Perry Antonio Reyes, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After Perry Antonio Reyes pleaded guilty to Level 5 felony involuntary manslaughter ¹ and Level 6 felony criminal recklessness,² the trial court imposed an aggregate six-year sentence with five years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”). On appeal, Reyes contends his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History 3

[2] On the night of October 10, 2024, police responded to a report of a potential self-inflicted gunshot wound at the home of Henry Clayton. Upon arrival, officers encountered Reyes, who was outside the house and covered in blood. Reyes was intoxicated; “his speech [was] slurred” and he had “a faint odor” of alcohol. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 13. Reyes informed one of the officers he accidentally shot his friend Clayton in the neck. Reyes claimed the two were “messing around” with Clayton's firearm, and he “did not know it had a chamber in it.” Id.⁴ According to Reyes, Clayton “handed him the gun and told him to shoot, because there was not anything in it.” Id. Officers placed Reyes under arrest. At the county jail, Reyes submitted to a portable breath test, which revealed a breath alcohol content of .20%.

[3] Police interviewed Clayton's girlfriend, who was also at the house. She was in the bathroom when she heard a gunshot. When she came out, she observed Reyes standing over Clayton, who was holding his face and bleeding. She applied pressure to the wound and called emergency services. She reported the firearm was on the couch, and the magazine clip was removed. She stated Reyes had been drinking since the afternoon. According to her, Reyes was playing with the firearm despite Clayton “telling him it was not a toy.” Id. at 16. Clayton ultimately died of the gunshot wound.

[4] The State charged Reyes with Level 5 felony involuntary manslaughter and Level 6 felony criminal recklessness. Reyes agreed to plead guilty as charged. The plea agreement stipulated a six-year sentence for involuntary manslaughter and left the executed part of the sentence to the trial court's discretion, subject to a maximum of five years. As for criminal recklessness, the agreement called for a concurrent sentence of two and one-half years, all executed.

[5] At the combined change of plea and sentencing hearing, the trial court heard from Clayton's family. His uncle testified Clayton was “absolutely missed [and] valued” and described the whole family as “serving a life sentence.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 16. Other relatives described Clayton's passing as a “senseless death” and asked the court to impose a lengthy sentence. Id. at 14; see also id. at 19–21.

[6] In allocution, Reyes told Clayton's family he was “truly sorry” and stated he “would do anything if [he] could ․ take it back[.]” Id. at 23. Reyes described Clayton as “a good friend” and acknowledged he “should have known better than to play [with] a gun while drinking.” Id. Reyes’ counsel asked the court to impose the minimum executed time under the plea agreement. Defense counsel also asked the court to consider Reyes’ mental health history and possible mental impairment a mitigating factor.

[7] At the time of sentencing, Reyes was thirty-two years old. The presentence investigation report (“PSI”) showed he had a record of criminal activity, including several juvenile adjudications involving battery, intimidation, disorderly conduct, and habitual disobedience. At age twenty, he was convicted of illegal possession of an alcoholic beverage. In later years he pleaded guilty to misdemeanor charges of public intoxication and resisting law enforcement, followed by Level 6 felony intimidation. And while at the county jail, Reyes had a disciplinary report for creating a major disturbance and another for contraband. The PSI further indicated Reyes reported a history of bipolar disorder, anxiety, and impairment from a brain injury at birth.

[8] The trial court accepted Reyes’ plea. The court considered his mental impairment during sentencing. Nevertheless, given his criminal record and history of substance use, the court was particularly concerned with ensuring Reyes “would be deterred from” committing similar crimes again. Id. at 26. The trial court sentenced him to six years for involuntary manslaughter with five years executed in the DOC. For criminal recklessness, the court imposed a concurrent sentence of two and one-half years. The court ordered Reyes to participate in substance use and mental health treatment while on probation.

Reyes’ sentence is not inappropriate.

[9] Reyes asks us to revise his sentence. The Indiana Constitution authorizes this Court to review and revise a trial court's sentencing decision as provided by rule. Ind. Const. art. 7, § 6. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides we may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” The principal role of appellate review is to leaven the outliers, not to achieve a perceived correct sentence in each case. Conley v. State, 183 N.E.3d 276, 288 (Ind. 2022). Therefore, “we reserve our 7(B) authority for exceptional cases.” Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 160 (Ind. 2019) (per curiam).

[10] “[S]entencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). The two prongs of 7(B) review are “separate inquiries to ultimately be balanced in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate.” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 126 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Conner v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). “[T]o the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Id. at 127.

