Alberto Garcia-Rodriguez, Appellant-Petitioner v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent (2026)

[1] Following his arrest on several felony and misdemeanor charges, Alberto Garcia-Rodriguez moved for a trial within seventy days (commonly referred to as a speedy-trial motion) in accordance with Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B). Pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(B), if a defendant who is in jail and held beyond the seventy-day limit moves for dismissal, the State's charges “must be dismissed” absent a justifiable showing for the delay. But his trial counsel failed to follow our Supreme Court's guidance in Grimes v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1224, 1230-34 (Ind. 2024), in how to prosecute the motion to dismiss, which, as we explained in his direct appeal, resulted in the motion's failure. Garcia-Rodriguez v. State, No. 24A-CR-2868, 2025 WL 1249708, at *3-4 (Ind. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2025) (mem.) (“Garcia-Rodriguez I”).

[2] Garcia-Rodriguez filed a petition for post-conviction relief and argued that he had received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel for her failure to properly prosecute the Rule 4(B) motion to dismiss. The post-conviction court found and concluded that, while Garcia-Rodriguez's trial counsel had committed a “critical error” that resulted in the failure of the motion, nonetheless Garcia-Rodriguez was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure because, even if she had properly prosecuted the motion, the trial court had the discretion to give priority to the longer-pending, non-speedy-trial criminal case it had prioritized over Garcia-Rodriguez's speedy-trial case.

[3] The post-conviction court's conclusion is contrary to law. In Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1040-41 (Ind. 2013), our Supreme Court made clear that, “absent extenuating circumstances, a defendant seeking a speedy trial would almost invariably be entitled to a trial setting ahead of any criminal defendant who had not filed a Rule 4 motion.” (Emphasis added.) The post-conviction court found no such extenuating circumstances for prioritizing the non-speedy-trial case over Garcia-Rodriguez's speedy-trial case, nor does the State suggest that any such circumstances could have been found. Thus, had Garcia-Rodriguez's counsel properly prosecuted the Rule 4(B) motion to dismiss, the trial court, as a matter of law, would have been required to dismiss the State's charges against him.

[4] We therefore reverse the post-conviction court's judgment and remand with instructions for the court to grant Garcia-Rodriguez's petition for post-conviction relief.

Facts and Procedural History

[5] We set out the relevant facts and procedural history in Garcia-Rodriguez's direct appeal as follows:

On March 15, 2024, the State charged Garcia-Rodriguez with Level 5 felony domestic battery, Level 5 felony battery, Level 6 felony intimidation, Level 6 felony criminal confinement, and Class A misdemeanor domestic battery. The State later amended its information to add two counts of Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy.

On July 2,[1] Garcia-Rodriguez filed his motion for an early trial under Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B), which generally required the court to hold his trial within seventy days of the filing of that motion. The court eventually scheduled Garcia-Rodriguez's trial for September 9, the day before the seventy-day deadline was set to expire.

On September 9, the parties appeared before the court, and the court informed them that it would have to reschedule Garcia-Rodriguez's trial to a later date due to court congestion. The court stated that Garcia-Rodriguez's case was “our second-choice matter, and I have confirmed our first-choice matter.” Garcia-Rodriguez objected to having his trial rescheduled, which the court overruled.

That same day, the court entered its written order continuing the trial. In the written order, the court stated:

The court on its own motion pursuant to Criminal Rule 4 takes notice of the court's congested calendar, in that the court will be trying:

Case Name: [J.R.M.,] Cause No: 49D30-2202-F3-004819 [(“Cause No. F3-4819”).]

The court now vacates the trial date of this cause and orders this matter reset on the first available trial date.

Two days later, i.e., the day after the seventy-day deadline had passed, Garcia-Rodriguez moved to dismiss the State's charges under Criminal Rule 4(B). In that motion, Garcia-Rodriguez asserted that the defendant in Cause No. F3-4819 “never asserted his right to a fast and speedy trial, and the case was not set for a [s]peedy [t]rial on September 9, 2024.” Thus, Garcia-Rodriguez continued, his case “should have been prioritized over” Cause No. F3-4819 on September 9, and the failure to hold his trial within seventy days of his early-trial motion required the court to dismiss the State's charges against him. But Garcia-Rodriguez did not attach any records from Cause No. F3-4819 to his motion to dismiss. The trial court summarily denied Garcia-Rodriguez's motion the next day.

