IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of L.P. (Father) and R.H. (Mother) and I.P.-H. (Minor Child) L.P. (Father) and R.H. (Mother) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] L.P. (“Father”) and R.H. (“Mother”) (collectively, “Parents”) appeal the termination of their parental rights to their child. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Parents have one child together: I.P.-H. (“Child”), born in 2015. The Department of Child Services (DCS) first became involved with the family in September 2020 after receiving a report of domestic violence between Parents and drug use in the home. The following month, Parents agreed to participate in an informal adjustment. Around the same time, Mother was charged with Class A misdemeanor theft for stealing a cell phone. She pled guilty in February 2021 and was sentenced to one year suspended to probation.

[3] In March 2021, the informal adjustment was extended by three months because Parents had continued using illegal substances. That same month, Father was charged with Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine, and Mother was arrested for a probation violation because she'd tested positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and THC. Accordingly, DCS detained Child, placed him in foster care, and filed a petition alleging that he was a child in need of services (CHINS). Upon admissions by Parents, Child was adjudicated a CHINS in August 2021.

[4] A month after the CHINS adjudication, Father was charged with Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine, Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. Then, in January 2022, he was charged with Level 1 felony dealing in a controlled substance resulting in death. After several months in foster care, Child was placed back with Mother on a trial home visit in February 2022, while Father was still in jail. The CHINS case was closed that April. Father pled guilty to Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine in the September 2021 case, the State dismissed the remaining charges there as well as the methamphetamine-possession charge from March 2021, and Father was sentenced to time served. In June 2022, Father pled guilty to Level 2 felony dealing in a narcotic drug. The trial court there sentenced him to 17.5 years, with 10 years executed in the Department of Correction (DOC) and 7.5 years suspended to probation.

[5] In March 2023, Mother and Child were living with Mother's mother. Mother's sister, B.H., also lived there and was on probation at the time. On March 6, police went to the home to do a probation check because B.H. had recently tested positive for methamphetamine. When police arrived, Mother was home and appeared intoxicated. Police found heroin, methamphetamine, syringes, and paraphernalia in the home, which Mother said were hers. She also admitted to using heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana and smoking marijuana in front of Child. Mother was arrested and later charged with Level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine, Level 5 felony possession of a narcotic drug, Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe, Level 6 felony maintaining a common nuisance, Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. Child was at school when police first arrived. Other children were present, so police contacted DCS. By the time a DCS assessment worker arrived, Child had returned home from school.

[6] Due to Mother's arrest and Father's incarceration, DCS detained Child that same day and placed him in foster care. The following day, DCS filed a CHINS petition. The trial court adjudicated Child a CHINS for the second time in April 2023. DCS identified Father's parents (“Paternal Grandparents”) in Florida as a potential placement for Child and initiated an Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) request with the state of Florida. The trial court issued a dispositional order in July requiring Mother to, among other things, refrain from using drugs, obey the law, complete a substance-abuse assessment and any resulting recommendations, and attend supervised visitation. The court noted that Father wasn't required to participate in services through DCS while he was incarcerated.

[7] Child exhibited behavioral issues in his foster placement and at school, so he began therapy and skill-building services through Lifeline Youth and Family Services. He was later diagnosed with ADHD, and a behavioral plan was put in place at his school. In July, Child's foster family requested to end the placement due to his behaviors. The ICPC request for placement with Paternal Grandparents was still pending and there were no appropriate family members for placement in Indiana, so DCS moved Child to a different foster home. Also in July, Father completed Recovery While Incarcerated.

[8] Mother attended supervised visitation with Child but otherwise failed to participate in services. In September, she pled guilty to Level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine (the State dismissed the rest of the charges) and was sentenced to three years, with one year executed in the DOC and two years suspended to probation. Due to Parents’ incarceration, Child's foster placement facilitated telephone visits with Mother and Father. In March 2024, while still incarcerated, Mother gave birth to another child, I.H.

[9] Mother was released from the DOC in April 2024 and began inpatient treatment at Volunteers of America (VOA). Child couldn't live with Mother due to VOA policy, but the court allowed Mother to resume supervised, in-person visitation. Mother also participated in some of Child's therapy sessions. In June, Child was moved to a different foster placement, where he has since remained. Mother produced negative drug screens while living at the VOA and was discharged in July. After that, she underwent parenting and substance-abuse assessments, secured housing and employment, and participated in behavioral-health services to help her develop healthy coping mechanisms and maintain her sobriety. The state of Florida completed the ICPC process, but DCS declined to place Child with Paternal Grandparents, choosing instead to keep him in Indiana so he could continue services and in-person visits with Mother.

[10] Given Mother's progress, in February 2025, the trial court modified her visitation from supervised to unsupervised. DCS had filed a petition alleging that I.H. was a CHINS under a separate cause number, and the trial court also allowed Mother to begin unsupervised visitation with I.H. But in April, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine and marijuana, so the court reinstated supervised visitation for both children. Mother tested positive for methamphetamine a second time in April and again in June. She denied using methamphetamine but acknowledged that she'd tested positive three times in violation of the dispositional order, and the court found her in contempt. The court suspended Mother's sentence for contempt on the condition that she would fully comply with the dispositional order moving forward.

