Armond B. Carroll, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Armond Carroll was convicted of possession of methamphetamine ¹ and possession of paraphernalia,² and he admitted that those new offenses violated the terms of probation he was serving in three earlier misdemeanor causes. For the new possession convictions, the trial court imposed an aggregate two-year sentence, with one year executed and one year suspended, and for the probation violations, the court ordered Carroll to serve portions of the sentences that had been suspended in the misdemeanor causes. Carroll contends his new sentence for the possession convictions is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and his character, and he also alleges the trial court erroneously revoked his probation without determining revocation was warranted. Because his new sentence is not inappropriate and the trial court did not err when revoking his probation, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On March 13, 2025, Carroll pled guilty in three misdemeanor causes: 66D01-2409-CM-239 (“CM-239”), 66D01-2410-CM-267 (“CM-267”), and 66D01-2411-CM-283 (“CM-283”). In CM-239, the trial court imposed a 180-day sentence for Class B misdemeanor harassment, with 8 days served and 172 days suspended to probation; in CM-267, the trial court imposed a 180-day suspended sentence for Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy; and in CM-283, the trial court imposed a 365-day sentence suspended to probation for Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. The court ordered the three sentences served consecutively. Among the conditions of his probation, Carroll was required “to comply with all standard terms and conditions of probation, including good and lawful behavior without arrest,” to refrain from the unlawful use or possession of controlled substances, to submit to drug screens, and to complete mental health counseling or anger management treatment. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 16.)

[3] On June 8, 2025, while Carroll remained on probation, Deputy Cody Foust of the Pulaski County Sheriff's Office was dispatched for a battery at the residence where Carroll lived with his family. At the residence, Deputy Foust advised Carroll of his rights, and then Carroll led Deputy Foust to a bedroom on the south end of the home where Carroll kept methamphetamine, two glass pipes for smoking methamphetamine, and a rolled dollar bill for snorting methamphetamine. Carroll identified the drugs as methamphetamine, and Deputy Foust seized the drugs, pipes, and dollar bill.

[4] The State charged Carroll with Level 6 felony strangulation,³ Level 6 felony domestic battery committed in the presence of a child,⁴ Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. At the ensuing jury trial, the court granted Carroll's motion for a directed verdict on the strangulation charge and dismissed it. The jury found Carroll not guilty of domestic battery and guilty of possession of methamphetamine and possession of paraphernalia.

[5] The State petitioned to revoke Carroll's probation in each of the three misdemeanor causes because he possessed methamphetamine while on probation. At a hearing on August 21, 2025, Carroll admitted the violations in all three causes, and the court found a factual basis for the admissions. The court then proceeded to sentence Carroll for the new convictions and determine his sanctions for the probation violations.

[6] For Carroll's new sentence in F6-60, the court identified as aggravating circumstances Carroll's criminal history and the fact that he was on probation when he committed the new offenses, and the court found no mitigating circumstances. The court imposed a sentence of 730 days for felony possession of methamphetamine, with 365 days executed in the county jail and 365 days suspended to probation. For the possession of paraphernalia conviction, the court imposed 60 days and ordered it served concurrent to the methamphetamine sentence.

[7] In the probation revocation for the misdemeanor causes, the court terminated Carroll's probation in all three cases. The court ordered Carroll to serve 60 days in CM-239, 60 days in CM-267, and 180 days in CM-283. The court ordered the three misdemeanor sentences served consecutive to one another and to the sentence imposed for the new possession convictions.

Discussion and Decision

1. Appropriateness of Carroll's Sentence

[8] Our authority to review and revise a sentence is implemented through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), under which we may revise a sentence authorized by statute only if we find it “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 7. Because sentencing is a function of the trial court, its judgment “should receive ‘considerable deference.’ ” Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1267 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008)). This deference can only be “ ‘overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense’ and ‘the defendant's character.’ ” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Oberhansley, 208 N.E.3d at 1267). Appellate review of a sentence is “to leaven the outliers, ․ but not to achieve the perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.” Nicholson v. State, 221 N.E.3d 680, 684 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225), trans. denied. The burden of proving a sentence is inappropriate falls to the defendant. Littlefield v. State, 215 N.E.3d 1081, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. In assessing the sentence, we “may consider all aspects of the penal consequences imposed” by the trial court, including that a portion of the sentence was suspended. Davidson v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ind. 2010).

[9] In evaluating the nature of the offense, we begin with the advisory sentence the legislature has fixed for the crime. Hamilton v. State, 233 N.E.3d 461, 485 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied. In F6-60, Carroll was convicted of Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. A Level 6 felony is punishable by a term of six months to two and one-half years, with an advisory sentence of one year, Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7 (2019), and a Class C misdemeanor is punishable by a “term of not more than sixty (60) days[.]” Ind. Code § 35-50-3-4. The trial court imposed an aggregate two-year sentence, with one of those years suspended to probation. Thus, the executed portion of Carroll's sentence – one year – is the advisory term. Carroll kept methamphetamine and the implements used to consume it in the home he shared with his children, and he did so while serving probation in three separate causes. That Carroll directed the officer to the contraband does not persuade us that a two-year sentence, with an executed term equal to the advisory sentence for the possession of methamphetamine, is too severe for these offenses.

