IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of T.H. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] T.H. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to J.H. (“Child”). Mother raises the following restated issues for our review:

I. Whether there was sufficient evidence supporting certain findings; and

II. Whether the trial court's judgment that Mother's parental rights should be terminated was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

[2] Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Mother and T.M.¹ are the biological parents of Child, born on January 9, 2019. At a young age, Mother was removed from the care of her biological parents, and their parental rights were later terminated; Mother was adopted at the age of five years old. Mother exhibited symptoms of mental illness at a young age and was diagnosed with bipolar disorder, which she thought was a false diagnosis. After being diagnosed, she was treated with medications. She moved out of her adoptive parents’ home when she was twenty years old and began refusing to take her medication. Mother then lived with a couple of boyfriends, and at one point, she lived in a shelter. After one breakup, she moved in with a friend and had “a one-night stand” from which Child was conceived. Ex. Vol. IV p. 6. When Child was born, Mother got “kicked out” of her friend's home and then spent several years living with different friends, boyfriends, and in shelters. Id. In at least one of these situations, Child, who was two years old at the time, was exposed to domestic violence.

[4] On August 11, 2021, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report that Mother was suffering a mental health crisis and was having thoughts of harming Child. Mother reported having thoughts of suffocating Child because she could not handle his behaviors. DCS removed Child from Mother's care on the same day due to this report and because Mother stated she needed to go to the hospital due to her mental health crisis. At that time, Mother was living in a homeless shelter.

[5] The next day, on August 12, 2021, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was a child in need of services (“CHINS”), and on August 13, 2021, a detention hearing was held that Mother was not able to attend because she was in inpatient mental health treatment. After the hearing, the trial court found that removal of Child was in Child's best interest because of Mother's inability, refusal, or neglect to provide shelter, care, or supervision at that time and that reasonable efforts to prevent removal were not necessary due to Mother's mental health crisis and the need to protect Child. Child was placed in relative care at that time.

[6] On September 13, 2021, Mother entered an admission to the CHINS petition, and Child was adjudicated to be a CHINS. On November 17, 2021, a dispositional hearing was held, and the trial court ordered Mother to, among other things, contact the DCS family case manager (“FCM”) weekly; enroll in recommended programs in a reasonable time; keep all appointments with service providers, DCS, and the court appointed special advocate (“CASA”); maintain suitable, safe and stable housing; secure and maintain a legal and stable source of income; complete a parenting assessment and all recommendations; complete a psychological evaluation and any recommendations; and attend all scheduled visitations with Child.

[7] In the beginning of the case, Mother complied with the case plan and was actively engaging in her mental health treatment and was making progress in enhancing her ability to parent Child but still struggled with obtaining stable housing and employment. By May 2022, Mother was still complying with the case plan, and her visits had progressed to pop-in visits and would have moved to unsupervised visits if she had transportation. In July 2022, Mother had made significant progress with the case plan and had exercised some overnight visits with Child and had housing and employment. Her challenge at that time was finding childcare for Child while she worked. In October 2022, the trial court found that reunification was the most appropriate permanency plan but recognized that Mother still did not have childcare and gave her thirty days to confirm a childcare plan.

[8] Mother began a trial home visit (“the THV”) with Child on December 22, 2022, that lasted until February 9, 2023. Child turned four during the THV, which ended due to Child “having extreme and dangerous behaviors with Mother” that she could not manage. Supp. Tr. Vol. I p. 37. On one occasion, Child took off his seatbelt and tried to grab the steering wheel to wreck the car; he would also throw things from the backseat at Mother while she was driving. On another occasion, Child threw Mother's glasses into the back of the vehicle, and when she tried to calm him, he kicked her in the head and laughed. Due to these behaviors, Mother had to take Child to the emergency room on multiple occasions. During one of these trips to the hospital, Mother made the decision to contact DCS to remove Child from the THV. On February 13, 2023, a detention hearing was held where the trial court found it was in the best interest of Child to be removed from the THV because of safety concerns and Mother's inability to control Child's behaviors.

