ECHO GREENWOOD LLC v. DENTAL TOUCH LLC (2026)

Statement of the Case

[1] Echo Greenwood LLC appeals the trial court's denial of its motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and the court's grant of A Dental Touch LLC's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Dental Touch cross-appeals for reimbursement of certain expenses it paid to Echo. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.¹

Issues

[2] Echo raises three issues, which we restate as:

I. Whether the trial court erred in denying Echo's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings as to its breach of lease claim and in granting Dental Touch's cross motion for judgment on the pleadings on Dental Touch's claim for specific performance of the lease as to the lease renewal option.

II. Whether the trial court erred in granting Dental Touch's cross motion for judgment on the pleadings on its claim for specific performance of the lease as to the amount of monthly rent for the term of the lease renewal.

III. Whether the trial court erred in ordering Dental Touch to continue to pay a certain amount for common area maintenance and operating expenses for the lease renewal period.

On cross-appeal, Dental Touch presents the issue:

IV. Whether the trial court erred in denying Dental Touch's cross motion for judgment on the pleadings on its claim for reimbursement for common area expenses it paid to Echo.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On February 1, 2004, Dental Touch entered into a twenty-one-year lease for office space in a commercial building in Greenwood. Under that lease, Dental Touch paid $4,000 per month in rent. It also paid its landlord $737.50 per month for common area maintenance and certain operating expenses.

[4] In December 2018, Echo purchased the building. In January 2019, Echo invoiced Dental Touch for common area expenses, insurance, and taxes in the amount of $1,106.25 per month. Dental Touch continued paying $737.50 per month. In April 2024, Dental Touch sought to exercise the renewal option in its lease, but Echo disputed the renewal, claiming Dental Touch was in breach of the lease.

[5] In July 2024, Echo filed its complaint against Dental Touch for breach of contract and eviction. Dental Touch counterclaimed for specific performance requiring Echo to honor the terms of the lease. Echo subsequently moved for partial judgment on the pleadings, and Dental Touch cross moved for judgment on the pleadings. After a hearing on the parties’ motions, the trial court issued an order denying Echo's motion and granting Dental Touch's motion in part. Echo appealed to this Court, but the appeal was dismissed without prejudice and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 225 (Aug. 8, 2025 Order).

[6] On remand, the parties tendered additional filings to the trial court, and on November 12, 2025, the court issued an order denying Echo's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings based on Dental Touch's alleged breach of its obligation under the lease to pay its share of common area maintenance expenses. The court granted Dental Touch's cross motion for judgment on the pleadings regarding its payment obligations under the lease for rent, real estate taxes, insurance, and certain monthly expenses; its notice of intent to exercise the option to renew the lease for an additional ten years; and its monthly rental rate for the ten-year extension. The court denied Dental Touch's motion for judgment on the pleadings concerning its claim that Echo should reimburse it for any overpayment of expenses for common area maintenance. The next day the court entered an additional order clarifying some procedural issues. Both parties now appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[7] A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Trial Rule 12(C) attacks the legal sufficiency of the pleadings. Bettenhausen v. Godby, 878 N.E.2d 1277, 1278 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). In other words, a Rule 12(C) motion is directed toward the substantive merits of the controversy. Poultry & Indus. Suppliers, Inc. v. Incubacol, S.A.S., 250 N.E.3d 448, 454 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied.

[8] We conduct a de novo review of a trial court's decision on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.² Kaur v. Amazon, Inc., 243 N.E.3d 1161, 1165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied. “ ‘Such motions should be granted only where it is clear from the face of the complaint that under no circumstances could relief be granted.’ ‘A judgment on the pleadings is, in reality, a summary judgment minus affidavits and other supporting documents.’ ” Poultry & Indus. Suppliers, 250 N.E.3d at 454 (alteration omitted) (quoting Mourning v. Allison Transmission, Inc., 72 N.E.3d 482, 486 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017)).

