Anthony Romano, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Anthony Romano pled guilty to Level 3 felony rape and was sentenced to 16 years, with 10 years executed and 6 years suspended to probation. He now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and, in the alternative, that his sentence is inappropriate. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Romano met 24-year-old N.B. online. N.B. is from Ohio and has autism. See Tr. Vol. 4 p. 37. In late June 2023, Romano drove from Indiana to Ohio to pick up N.B., and the pair drove to Hartford City, Indiana, where they checked into a motel. They stayed at the motel until late August 2023, when N.B. contacted her family and had them pick her up. N.B. then went to a hospital, alleging that Romano had raped her, and law enforcement in Indiana was contacted.

[3] The State charged Romano with two counts of Level 3 felony rape, one count of Level 5 felony criminal confinement, and one count of Class A misdemeanor battery. The State alleged that Romano prevented N.B. from leaving the motel and forced her to participate in sexual acts. Romano was eventually released on bond with GPS monitoring, but he later violated the conditions of his bond and was returned to jail.

[4] In June 2025, Romano and the State entered into a plea agreement under which Romano would plead guilty to an amended count of Level 3 felony rape and the remaining charges would be dismissed. Sentencing was left to the discretion of the trial court except that the executed portion of Romano's sentence was capped at 10 years. During the factual basis for the charge, Romano admitted that he was in a relationship with N.B. and that she had “made it known to [him] verbally that she didn't want to continue or to progress in what [he was] doing during sexual intercourse” but that he “persisted with the intercourse.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 15. The court tentatively accepted Romano's guilty plea and set sentencing for August 19.

[5] At the August 19 hearing, Romano asked for a continuance so that he could file a written motion to withdraw his guilty plea. See Tr. Vol. 3 p. 3. The trial court continued the matter and gave the parties 30 days “to prepare written arguments for or against the withdrawal of the plea agreement.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 124. Romano then filed a written motion to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that he “has had time to reflect on the plea of guilty and desires to withdraw the plea and to go to trial” because he “asserts his innocence on the charge.” Id. at 122. The trial court denied the motion:

5. That in the present case, the presentation of the Defense did not lead the Court to believe any such miscarriage of justice is likely to occur if the Court denies the Defendant's request to withdraw.

6. That in the present case, the information provided suggests that the primary motivation for the motion to withdraw is simply that the Defendant no longer feels the signed agreement is in his best interest.

7. That the Court does not believe that regret of entering into an agreement is sufficient to allow the agreement to be withdrawn.

8. That further, the Defendant entered a plea of guilt[y] on record, after thorough questioning and admonishment from the Court, during which time the Court verified the Defendant understood the constitutional rights he had and would be waiving as well as the consequences of his change of plea.

9. That further, the Defendant was at all times represented by counsel during the formulation of the agreement, its entry into the record, and the formal hearing for change of plea.

10. That the factual basis was significant in implicating the Defendant and allowing the withdraw[al] of the plea and the agreement would be unjust to the victim in this cause as well as to the community.

Id. at 164-65.

[6] At the sentencing hearing, N.B. testified that while they stayed at the motel, Romano forced her to engage in sexual acts “[m]ore than fifty” times, which he kept track of. Tr. Vol. 4 p. 39. She said Romano wouldn't let her leave the motel room when he wasn't there, warning her that she was being monitored by camera, and that he broke her phone. Finally, she explained the three rules that Romano had given her: (1) “not to talk to anyone while we were out”; (2) “not to talk to [her] family”; and (3) “never, ever leave his side.” Id. at 42.

[7] The trial court found several aggravators: (1) Romano lacked remorse; (2) N.B. will continue to suffer harm “from [Romano's] conduct due to the disabilities that she has”; (3) Romano has “caused harm that exceeds that necessary to formulate the charge” that he pled guilty to; and (4) Romano “blatantly violated specific conditions of bond.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 179-80. The court found one mitigator: Romano had no criminal history. Finding the aggravators to “significantly” outweigh the mitigator, the court sentenced Romano to 16 years, with 10 years executed and 6 years suspended to probation. Id. at 180.

[8] Romano now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Romano's motion to withdraw his guilty plea

[9] Romano contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. After entry of a guilty plea but before sentencing, the trial court “shall” allow the withdrawal of the plea if the defendant proves that the withdrawal is “necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(b). Absent that showing, a trial court “may allow” the defendant to withdraw a guilty plea “for any fair and just reason unless the state has been substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant's plea.” Id. The defendant has the burden of establishing the grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at (e).

[10] On appeal from the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the defendant faces a “high hurdle” and a “presumption in favor of the ruling.” Coomer v. State, 652 N.E.2d 60, 62 (Ind. 1995). We reverse the trial court's ruling only for an abuse of discretion. I.C. § 35-35-1-4(b).

[11] Romano argues that he “suffered from serious mental health diagnoses including schizophrenia and borderline personality disorder,” which rendered his guilty plea “invalid.” Appellant's Br. p. 12. He therefore maintains that the trial court should have granted his motion to withdraw to correct a “manifest injustice.” Id. The problem with this argument, as the State points out, is that Romano did not seek withdrawal on this ground in the trial court. Instead, his written motion alleged only that he had time to reflect on the plea, now asserted his innocence, and wished to go to trial. The trial court denied the motion on that basis, explaining that regret and a change of heart were insufficient given the plea colloquy, representation by counsel, and factual basis. Because Romano's mental-health theory was not presented to the trial court, it is not preserved for appellate review, and he has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion on the grounds actually asserted.

II. Romano has failed to prove that his sentence is inappropriate

[12] In the alternative, Romano contends that his sentence is inappropriate and asks us to revise it under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides that an appellate court “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” The court's role under Rule 7(B) is to “leaven the outliers,” and “we reserve our 7(B) authority for exceptional cases.” Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 160 (Ind. 2019). “Whether a sentence is inappropriate ultimately turns on the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and a myriad of other factors that come to light in a given case.” Thompson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 383, 391 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008)). Because we generally defer to the judgment of trial courts in sentencing matters, defendants must persuade us that their sentences are inappropriate. Schaaf v. State, 54 N.E.3d 1041, 1044-45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

[13] The sentencing range for a Level 3 felony is 3 to 16 years, with an advisory term of 9 years. I.C. § 35-50-2-5(b). Here, the trial court sentenced Romano to the maximum term of 16 years but suspended 6 of those years to probation. As the trial court explained at sentencing, had Romano gone to trial on all the charges, he faced a significantly higher sentence. See Tr. Vol. 4 p. 55.

[14] Romano concedes that the crime is “disturbing” and will likely have “long-term effects on” N.B. Appellant's Br. p. 10. However, he points out that even though N.B. “may have feared [he] would do something to prevent her from leaving, the record does not reflect she was ever locked up or confined.” Id. at 11. But confinement is not limited to being physically locked in a room. N.B., who has autism, testified at sentencing that Romano restricted her movements, controlled her communications, and broke her phone. The nature of the offense does not support a sentence revision.

[15] The only facet of his character that Romano addresses is that he had no criminal history. The trial court recognized as much. And while we agree that Romano's lack of criminal history is mitigating, given the egregious nature of the offense, Romano has failed to persuade us that his 16-year sentence with 6 years suspended to probation is inappropriate.

[16] Affirmed.

Vaidik, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Scheele, J., concur.