In October, the court held Garcia-Rodriguez's jury trial. The jury found Garcia-Rodriguez guilty of several of the charged offenses, and the court entered judgment of conviction against Garcia-Rodriguez for Level 5 felony domestic battery, Level 6 felony intimidation, and two counts of Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. The court then sentenced Garcia-Rodriguez accordingly.

Garcia-Rodriguez I, 2025 WL 1249708, at *1-2 (citations to the record and footnote omitted; alterations original to Garcia-Rodriguez I).

[6] On direct appeal, Garcia-Rodriguez raised a single issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court erred when it denied his Rule 4(B) motion to dismiss. We began our review with our Supreme Court's recognition of the purposes of Rule 4:

Criminal Rule 4 implements a criminal defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Ind. Const. art. 1, § 12; Crim. R. 4. Rule 4 places the onus on the State to bring defendants to trial and gives them a procedure to invoke their speedy-trial right. Austin[,] 997 N.E.2d [at] 1037[.] The rule is not meant to give defendants a “technical means to avoid trial but rather to assure speedy trials.” Cundiff v. State, 967 N.E.2d 1026, 1028 (Ind. 2012).

Under Rule 4(B), a defendant may move for a speedy trial, which obliges the State to bring the defendant to trial within seventy days, or else the charges must be dismissed. But this obligation has exceptions. A court may delay the start of trial past the seventy-day window due to congestion of the court's calendar or an emergency․

Id. at *2 (quoting Grimes, 235 N.E.3d at 1230; brackets and footnote omitted).

[7] We then explained the procedure our Supreme Court has outlined for how criminal defendants must prosecute Rule 4(B) motions to dismiss:

Our Supreme Court applies a “burden-shifting test” to “evaluate a trial court's decision to reschedule a trial past the seventy-day deadline for calendar congestion.” [Grimes, 235 N.E.3d] at 1231. The test “starts with the trial court's order finding the court's schedule is congested and continuing the trial date.” Id. That finding “is presumed correct” and shifts the burden to the defendant both to object to the continuation of his trial and also to move to dismiss the State's charges once the seventy-day deadline passes without a trial. Id. In his motion to dismiss, “the defendant must show that the court's congestion finding was factually or legally inaccurate ․” Id. (quotation marks omitted). If he does so, the burden shifts back to the trial court to further explain itself if it denies the motion to dismiss. See id. at 1234.

Id. (emphasis added). Critically, we emphasized that, to “show” the court's congestion finding was inaccurate:

the defendant must include with his motion to dismiss “evidence” that is “sufficient” to show that “the court's congestion finding was incorrect when the court continued the trial.” Grimes, at 235 N.E.3d at 1233. For example, in Grimes, our Supreme Court held that the defendant met his burden to show prima facie error in the court's finding of congestion when he included with his motion to dismiss a copy of the court's own docket, albeit a docket dated nine days after the trial court's congestion finding. Id. at 1234.

Id. at *3.

[8] Applying our Supreme Court's balancing test to how Garcia-Rodriguez's trial counsel prosecuted his Rule 4(B) motion to dismiss, we concluded:

Here, at the September 9 hearing, the court found that calendar congestion required it to reschedule Garcia-Rodriguez's trial past the seventy-day deadline. The court specifically found that Cause No. F3-4819 had “first-choice” priority over Garcia-Rodriguez's case. The court's finding shifted the burden to Garcia-Rodriguez to promptly object, which he did, and then to move to dismiss the State's charges once the seventy-day deadline had passed, which he also did.