[9] The pleadings also consist of any written instruments attached to a pleading. Youell v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 117 N.E.3d 639, 641 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018); see also Eskew v. Cornett, 744 N.E.2d 954, 957 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that because Trial Rule 9.2(A) requires that copy of written document upon which pleading is founded must be attached to pleading, we may look to both pleadings and attached documents for purposes of determining appropriateness of ruling on motion for judgment on pleadings), trans. denied. Thus, we examine only the pleadings, documents attached to the pleadings, and any facts of which we may take judicial notice, and we accept as true all well-pleaded material facts alleged in the complaint. Waldrip v. Waldrip, 976 N.E.2d 102, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

I. Breach of Lease and Lease Renewal Option

[10] Echo argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for partial judgment on the pleadings on its breach of lease claim and in granting Dental Touch's cross motion for judgment on the pleadings on its claim for specific performance of the lease as to the lease renewal option. These two issues are bound together in that Echo contends Dental Touch was in default for failing to reimburse Echo for utilities and common area maintenance services and therefore could not exercise the option to renew the lease.

[11] Echo attached a copy of the lease to its complaint. Echo's claim rests on Dental Touch's purported violations of Section K of the lease, which provides:

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 50 (Ex. 1 to Complaint – Lease ¶ K). From the list of services in Section K., the monthly expenses at issue here are:

4. HVAC Maintenance

5. Water Service

6. Sewer Service

8. Trash Removal

9. Lawn/Landscaping

10. Snow Removal

Section C of the lease states that Dental Touch may renew its lease for a period of ten years, provided it is not in default. Id. at 48. In Section P.2, the lease defines a default, in part, as a failure to pay any amount when due if the failure continues for ten days after written notice. Id. at 51.

[12] The pleadings and documents attached to the pleadings show that prior to Echo purchasing the building, Dental Touch paid its landlord $737.50 per month for certain common area maintenance and operating expenses. Id. at 63 (Counterclaim ¶ 19), 103 (Ex. 7 to Answer/Counterclaim – Estoppel Cert. ¶ 7). These expenses consisted of the following: HVAC maintenance, water service, sewer service, trash removal, lawn/landscaping, and snow removal, which are the expenses at issue in this case. Id. at 104 (Ex. 7 to Answer/Counterclaim – Estoppel Cert. ¶ 7).

[13] Commencing in January 2019 when Echo became the successor landlord, it invoiced Dental Touch for $1,106.25 per month for common area maintenance, insurance, and taxes. Id. at 60 (Counterclaim ¶ 3). Dental Touch disagreed with these charges, and the parties communicated about this assessment over a period of several months without reaching a resolution. See id. at 68-101 (Exs. 1-6 to Answer/Counterclaim – Emails). However, it appears that in addition to its monthly rent payment, Dental Touch continued to pay Echo $737.50 per month for common area maintenance and operating expenses for the duration of the original lease term. See id. at 44 (Complaint ¶ 12); Appellee's Br. p. 26.

[14] In April 2024, Dental Touch notified Echo of its intent to exercise the lease's renewal option. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 107 (Ex. 8 to Answer/Counterclaim – Lease Extension Notice). Echo responded that Dental Touch was not entitled to exercise the renewal option because it was in default for failing for over five years to pay the proper amount for common area maintenance and operating expenses under Section K of the lease. Id. at 108-09 (Ex. 9 to Answer/Counterclaim – Lease Expiration Letter/Notice of Default).

[15] In July 2024, Echo filed its complaint, alleging that it provided Dental Touch with written notice of the monthly estimated common expenses that it would charge under the lease for each calendar year and that Dental Touch has continued to pay a static monthly amount, creating a shortfall on Dental Touch's account. Id. at 44 (Complaint ¶¶ 11-14). Echo further asserted that Dental Touch has refused to pay the shortfall and that such failure to pay constitutes a default under the lease. Id. at 44, 45 (Complaint ¶¶ 15, 19).

[16] We begin our discussion with waiver, which is “ ‘the intentional relinquishment of a known right.’ ” Page Two, Inc. v. P.C. Mgmt., Inc., 517 N.E.2d 103, 106 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Lafayette Car Wash, Inc. v. Boes, 282 N.E.2d 837, 839 (Ind. 1972)). In the context of contracts, the general rule is that if a party to a contract performs acts that recognize the contract as still existing, such as accepting rent payments, specific performance of the terms of the contract is waived, and the party may not claim a forfeiture of the lease. Page Two, Inc., 517 N.E.2d at 106 n.1. “This rule is founded on principles of common honesty: a landlord cannot take the position a lease is valid for one purpose, e.g., collection of rent, and yet declare it invalid for other purposes.” Id.