[11] DCS petitioned to terminate Parents’ parental rights to Child in August. Later that month, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine again, so DCS requested that the court order her to execute her sentence for contempt. The court issued a warrant for Mother's arrest, and she was arrested in September. On October 13, two weeks before the termination fact-finding hearing, Father moved to modify Child's placement in the CHINS case to have Child placed with Paternal Grandparents in Florida. Around that time, Child had a therapeutic visit with Paternal Grandparents over the phone. The visit went well, but when DCS tried to set up another phone call, Child declined. The day before the fact-finding hearing, Mother's friend, A.I., petitioned for guardianship of Child, and Mother consented. A.I. previously had placement of I.H. in his CHINS case.

[12] At the fact-finding hearing, the trial court heard evidence on both the termination petition and Child's placement (A.I.’s guardianship petition was pending under a separate cause number). DCS opposed placing Child with Paternal Grandparents. DCS explained that at the time the ICPC process was completed, Mother was doing well, so the focus was reunification with Mother. Additionally, the only contact Child had with Paternal Grandparents during the CHINS and termination proceedings was the single therapeutic visit, and before that, Child and Paternal Grandparents hadn't spoken since 2020. DCS also opposed A.I. being awarded guardianship of Child because she'd been unable to continue serving as placement for I.H. due to her work schedule, and she'd “made it clear that” she thought “this is all bologna and that the kids should just go home.” Tr. p. 107.

[13] Rosalind Freeman, Child's social worker at Lifeline, testified that Child “has been on an emotional roller coaster” and that “if he continues to remain in limbo,” he could suffer “cognitive deficits ․ due to trauma.” Id. at 24-25. Freeman noted that when Mother tested positive for methamphetamine in April, Mother didn't “t[ake] it as [a] big deal.” Id. at 19. Mother had denied using methamphetamine despite her positive drug screens, but at the hearing, she admitted using methamphetamine four times in 2025. At the time, she was still in jail for contempt and was set to be released in November. Father's earliest possible release date from the DOC is July 2028. He testified that he's had one disciplinary complaint during his incarceration, which was in 2023 for making “hooch.” Id. at 157.

[14] Child's foster mother, a social worker trained in caring for children who have been exposed to trauma, testified that she and her husband would adopt Child if the court terminated Parents’ rights. Family Case Manager (FCM) Ashley Wyatt opined that termination is in Child's best interests because it would allow him to have a permanent home and “[i]t would settle his emotions.” Id. at 106. Greg LeMaster, Child's guardian ad litem (GAL), supported DCS's plan of adoption given the history of the case, the amount of time Child has been removed from Parents’ care, and Child's bond with his current placement. GAL LeMaster acknowledged Mother's success in securing housing and employment but, in light of her drug problems, wasn't confident that her success would continue.

[15] In November, the trial court terminated Parents’ parental rights to Child.¹

[16] Parents now separately appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[17] Parents contend there is insufficient evidence to support the termination of their parental rights. When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013). Rather, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the trial court's judgment. Id. When a trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set aside the court's findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. Id. To determine whether a judgment terminating parental rights is clearly erroneous, we review whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings and whether the findings support the judgment. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016). DCS must prove the allegations in a termination petition by clear and convincing evidence. See Ind. Code § 31-34-12-2.

[18] Here, DCS filed its termination petition under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4. A petition under that section must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c). As to the first requirement, DCS alleged, and the trial court found, the existence of the following circumstances in subsection (d):

(2) That:

(A) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office ․ for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months ․ ; and

(B) despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

See Father's App. Vol. 2 pp. 10, 90-93.² Parents both challenge the trial court's conclusions under subsection (d) and that termination is in Child's best interests. We address each challenge in turn.

I. The trial court did not err in concluding there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in Child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied

[19] In determining whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in a child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, the trial court engages in a two-step analysis: first, the court identifies what conditions led to the child's placement and retention outside the home, and then it determines whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will not be remedied. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231. This second step requires the court to judge a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, considering evidence of changed conditions and balancing any recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). “Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.” Id.

[20] Here, Child was removed due to exposure to illegal drugs and Parents’ incarceration—Mother had been arrested for possession of drugs and paraphernalia and Father was serving a 10-year executed sentence in the DOC. At the time of Mother's arrest, she admitted to using heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana and to smoking marijuana in front of Child. Before pleading guilty to Level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine, Mother failed to participate in services other than visitation with Child. Although Mother made commendable progress after her time in the DOC and VOA, she relapsed in 2025 and used methamphetamine at least four times that year. When she first tested positive for methamphetamine that April, Mother didn't “t[ake] it as [a] big deal.” In July, after she tested positive two more times, the court found her in contempt, but that didn't deter her—she used methamphetamine again the following month, which resulted in the court ordering her to execute her previously suspended sentence for contempt. By the time of the fact-finding hearing, she was still in jail for contempt. Mother doesn't acknowledge her positive drug screens or the contempt finding; instead, she focuses on the progress she made before going to jail. But this is a request for us to reweigh the evidence, which we do not do. See K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1229.