[11] The question “is not whether another sentence is more appropriate; rather, the question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate.” Helsley v. State, 43 N.E.3d 225, 228 (Ind. 2015) (quoting King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)) (emphasis omitted). Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. The defendant bears the burden of persuading us a revised sentence is warranted. Cramer v. State, 240 N.E.3d 693, 698 (Ind. 2024).

[12] “When assessing the nature of the offense, the advisory sentence is the starting point that the legislature selected as an appropriate sentence for the particular crime committed.” Hollins v. State, 145 N.E.3d 847, 853 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. The sentencing range for a Level 5 felony is from one to six years, with an advisory sentence of three years. I.C. § 35-50-2-6(b) (2014). And the range for a Level 6 felony is a fixed term of between six months and two and one-half years, with an advisory sentence of one year. I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b) (2019). The trial court sentenced Reyes to six years for Level 5 felony involuntary manslaughter with one year suspended, concurrent with a two and one-half-year sentence for Level 6 felony criminal recklessness. As the State points out, the sentence was “within the range permitted by the sentencing cap to which Reyes agreed.” Appellee's Br. at 11; see also Merriweather v. State, 151 N.E.3d 1281, 1286 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (noting a defendant's choice to enter a plea agreement limiting the trial court's discretion to a sentence less than the statutory maximum should typically be understood as evidence of sentence reasonableness and appropriateness).

[13] As for the nature of the offenses, Reyes was drinking excessively the day he shot Clayton. He was “messing around” with Clayton's gun even after being warned against it. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 13; see also id. at 16. Reyes himself acknowledged in allocution “he should have known better than to play [with] a gun” while intoxicated. Tr. Vol. 2 at 23. Yet on the day of the incident, Reyes took Clayton's firearm and shot his friend in the neck. Several of Clayton's family members testified to the loss they have felt since the shooting. Clayton's relatives described his passing as a “senseless death” and characterized the family as having to endure a “life sentence.” Id. at 14, 16. The nature of the offenses does not suggest Reyes’ sentence is inappropriate.

[14] Reyes argues otherwise, claiming his “diminished mental capacity is evident throughout the record.” Appellant's Br. at 10. The trial court considered Reyes’ mental health history during sentencing, as evidenced by its order requiring him to complete substance use and mental health treatment during probation. No evidence in the record indicates a nexus between his mental health and the nature of the offenses he committed. See Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1249 (Ind. 2024) (declining to revise defendant's sentence where no evidence showed a nexus between his mental health history and his criminal conduct). Ultimately, the court determined the sentence imposed would be most likely to deter Reyes from committing similar crimes in the future. We defer to the court's determination. See Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222.

[15] Regarding the character of the offender, Reyes has a record of criminal activity, starting with various adjudications as a juvenile. As an adult, he has multiple convictions related to substance use, including illegal possession of an alcoholic beverage and public intoxication. He also has a misdemeanor conviction for resisting law enforcement and a Level 6 felony conviction for intimidation. While at the county jail, he received disciplinary reports for creating a disturbance and for contraband. Even a minor criminal record reflects poorly on a defendant's character. Cramer, 240 N.E.3d at 700. Nothing about Reyes’ lengthy criminal history persuades us his sentence is inappropriate.

[16] Even so, Reyes argues his sentence is unwarranted partly because he “took responsibility for his actions” and apologized to Clayton's family. Appellant's Br. at 11. But as the State argues, faced with overwhelming evidence against him, Reyes’ “plea appears to have been a pragmatic decision, a fact that lessens the value of his acceptance of responsibility.” Appellee's Br. at 15 (citing Brown v. State, 907 N.E.2d 591, 594 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)). As for remorse, we defer to the trial court's decision not to consider Reyes’ apology a significant mitigator. Hollins, 145 N.E.3d at 852 (“We accord substantial deference to a trial court's evaluation of a defendant's remorse.”).

[17] In short, Reyes has not provided compelling evidence portraying his offenses in a positive light or showing “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character” to satisfy his burden of demonstrating his sentence warrants revision. Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

Conclusion

[18] Reyes’ sentence is not inappropriate.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-4(b)(1) (2018).

2.   I.C. § 35-42-2-2(a), (b)(1)(A) (2019).

4.   As stated by one of the responding officers, Reyes “kept referring to the fact the firearm had a bullet chambered as having a chamber.” Id.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Mathias, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.