[9] At the June 2023 permanency hearing, the trial court found that Mother had partially complied with the case plan but had not yet shown she had completed the ordered psychological evaluation. Mother was not employed and was homeless at that time. Mother remained partially compliant as of the September 2023 hearing, where evidence was presented that Mother had housing but was still unemployed and did not have a valid driver's license. She had started individual therapy but had still not completed a psychological evaluation. At a hearing held in November 2023, the permanency plan was changed to adoption and reunification due to Child being removed for over two years at that point and Mother being unable to obtain stable housing and employment, failing to progress past supervised visitation, and not being able to apply the parenting skills she had learned throughout the case.

[10] Throughout the review hearings in 2024, DCS expressed concerns regarding Mother's failure to enhance her ability to fulfill her parental obligations and failure to apply the parenting skills that she learned through the services provided by DCS. During this time period, the cause for Child's out-of-home placement had not been alleviated, and Mother still had not completed her court-ordered services to address the underlying CHINS conditions. After the THV ended, Mother engaged in supervised visitation with Child. However, after July 4, 2024, Mother no longer had any visits with Child because Child refused to engage in visitation and demonstrated an extreme trauma response. The trial court suspended all visitation at a review hearing on July 31, 2024.

[11] On August 30, 2024, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights to Child. The trial court held the termination fact-finding hearing on November 20, 2024, and February 12, March 19, April 2, April 4, and June 25, 2025. At the time of the hearing, Child had remained out of Mother's care since August 11, 2021, except for the THV that occurred between December 22, 2022, and February 9, 2023.

[12] At the termination hearing, Rose Buckley (“Buckley”), who performed Mother's psychological evaluation, testified that the evaluation occurred over a few days in October and November 2023. Mother reported to Buckley that she struggled to manage Child's behaviors, which she described as out of control. Buckley performed diagnostic tests and reported that Mother scored in the borderline low range on the cognitive assessment and that, based on this, Mother would struggle with problem solving, decision making, and reasoning. Buckley diagnosed Mother with borderline intellectual functioning, unspecified personality disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). As a result of these diagnoses, she recommended that Mother continue in therapy and parenting education to enhance her skills. Buckley stated that, in her opinion, Mother did not have the cognitive capacity to parent Child alone for extended periods of time without some sort of social support. Buckley testified that for Mother to be able to parent Child safely she needed to comply with the recommendations from service providers to build her own parenting skills and social network, build healthy relationships, and work through her trauma and understand how it impacted her parenting. She further stated that Mother could not just pick the recommendations that she wanted to comply with and, instead, needed to comply with and actively engage in all the recommendations.

[13] Keelie Howard (“Howard”), who was Mother's therapist, testified that Mother began therapy with her in August 2023 and continued until May 2024. However, within that period, there were lapses where Mother did not consistently attend therapy. After Mother completed the psychological evaluation, Howard reviewed the results with Mother, and Mother resisted those attempts and believed that the results were incorrect. In January 2024, Mother had sought independent counseling through Rugged Grace and started therapy there. However, Howard was never able to make contact with anyone from Rugged Grace to ensure continuity of care. Howard learned at a February 2024 meeting that Rugged Grace was not willing to participate in the CHINS case, so Mother continued therapy with Howard and Rugged Grace. While Mother reported to Howard that she experienced decreased anxiety and panic attacks, Mother did not make any progress on “accountability, awareness, or adaptability.” Tr. Vol. II p. 76. Mother also failed to make progress with her emotional regulation and would become “very dysregulated” and fixated on thoughts that people were “out to get her.” Id. at 77.

[14] In April 2024, Mother had a very positive and productive session with Howard where she was engaged and showed an ability to implement strategies learned in therapy, but soon thereafter, the rapport between Mother and Howard broke down with Mother telling Howard that she did not think she could trust Howard because of Howard being a DCS provider. Because of this, Howard discontinued being Mother's therapist in May 2024 and had transition sessions to assist Mother with continuity of care. Overall, Howard testified that Mother showed a lack of progress during therapy because, although Mother attended sessions, she did not demonstrate the ability to execute the skills learned. Specifically, Howard stated that Child was triggered by electronics during visits and despite discussing parenting strategies regarding Child's triggers, Mother's solution for de-escalating Child's behaviors was to give him her phone.