[17] However, there is a recognized exception to the general rule of waiver that we must also address. Such exception is an anti-waiver lease provision. In HK New Plan Marwood Sunshine Cheyenne, LLC v. Onofrey Food Servs., Inc., this Court held that the landlord did not waive the tenant's default by accepting late payments where the lease expressly provided that no covenant, term, or condition of the lease shall be deemed waived unless waived in writing and that the acceptance of rent shall not be deemed a waiver of any earlier breach regardless of the landlord's knowledge of the breach when the rent is accepted. 846 N.E.2d 318, 325 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).

[18] We turn to the facts before us and view them through the lens of these rules. Echo accepted Dental Touch's monthly rent payments as well as its monthly payments of $737.50 for common area maintenance and operating expenses, all the while knowing that the amount for maintenance and expenses was disputed. Though these actions would generally constitute waiver of Echo's right to claim that Dental Touch had forfeited the lease due to a breach, the lease contains a non-waiver clause. Section U of the lease provides:

No waiver of any covenant or condition or the breach or default of any covenant or condition of this Lease shall be taken to constitute a waiver of any subsequent breach or default, or justify or authorize a non-observance on any other occasion of such or any other covenant or condition. No failure by Landlord to exercise any right or remedy at any time available to Landlord under this Lease shall constitute a waiver of such right or remedy as to the same or any other breach or default by Tenant. The acceptance of rent by Landlord at any time when Tenant is in breach or default of any covenant or condition shall not be construed as a waiver of any default. Landlord's rights and remedies under this Lease are cumulative and neither the inclusion nor the exercise by Landlord of any such right or remedy shall preclude or limit Landlord's exercise of any other right or legal or equitable remedy available under this Lease or under applicable law.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 52 (Ex. 1 to Complaint – Lease ¶ U). Thus, pursuant to this provision, Echo's acceptance of Dental Touch's rent and insufficient payments for maintenance and operating expenses cannot be deemed waiver of any breach by Dental Touch.

[19] Nevertheless, even where a lease contains an anti-waiver clause, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may operate to prevent a landlord, who has acquiesced to a deviation from the lease terms, from asserting a breach and forfeiture without giving the tenant notice and a reasonable opportunity to cure. The estoppel doctrine is based on the rationale that one, who by deed or conduct induced another to act in a particular manner, will not be permitted to adopt an inconsistent position or course of conduct to the detriment of the other who relied on the conduct. T-3 Martinsville, LLC v. US Holding, LLC, 911 N.E.2d 100, 116 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), clarified on reh'g, trans. denied.

[20] In T-3 Martinsville, the tenant failed to pay rent for one and one-half years. After that time, the landlord filed its complaint alleging that the tenant had breached the lease for failing to pay rent during that period. The parties’ lease contained a non-waiver provision stating that no failure of the landlord to insist upon strict performance of the lease shall be construed as a waiver. A panel of this Court determined that, even where a lease contains an anti-waiver clause that might otherwise prevent a landlord's failure to demand strict performance of the terms of the lease from being deemed a waiver, the doctrine of equitable estoppel operates independently to bar a landlord from claiming a breach without notice to the tenant and a reasonable time to cure. Id. at 116-17.

[21] The panel further noted that:

[W]hen a party deviates from strict performance called for by the contract, the former cannot suddenly declare the deviation a breach of contract. Notice must be given to the other party that strict performance will be required in the future, then if the party continues to deviate, a default can be declared. Similarly, when both parties to a contract acquiesce to a delay, neither side can suddenly declare the contract rescinded and simply walk away. Notice must be given to the other party along with an opportunity to perform within a reasonable time.

Id. at 114 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Scott-Reitz Ltd. v. Rein Warsaw Assocs., 658 N.E.2d 98, 104 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)); see also 52 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 191 (2026) (stating that estoppel exists when landlord, by actions or words, implicitly permits tenant to violate provisions of lease over such period of time as to cause tenant to reasonably depend on such actions or words; even if lease contains non-waiver provision, landlord is estopped from taking position inconsistent with its earlier actions and strictly enforcing terms of lease without giving fair notice to tenant).