However, Garcia-Rodriguez's ․ objection and motion alone were not sufficient to demonstrate that the court's congestion finding was clearly erroneous. Rather, the burden was on him to include evidence with his motion to dismiss to show that the court's congestion finding was incorrect. But Garcia-Rodriguez included no evidence with his motion to dismiss; he simply asserted that the court was wrong. Thus, Garcia-Rodriguez did not meet his burden under Criminal Rule 4(B) to show, in his motion to dismiss, that the court's congestion finding was clearly erroneous.

Id. (citation and footnote omitted; emphasis in original).

[9] But Garcia-Rodriguez also asked our Court to take judicial notice of the CCS from Cause No. F3-4819. We agreed and then explained why doing so did not matter to the outcome of his direct appeal:

That CCS demonstrates that the defendant in Cause No. F3-4819 was charged in February 2022, arrested in September 2022, and never requested a speedy trial. Indeed, he moved for, joined in, or did not oppose ten continuances of his trial date following his arrest and prior to his September 9, 2024, trial. The defendant's case in Cause No. F3-4819 was also consolidated with a misdemeanor case that had been pending since 2016, but the defendant had never been separately held in jail in that case. Further, the charges in the misdemeanor case were dismissed in January 2024.

Had Garcia-Rodriguez properly included that CCS with his motion to dismiss, he would have at least cast serious doubt on the trial court's assertion that the defendant in Cause No. F3-4819 was entitled to priority over Garcia-Rodriguez's case. As our Supreme Court has long made clear, “a defendant seeking a speedy trial would almost invariably be entitled to a trial setting ahead of any criminal defendant who had not filed a Rule 4 motion.” Austin[,] 997 N.E.2d [at] 1041[.]

But that does not mean that Garcia-Rodriguez would have been entitled to have the State's charges dismissed at that point. Rather, had Garcia-Rodriguez included the CCS with his motion to dismiss, the burden would have shifted back to the trial court to further explain its congestion finding if the court were to deny the motion to dismiss. See id. at 1042; see also Grimes, 235 N.E.3d at 1234. Indeed, while Rule 4 cases generally receive priority over non-Rule 4 cases, there is no “bright-line approach whereby all other cases must yield to the defendant who files a speedy trial motion,” and “a variety of things could constitute congestion” of the court's calendar aside from which cases are Rule 4 cases and which are not. Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1040, 1042.

And that is the critical flaw with Garcia-Rodriguez's motion to dismiss in the trial court. Because he did not attach the CCS from Cause No. F3-4819 to his motion to dismiss, he did not shift the burden back to the trial court to further explain its congestion finding. Therefore, we can take nothing from the court's ensuing summary denial of his motion to dismiss other than the correct conclusion that Garcia-Rodriguez's motion was unsupported․

Id. at *3-4 (emphases added; original emphasis removed). Accordingly, we affirmed the trial court's denial of Garcia-Rodriguez's Rule 4(B) motion to dismiss. Id. at *4.

[10] Following the conclusion of his direct appeal, Garcia-Rodriguez filed his petition for post-conviction relief. In his petition, he alleged that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by not including the CCS from Cause No. F3-4819 with his Rule 4(B) motion to dismiss. And he argued that, had his trial counsel done so, the trial court would not have been able to rebut his showing of his entitlement to dismissal of the charges.

[11] The post-conviction court granted Garcia-Rodriguez's request to decide his petition by affidavit and submitted exhibits only. Thereafter, the post-conviction court agreed that Garcia-Rodriguez's trial counsel had “committed a critical error in failing to submit supporting documents along with [the] motion to dismiss and therefore was arguably deficient in her performance ․” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 165. But, trial counsel's “critical error” notwithstanding, the post-conviction court found that Garcia-Rodriguez could not show that his Rule 4(B) motion to dismiss, if properly prosecuted, “would have been successful,” stating:

The CCS in Cause F3-4819 shows that the September 9, 2024[,] jury trial had been labeled by the Court as “NO FURTHER CONTINUANCES.” Although there was no speedy trial request in that case, the defendant was in custody, the case was filed in February 2022, and the defendant had been arrested in September of 2022, approximately eighteen (18) months before [Garcia-Rodriguez's] case was filed.