[15] Mother's therapist from Rugged Grace, Katelin Patterson (“Patterson”), testified that Mother began working with her in May 2024 and that they had weekly, virtual sessions focusing on Mother's PTSD and trauma and trying to reduce Mother's panic attacks and provide coping skills. Through their sessions, Mother demonstrated progress in accountability and responsibility for her actions but not with her resentment toward DCS because of the CHINS case. Patterson reported that Mother had shown improvement in her focus and was able to stay “on topic a little bit better.” Id. at 126. As for Mother's panic attacks, she had many triggers, and Patterson testified that, after a year of therapy with her, Mother was able to “work things through a little bit better,” but Patterson expected to see more progress. Id. at 127. During Mother's therapy with Patterson, they did not discuss Mother's visits with Child, and Patterson never observed Mother parent Child.

[16] Joshua Myers (“Myers”) was Child's home-based case worker and therapist. He testified that, when he first started meeting with Child in September 2023, there were instances of “pretty severe behavioral issues at school” and Child was “unpredictable.” Id. at 143. Myers noticed these situations improved steadily but when visits with Mother were re-initiated, Myers found that Child's behaviors worsened. After visits with Mother were suspended, Child's behavioral outbursts improved with Child only having a couple of outbursts in eight months. Myers attributed this to Child having a consistent caregiver and consistent environment.

[17] FCM Brock Cummings (“FCM Cummings”) managed the case from May 2024 to mid-February 2025. After Mother's visits were suspended, he did not recommend resuming visits with Child due to concerns for Child's well-being. FCM Cummings testified that, after he began working on Mother's case, “a whole new team” of service providers began, but that team ended up closing out Mother's services due to her lack of progress and lack of participation. Tr. Vol. III p. 26. He also stated that Mother did not focus on positive future goals and making progress in her parenting skills but instead focused on past issues. FCM Cummings also had safety concerns for Child if he was returned to Mother's care because Mother had not shown that she could take care of her own needs and Child's needs.

[18] FCM Caitlyn Sherrill (“FCM Sherrill”) worked with Mother for the first four months of the case and was FCM Cummings's supervisor. She testified that although Mother complied with the dispositional order by attending services, she did not make any progress in the goals. FCM Sherrill reiterated that Mother had not had visitation with Child since July 2024 and that DCS had not recommended reinstating visits because Child's therapist determined it would not be in Child's best interest. She also stated that DCS had requested that visits be suspended because DCS “wanted to be able to therapeutically address [Child's] mental health [and] get him into a place where we could resume visitation” and not to harm the relationship between Child and Mother. Supp. Tr. Vol. I p. 20.

[19] Mother received home-based case services starting in December 2024 from Michele Morse-Lawson (“Morse-Lawson”), and she testified that Mother completed the 1-2-3 Magic parenting curriculum and a six-hour parenting skills course, which Mother found independently. Morse-Lawson worked with Mother on obtaining stable housing, and at the time of the April 24, 2025 hearing, Mother was renting a trailer that Morse-Lawson believed to be adequate for Child. Morse-Lawson also testified that, as of the April 24 hearing date, Mother was employed full-time. She stated that she had no concerns with Mother interacting with Child but had never observed Mother with Child.

[20] Mother testified that she believed that she had fully complied with the dispositional order and completed everything that the trial court had ordered her to do. She did admit that she had not yet completed her home-based case work. Mother also stated that she stopped contacting DCS about one month before the April 24, 2025 hearing date.

[21] C.E. and his wife were Child's placement and had known Child since he was nine months old. They began acting as Child's placement in June 2022 and took care of him until the THV in December 2022. They then took him back into their home in February 2023 when the THV ended, and Child had remained in their care since then. C.E. testified that, when Child had visitation with Mother, he would have violent outbursts that included kicking, screaming, and throwing things. However, since visitation had been suspended, Child had only had two outbursts, which were shorter in duration than the previous outbursts had been. Child acted like a typical child of his age and would get upset when he did not get his way but was not as violent as he had been before. C.E. stated that he and his wife went through training to assist with attachment issues and how to deal with Child's behaviors. He testified that he and his wife were willing to adopt Child.

