Duane James Reeves, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Duane James Reeves (“Reeves”) was convicted after a jury trial of battery resulting in bodily injury ¹ as a Class A misdemeanor and was sentenced to 120 days in the Huntington County Jail. Reeves appeals and raises the following issues for our review:

I. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut his claim of self-defense; and

II. Whether his conviction violates the protections against double jeopardy.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On May 25, 2025, both Reeves and Anthony Peyton (“Peyton”) were living at the Huntington Inn. Peyton had recently adopted a dog and was still working with the dog on leash training. He and Reeves had previous conversations about Peyton keeping the dog on a leash when it was outdoors. In these prior conversations, Peyton had assured Reeves that his dog was not vicious or dangerous.

[4] On that day, Peyton woke up and took his dog out to a grassy area to go to the bathroom. Peyton took his dog off the leash so that the dog would “be comfortable to use the bathroom.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 99. At the same time that Peyton's dog was relieving itself, Reeves approached the door to his apartment with his own dog. Peyton's dog began to run towards Reeves and his dog, and Peyton immediately called his dog back to him. Peyton's dog obeyed, and Peyton put the leash back on the dog. As he put his own dog into his apartment, Reeves stated to Peyton, “if you have your dog off the leash again, I'm gonna (sic) beat your face in.” Id. Peyton responded, “do it.” Id. at 100. He then put his dog back inside his apartment and walked back outside in an attempt to find a compromise to the problem with Reeves. Reeves then walked aggressively over to Peyton and began hitting him in the face and body. Reeves struck Peyton at least ten times.

[5] The police were dispatched to the scene, and when they arrived, Reeves approached them and stated, “take me to jail.” Id. at 115. Reeves stated that he and Peyton had been in a fight but that it had been “mutual” and that Peyton had punched him several times in the ribs. Id. at 116. When the police spoke with Peyton, he told them that he had been “assault[ed]” and showed them where he was struck by Reeves. Id. at 124. The officer saw red marks on Peyton's torso and shoulder area.

[6] On May 27, 2025, the State charged Reeves with Class A misdemeanor battery and Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct. The State later amended the charging information and added a count of Class B misdemeanor battery. On October 30, 2025, a jury trial was held.

[7] At trial, Peyton testified to what occurred and stated that his dog never acted in a threatening way to Reeves and never reached Reeves or his dog before Peyton was able to get him back on his leash. Peyton testified that he never hit Reeves and never put his hands up in an aggressive manner. He further stated that he did not participate in the fight at all and that he experienced pain from Reeves hitting him. A video of the incident that was taken from a surveillance camera was played at trial. After the video was shown at trial, Peyton reiterated that it depicted that he did not “throw a punch[,]” “[t]hreaten to throw a punch[,]” or raise his hands “as if to throw a punch[.]” Id. at 105.

[8] Reeves testified on his own behalf at trial and stated that, as he approached his apartment on May 25, 2025, Peyton's dog aggressively ran toward him at full speed. He testified that he believed that Peyton had “sicked his dog” at Reeves and he acted in self-defense. Id. at 139. He claimed that he “was attacked” and had to “defend” himself. Id. at 139–40. He acknowledged that Peyton immediately called for his dog to come back and that the dog never “got anywhere near” Reeves and his dog. Id. at 139.

[9] The jury found Reeves guilty of all three counts. On March 2, 2026, a sentencing hearing was held. The trial court entered judgment of conviction on Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury only and sentenced Reeves to 120 days executed. Reeves now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Self-Defense

[10] Reeves argues that the State's evidence failed to rebut his assertion that he acted in self-defense. The standard for reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to rebut a claim of self-defense is the same standard used for any claim of insufficient evidence. Quinn v. State, 126 N.E.3d 924, 927 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. We will reverse a conviction only if no reasonable person could say that the State negated the defendant's self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[11] A valid claim of defense of oneself or another person is legal justification for an otherwise criminal act. I.C. § 35-41-3-2(a); Quinn, 126 N.E.3d at 927. “A person is justified in using reasonable force against another person to protect the person ․ from what [he] reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.” I.C. § 35-41-3-2(c). To prevail on a claim of self-defense, the defendant must show that he: (1) was in a place where he had a right to be; (2) did not provoke, instigate, or participate willingly in the violence; and (3) had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm. Quinn, 126 N.E.3d at 927. Once a defendant raises a claim of self-defense, the State has the burden of negating at least one of the necessary elements. Id. (citing Kimbrough v. State, 911 N.E.2d 621, 635 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) and Miller v. State, 720 N.E.2d 696, 700 (Ind. 1999)). The State may meet its burden by rebutting the defense directly, by affirmatively showing the defendant did not act in self-defense, or by relying on the sufficiency of the case-in chief. Id. Whether the State has met its burden is a question for the trier of fact. Id.