Id. The post-conviction court further found that the trial court had “made a determination that the older[,] non-speedy trial case with a defendant in custody should be first priority on September 9[ ] and gave [Garcia-Rodriguez] the next available date.” Id. at 166.

[12] Based on those findings, the court concluded that, had Garcia-Rodriguez's trial counsel included the CCS in Cause No. F3-4819 with the motion to dismiss, the trial court still would have denied the motion. Thus, the post-conviction court denied Garcia-Rodriguez's petition on the basis that he had failed to show that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's performance.

[13] This appeal ensued.

Standard of Review

[14] Garcia-Rodriguez appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. As our Supreme Court has explained:

Post-conviction proceedings are civil proceedings in which the defendant must establish his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Post-conviction proceedings do not offer a super-appeal[;] rather, subsequent collateral challenges to convictions must be based on grounds enumerated in the post-conviction rules. Those grounds are limited to issues that were not known at the time of the original trial or that were not available on direct appeal. Issues available but not raised on direct appeal are waived, while issues litigated adversely to the defendant are res judicata․

Because the defendant is appealing from the denial of post-conviction relief, he is appealing from a negative judgment and bears the burden of proof. Thus, the defendant must establish that the evidence, as a whole, unmistakably and unerringly points to a conclusion contrary to the post-conviction court's decision. In other words, the defendant must convince this Court that there is no way within the law that the court below could have reached the decision it did․

Wilkes v. State, 984 N.E.2d 1236, 1240 (Ind. 2013) (citation modified). Typically, we review the factual findings of the post-conviction court under our clearly erroneous standard of review. Lee v. State, 892 N.E.2d 1231, 1236-37 (Ind. 2008). However, where, as here, the court's factual findings “are based entirely on a paper record,” we review them “de novo.” Id.

[15] Garcia-Rodriguez argues that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his petition because the record establishes that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel with respect to counsel's prosecution of the Rule 4(B) motion to dismiss. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel:

[The post-conviction petitioner] must show (1) that his counsel's performance fell short of prevailing professional norms, and (2) that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). A showing of deficient performance under the first of these two prongs requires proof that legal representation lacked an objective standard of reasonableness, effectively depriving the defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the proceedings below would have resulted in a different outcome. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.

When assessing the counsel's performance, we rely on some basic guidelines. First, we start by strongly presuming that, throughout the proceedings, counsel exercised reasonable professional judgment and rendered adequate legal assistance. Second, defense counsel enjoys considerable discretion when developing legal strategies for a client, demanding deference during judicial review. Third, counsel's isolated mistakes, poor strategy, inexperience, and instances of bad judgment do not necessarily render representation ineffective.

Wilson v. State, 157 N.E.3d 1163, 1177 (Ind. 2020) (citation modified).

1. The performance of Garcia-Rodriguez's counsel was constitutionally deficient.

[16] We first consider whether Garcia-Rodriguez established that his trial counsel's prosecution of the Rule 4(B) motion to dismiss was constitutionally deficient. To show that it was, Garcia-Rodriguez was required to show that his counsel's failure to attach necessary documentation to support the motion was objectively unreasonable. See id. The post-conviction court agreed that Garcia-Rodriguez's trial counsel had “committed a critical error in failing to submit supporting documents along with [the] motion to dismiss” but then stated only that counsel's failure “was arguably deficient in ․ performance ․” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 165.

[17] Garcia-Rodriguez's counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient. Prior to Garcia-Rodriguez having filed his speedy-trial motion, our Supreme Court had established the burden-shifting framework in which motions to dismiss under Rule 4(B) are to be prosecuted by defense counsel. Grimes, 235 N.E.3d at 1230-34. That framework made clear that, where, as here, the burden is on the defendant to show that the trial court's finding of congestion was clearly erroneous, the defendant can meet that burden only by submitting “evidence” to the court that is “sufficient” to show that “the court's congestion finding was incorrect when the court continued the trial.” Id. at 1233. Thus, the law on how Garcia-Rodriguez's counsel ought to have prosecuted the motion to dismiss was established at the time she attempted to argue that her client was entitled to dismissal under Rule 4(B).