[22] CASA Stephanie Gardner (“CASA Gardner”) had been involved in the case since December 2022. She testified that Mother struggled throughout the case to maintain appropriate boundaries and the ability to sustain “the things that are necessary to provide[ ] for a child.” Supp. Tr. Vol. I p. 23. Historically, Mother would “do well with one thing for a while” but struggle in other areas. Id. CASA Gardner also reported that Mother lacked consistency in her life, which was detrimental to Child's well-being. Mother also had trouble sustaining connections with people in that she would quickly make a connection, but the relationship would end if anything negative occurred. As an example, CASA Gardner stated that when she disagreed with something Mother had wanted, Mother made accusations against CASA Gardner. She said it also happened with other service providers. This quick bonding and then quick severing of relationships and multiple people coming in and out of her life was not helpful to Child's development, especially with his history of trauma.

[23] Both FCM Sherrill and CASA Gardner opined that termination was in the best interests of Child. FCM Sherrill testified this was because Child was the most stable he had ever been and Mother had not made progress in the goals necessary to manage Child's behaviors. FCM Sherrill believed that, if Child was returned to Mother, “a situation exactly like what led to [the] initial involvement where Mother [had] thoughts ․ of harming the child” would occur. Id. at 14. CASA Gardner testified that, although she first felt that Mother was set up to fail because she was not provided helpful services, by the time of the hearing, CASA Gardner thought that Mother had been provided “every service possible for long periods of time with multiple providers.” Id. at 26. CASA Gardner stated that she had witnessed Mother be taught skills by providers and then not implement the skills and that this behavior occurred “over and over again.” Id. She also stated Mother had not shown sufficient stability to provide for all aspects of Child's life. Child was six years old at the time of the hearing and had been with placement for over two years. He had been out of Mother's care for almost four years. CASA Gardner stated that Child had known “trauma and instability and chaos in his life,” and he needed stability, consistency, and safety. Id. She further believed that if the trial court attempted to reunify Child with Mother, “it would be very, very difficult” for Child and would cause him “long[-]term harm.” Id. at 27.

[24] On August 5, 2025, the trial court issued its order terminating Mother's parental rights. The trial court concluded that there was both a reasonable probability that the reasons for Child's removal or continued placement outside the home will not be remedied by Mother and that continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child's wellbeing. It further concluded that termination was in Child's best interest and that there was a satisfactory plan for Child's care and treatment. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[25] While the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of a parent to establish a home and raise their children, the law allows for the termination of parental rights based on a parent's inability or unwillingness to meet parental responsibilities. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005); In re D.P., 994 N.E.2d 1228, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Thus, parental rights are subordinated to the child's interests in resolving a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship. In re. J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the parent but to protect the child. In re D.P., 994 N.E.2d at 1231. Termination of parental rights is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. The trial court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

[26] As our Supreme Court has observed, “[d]ecisions to terminate parental rights are among the most difficult our trial courts are called upon to make. They are also among the most fact-sensitive—so we review them with great deference to the trial courts ․” E.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. 2014). “We do not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses, but consider only the evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” Id. at 642 (quoting Egly v. Blackford Cnty. Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 1992)). In evaluating the trial court's findings and conclusions in an order terminating parental rights, we review only for clear error, and we apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re A.P., 981 N.E.2d 75, 81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “A judgment is clearly erroneous if the findings do not support the trial court's conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment.” Id. If the evidence and reasonable inferences support the trial court's decision, we must affirm. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

I. Findings Supported by the Evidence

[27] Initially, Mother asserts that several of the trial court's findings were not supported by the evidence presented at the hearing. A finding is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or reasonable inferences drawn therefrom which support it. Stewart v. Randolph Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 804 N.E.2d 1207, 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Even erroneous findings are not reversible error if they are harmless. See, e.g., In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (“We may reverse a trial court's judgment ․ only if its findings constitute prejudicial error ․ A finding of fact is not prejudicial to a party unless it directly supports a conclusion.”), trans. denied. An erroneous finding is “merely harmless surplusage” when the unchallenged findings “provide ample support for the trial court's ultimate conclusion.” Id.