[22] In this case, the pleadings demonstrate that from January 2019 to April 2024 in addition to its monthly rent Dental Touch paid, and Echo accepted, monthly payments of $737.50 for common area maintenance and operating expenses. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 44 (Complaint ¶ 12); Appellee's Br. p. 26. When Dental Touch attempted to exercise its option to renew the lease in April 2024, Echo responded with a letter that was to “serve as notice to [Dental Touch] that they are in default under Section K of the Lease and therefore not entitled to their renewal option. [Echo] expects [Dental Touch] to vacate the premises upon the expiration of their current term on 1/31/2025.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 107 (Ex. 8 to Answer/Counterclaim – Lease Extension Notice), 109 (Ex. 9 to Answer/Counterclaim – Lease Expiration Letter/Notice of Default). Echo had notified Dental Touch that its payments were insufficient but continued to accept Dental Touch's non-conforming payments for over five years, causing Dental Touch to rely on this acceptance. Echo waited until Dental Touch attempted to renew its lease to suddenly declare a breach.

[23] Accordingly, based on the foregoing, we conclude that Echo acquiesced in Dental Touch's allegedly insufficient payments for common area maintenance/operating expenses for over five years. Notwithstanding the lease's anti-waiver provision, Echo cannot now claim a breach without giving Dental Touch notice that strict performance will be required in the future. Then should Dental Touch not strictly perform in the future, Echo must give Dental Touch notice of its default and a reasonable opportunity to cure before taking action to terminate the lease. Therefore, Echo's complaint alleging a breach of contract is premature and did not terminate the lease or preclude Dental Touch from exercising its renewal option to renew the lease for a ten-year period commencing February 1, 2025. Thus, Dental Touch's exercise of the lease renewal option was effective.

II. Rent Amount for Renewal Period

[24] Echo next claims the trial court erred in granting Dental Touch's cross motion for judgment on the pleadings on its claim for specific performance of the lease as to the amount of monthly rent for the term of the lease renewal. More particularly, Echo argues that the trial court incorrectly interpreted the terms of the lease.

[25] A lease is construed in the same manner as any other contract. Youell, 117 N.E.3d at 641. When construing a contract, our primary task is to determine and implement the intent of the parties at the time they entered the contract. Matter of Est. of Webster, 275 N.E.3d 928, 936 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (quoting Wohlt v. Wohlt, 245 N.E.3d 611, 616 (Ind. 2024)). Accordingly, we look first to the language of the agreement. Id. We neither construe clear and unambiguous contract language nor add provisions not agreed upon by the parties. Matter of Est. of Webster, 275 N.E.3d at 936.

[26] Contract terms are not necessarily ambiguous, and thus subject to judicial construction, merely because they are not defined in the contract or because the parties differ as to their meaning. Id. (quoting Holiday Hosp. Franchising, Inc. v. AMCO Ins. Co., 983 N.E.2d 574, 578 (Ind. 2013)). Rather, terms are ambiguous only if they are subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. Matter of Est. of Webster, 275 N.E.3d at 936.

[27] The lease provides:

C. TERM AND RENEWALS:

․

All of the terms and conditions of this Lease shall apply during the renewal periods, except that the rent shall be adjusted as provided below.

Tabular or graphical material not displayable at this time. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 48 (Ex. 1 to Complaint – Lease). Echo alleges that use of the word “shall” in this provision, indicates that the parties are required to adjust the rent amount for the renewal period. Echo further contends that because the parties did not supply a rent amount in Section D.3 of the lease, as they were required to do, the renewal option is rendered unenforceable. Alternatively, Echo argues the lease is ambiguous.

[28] There is only one reasonable way to interpret this provision. The parties agreed that all the terms and conditions of the lease would apply during the renewal period and that the only exception to this rule could be the rent. However, the lease does not require the rent to be adjusted. The word “shall” does not modify only the words “be adjusted;” rather, “shall” modifies the whole phrase “be adjusted as provided below.” In other words, if the rent amount is adjusted for the renewal period, it shall be adjusted in the manner noted below.

[29] Section D.3 is the field in the lease where any rent adjustment for the renewal period was to be noted. Like the sentence in Section C., the language of Section D.3 also indicates that an adjustment was not required by stating “if applicable.” See id. (¶ D.3). We are mindful that courts should interpret a contract so as to harmonize its provisions rather than place them in conflict. Matter of Est. of Webster, 275 N.E.3d at 936. The parties left blank the field in Section D.3, indicating the rent would remain the same.

[30] We conclude that the renewal provision is not ambiguous. Accordingly, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning to the provision to determine that Dental Touch and its previous landlord intended for the rent amount to remain the same for the renewal period. Therefore, the rent for the ten-year renewal period remains $4,000 per month.