[12] Reeves argues that he was legally justified in battering Peyton, and the State failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut his claim of self-defense. He specifically contends that he was in the common area of the Huntington Inn, which was a place that he had a right to be. He asserts that he did not provoke, instigate, or willingly participate in the violence because he reasonable believed that Peyton had made his dog attack Reeves, and due to Peyton's actions, Reeves needed to defend himself. Reeves further maintains that he had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm because Peyton's dog caused such harm when he was released to attack Reeves.

[13] The evidence presented at trial belied Reeves's claim of self-defense. The evidence presented by the State established that, after Peyton had called his dog back to him and as he was placing the dog back on the leash, Reeves stated to Peyton, “if you have your dog off the leash again, I'm gonna (sic) beat your face in.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 99. Peyton then placed his dog back into his apartment. When Peyton came back outside, Reeves aggressively approached him and began hitting him in the head and body. In total, Reeves hit Peyton at least ten times and caused pain and red marks. Peyton testified that he never struck, kicked, or punched Reeves, nor did he ever put his hands up in an aggressive manner. This testimony was corroborated by the surveillance video, which depicted Reeves as the aggressor. Although Reeves argues that Peyton was the initial aggressor because he released his dog to attack Reeves, the evidence did not support this assertion. Instead, although Peyton's dog did run toward Reeves and his dog initially, Peyton immediately called the dog back and the dog returned to Peyton, who then put the dog back into his apartment. Only once Peyton's dog was back in Peyton's apartment, did Reeves aggressively approach Peyton and start hitting him. Based on the evidence presented, the jury could reasonably conclude that Reeves was the initial aggressor and that he provoked, instigated, or participated willingly in the violence. See Quinn, 126 N.E.3d at 927. Therefore, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut Reeve's claim of self-defense.

II. Double Jeopardy

[14] Reeves argues that his convictions for all three charged offenses violated double jeopardy principles because they all involve the same act of fighting that occurred between the same two parties, at the same location, and at the same time. Although Reeves refers to his convictions for Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury, Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct, and Class B misdemeanor battery, the record reflects that he was only convicted of Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury. At the conclusion of his jury trial, the jury did find him guilty of all three of the offenses for which he was charged, but during sentencing, the trial court only entered judgment of conviction on one count, Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 184. The trial court clearly stated that it was only entering judgment on that count and not the other counts. Further, in its written sentencing order, the trial court stated that it was only entering a sentence for the count of Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 5.

[15] Therefore, Reeves was only convicted of one of the counts for which he was charged. “[A] defendant's constitutional rights are violated when a court enters judgment twice for the same offense, but not when a defendant is simply found guilty of a particular count.” Green v. State, 856 N.E.2d 703, 704 (Ind. 2006). If a trial court does not formally enter a judgment of conviction on a guilty verdict, then there is no requirement that the trial court vacate the jury's finding of guilt or take any further step with respect to the count. See, e.g., Kovats v. State, 982 N.E.2d 409, 414–15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Our Supreme Court has held that “a merged offense for which a defendant is found guilty, but on which there is neither a judgment nor a sentence, is ‘unproblematic’ as far as double jeopardy is concerned.” Green, 856 N.E.2d at 704 (emphasis added). Here, where the trial court only entered judgment of conviction on one of the counts for which the jury found Reeves guilty, there is no double jeopardy violation.

Conclusion

[16] We, therefore, conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut Reeves's self-defense claim. Further, his sole conviction for Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury did not constitute a double jeopardy violation.

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c)(1), (d)(1).

Foley, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Altice, J., concur.