[28] Mother first takes issue with Finding B(3), which stated in pertinent part, “The [THV] ended after a little more than a month at Mother's request because Mother could not cope with [Child's] behaviors and once again was having thoughts of harming [Child].” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 29 (emphasis added). Although not thoroughly fleshed out, Mother's argument seems to be that the evidence did not support the emphasized portion of the finding, that Mother requested the THV be ended because she could not cope with Child's behaviors and was having thoughts of harming him again. CASA Gardner testified that Mother made the decision to call DCS to have the THV end because she was struggling with his behaviors. See Supp. Tr. Vol. I pp. 38–39. Sufficient evidence supported this aspect of the finding. However, to the extent that the evidence did not support that at the time the THV ended Mother was having thoughts of harming Child, we conclude that it is harmless error as it is merely harmless surplusage and does not constitute prejudicial error. See In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d at 20.

[29] Mother next asserts that Findings B(6) and B(10) were not supported by the evidence. Those findings stated:

6. Mother has not been able to advance beyond supervised visits since the termination of the [THV] on February 9, 2023, and Mother has not had a visit with [Child] since July 4, 2024.

․

10. By Mother's own testimony, for Mother to be able to successfully parent [Child], Mother would have to restart from the beginning of learning how to parent [Child]. Mother has not worked with the child and family team or providers to equip herself with the skills necessary to safely parent [Child].

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 30. Mother argues that Finding B(6) ignores that the reason that she had not advanced beyond supervised visitation and had not had a visit with Child was because DCS terminated her visitation in July 2024 and that she had independently sought parenting education after the visits had been suspended. She also contends that there was no evidence of concerning parenting behaviors during the visits she had with Child nor was there any effort by DCS to reinstate her visits after Child made progress in his therapy. As to B(10), Mother argues that the finding is not consistent with her testimony, where she testified that the best way to move forward toward reunification after a long time period of not visiting with Child was to allow Child to ease back into her care and had nothing to do with her parenting abilities.

[30] To the extent that Mother argues that the findings ignore certain evidence, she is merely asking this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642. As to Finding B(6), evidence was presented that, after the THV ended, Mother engaged in supervised visitation with Child but never advanced past supervised visitation and that visitations were suspended on July 4, 2024, after which Mother no longer had any visits with Child because Child refused to engage in visitation and exhibited symptoms of extreme trauma. As to Finding B(10), although Mother focuses on testimony which she contends does not support the finding, she also testified that at the time of the hearing, she had not seen Child in a year and in order to parent him, she would “have to get to know him” due to the changes that would have occurred in that time. Tr. Vol. III pp. 48–49. The trial court could reasonably infer from this testimony that Mother would need to start at the beginning to relearn how to parent Child based on how he had changed over the time since she last had visitation with him. We, therefore, conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to support Findings B(6) and B(10).

[31] Mother next challenges Findings B(5), B(8), B(9), B(11), B(13), and B(16), which stated:

5. [DCS] is involved with the family because at the time of removal [o]n August 11, 2021, Mother was in a mental health crisis that included having thoughts of harming [Child].

․

8. Despite exhaustive efforts by the child and family team, Mother has not benefited from the services provided. Mother struggles to implement the skills learned from the services provided in her day-to-day life or visitation with [Child]. Mother has been unwilling or unable to take advantage of the services to learn the necessary skills to provide [Child] with a safe and stable home. For example, Mother has had numerous therapists, and each testified that instead of using therapy for skill building, the service was used as a safe space for Mother to vent about current stressors.

9. Mother has not gained the necessary skills outlined in psychological evaluation. At no fault of [DCS], Mother has not participated in services and treatment as outlined in the psychological evaluation. Mother has cherry picked what services she will participate in and to what extent throughout the life of this case. Mother continues to deny the results of the psychological evaluation and did not provide the psychological evaluation to her therapist until late into this termination proceeding.

․

11. Mother has mostly been compliant with services, but mere compliance is insufficient. Mother has been unable to internalize and implement the skills the services provide. Merely attending services is insufficient to remedy the reasons for [Child's] removal. A parent must receive the intended benefit and be able to implement the skills learned to remedy the reasons for involvement.

