IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of J.A. (Minor Child) and T.A. (Mother) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] T.A. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's termination of her parental rights to J.A. (“Child”), on petition of the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”). Mother presents two issues for appellate review: (1) Did Mother suffer a due process violation in the CHINS proceedings? and (2) Did DCS fail to present clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's termination decision? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother and J.D. (“Father”) are the parents of Child.¹ Mother has two other children from prior relationships: J.D.A. and A.A. In 2021, before Child was born, Mother pleaded guilty to two counts of driving with a controlled substance in her blood.² Mother was ordered to participate in substance use treatment as part of her sentence. The following year, DCS alleged J.D.A. and A.A. were Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”) in light of Mother's continued substance use. Both children were adjudicated CHINS by admission in early 2023. Mother failed to participate in court-ordered services, and the CHINS cases closed with both children remaining outside Mother's care. DCS placed A.A. under a guardianship, and a relative of Father's adopted J.D.A.

[3] On September 29, 2024, Mother gave birth to Child. Mother struggled with substance use while pregnant. About a month before Child's birth, she tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. After delivery, “cord blood results of the child were positive for [a]mphetamine, [m]ethamphetamine, [c]ocaine and its metabolites.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 25. Mother refused to disclose to medical staff any information about her substance use during the pregnancy. Hospital personnel suspected Mother was smoking cigarettes in her room, yet she would not permit staff to take Child out of the room. Hospital staff contacted DCS because Mother insisted on leaving with Child without first receiving medical clearance. DCS filed a petition alleging Child was a CHINS, and on October 3 the department removed Child on an emergency basis.

[4] In a later amended filing, DCS alleged Child had been born with a controlled substance “in the child's body, including the child's blood, urine, [or] umbilical cord[.]” Id. at 24. After an initial hearing, the trial court ordered Child's continued removal and placement in foster care upon release from the hospital and selected a Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) to represent Child's interests. At a factfinding hearing held in November, Mother admitted Child was a CHINS and the court ordered DCS responsible for Child's care and placement.

[5] The trial court issued a dispositional order a month later. Among other things, the court ordered Mother to have weekly contact with the Family Case Manager (“FCM”); maintain suitable housing; secure a stable source of income; ensure Child is properly clothed, fed, and supervised; and work with the prosecutor to officially establish paternity of Child. In addition, the court ordered Mother to complete parenting and substance use assessments and to follow treatment recommendations. Mother had to follow the law and submit to random drug screens.

[6] In April 2025, DCS moved to terminate the parent-child relationship.

[7] The trial court held a factfinding hearing on June 23. Mother, the CASA, and FCM Boyce Johnson all testified. DCS presented evidence regarding Mother's failure to participate in required services. Mother failed to maintain contact with the FCM, did not offer documentation of employment or proof of income, did not provide clothing for Child, and did not take steps to establish paternity. FCM Johnson testified Mother failed to complete the court mandated parenting and substance use assessments. He reported that from January to May 2025, Mother missed seventy calls for screens with her service provider and thirty-two random drug tests. FCM Johnson believed Mother's drug of choice was methamphetamine, and he testified her home was not suitable for Child. FCM Johnson testified Mother lacked a crib for Child and he found the home cluttered with tools. He testified Mother appeared impaired during meetings and he stopped visiting Mother at her home because the last time he did “there was like a fog haze in the home” that made his “skin [feel] like it was crawling.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 46–47. Mother missed all visits in April.

[8] The CASA explained DCS placed Child with the same relative who adopted J.D.A., and testified Child was doing “extremely well” there. Id. at 69. The CASA asserted Child's placement offered his best chance at long-term stability. Both the CASA and the FCM supported termination of the parent-child relationship.

[9] Mother had to be transported to the factfinding hearing from county jail where she was being held pending charges in a separate criminal matter.³ She acknowledged struggling with substance use over the past five years and agreed Child's cord blood had tested positive for methamphetamine after birth. She testified she had participated in required services. Mother disputed FCM Johnson's account of her living situation. She testified she owned a building and also lived in a duplex where Child would have his own room. Although she did not have a crib, Mother stated she had a “pack n play” for Child to sleep. Id. at 81. She explained any tools the FCM may have seen on the floor were temporarily there. Mother did not have current employment but believed she would be eligible for government assistance programs such as SNAP. Mother testified she missed scheduled calls because her place did not have electricity for two months. According to Mother, her uncle paid the electric bill at the building, and she had recently restored electricity in her home by running a cord from a neighbor's garage. Mother did not clarify why the electric bill had not been paid. She believed FCM Johnson had confused her crying over not having electricity for impairment during one of their visits at the library. She admitted using methamphetamine “once or twice” the month before the hearing. Id. at 93. Mother asked the trial court for one “more chance” to “get [her] life together for [her] kids.” Id. at 89.