[21] As for Father, he argues that “incarceration alone is insufficient to establish that conditions leading to removal will not be remedied.” Father's Br. p. 10. But this argument ignores the reasons for and context of Father's incarceration. DCS first became involved with the family in 2021 due to Parents’ drug use, and despite agreeing to participate in an informal adjustment, Father continued using drugs and was charged with Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine. After DCS filed a CHINS petition and Child was adjudicated a CHINS for the first time, Father was charged with two more drug-related cases and was eventually sentenced to 10 years in the DOC. As noted above, the reasons for Child's removal in the most recent CHINS case were both Parents’ incarceration and exposure to illegal drugs. Although Father completed Recovery While Incarcerated in July 2023, that same year, he incurred a disciplinary complaint for making “hooch.” Father testified that he'd been “sober from drugs” the entire time he'd been in the DOC, Tr. p. 158, but this does not necessarily establish that he'll be able to maintain his sobriety once he's released, see K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1234 (explaining that trial court was within its discretion to consider that mother was in prison for majority of her period of sobriety). And at the time of termination, Father had nearly three years left to serve in the DOC.

[22] The evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in Child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied.³

II. The trial court did not err in concluding that termination is in Child's best interests

[23] Deciding whether termination is in a child's best interests requires the trial court to look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the child. In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 49 (Ind. 2019), reh'g denied. Central among these interests is the child's need for permanency, as “children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.” Id. We have held that recommendations by both the case manager and child advocate, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[24] Here, FCM Wyatt opined that termination is in Child's best interests because it would allow him to have a permanent home and “settle his emotions.” GAL LeMaster supported DCS's plan of termination and adoption by Child's current placement because of the amount of time Child had been out of Parents’ care, Child's bond with the foster family, and his doubt that Mother's progress would continue. Additionally, neither parent has shown an ability to provide a stable, drug-free environment for Child. Although Mother had secured employment, housing, and unsupervised visits by early 2025, she relapsed within a couple of months and was jailed for contempt. Father remains in the DOC and hasn't shown that he can stay sober outside of prison. Parents’ issues with substance abuse have not been remedied and pose a safety risk to Child if he were returned to their care. See id. at 1006 (finding termination in children's best interests where parents did not address their substance-abuse issues and children had been removed from their care for over two years), trans. denied.

[25] While this evidence alone is sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion, permanency is a central consideration in determining Child's best interests. Freeman, Child's social worker, testified that he “has been on an emotional roller coaster” and that “if he continues to remain in limbo,” he could suffer “cognitive deficits ․ due to trauma.” Child, now 10, has been out of Mother's care for over three years and out of Father's care for over five years—since DCS filed the first CHINS petition in April 2021. Father's earliest possible release date is July 2028, when Child will be nearly 13. By contrast, Child has been with the same foster placement for nearly two years, to whom he is bonded and who wish to adopt him.

[26] Father claims that termination is not in Child's best interests because DCS “failed to pursue available and appropriate relative placement options,” specifically Paternal Grandparents and A.I. Father's Br. p. 16. But this claim is not supported by the evidence. DCS first identified Paternal Grandparents as a potential placement for Child and initiated an ICPC request with the state of Florida around April or May 2023. DCS didn't “g[e]t the results from Florida” for “[a]lmost a year.” Tr. p. 75. By that point, Mother was doing well, so DCS opted to keep Child in Indiana so he could continue his therapy, skill-building services, and in-person visits with Mother. Additionally, the only contact Child had with Paternal Grandparents during the CHINS and termination proceedings was a single therapeutic visit by phone a couple of weeks before the termination hearing—before that, Child and Paternal Grandparents hadn't spoken since 2020. After the therapeutic visit, DCS tried to set up another phone call, but Child declined. As for A.I., she is Mother's friend, not a relative. But in any event, DCS opposed A.I. having guardianship of Child because she'd been unable to continue serving as placement for I.H. in his CHINS case due to her work schedule, and she'd “made it clear that” she thought “this is all bologna and that the kids should just go home.” The record shows that DCS did pursue both placements but ultimately determined that they weren't in Child's best interests.

[27] Child has waited long enough. The totality of the evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that termination is in Child's best interests.

[28] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court denied A.I.’s petition to establish guardianship in December 2025, concluding that Child was receiving excellent care in his foster placement and had been since being placed there.

2.   As to Father, DCS also alleged, and the trial court found, that “the parent is incarcerated and ․ is expected to remain incarcerated for a significant portion of the remaining time during which the child is less than eighteen (18) years of age.” I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(8)(A); see Father's App. Vol. 2 pp. 10, 91, 93. Father also challenges the trial court's conclusion that DCS proved this circumstance, but Section 31-35-2-4(c)(1) requires the existence of only one of the circumstances in subsection (d). See In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. Because we affirm on the ground that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in Child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, we need not address the court's conclusion as to Father's incarceration.

3.   As noted above, because Section 31-35-2-4(c)(1) requires the existence of only one of the circumstances in subsection (d), we need not address the other circumstance alleged. See J.W., 259 N.E.3d at 1045.

Vaidik, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Scheele, J., concur.