IN RE: E.V. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In this consolidated appeal, C.V. (“Father”) and M.R. (“Mother”) (collectively, “Parents”) challenge the juvenile court's order finding that their minor children, E.V., J.V., and V.V. (collectively, “Children”), are children in need of services (“CHINS”). We affirm.

Issues

[2] Mother presents three issues, which we consolidate and restate as: whether the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) presented sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's CHINS finding. Father presents two issues, which we restate as:

I. Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering Father to undergo a psychosexual assessment.

II. Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion or denied Father due process by overruling Father's objection to DCS's predispositional report.

Facts

[3] Parents have three children: E.V., who was born in July 2020; J.V., who was born in August 2022; and V.V., who was born in May 2025. Mother also has two older children from a prior relationship: L.A., born in 2017, and E.A., born in late 2018 or 2019. On August 10, 2025, DCS received a report of sexual abuse and neglect regarding L.A. and E.A. This report indicated that L.A. and E.A.’s paternal grandfather had molested them and that L.A. and E.A. reported domestic violence between their grandparents. Tr. Vol. II p. 49; Mother's App. Vol. II p. 48. On August 19, 2025, E.A. was interviewed at a child advocacy center (“CAC”), where she disclosed domestic violence between Mother and Father and reported that Father—who is not E.A.’s biological father—had made her touch his private parts. That same day, August 19, 2025, DCS removed Children from Parents’ home. On August 20, 2025, DCS received the report of E.A.’s interview at the CAC.

[4] On August 21, 2025, DCS filed petitions alleging that Children were CHINS under Indiana Code Sections 31-34-1-1,¹ 31-34-1-3(c),² and 31-34-12-4.6(a).³ The juvenile court held an initial/detention hearing that same day, returned Children to Mother's custody, and prohibited Father from having contact with Children. On September 2, 2025, DCS received a drug screen from Mother that was positive for methamphetamine and alcohol. At a pretrial conference on September 12, 2025, the juvenile court granted DCS's request to detain Children and ordered that Children be screened for drugs. Children were then placed in foster care.

[5] In foster care, E.V. displayed sexualized behavior, including trying to touch the foster parent's breasts and telling her to touch herself because it “feels good”; E.V. also asked to be choked and talked about choking. Mother's App. Vol. II p. 64; Father's App. Vol. II p. 64. This behavior suggested that E.V. had been exposed to sexually inappropriate behavior. Mother's App. Vol. II p. 59; Father's App. Vol. II p. 72.

[6] On December 8, 2025, the juvenile court held a fact-finding hearing at which both Parents admitted that (1) each child was under eighteen years of age; (2) E.A. had been the victim of sexual abuse; (3) Children lived in the same household as E.A.; and (4) the coercive intervention of the juvenile court was necessary to ensure that Children received the necessary care, treatment, and supervision. Accordingly, the juvenile court found Children to be CHINS under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-3(c).

[7] The juvenile court scheduled a dispositional hearing for January 7, 2026. On December 30, 2025, DCS filed its predispositional report. This report stated that E.A. had disclosed sexual abuse by Father and that DCS had substantiated this allegation; the report recommended that Father complete a psychosexual assessment. Both prior to and at the dispositional hearing, Father objected to the report based on its inclusion of these new allegations and argued that they were not based on anything presented at the fact-finding hearing. The juvenile court overruled Father's objection.

[8] At the dispositional hearing, DCS Family Case Manager, Charlene Colley, (“FCM Colley”) testified that E.A. reported that Father had sexually abused E.A. and that DCS had substantiated this allegation. FCM Colley recommended that Father complete a psychosexual assessment because of E.A.’s substantiated allegations and because Father had reported that he had been a victim of sexual abuse when he was a child. FCM Colley further testified that Mother had a history of being a victim of domestic violence and that E.A. had reported domestic violence between Mother and Father. According to FCM Colley, during DCS's investigation, Father admitted that there had been an “altercation” between him and Mother. Tr. Vol. II p. 57.

[9] FCM Colley also testified regarding a child hearsay evaluation of E.A. that occurred in October 2025.⁴ According to the evaluator's report,⁵ E.A., oddly, said that she did not know Father and made statements suggesting that she was unsure who her molester was. FCM Colley also testified that E.A. did not indicate an understanding of the oath and did not state that her grandfather had abused her. On cross-examination, FCM Colley acknowledged that E.A. had further stated that Father “went to jail because I accidently lied on him.” Id. at 50. Father, via counsel, argued that he should not be required to undergo a psychosexual assessment or participate in domestic violence prevention services.