[10] In the termination order, the court found in part:

1. [Child] was born on September 29, 2024, to [Mother].

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11. Mother tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine on October 1, 2024, and on October 3, 2024.

12. Between January 24, 2025, and May 1, 2025, Mother missed seventy (70) calls for drug screening, resulting in twenty-nine unforgiven missed tests ․ even though DCS offered Mother an alternative option to report to a screening center if that were more convenient for her.

13. Mother missed all of her visits with the Child in April 2025.

14. Mother began visits again in May, but after receiving screen results the Department asked the Court to suspend visitation.

15. The FCM was present during a visit in May at the Anderson Library and Mother seemed impaired. Mother, in her testimony, says that day was her last use, when the FCM said she looked messed up․

16. Mother admitted to using methamphetamine once or twice since the FCM screened Mother in May, but before June.

17. Mother's positive screens, failures to call and screen, and admissions, all indicate recreational drug use over the majority of the CHINS case.

18. Mother has a history of substance use arrests[.]

* * *

21. Mother's report of her housing situation is concerning and not adequate for a one-year-old child. She states that she lives in one unit of a six-unit apartment building, and that she owns her unit, but her uncle owns the other five and the other five tenets [sic] pay her uncle. She states she owned the unit ever since she got hit in the face a couple years ago because the person that hit her ․ had a father who paid for the unit. She states she had to run power [through] an extension cord from her neighbor's garage because her electrical was off for months. She states her uncle pays her electric bill.

22. Mother's report of her financial situation is also concerning and not adequate to care for a one-year-old child. She states she was last employed in 2022 or right before the Child was born in 2024[.] She receives SNAP benefits, but no other benefits. Mother said that being hit in the face caused a mild stroke that does not impair her ability to care for the Child, and presumably would not impair her ability to find employment. Mother offered no evidence that she is disabled or is seeking disability.

23. Mother presented to the Court no independent evidence, other than her testimony, to corroborate these unusual claims about housing, employment, and her stroke.

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Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 154–55 (internal citation omitted). The court then concluded in part:

Termination of [Mother's] parental rights is in the child's best interests;

There is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child, that being adoption;

There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied;

That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health or life of the child; and

That the parent:

a. has a history of extensive, abusive, and chronic use of alcohol or a controlled substance that renders the parent incapable of caring for the child; and

b. has refused or failed to complete available treatment for the alcohol or controlled substance use during the two (2) year period immediately preceding the filing date of [the termination] petition.

Id. at 158. The trial court accordingly terminated the parent-child relationship between Mother and Child.

1. Mother's allegations of due process violations in the CHINS proceedings are waived.

[11] Mother argues DCS's removal of Child immediately after birth and later filing of the CHINS petition “were done in violation of due process.” Appellant's Br. at 17. In particular, she alleges (1) DCS removed Child without probable cause; (2) DCS failed to make reasonable efforts toward reunification in the CHINS proceedings; and (3) DCS rushed to terminate the parent-child relationship. See id. at 18–25.

[12] “A parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests.’ ” In re A.B., 226 N.E.3d 791, 794–95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016)). “The State must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution when it seeks to terminate the parent-child relationship.” S.L. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 997 N.E.2d 1114, 1120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).⁴ “Due process embodies the idea of fundamental fairness and the ‘opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” A.B., 226 N.E.3d at 795 (quoting In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 917 (Ind. 2011)).

[13] That said, “[i]t is well established that we may consider a party's constitutional claim waived when it is raised for the first time on appeal.” Hite v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 845 N.E.2d 175, 180 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); see also McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 194–95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding mother waived due process challenge for failure to object during CHINS proceedings and at termination stage); In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 877–78 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding father waived alleged due process violation in the CHINS proceedings in part for failure to provide the appellate court “with the appropriate record of the hearing”). As Mother neither raised her due process allegations at the termination stage nor provided a complete record of the CHINS proceedings, and because she raises her allegations for the first time on appeal, she has waived her constitutional claim.

[14] Waiver notwithstanding, Mother argues the alleged “due process violations created an unacceptable risk of an erroneous termination” amounting to fundamental error. Appellant's Br. at 26. “On rare occasions, appellate courts may analyze an issue under the fundamental error doctrine to examine an otherwise defaulted claim.” In re Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d 1201, 1214 (Ind. 2019). The fundamental error doctrine is “extremely narrow and available only when the record reveals a clearly blatant violation of basic elementary principles, where the harm or potential for harm cannot be denied, and which violation is so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible.” In re E.T., 152 N.E.3d 634, 639–40 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d at 1214–15), trans. denied. In other words, the error must be so “egregious and abhorrent to fundamental due process that the trial judge should or should not have acted, irrespective of the parties’ failure to object or otherwise preserve the error for appeal.” In re G.P., 4 N.E.3d 1158, 1167 n.8 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Whitting v. State, 969 N.E.2d 24, 34 (Ind. 2012)). We review “the alleged misconduct in the context of all that happened in the proceeding and all the relevant information presented to the court.” Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d at 1215.