III. Continuation of Monthly Payments of $737.50

[31] Both parties assert that the trial court erred when it ordered Dental Touch to continue to pay Echo $737.50 per month for certain common area expenses. The court ordered:

V. ORDER

1. The Court Orders that the Lease imposed no obligation on Dental Touch to pay monthly estimated payments for common area expenses associated with Echo Greenwood's ownership and operating of three buildings in the Emerson Office Park. However, the Court Orders that, pursuant to its prior history, Dental Touch continue to pay Echo Greenwood the sum of Seven Hundred Thirty-Seven dollars and Fifty Cents ($737.50) per month toward Dental Touch's share of the HVAC Maintenance, Water Service, Sewer Service, Trash Removal, Lawn and Landscaping, and Snow Removal. Dental Touch shall be solely responsible to the service provider directly for Electrical Service, Heat and/or Gas Service, Telephone Service, Cleaning/Janitorial, Fire Sprinkler System and Alarm/Security System.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 40 (Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions Thereon and Order on Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings).

[32] Echo and Dental Touch agree that the trial court decided this issue and entered judgment on it despite the fact that it was not litigated by the parties. See Appellant's Br. pp. 38-39; Appellee's Br. pp. 24-25. Echo sued Dental Touch seeking (1) a declaration that Dental Touch is in breach of the lease and thus unable to exercise the renewal option of the lease, (2) damages for such breach, and (3) termination of the lease. Dental Touch counterclaimed seeking (1) an order that Echo honor the terms of the lease, specifically the provisions concerning the ten-year extension of the lease and the monthly rent during the extension period, and (2) an order that Echo reimburse Dental Touch for the monthly payments of $737.50 it made to Echo under the original lease period commencing January 2019.

[33] The pleadings do not purport to litigate a monthly amount to be paid by Dental Touch to Echo under the lease extension, nor do they request the court to order such. Thus, we conclude the trial court erred when it made a determination on and ordered Dental Touch to pay Echo $737.50 per month during the lease extension period.

IV. Reimbursement for Monthly Expenses

[34] Dental Touch claims that the trial court erred in denying its cross motion for judgment on the pleadings on its claim for reimbursement for the $737.50 per month it has paid to Echo for common area expenses. Dental Touch contends that it overpaid Echo and should be reimbursed because it was not required by the lease to pay these expenses to Echo.

[35] We first address Dental Touch's statement that “[n]ow that it has been established that the trial court erred in modifying the parties’ Lease and that no equitable relief is available to Echo here, it follows that [Dental Touch] is entitled to reimbursement for overpayments to Echo since Echo assumed the Lease.” Appellee's Br. p. 25. No such determination has been made. Rather, we conclude, and the parties agree, that the trial court's ruling that Dental Touch should continue to pay $737.50 each month is erroneous because the issue was not pleaded by the parties or litigated in the trial court. See Issue III, supra.

[36] Turning to Dental Touch's argument that it should be reimbursed, we look to the parties’ pleadings. The pleadings show that commencing in January 2019, Echo invoiced Dental Touch for $1,106.25 per month for common area maintenance, insurance, and taxes. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 60 (Counterclaim ¶ 3). Dental Touch disagreed with these charges, and the parties communicated about this assessment over a period of several months without reaching a resolution. See id. at 68-101 (Exs. 1-6 to Answer/Counterclaim – Emails). Nonetheless, in addition to its monthly rent payment, it appears that Dental Touch paid Echo $737.50 per month for common area maintenance and operating expenses for the remainder of the original lease term. See id. at 44 (Complaint ¶ 12); Appellee's Br. p. 26.

[37] Although Dental Touch paid Echo $737.50 every month for more than five years, it now alleges that it was not required to make those payments to Echo and should be reimbursed for such payments. And Dental Touch contends that, based on the non-waiver provision of the lease, its continuing payments to Echo cannot be deemed waiver of its claim for reimbursement. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 52 (Ex. 1 to Complaint – Lease ¶ U).