[10] On January 21, 2026, the juvenile court entered dispositional orders in which Parents were ordered to participate in various services. Regarding the psychosexual assessment, the juvenile court found that “[a]ny of these things that we've heard about standing alone might not be enough,” but that “in combination ․ they do warrant an assessment.” Id. at 89. The juvenile court noted that the evidence that Father had himself been a victim of sexual abuse and that E.A. had also been a victim demonstrated an increased risk of harm to Children. The juvenile court also found that there was conflicting evidence as to whether there was a history of domestic violence between Parents and stated in its dispositional orders: “The Court does not order the parents to participate in a domestic violence assessment, or services, as long as they are not residing together.” Father's App. Vol. II p. 88. Parents now appeal.

Discussion and Decision

I. Mother's Arguments

A. Mother cannot challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the CHINS finding because she admitted Children were CHINS.

[11] Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court's determination that Children are CHINS. CHINS proceedings are civil actions; thus, “the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code.” In re N.E., 228 N.E.3d 457, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010)); see also Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3 (providing that CHINS findings must generally be based on a preponderance of the evidence). On review, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. R.L. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 144 N.E.3d 686, 689 (Ind. 2020).

[12] Mother claims that DCS failed to prove the elements required for a CHINS finding under Indiana Code Sections 31-34-1-1 and 31-34-1-2 ⁶ and also failed to prove that the coercive intervention of the juvenile court was necessary. But Mother admitted that Children were CHINS at the fact-finding hearing. When a parent admits that her children are CHINS, DCS is relieved of its obligation to prove the elements of the CHINS statute by a preponderance of the evidence. In re T.F., 272 N.E.3d 1025, 1033 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). If a parent admits that her child is a CHINS, she cannot challenge on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the CHINS finding. Id. (citing Hayden v. Franciscan All., Inc., 131 N.E.3d 685, 693 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)). Because Mother admitted that Children were CHINS, she cannot now claim that there was insufficient evidence to support the CHINS adjudications.⁷

II. Father's Arguments

A. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Father to undergo a psychosexual assessment.

[13] Father first claims that the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering Father to undergo a psychosexual assessment. After a juvenile court has made a CHINS finding, it has broad discretion in determining the programs and services a parent is required to participate in. In re B.W., 266 N.E.3d 744, 751 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (citing In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1258 (Ind. 2012)), trans. denied. “[T]he requirements must relate to some behavior or circumstances that w[ere] revealed by the evidence.” Id. (citing K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1258). Services ordered in a CHINS disposition must be reasonably related to the child's needs and the family's particular circumstances. See id.; Ind. Code § 31-34-19-6 (listing factors juvenile courts must consider when issuing dispositional decrees). We review a juvenile court's dispositional order for an abuse of discretion. B.W., 266 N.E.3d at 751 (citing In re R.G., 130 N.E.3d 1171, 1180-81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)).

[14] Father argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering him to undergo a psychosexual assessment because this requirement was based on allegations that were not established at the fact-finding hearing. In essence, Father argues that a predispositional report, and the court's dispositional order, must be limited to the facts that were proven, or admitted to, at the fact-finding hearing. We disagree.

[15] The fact-finding hearing and the dispositional hearing serve different functions. At issue in the fact-finding hearing is whether a child is a CHINS. See K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1255. A dispositional hearing, in contrast, concerns the “[a]lternatives for the care, treatment, rehabilitation, or placement of the child” and “the necessity, nature, and extent” of parental participation in services. Ind. Code § 31-34-19-1(a)(1), (2). A dispositional hearing, accordingly, operates under its own evidentiary rule that permits the admission of a predispositional report “to the extent that the report contains evidence of probative value even if the report would otherwise be excluded.” Ind. Code § 31-34-19-2(a).

[16] Because a predispositional report may be admitted as evidence at the dispositional hearing, it would be illogical to limit the predispositional report, or the dispositional order, to the evidence that had been presented at the earlier fact-finding hearing. Indeed, if the predispositional report were limited to only the evidence presented at the fact-finding hearing, DCS would be unable to respond to information or circumstances that occurred after the fact-finding hearing, even if such information or circumstances were relevant to the care, treatment, rehabilitation, or placement of the child and the necessity, nature, and extent of parental participation in services.