[15] Mother cannot demonstrate the alleged violations rise to the level of fundamental error. Mother has a long history of substance use. She was ordered to undergo treatment after multiple convictions of driving with a controlled substance in her blood. Her two older children remained outside of her care due to her failure to participate in court-ordered services. During her pregnancy with Child, she tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. She tested positive again for the same substances one day after Child's birth. Mother refused to answer questions about her substance use while pregnant. Hospital personnel attending to Mother and Child feared Mother was smoking in her room. Child was experiencing withdrawal symptoms, but Mother insisted on leaving without medical clearance. DCS had reason to believe Child's removal was necessary. See Ind. Code § 31-34-1-10(1)(C) (2017) (stating a child is a CHINS if born with, “any amount, including a trace amount, of a controlled substance ․ in the child's body, including the ․ umbilical cord tissue”). Mother admitted the above as true and agreed Child was a CHINS. Based on this context, we cannot conclude the trial court should have been alerted DCS removed Child in blatant violation of Mother's right to due process. See Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d at 1215.

[16] What is more, Mother's own conduct undermined reunification efforts. “As a matter of statutory elements, it has been established that DCS is not required to provide parents with services prior to seeking termination of the parent-child relationship.” In re F.A., 148 N.E.3d 353, 357 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). From January to May 2025, Mother missed seventy calls with her provider and dozens of random drug screens. She failed to maintain contact with the FCM and did not complete the required parenting and substance use assessments. She acknowledged using drugs the month before the termination factfinding. Given the ample evidence of Mother's failure to participate in reunification efforts, nothing in the record indicates DCS's move to terminate Mother's parental rights created “the harm or potential for harm” necessary to apply the fundamental error doctrine. E.T., 152 N.E.3d at 639.⁵

2. Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's termination decision.

A. Standard of Review

[17] A decision to terminate parental rights is among the most difficult a trial court is called upon to make. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. 2014). These decisions are “among the most fact-sensitive—so we review them with great deference to the trial courts, recognizing their superior vantage point for weighing the evidence and assessing witness credibility.” Id. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the judgment. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016). “We confine our review to two steps: whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings, and then whether the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.” In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1170 (Ind. 2016) (quoting E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642). In deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will affirm the termination of parental rights unless the trial court's judgment is clearly erroneous. In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019). Findings are clearly erroneous when the record contains no facts supporting them either directly or by inference. In re A.L., 273 N.E.3d 481, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). Trial court findings not challenged on appeal are accepted as true. See In re A.M.J., 228 N.E.3d 1132, 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

B. Statutory requirements to terminate the parent-child relationship

[18] A parent has a constitutionally protected right to establish a home and raise his or her child. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). But the right is not absolute. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45. “When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” Id. at 45–46.

[19] When terminating a parent's rights to his or her child, DCS must prove there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child and termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests. I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(2)–(3) (2024). DCS must similarly allege and prove the existence of one or more statutory circumstances justifying termination. I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(1), (d)(1)– (12).⁶

[20] In the event the trial court finds the allegations of a termination petition proven by clear and convincing evidence, the court “shall” terminate the parent-child relationship and enter findings of fact supporting that conclusion. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a), (c)(1) (2012); see also I.C. § 31-37-14-2 (1997) (burden of proof).

C. Challenged Findings

[21] Mother challenges only three of the trial court's findings, so we accept the rest as true. See A.M.J., 228 N.E.3d at 1139. More specifically, she argues it was clearly erroneous for the court to find: (1) she failed to contact the family case manager each week; (2) she failed to maintain suitable, safe, and stable housing with adequate bedding for Child; and (3) she failed to ensure Child is properly clothed, fed, and supervised. See Appellant's Br. at 28–31.

[22] Pursuant to the CHINS dispositional order, Mother had an obligation to contact the FCM every week, whether it be in person, by letter, email, or phone. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 32. At the factfinding hearing, FCM Johnson testified Mother failed to do so. The FCM stated Mother at times contacted him as required “but most of the time ․ she would not.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 35. Mother argues perfect compliance is not required, Appellant's Br. at 29, but the court simply found Mother failed to maintain weekly contact with FCM Johnson as required. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 154. Given FCM Johnson's testimony, the facts support the trial court's finding.