[18] Yet, Garcia-Rodriguez's trial counsel failed to follow our Supreme Court's instructions. Instead, she merely asserted to the trial court that its assessment of which case had priority was erroneous. Counsel's mere assertion to the trial court, without including the CCS from Cause No. F3-4819 or asking the trial court to take judicial notice of that CCS, was objectively unreasonable.

[19] Still, the State asserts that Garcia-Rodriguez received constitutionally sufficient performance from his trial counsel because she took all the right steps in prosecuting the speedy-trial motion save for “the single legal error at issue ․” Appellee's Br. at 14-15. We reject the State's argument. While not all mistakes rise to the level of constitutionally deficient performance, this mistake was the entire and exclusive reason Garcia-Rodriguez's Rule 4(B) motion to dismiss failed, which denied him his Rule 4(B) speedy-trial right. And the stakes were high—simply follow our Supreme Court's instructions in Grimes, and counsel could have obtained “dismissal” of the State's charges against her client altogether. Crim. R. 4(B). Her failure to do so was unreasonable and denied Garcia-Rodriguez his constitutional guarantee to effective counsel.

2. The deficient performance of Garcia-Rodriguez's counsel denied him dismissal of the State's charges that he otherwise would have been entitled to as a matter of law.

[20] We thus turn to whether trial counsel's constitutionally deficient performance resulted in prejudice against Garcia-Rodriguez. Prejudice here means a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the proceedings below would have resulted in a different outcome. Wilson, 157 N.E.3d at 1177. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id.

[21] Had Garcia-Rodriguez's trial counsel included the CCS from Cause No. F3-4819 in her response to the trial court's finding of congestion, that CCS would have demonstrated that Cause No. F3-4819 was a non-speedy-trial criminal case, albeit a longer pending one. The burden thus would have shifted to the trial court to further justify its congestion finding. Here, the post-conviction court stated that, had Garcia-Rodriguez's trial counsel properly shifted the burden back to the trial court, the court would have exercised its discretion to prioritize F3-4819 over Garcia-Rodriguez's speedy-trial case because F3-4819 was the longer pending case. The post-conviction court made no other findings in support of prioritizing F3-4819, nor does the State suggest on appeal that any other such findings could have been found from the record. See Appellee's Br. at 18-19.

[22] Thus, whether counsel's deficient performance resulted in prejudice against Garcia-Rodriguez turns on whether the trial court had discretion to give priority to Cause No. F3-4819. Regarding prioritization of cases involving Criminal Rule 4, our Supreme Court has made clear:

The constitutional protections embodied by Criminal Rule 4 necessitate a prioritized treatment when a defendant files a motion pursuant to Rule 4(B)—a treatment beyond simply assigning that defendant's case to the next presently vacant trial setting on the calendar.

Rather, it must be assigned a meaningful trial date within the time prescribed by the rule, if necessary superseding trial dates previously designated for civil cases and even criminal cases in which Criminal Rule 4 deadlines are not imminent. We recognize, however, that emergencies in either criminal or civil matters may occasionally interfere with this scheme. Similarly, there may be major, complex trials that have long been scheduled or that pose significant extenuating circumstances to litigants and witnesses, which will, on rare occasions, justify application of the court congestion or exigent circumstances exceptions.

Clark [v. State], 659 N.E.2d [548,] 551-52 [(Ind. 1995)]. Thus, courts recognize that Rule 4(B) does not necessarily present a bright-line approach whereby all other cases must yield to the defendant who files a speedy trial motion. McKay v. State, 714 N.E.2d 1182, 1188 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).