[17] Father also refers to FCM Colley's testimony regarding E.A.’s statements during the child hearsay evaluation, in which Father claims E.A. recanted her allegations against Father. The juvenile court, however, considered that evidence and noted that, in light of the totality of the evidence, an assessment was warranted. Father's argument is merely an invitation to reweigh that evidence, which we cannot do. See R.L., 144 N.E.3d at 689.

[18] Moreover, the testimony adduced at the dispositional hearing was sufficient by itself to support the juvenile court's dispositional orders. FCM Colley testified without objection that E.A. identified Father as her abuser during her CAC interview, that DCS substantiated E.A.’s allegation, and that Father had reported that he had been a victim of childhood sexual abuse. These circumstances formed the basis for FCM Colley's recommendation that Father complete a psychosexual assessment. The testimony, apart from the information contained in the predispositional report, supports the juvenile court's decision to order Father to undergo a psychosexual assessment.

[19] Nevertheless, Father claims that the juvenile court abused its discretion because E.A. is not his biological child and was not a party to the CHINS proceedings. But this is not the relevant question; the relevant question is whether the conduct at issue is probative of the risk of harm to Children, who are parties in this case. A report of sexual abuse of another child living in the same household as Children is clearly probative of the risk of harm to Children, whether or not the victim is biologically related to Father or was a party to this case. We also note that a psychosexual assessment is an assessment of risk, not a finding of wrongdoing. The conflicting evidence about the underlying allegation, accordingly, does not indicate that the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering Father to undergo the assessment.

[20] Father also claims that his statement that he had been a victim of childhood sexual abuse was not made to FCM Colley and was uncorroborated. But Father did not object to FCM Colley's testimony on hearsay or other grounds, and any argument regarding the admissibility of that testimony is, thus, waived. In re K.W., 178 N.E.3d 1199, 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). And Father's claims regarding the lack of corroboration are merely requests that we reweigh the evidence, which, again, we cannot do. See R.L., 144 N.E.3d at 689.

[21] To the extent that Father argues that there was no evidence that any of the three Children were themselves the victims of sexual abuse, this misunderstands the nature of the services the juvenile court ordered. A protective service, such as a psychosexual assessment, may be ordered to address a risk of harm; the juvenile court need not await proof that a child has been harmed before the court can order services. B.W., 266 N.E.3d at 750. All that is required is that the service ordered by the juvenile court be “relate[d] to some behavior or circumstances that w[ere] revealed by the evidence.” K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1258.

[22] Here, there was evidence that Father had been the victim of childhood sexual abuse and that Children's half-sibling, E.A., who was a member of Children's household, had identified Father as having sexually abused her. Under these facts and circumstances, we cannot say that the juvenile court abused its broad discretion by ordering Father to complete a psychosexual assessment.

B. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion or deny Father due process by overruling Father's objection to the predispositional report.

[23] Father next argues that the juvenile court erred by overruling his objection to the predispositional report, which he claims included allegations against him that were not established at the fact-finding hearing and omitted E.A.’s statements at the later child hearsay evaluation.

[24] Father's argument is essentially one challenging the admission of the predispositional report into evidence. We review a juvenile court's decisions regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence only for an abuse of discretion. N.E., 228 N.E.3d at 473. “A [juvenile] court abuses its discretion only if its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.” Id. Errors in the admission of evidence are to be disregarded as harmless error unless they affect the substantial rights of a party. Id.

[25] Father claims that, by overruling his objection to the predispositional report, the juvenile court “exceeded the scope” of a dispositional hearing. Father's Br. p. 20. That is, he again claims that the predispositional report referred to matters that were not established by Parents’ admissions at the fact-finding hearing. This echoes Father's argument regarding the propriety of the juvenile court ordering Father to undergo a psychosexual assessment, and we again disagree with Father.

[26] Indiana Code § 31-34-19-2(a) provides that a predispositional report “may be admitted into evidence to the extent that the report contains evidence of probative value even if the report would otherwise be excluded.” This statute allows a predispositional report to contain materials that would otherwise be excluded by our evidentiary rules. See K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1259 (“At a dispositional hearing, the juvenile court can admit the [pre]dispositional report of DCS even if it includes hearsay.”). Still, the parent must “be given a fair opportunity to controvert any part of the report admitted into evidence.” I.C. § 31-34-19-2(c).