[23] Similarly, Mother was responsible for maintaining a suitable housing environment. FCM Johnson testified Mother's home was not suitable. He reported the home was cluttered with construction tools and Mother had no crib for Child to sleep. He stopped visiting Mother at her home because of potentially hazardous conditions that irritated his skin. For her part, Mother committed to putting away any tools if Child lived with her and testified she had a “pack n play” big enough for Child to sleep. Tr. Vol. 2 at 81. Mother described her living arrangement at the hearing, claiming she owned a building and lived in a duplex where Child had a room for himself. But she testified she had only recently restored electricity by running a cord from a neighbor's garage, and she did not explain why her electric bill went unpaid for months. She provided the trial court no evidence, beyond her testimony, to support her claim of ownership of the building. The court found Mother's “housing situation ․ concerning and not adequate for a one-year-old child.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 155. In essence, Mother's argument on appeal is a request to reweigh her credibility and the evidence before the court below, which we cannot do. See E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642.

[24] Mother had no job at the time of the termination. She did not report a source of income. She believed she would be eligible for SNAP benefits as she received them before. FCM Johnson testified Mother appeared impaired during at least one scheduled visit, and that Mother missed all visits with Child in April 2025. And he testified Mother never provided “any clothing to pass along” to Child. Tr. Vol. 2 at 38. In short, these facts support the trial court's finding Mother did not ensure Child was properly clothed, fed, and supervised.

[25] The trial court's unchallenged findings demonstrate Mother has been unable to remedy her substance addiction since at least 2021—when she was first ordered to participate in treatment following her criminal convictions. During her children's CHINS cases, she had ample opportunity to pursue recovery and participate in reunification efforts. Yet her “positive screens, failures to call and screen, and admissions, all indicate recreational drug use over the majority of the CHINS case.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 155. Under these circumstances, the trial court's conclusion there is a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in Child's removal will not be remedied is not clearly erroneous. See K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231.

D.Child's Best Interests

[26] Finally, Mother challenges the trial court's finding that termination was in Child's best interests. She argues “[a]doption should never be seen as the default solution ․ when parents are having trouble providing an optimal home for a child.” Appellant's Br. at 31. Mother maintains she should have “been given a fair opportunity to complete services and complete all the requirements of the dispositional order.” Id. at 32.

[27] To decide whether termination is in a child's best interests, “trial courts must look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the children.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. A child's need for permanency is a central concern. Id. A child need not wait indefinitely for his or her parent to “work toward preservation or reunification[.]” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648. And the trial court “need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that the child's physical, mental and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” Id. (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235).

[28] Mother's two older children remained outside of her care because of her failure to participate in court-ordered services. She has been unable to address her substance use problems since she was arrested for driving with a controlled substance in her blood in 2021. She again faced criminal charges at the time of Child's termination. From January to May 2025, she missed seventy calls and dozens of random drug screens. The FCM testified Mother's drug of choice appeared to be methamphetamine, and Mother herself admitted using the drug “once or twice” as recently as the month before the factfinding. Tr. Vol. 2 at 93. She never completed the required parenting and substance use assessments. At the same time, Child was doing “extremely well” at his placement. Id. at 69. There, he has the chance to bond with his older sibling and have long-term stability. The FCM and the CASA testified termination was in Child's best interests. The recommendations of the case manager and the court-appointed advocate, coupled with evidence of a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in Child's removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show termination was in Child's best interests. See In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

Conclusion

[29] We discern no due process violation, and clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's decision to terminate the parent-child relationship.

[30] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father voluntarily relinquished his parental rights and does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Around the same time, Mother also pleaded guilty to multiple counts of theft.

3.   On June 14, Mother was arrested for allegedly committing battery on a public safety officer, resisting law enforcement, and criminal mischief—the trial court took judicial notice of that criminal case. Id. at 94–95.

4.   Because Mother presents no authority or independent analysis alleging a violation under the state constitution, any state constitutional claim is waived. See Abel v. State, 773 N.E.2d 276, 278 n.1 (Ind. 2002) (noting defendant waived constitutional claim for failure to present any authority or independent analysis under the Indiana Constitution).

5.   The State urges us to reconsider how this Court has at times analyzed alleged violations of procedural due process. See Appellee's Br. at 17–20 (citing In re T.W., 135 N.E.3d 607 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)), trans. denied. We decline the State's invitation. In this case, the trial court had probable cause to remove Child and Mother failed to meaningfully participate in reunification efforts before DCS filed to terminate the parent-child relationship. Mother waived her due process claim, and she cannot demonstrate fundamental error. We need not go further than necessary to decide the matter before us.

6.   Mother does not challenge the trial court's conclusions pursuant to Subsection (c)(2) (satisfactory plan) or Subsection (d) (circumstances warranting termination). As examined below, she only challenges the court's conclusion regarding Child's best interests. To the extent Mother attempts to argue about a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Child or the circumstances warranting termination, see Appellant's Br. at 30 n.12, she has waived these claims for failure to make a cogent argument. See In re B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.