․

13. Mother has made some improvement with managing her mental health, specifically panic attacks. Nevertheless, the reasons for removal cannot be remed[ied] until Mother can provide care for [Child] on her own and cope with [Child's] behaviors without having thoughts of harming [Child], and Mother has not advanced past supervised visitation since the end of the [THV].

․

16. Mother is unwilling and/or unable to meet her parental responsibilities and to remedy the circumstances that resulted in [Child] being placed in care outside of Mother's home and meet her parental responsibilities. Mother has not taken accountability for her actions that have prevented the CHINS case from progressing [nor has she taken] full advantage of the services provided.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 30–31. Mother contends that these findings contradict the evidence presented in this case and points to evidence that supports ways that she complied with the dispositional decree, such as taking her medications, working with a therapist, obtaining employment and housing, maintaining appropriate dating relationships, and completing parenting programs. However, her assertions are again requests to reweigh the evidence. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642.

[32] Contrary to Mother's assertions, these challenged findings were supported by the evidence. DCS became involved with the family on August 11, 2021, when it received a report that Mother was suffering a mental health crisis and was having thoughts of harming Child because she could not handle his behaviors. Evidence was presented that, although Mother complied with services in the sense that she attended the services, she did not make any progress towards reunification with Child because she struggled to implement and internalize the skills learned from the providers. CASA Gardner testified that Mother struggled throughout the case to maintain the ability to sustain skills “necessary to provide[ ] for a child” and that Mother would “do well with one thing for a while” but struggle in other areas. Supp. Tr. Vol. I p. 23. She also stated that Mother lacked consistency in her life, which was detrimental to Child's well-being. FCM Cummings testified that Mother did not focus on positive future goals and making progress in her parenting skills but instead focused on past issues. FCM Cummings also had safety concerns for Child if he was returned to Mother's care because Mother had not demonstrated that she could take care of her own needs and Child's needs. FCM Sherrill testified that Mother had not made progress in the goals necessary to manage Child's behaviors and that, if Child was returned to Mother, a similar situation to what led to DCS's initial involvement where Mother had thoughts of harming Child would occur. Id. at 14. There was also testimony from Mother's therapist that Mother showed a lack of progress during therapy because she did not demonstrate the ability to execute the skills learned and that Mother needed to comply with and actively engage in all the recommendations and not just pick the recommendations that she wanted to comply with. We, therefore, conclude that these findings were supported by the evidence.

[33] Lastly, Mother challenges Finding B(15),² which stated that, Buckley, who completed Mother's psychological evaluation, testified that “Mother would never be able to parent ․ Child on her own for an extended period of time.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 31. Mother asserts that this finding is an incomplete characterization of Buckley's testimony because Buckley completed the evaluation over eighteen months prior to the issuance of the trial court's order and because Buckley's complete statement was that, due to Mother's cognitive ability, she would not be able to parent Child on her own for extended periods of time without some kind of social supports. Therefore, Mother claims that there was no evidence from Buckley about Mother's ability to parent Child as of the time of the hearing with or without social supports.

[34] At the hearing, when asked if Mother had the cognitive capacity to parent Child alone at the time the evaluation was completed, Buckley testified that she did not think that Mother would be able to parent Child “completely entirely alone,” “for like extended periods of time without some kind of social supports.” Tr. Vol. II p. 39. This testimony, as well as any reasonable inferences gleaned from it, supported Finding B(15). See In re A.P., 981 N.E.2d at 81 (stating that findings of fact are clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it).

II. Sufficient Evidence for Judgment

[35] Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's decision terminating her parental rights to Child. Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, the State must allege and prove:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c). As stated above, a petition must allege the existence of one or more of the circumstances contained in subsection (d). Here, the pertinent, alleged circumstance was:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(3). The State's burden of proof for establishing these allegations is one of clear and convincing evidence. In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Moreover, “if the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a) (emphasis added).