For example, in the criminal arena speedy trial motions are subject to their own internal prioritization. Where a longer-incarcerated defendant moves for a speedy trial, his or her request should generally take priority over a more recently charged movant. But this would not necessarily be the case if, say, the more recently charged defendant's Criminal Rule 4 deadline was significantly more imminent and there remained time after that deadline to hold the trial of the longer-incarcerated defendant before his or her deadline. See James v. State, 716 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Ind. 1999). Where the trial court's calendar can satisfy both Rule 4 deadlines, the longer-incarcerated defendant need not necessarily go first. After all, Rule 4 effectuates a “speedy” trial—not necessarily the “next” trial. But at the same time, and absent extenuating circumstances, a defendant seeking a speedy trial would almost invariably be entitled to a trial setting ahead of any criminal defendant who had not filed a Rule 4 motion.

Similarly, “[a]lthough the right of the accused to a speedy trial stands higher than similar rights of civil litigants, civil settings need not always give way to criminal settings required by the time limitations in Crim. R. 4.” Baker v. State, 590 N.E.2d 1126, 1128 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Gill v. State, 267 Ind. 160, 165, 368 N.E.2d 1159, 1162 (1977)). In addition to prioritizing the long-scheduled, complex civil matters or those with extenuating circumstances we referenced in Clark, civil settings must give way to speedy trial motions only “where the continuance of the civil trial will result in sufficient time to fully prepare for and accommodate the criminal trial.” Gill, 267 Ind. at 165, 368 N.E.2d at 1162.

Nevertheless, “in order for the meaning of the rule not to be eviscerated, it is essential that courts honor requests made for speedy trials by scheduling trial dates within the time prescribed by the rule.” McKay, 714 N.E.2d at 1188. And we therefore have referred to this as a requirement that speedy trial motions receive “particularized priority treatment.” Clark, 659 N.E.2d at 551. But we do not intend to suggest that a trial judge must necessarily wipe his or her calendar clean, or jam a trial into an opening in a schedule or courtroom that lacks the space, time, and resources to accommodate it. They must, however, be mindful of their calendar and the seventy-day window and exercise all reasonable diligence to preserve the defendant's right to a speedy trial.

But at the same time, the aim of providing a speedy trial should never risk an unfair or incomplete trial. Rather, the trial judge should set the defendant's trial for the first setting not already occupied by a superseding speedy trial request or exceptional civil matter, or, if need be, create a new trial setting if time allows for the availability of a courtroom, witnesses, jury pool, and other necessary resources.

Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1040-41 (emphases added; alteration to Baker quote original to Austin).

[23] Our Supreme Court's explanation in Austin for how to prioritize cases when at least one Criminal Rule 4 case is involved is a mandate on this record: the trial court had no discretion to prioritize Cause No. F3-4819, a non-speedy-trial criminal case, over Garcia-Rodriguez's speedy-trial case simply because Cause No. F3-4819 was the longer pending case. Indeed, Cause No. F3-4819 was the longer-pending case because the defendant filed or joined ten motions to continue the jury trial, which accounted for nearly twenty-two months of delay. Without a showing of an emergency or other extenuating circumstance, Garcia-Rodriguez's Rule 4(B) request required the trial court to give his case particularized priority treatment over Cause No. F3-4819.

[24] Thus, had Garcia-Rodriguez's trial counsel followed our Supreme Court's instructions in Grimes and effectively put the burden back on the trial court to support its finding of congestion, the trial court, as a matter of law, would not have been able to do so. In other words, the trial counsel's failure to properly prosecute the Rule 4(B) motion to dismiss resulted in Garcia-Rodriguez not receiving a dismissal of the State's charges to which he otherwise would have been entitled. But for his counsel's failure, then, the result of the proceeding would have been different: rather than standing convicted following a trial, the trial court would have been required to dismiss the State's charges against him. Accordingly, the post-conviction court's denial of Garcia-Rodriguez's petition is contrary to law.

Conclusion

[25] For all of these reasons, we reverse the post-conviction court's denial of Garcia-Rodriguez's petition and remand with instructions for the court to grant his petition.

[26] Reversed and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Our Supreme Court decided Grimes on June 26, 2024.

Mathias, Judge.

Kenworthy, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.