[27] Here, DCS filed its report eight days before the hearing, and Father was given a fair opportunity to controvert the contents of the report. Accordingly, we cannot say that the juvenile court abused its discretion by overruling Father's objection to the predispositional report.

[28] Father also claims that, by overruling his objection to the predispositional report, the juvenile court denied him due process. Procedural due process requires that a parent receive “the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1257. Father does not claim that he was unaware of the report's contents before the hearing or that he was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to contest them. In fact, DCS filed its predispositional report eight days before the dispositional hearing, well in advance of the forty-eight-hour minimum required by statute. See Ind. Code § 31-34-18-6(a) (providing generally that “[p]redispositional reports shall be made available at least forty-eight (48) hours before the dispositional hearing”).

[29] The predispositional report expressly notified Father of E.A.’s disclosure and that DCS had substantiated E.A.’s claims. At the dispositional hearing, Father's counsel cross-examined FCM Colley regarding the basis for her recommendation and argued against the recommendation that Father complete a psychosexual assessment.

[30] Moreover, we note that FCM Colley testified at the dispositional hearing, without objection, that E.A. identified Father as her abuser during her CAC interview, that DCS substantiated that allegation, and that Father separately disclosed his own history as a victim of childhood sexual abuse. Because the contents of the predispositional report were also established through live testimony that Father had a full opportunity to cross-examine, the report could not have deprived Father of a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the substance of DCS's recommendation, nor did it affect the ultimate outcome.

[31] The same is true of the matters Father contends the predispositional report omitted. On direct examination, DCS elicited FCM Colley's testimony regarding E.A.’s statements during the child hearsay evaluation, and Father's counsel cross-examined her at length concerning those statements. The juvenile court expressly weighed this evidence in making its ruling. The report's omission of E.A.’s statements at the child hearsay evaluation, therefore, did not deprive Father of a meaningful opportunity to be heard, and any error in admitting the report without this information was harmless. We, therefore, cannot say that Father was denied due process by the admission of the predispositional report.

Conclusion

[32] Mother admitted that Children were CHINS under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-3 and, therefore, cannot challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the CHINS findings on appeal. As to Father's claims, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Father to undergo a psychosexual assessment. Nor did the juvenile court abuse its discretion or deny Father due process by overruling Father's objection to the predispositional report. Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court's judgment.

[33] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1 (defining a CHINS as a child whose physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or endangered as a result of a parent's inability, refusal, or neglect to supply necessary care, plus a need for services unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court).

2.   See Ind. Code § 31-34-1-3(c) (defining a CHINS as a child who resides in the same household as a child victim of certain sex offenses, where the child needs services unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court and the assigned caseworker determines either that further intervention is necessary or that informal adjustment is inappropriate).

3.   See Ind. Code § 31-34-12-4.6(a) (creating a rebuttable presumption that a child is a CHINS if the court finds that the child lives in the same household as an adult who is subject to an order under Indiana Code Section 31-34-20-3 requiring the adult to participate in a program of care, treatment, or rehabilitation).

4.   FCM Colley explained that the purpose of such an evaluation is to determine whether a child is able to testify, not to re-interview the child regarding the underlying allegations.

5.   The evaluator's report was not admitted into evidence.

6.   We note that the juvenile court found Children to be CHINS under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-3 and declined to find that Children were CHINS under any other provision. DCS clarified at the fact-finding hearing that it was seeking a CHINS finding only under Section 31-34-1-3. Mother's arguments regarding the elements of Indiana Code Sections 31-34-1-1 and 31-34-1-2 are, therefore, inapposite.

7.   Mother also claims that there was insufficient evidence to show domestic violence between Parents. To the extent this is an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the CHINS findings, it is waived, as noted above. To the extent this is an attack on the juvenile court's dispositional order, which provided that Parents did not have to engage in domestic violence services so long as they did not reside together, we note that, at the time of the dispositional hearing, Parents were not residing together, as Father had moved to Florida without Mother. Unless and until Parents reside with each other again, there is no requirement for Parents to complete a domestic violence assessment, and the issue is not ripe for review. See Garau Germano, P.C. v. Robertson, 133 N.E.3d 161, 167-68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (noting that a court may not review an issue that is not ripe and that an issue is not ripe if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated or occur at all), trans. denied.

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Bradford, J., and Felix, J., concur.