A. Conditions Not Remedied

[36] Mother argues that there was insufficient evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in the removal of Child and the reasons for placement outside of the home would not be remedied. In determining whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to a child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, a court engages in a two-step analysis. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). First, the court must determine what conditions led to the child's placement and retention in foster care, and second, the court must determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. Id. In the second step, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions and balancing a parent's recent improvements against “ ‘habitual pattern[s] of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.’ ” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643 (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). Under this rule, “[trial] courts have properly considered evidence of a parent's prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment.” In re D.B., 942 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).

[37] In addition, DCS need not provide evidence ruling out all possibilities of change; rather, it must establish only that there is a reasonable probability that the parent's behavior will not change. In re Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of Kay L., 867 N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). “We entrust th[e] delicate balance to the [trial] court, which has [the] discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. When determining whether the conditions resulting in removal would be remedied, the trial court may consider the parent's response to the offers of help from DCS or the service providers. D.B., 942 N.E.2d at 873.

[38] Mother argues that there was insufficient evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in the removal of Child would not be remedied because she asserts that all of the conditions that led to removal had been remedied at the time of the termination hearing. She contends that Child was removed from her care due to her mental health issues that led to her having thoughts of harming Child. Mother maintains that the evidence established that, at the time of the hearing, she had made significant progress in addressing her mental health, was mentally stable, and no longer had thoughts of harming Child.³

[39] Child was removed from Mother's care in August 2021 because she suffered a mental health crisis and had thoughts of harming Child. At that time, Mother struggled to handle Child's behaviors and had thoughts of suffocating him. Initially, after Child was adjudicated a CHINS and a dispositional order was issued, Mother complied with the case plan, actively engaged in her mental health treatment, and made progress in enhancing her ability to parent Child but still struggled with obtaining stable housing and employment. Mother's visits progressed to pop-in visits, and she eventually had overnight visits after obtaining housing and employment. Mother began the THV on December 22, 2022, which ended on February 9, 2023, at Mother's request because of concerns for Child's safety and Mother's inability to manage Child's “extreme and dangerous behaviors.” Supp. Tr. Vol. I p. 37.

[40] Throughout the rest of 2023, Mother only partially complied with the case plan and struggled to obtain housing and employment and to complete the court-ordered psychological evaluation. By November 2023, the permanency plan was changed to adoption and reunification as Child had been removed for over two years and Mother was still unable to obtain stable housing and employment, failed to progress past supervised visitation, and was not able to apply the parenting skills she had learned throughout the case. Throughout 2024, Mother still failed to enhance her ability to apply the parenting skills that she learned through her services. Although Mother engaged in supervised visitation with Child, the trial court suspended her visitation in July 2024 because Child refused to engage in visitation and demonstrated an extreme trauma response due to the visitation.

[41] Over the course of the case, Mother complied with services in that she attended the services but was unable to implement the skills learned in her daily life or with Child. Mother was either unwilling or unable to take advantage of the services to learn the necessary skills to provide Child with a safe and stable home. Although Mother did eventually complete a psychological evaluation, she disputed the results, believing they were incorrect, and she cherry picked what services she participated in as a result of the evaluation. Mother participated in therapy but made no progress in the goals of accountability and adaptability or in her emotional regulation. Overall, Mother showed a lack of progress during therapy because she did not demonstrate the ability to execute the skills learned.

[42] Although Mother may be correct that she made some improvement in managing her mental health, which was one of the reasons for Child's removal, Child remained out of Mother's care because she was unable to demonstrate that she could care for Child on her own and cope with his behaviors. Child was removed initially due to Mother's thoughts of harming Child due to his behaviors, and the THV ended because Mother, again, could not control or cope with Child's behaviors. Over the almost four-year duration of this case, Mother was unable to demonstrate that she could internalize and implement the skills necessary to safely parent Child. We, therefore, conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to support the trial court's conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions which resulted in Child's removal and continued placement outside the home would not be remedied.

B. Best Interests

[43] Mother additionally argues that DCS also failed to present clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parent-child relationship was in Child's best interests. In determining what is in the best interests of the child, a trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied), trans. dismissed. In doing so, the trial court must subordinate the interests of a parent to those of the child. Id.