[10] Nor does Carroll's character render his sentence inappropriate. One relevant consideration for character is a defendant's criminal history. Denham v. State, 142 N.E.3d 514, 517 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. When Carroll committed the new possession offenses, he had four prior misdemeanor convictions, was serving probation in three of those causes, and had been placed on probation only three months earlier. The presentence investigation report reflected Carroll's long history of substance use and only brief periods of sobriety. The trial court recognized Carroll's acceptance of responsibility, and it gave that recognition effect by suspending half of the term, declining to find him unlikely to respond to probation, and ordering treatment. Nevertheless, the fact that his family needed to obtain a protective order against him does not suggest he has such an exemplary character that a two-year sentence would be inappropriate. On this record, we cannot say that Carroll's sentence is inappropriate for his offense or his character.

2. Revocation of Probation

[11] “Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). Trial courts determine both the conditions of probation and whether to revoke if those conditions are violated. Id. When the State files a petition to revoke probation, the trial court must undertake a two-step process: determining first whether the probationer violated a condition or conditions of probation and second what sanction to impose for the violation. Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013). A probation revocation determination, including the sanction imposed, is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's “decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances, or when the trial court misinterprets the law[.]” Id. (internal citation omitted).

[12] To the extent Carroll challenges the procedure the trial court followed as a denial of due process, our review is de novo. Scott v. State, 258 N.E.3d 298, 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). A probationer is entitled to the following due process rights:

(a) written notice of the claimed violations of probation; (b) disclosure to the probationer of the evidence against him or her; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a neutral and detached hearing body; and (f) a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking probation.

Puckett v. State, 956 N.E.2d 1182, 1186 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Indiana “codified the[se] due process requirements ․ in Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3.” Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008). However, if “a probationer admits to the violations, the procedural safeguards [in that statute] and the evidentiary hearing are unnecessary. Instead, the court can proceed to the second step of the inquiry and determine whether the violation warrants revocation.” Id. Even then, a probationer who admits a violation “must still be given an opportunity to offer mitigating evidence suggesting that the violation does not warrant revocation.” Id. Upon finding a violation, the court may continue the person on probation, with or without modified conditions, extend the probationary period, or order execution of all or part of the suspended sentence. Ind. Code Ann. § 35-38-2-3.

[13] Carroll admitted that he violated the conditions of his probation in each of the three causes by possessing methamphetamine while on probation. Those admissions satisfied the first step and dispensed with the need for an evidentiary hearing. See Woods, 892 N.E.2d at 640 (“When a probationer admits to the violations, the procedural safeguards ․ and the evidentiary hearing are unnecessary.”). Carroll contends that the court then moved directly to revocation without determining that his violations warranted that sanction. We do not believe the record supports his characterization.

[14] After accepting Carroll's admissions, the court indeed said, “I'll grant the State's petitions to revoke probation.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 8.) The trial court then asked how the parties wanted to proceed to sentencing and determination of sanction for the probation violations. Carroll indicated he wished the sentence for F6-60 and the sanctions for the violations to be considered “Globally[.]” (Id.) The court then proceeded to a combined disposition hearing at which the court received two letters offered on Carroll's behalf, heard his counsel argue that he should remain on probation and receive treatment, and invited and considered Carroll's own statement asking to serve his time on probation. (Id. at 9-18.) Carroll therefore received the opportunity to present mitigating evidence that due process requires, and he identifies no mitigating evidence he was prevented from offering. The court engaged with the evidence presented: it declined to find that Carroll was unlikely to respond to probation, acknowledged his acceptance of responsibility, and ordered treatment directed at the substance use underlying his conduct. Having weighed those matters, the court ordered execution of portions of the suspended sentences. We find no denial of due process.

[15] Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering Carroll to serve part of his suspended sentences. The selection of a sanction among the statutory options in Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3 rests within the court's discretion. Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 616. Carroll's criminal history and his violation of probation so soon after it was extended support the court's choice. See Slater v. State, 223 N.E.3d 298 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (sanction for probation violation supported by criminal history and past probation violations), trans. denied.

Conclusion

[16] Carroll's sentence for possession of methamphetamine and paraphernalia is not inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and his character. The trial court afforded Carroll the process he was due before revoking his probation, and it acted within its discretion when ordering him to serve portions of his previously suspended sentences. We accordingly affirm the trial court.

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(a).

2.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-8.3(b)(1).

3.   Ind. Code § 35-42-2-9(c).

4.   Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1).

May, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Scheele, J., concur.