycam footage from the night of Corn's arrest; (2) photographs of the tinfoil and bus tickets collected from the scene; (3) a stipulation to the test results that showed the substance recovered in the folded, pink bus ticket was 0.07 grams of methamphetamine; and (4) a map of downtown Fort Wayne depicting the location of Freimann Square and the Allen County Courthouse. The jury found Corn guilty as charged.

[9] The trial court conducted Corn's sentencing and two probation revocation hearings contemporaneously. On his new conviction, the trial court sentenced Corn to five years executed in the Department of Correction (DOC). Finding the State proved Corn committed a new criminal offense, the court revoked his one-year probationary sentence in F6-384 and his two-year probationary sentence in F6-146, and ordered him to serve both sentences in the DOC. Corn's sentences on the new offense and the two revocations were to be served consecutively to each other.

Discussion & Decision

1. Judicial Notice

[10] Corn argues the trial court erred by taking judicial notice of the fact that Freimann Square was a public park. “[W]e review a trial court's decision to take judicial notice of a matter, like other evidentiary decisions, for abuse of discretion.” Horton v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1157 (Ind. 2016). Under Indiana Evidence Rule 201(a),

[t]he court may judicially notice:

(1) a fact that:

(A) is not subject to reasonable dispute because it is generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction, or

(B) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.

Corn argues the State “failed to prove that the fact that Freimann Square is a park is a fact that is generally known or can be accurately determined from reliable sources.” Appellant's Brief at 11.

[11] Both parties compare this case to Haley v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). There, Haley was charged and convicted of “dealing in methamphetamine within 1,000 feet of school property.” 736 N.E.2d at 1252. The school involved was the Howe Military Institute, and at trial, the court took judicial notice of the fact that Howe was a school in LaGrange County. Id. After doing so, the court admonished the jury that it “was not required to accept that fact as conclusive.” Id. On appeal, Haley argued that taking judicial notice of that fact was a violation of his constitutional right to confront witnesses and “that absent the judicial notice, there was insufficient evidence to prove that Howe [was] a school ․” Id. This Court concluded, in relevant part, that the trial court's judicial notice was proper because it met the requirements of Evidence Rule 201. Id. at 1253. Specifically, the panel reasoned that: (1) “the fact that Howe is a private school is generally known within LaGrange County[;]” (2) the trial court provided the defendant an opportunity to be heard on the issue, see Ind. Evidence Rule 201(e);³ and (3) the trial court admonished the jury that it did not have to accept the fact as conclusive, see Evid. R. 201(f).⁴ Haley, 736 N.E.2d at 1252.

[12] Corn distinguishes Haley from his case based only on the fact that in Haley, the defendant there did not argue “that the requirements of [Rule] 201 were not met” and here, Corn did. Appellant's Br. at 10. While Corn is correct that the defendant did not present that argument on appeal in Haley, the panel nonetheless analyzed whether the Rule 201 requirements were met and concluded that they were. 736 N.E.2d at 1253. Here, Corn simply quotes his and the State's assertions from trial to prove he disputed the issue below. But he develops no argument that the requirements were not satisfied. We agree with the State that they were.

[13] Like Haley, the trial court here found “that it's generally known within [its] territorial jurisdiction that [Freimann Square] is a public park.” CR-86 Trans. Tr. at 101. The evidence admitted by the State, and unchallenged by Corn, shows that Freimann Square and the Allen County Courthouse (where the trial took place) were catty-corner from each other. See Ex. at 5. The trial court is certainly in a better position than this Court to assess what facts are “generally known within [its] jurisdiction,” and Corn offers no evidence to show that Freimann Square's status as a park “is subject to reasonable dispute ․” Evid. R. 201(a)(1)(A). Indeed, the law enforcement officers consistently referred to Freimann Square as a “park” during their testimonies. See CR-86 Trans. Tr. at 127 (Detective Miller: “I have been to that park multiple times on operations where narcotics have been used openly.”). Additionally, Corn was permitted by the trial court to present arguments in opposition to the State's judicial notice motion, and after the court took judicial notice, it admonished the jury appropriately. Id. at 100-01. Given that these requirements were met here, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in taking judicial notice of the fact that Freimann Square is a public park in Fort Wayne.

2. Admission of Evidence

[14] Corn also argues the trial court erred by failing to exclude State's Exhibits 2 and 3 because they were produced the morning of trial. We review a court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. Benjamin v. State, 233 N.E.3d 506, 511 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). We will affirm unless the decision was “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or if the trial court has misinterpreted the law.” State v. Lyons, 211 N.E.3d 500, 505 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Wright v. Miller, 989 N.E.2d 324, 330 (Ind. 2013)). Corn contends Exhibits 2 and 3 should have been excluded because they were not produced in accordance with the applicable discovery deadlines. See Indiana Criminal Rule 2.5(B)(1), (2)(e) (“The [S]tate must disclose and furnish all relevant items and information under section (B)(2) to the defense within thirty days from the date of the initial hearing, [or] an appearance by defense counsel, ․ whichever is later[,]” including “[a]ny ․ documents ․ that the prosecuting attorney intends to use in the hearing or trial.”). The State does not dispute that its late disclosure of these exhibits violated discovery rules.