[44] Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. (citing In re R.S., 774 N.E.2d 927, 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied). A parent's historical inability to provide a suitable, stable home environment along with the parent's current inability to do so supports a finding that termination is in the best interests of the child. In re A.P., 981 N.E.2d at 82. Testimony of the service providers, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Before terminating the parent-child relationship, the trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that his or her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 224. Additionally, a child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child. Id. (citing McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)).

[45] Our review of the totality of the evidence reveals that, at the time of the termination hearing, Child was six years old and had been removed from Mother's care for almost four years. Over this lengthy period of time, Mother made little progress in demonstrating an ability to implement the skills learned from her services that would enable her to safely parent Child. After the unsuccessful THV, Mother never advanced past fully supervised visitation, and at the time of the hearing, Mother had not had contact with Child since July 2024.

[46] In considering the Child's need for permanency and stability, the evidence clearly supported the conclusion that termination was in Child's best interests. Child had been removed from Mother's care and in his current placement for several years. Although Child had violent outbursts in the past, at the time of the hearing and since visitation with Mother had been suspended, Child was the most stable he had ever been. He rarely had any outbursts and acted like a typical child of his age. This was attributed to Child having a consistent caregiver and consistent environment.

[47] Additionally, both FCM Sherrill and CASA Gardner testified that they believed that termination was in the best interests of Child. FCM Sherrill stated that, at the time of the hearing, Child was the most stable he had ever been and Mother had not made progress in the goals necessary to manage Child's behaviors. She was concerned that, if Child was returned to Mother, a situation similar to the one that led to DCS involvement could occur where Mother had thoughts of harming the child. CASA Gardner testified that Mother had been provided with many services over the life of the case and had not been able to implement the skills taught to her from multiple service providers. She also believed that Mother had not shown the stability necessary to provide for all aspects of Child's life and that he needed such stability, as well as consistency and safety.

[48] The trial court “need not wait until a child is irreversibly influenced by a deficient lifestyle such that [his or] her physical, mental, and social growth is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” K.E. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 649 (Ind. 2015) (alteration in original). Looking at the totality of the evidence, the trial court's conclusion that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Conclusion

[49] We, therefore, conclude that the evidence supported the challenged findings, and to the extent that the findings were erroneous, the error was harmless. We further conclude that the trial court did not err in its judgment terminating Mother's parental rights to Child.

[50] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   T.M. signed a consent to adoption on October 3, 2024, and therefore was not a participant in the termination proceedings.

2.   Although Mother lists Findings B(14) and B(17) as well as Finding B(15) as specific findings she challenges, she does not develop any argument as to Findings B(14) and B(17) and has, therefore, waived any challenge to those findings. See Dridi v. Cole Kline, LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 366 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (“A party waives an issue where the party fails to develop a cogent argument or provided adequate citation to authority and portions of the record.”). In any case, irrespective of these findings, the judgment is supported.

3.   Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) is written in the disjunctive, and therefore, DCS was required to prove only one of the circumstances alleged in subsection (d). See In re G.M., 71 N.E.3d 898, 904 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (because statute written in the disjunctive, DCS need only prove one of the enumerated elements therein), trans. denied. Here, the trial court concluded that DCS had proved both (d)(3) and (d)(4), that there was a reasonable probability that the condition that resulted in Child's removal or continued placement outside of the home will not be remedied and the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being of Child. On appeal, Mother only argues that sufficient evidence was not presented to support the trial court's conclusion under (d)(3). By failing to challenge the trial court's conclusion under (d)(4), Mother has waived such challenge for failure to make a cogent argument. See Dridi, 172 N.E.3d at 366. Because DCS was required to prove only one of the circumstances under section (d), we need not address Mother's challenges to the conclusion under (d)(3). See In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1047 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (noting that once it was determined that DCS had proven one of the disjunctive subsections 31-35-2-4(d), we did not need to consider whether the conclusions under the other disjunctive elements were proven), trans. denied. However, we generally prefer to address cases on the merits rather than decide them on procedural grounds such as waiver, so we proceed to determine whether the trial court's conclusion under (d)(3) was supported by sufficient evidence. In re V.K., 279 N.E.3d 1029, 1038 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026).

Foley, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Weissmann, J., concur.