[38] Assuming that the non-waiver provision found in Section U of the lease applies to Dental Touch, we observe that the voluntary payment doctrine may nevertheless operate to prevent Dental Touch from obtaining a refund. As a general rule, money voluntarily paid with full knowledge of all the facts, and not induced by fraud or improper conduct, cannot be recovered even though it was not legally due. Time Warner Ent. Co., L.P. v. Whiteman, 802 N.E.2d 886, 889-90 (Ind. 2004) (quoting 23 I.L.E. Payment §§ 41, 42-43 (1970)). Thus, the voluntary payment doctrine provides that “money voluntarily paid in the face of a recognized uncertainty as to the existence or extent of the payor's obligation to the recipient may not be recovered, on the ground of ‘mistake,’ merely because the payment is subsequently revealed to have exceeded the true amount of the underlying obligation.” Time Warner Ent. Co., 802 N.E.2d at 892 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 6 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001) (emphasis in original)); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 6 cmt. e (2011).

[39] The voluntary payment doctrine can apply where money has been paid under a contract. 23 I.L.E. Payment § 21 (2026) (citing Bd. of Comm'rs of Warren Cnty. v. Gregory, 42 Ind. 32 (1873)). And application of the rule is limited to situations where a party has voluntarily paid a disputed amount. Time Warner Ent. Co., 802 N.E.2d at 891; cf. City of Jeffersonville v. Hallmark at Jeffersonville, L.P., 937 N.E.2d 402, 409 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that voluntary payment doctrine did not preclude refund of overpaid fees where payor was put in position of having to make payment in order to receive service), trans. denied.

[40] Here, Dental Touch disputed whether it owed anything to Echo on a monthly basis besides its rent payment, and, if it did owe more than the rent, it disputed the amount it owed. In March 2019, counsel for Dental Touch acknowledged that prior to 2019 Dental Touch had paid $737.50 in common area maintenance but that Dental Touch and Echo had been unable to reach an agreement “for the continuation of that practice” “going forward.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 100 (Ex. 6 to Counterclaim). Nevertheless, Dental Touch paid Echo $737.50 per month from January 2019 for the remainder of its original lease term. During that time, Echo continued to notify Dental Touch that it was not paying the correct amount. Id. at 44 (Complaint ¶¶ 11-15).

[41] Thus, with full knowledge of the facts and disputing that it owed anything besides rent under the terms of the lease, Dental Touch continued its course of paying Echo $737.50 per month for over five years. We conclude that, pursuant to the voluntary payment doctrine, such course of action prevents Dental Touch from obtaining reimbursement for these payments, even though they may not have been legally due.

[42] Finally, the parties request remand to the trial court for a determination of both trial and appellate attorney fees. See Appellant's Br. p. 40; Appellee's Br. pp. 26-27. We grant that request.

Conclusion

[43] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court's denial of Echo's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings as to its breach of lease claim was not erroneous because the doctrine of equitable estoppel prevents Echo from asserting a breach and forfeiture.

[44] We further conclude that the trial court properly denied Echo's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and granted Dental Touch's cross motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the lease renewal option. Dental Touch was not in breach of the lease at the time it exercised the option to renew its lease, and thus, Dental Touch's exercise of the lease renewal option was effective. In addition, the lease term for the rent amount during the lease renewal period was not ambiguous.

[45] We also conclude that the trial court erred in ordering Dental Touch to continue to pay $737.50 per month for the lease renewal period as that issue was not pleaded or litigated by the parties in the trial court.

[46] On Dental Touch's cross-appeal, we conclude that the trial court's denial of Dental Touch's cross motion for judgment on the pleadings on its claim for reimbursement for common area expenses it paid to Echo was not erroneous. Dental Touch is prevented by the doctrine of voluntary payment from obtaining reimbursement.

[47] On the issue of attorney fees, we remand to the trial court for a determination. [48] Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part.

FOOTNOTES

1.   By separate order issued simultaneously with this opinion, we deny the parties’ motions for oral argument.

2.   We note that the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 14. The entry of specific findings and conclusions thereon generally triggers a different standard of review than we employ here. See Ind. Trial Rule 52(A) (“[T]he court on appeal shall not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”). But such findings and conclusions in the grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings have a different posture because a judgment on the pleadings is appropriate only where there are no genuine issues of material fact to be resolved. Accordingly, we are not bound by the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions thereon. See Midwest Psych. Ctr., Inc. v. Ind. Dep't of Admin., 959 N.E.2d 896, 902, n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied; see also T.R. 52(A) (“Findings of fact are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rule[ ] 12.”).

Crone, Senior Judge.

Altice, J., and Foley, J., concur.