[15] Nonetheless, we find it unnecessary to decide whether the trial court erred in admitting Exhibits 2 and 3 because any such error was harmless. At trial, in response to the question, “[W]hat is Freimann Square,” Officer Williams testified, “It is a Fort Wayne City Park.” CR-86 Trans. Tr. at 103. The State even clarified, asking, “Okay, and is it fair to say Freimann Square is a public park in Fort Wayne?” Id. The officer testified, “It is.” Id. Corn does not challenge the admission of that testimony on appeal.⁵ Furthermore, as discussed above, it was within the trial court's discretion to take judicial notice of the fact that Freimann Square was a public park in Fort Wayne. As a result, Exhibits 2 and 3 were merely cumulative evidence of other properly admitted evidence and any error in their admission is not grounds for reversal. See Salinas v. State, 257 N.E.3d 17, 27 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (“Erroneously-admitted evidence that is ‘cumulative of other evidence properly before the jury’ constitutes harmless error.” (quoting Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230, 1240 (Ind. 2012), reh'g denied)), trans. denied.

3. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[16] Corn contends that “[b]ecause the trial court erred in admitting the State[’s] ․ Exhibits ․ and in taking judicial notice that Freimann Square is a park, the State ․ failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] possessed methamphetamine in or within 500 feet of a park ․” Appellant's CR-86 Trans. Br. at 11. We interpret Corn's assertion to mean that, without the State's exhibits and the judicial notice, there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. However, because we conclude that the court did not err in taking judicial notice, Corn's argument here fails.

4. Probation Revocations

[17] Lastly, Corn challenges the sanctions imposed by the trial court for his probation violations. Placement on probation is an alternative to incarceration through the DOC. Ewing v. State, 273 N.E.3d 1107, 1111 (Ind. 2026). Defendants are not entitled to such placements; “[e]ach is a ‘matter of grace,’ a ‘conditional liberty that is a favor, not a right.’ ” Id. (quoting Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ind. 1999), reh'g denied).

If the court finds that the person has violated a condition at any time before termination of the probation period, and the petition to revoke is filed within the probationary period, the court may impose one or more sanctions, including ordering execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

Castillo v. State, 67 N.E.3d 661, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h) (2015)) (emphasis added), trans. denied. We review a trial court's probation revocation and sanction for an abuse of discretion. Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013).

[18] “Proof of a single violation is sufficient to permit a trial court to revoke probation.” DePalma v. State, 258 N.E.3d 1081, 1085 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Hammann v. State, 210 N.E.3d 823, 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), reh'g denied, trans. denied). Critically, “the selection of an appropriate sanction will depend upon the severity of the defendant's probation violation, which will require a determination of whether [he] committed a new criminal offense.” Id. (quoting Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 618). Corn does not dispute the trial court's determination that he violated his probation by committing a new criminal offense. Rather, he argues that he “would have benefitted from additional rehabilitative efforts to address his substance abuse issues and to assist him in finding [a] safe, stable, and sober living situation so he can maintain sobriety.” Appellant's Br. at 6.

[19] First, the trial court was well within its statutory authority to revoke the entirety of Corn's suspended probationary sentences in light of its determination that he violated the terms of those sentences by committing a new criminal offense. Second, the court recognized Corn's substance use concerns and specifically recommended that he be allowed to participate in “any kind of rehabilitative treatment” while in the DOC. CR-86 Trans. Tr. at 161. Critically, Corn's purported substance use problem does not negate his significant criminal history and persistent failure to abide by the rules of probation. Since 2018, Corn has failed to satisfactorily complete probation seven different times, and the revocations at issue here make numbers eight and nine. In light of these facts, we cannot say the trial court's revocation of Corn's full terms of probation in these two causes was an abuse of discretion.

Conclusion

[20] Finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the State's exhibits, taking judicial notice, or revoking the entirety of Corn's probationary sentences, we affirm.

[21] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Corn originally appealed his conviction and each of his two probation revocations separately. See 26A-CR-82, 26A-CR-86, and 26A-CR-90. However, his three appeals were consolidated under this cause, 26A-CR-82.

2.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(a), (b)(2) (2014).

3.   Evidence Rule 201(e) provides that “[o]n timely request, a party is entitled to be heard on the propriety of taking judicial notice and the nature of the fact to be noticed.”

4.   Subpart (f) provides that “[i]n a criminal case, the court must instruct the jury that it may or may not accept the noticed fact as conclusive.” Evid. R. 201(f). We note that Haley referenced a prior version of Evidence Rule 201 where substantively similar language was found in subsection (g). See Haley, 736 N.E.2d at 1253 (“[W]hen a court takes judicial notice in a criminal case, ‘the court shall instruct the jury it may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed.’ ” (quoting Ind. Evidence Rule 201(g) (2000))).

5.   At trial, Corn objected to the officer's testimony on hearsay grounds which the trial court overruled. See CR-86 Trans. Tr. at 102-03. However, he does not challenge that ruling on appeal.

DeBoer, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.