Bryan E. Harris, Appellant/Defendant v. Dustin Simpson, Appellee/Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In June of 2025,¹ a branch from a tree located on land owned by Bryan Harris in Anderson fell on a truck owned by Dustin Simpson, damaging it. Simpson filed a small-claims action against Harris. On the day of trial (which had already been reset once), Harris was unprepared to present his case and requested a continuance, which request the small-claims court denied. The small-claims court entered judgment in favor of Simpson and denied Harris's motion for relief from judgment. Harris contends that the small-claims court abused its discretion in denying his motion for relief from judgment. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On June 18, 2025, a branch from a tree located on land owned by Harris fell onto Simpson's truck, causing approximately $1700.00 in damage. On August 12, 2025, Simpton initiated a small-claims action against Harris. Trial was originally set for October 7, 2025, but, on that date, the small-claims court reset trial for December 7, 2025, and ordered the parties to “exchange all potential exhibits[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 12. On December 2, 2025, the small-claims court held a trial, at which Harris and Simpson appeared, and Simpson presented evidence that a branch had fallen from Harris's property onto his truck, damaging it.²

[3] When the small-claims court asked Harris if he had any evidence to present, he responded, “at this time, no” and that “the reason that we wanted to come here was just to see if this was going to continue based on the circumstantial evidence that he has provided, and if so, then we wanted to ask for a continuance to work on getting well, no, this is the trial date.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 37. The small-claims court told Harris that “if you have evidence to present, it needs to be now[,]” and Harris responded that “I have witnesses and people that live there.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 37. When Harris said that he “wasn't aware that this was going to be the, yeah, this is the trial date[,]” the small-claims court replied, “[t]hat's what was said at the time. That's what it said on the entry order from the last hearing that this was [the] trial date. That's why the two of you were required to exchange any possible exhibits before today so that we were all ready to go.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 38. The small-claims court entered judgment in favor of Simpson in the amount of $1714.33, plus court costs.

[4] On January 20, 2026, Harris moved for relief from judgment, which motion the small-claims court denied the next day. The small-claims court found that Harris had “[i]n no manner [․] established surprise or excusable neglect” and that “[t]he only mistake was that [Harris] did not take this matter with the degree of seriousness required.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 9.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Harris contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for relief for judgment. As an initial matter, we note that Simpson has not filed an appellee's brief in this appeal. Under such circumstances, we will not develop an argument for the appellee but instead will reverse the trial court's judgment if the appellant's brief presents a case of prima facie error. Salyer v. Wash. Regular Baptist Church Cemetery, 141 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2020). “Prima facie error in this context means ‘at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.’ ” Id. (citation omitted).

[6] That said, Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) provides, in relevant part, as follows: “On motion and upon such terms as are just the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a judgment, including a judgment by default, for [․] mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect[.]” “We review the denial of a motion for relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion.” Cnty. Materials Corp. v. Ind. Precast, Inc., 187 N.E.3d 253, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. “An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court's judgment is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and inferences supporting the judgment for relief[,]” Sanders Kennels, Inc. v. Lane, 153 N.E.3d 262, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), and “[w]e may neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.” Cnty. Materials, 187 N.E.3d at 265.

[7] Harris argues that the small-claims court abused its discretion in failing to find that his failure to come to trial prepared to present his case was the result of mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect. Harris does not actually argue that he was somehow surprised or misled about December 2, 2025, being that actual trial date; he instead focuses on the nature of the evidence he would have presented and that he was denied a continuance to allow him to do that. Put another way, Harris's argument is essentially one of excusable neglect.

[8] However characterized, Harris's argument ignores that fact that he had been served with a small-claims informational sheet along with Simpson's complaint, in which he was instructed to “[b]ring all documents you have which concern this claim to the hearing” and “[i]f your claim proceeds to trial, you will be required to appear with your witnesses and documents to prove your side of the case.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 11. Harris's argument also fails to acknowledge that the December trial date was already the second trial date, having been reset from a day in October. On that earlier date, the small-claims court had issued a hearing order in which it had clearly informed the parties that the new trial date was December 2, 2025, and that they were to exchange all potential exhibits. To the extent that Harris neglected to come to trial prepared to present his case, there is ample evidence to support a finding that it was not excusable neglect. Harris's argument amounts to nothing more than a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Cnty. Materials, 187 N.E.3d at 265. Harris has failed to establish that the small-claims court abused its discretion in denying his motion for relief from judgment.

[9] We affirm the judgment of the small-claims court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record does not clearly indicate that the branch fell in 2025. At trial, which took place on December 2, 2025, Simpson testified that the branch had fallen “[o]n June 18th[,]” so we will assume that he was referring to the most recent occurrence of that month. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 24.

2.   The official Transcript as submitted is apparently incomplete, seemingly cutting off abruptly before Simpson had even completed presenting his case. Harris has submitted a purported complete trial transcript in his Appendix, which we shall treat as accurate.

Bradford, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.