III v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Robert Louis Miller III appeals the trial court's determination that he violated the terms of his probation and its accompanying sanction. He presents two issues for our review: (1) whether the State presented sufficient evidence that he violated his probation and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in sanctioning him. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In May 2023, Miller pled guilty to Level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine and Level 6 felony obstruction of justice. The trial court sentenced him to six years, with three years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC) and three years suspended to probation. Miller's probation began in December 2024.

[3] On June 1, 2025, Katlyn Cole, Miller's girlfriend, contacted the Madison County Sheriff's Department and reported she and Miller had been in an argument a few days earlier during which he hit and choked her, threatened to shoot her, and broke her phone. Thereafter, the State charged Miller with Level 3 felony criminal confinement, Level 5 felony theft, Level 5 felony intimidation, Level 5 felony unlawful carrying of a handgun, Level 6 felony strangulation, Class A misdemeanor domestic battery, Class A misdemeanor interference with reporting a crime, and Class A misdemeanor unlawful carrying of a handgun. See Cause No. 48C04-2506-F3-001733 (Cause No. 1733).¹

[4] On July 1, the State filed a notice of violation of probation alleging in part that Miller was charged with the new offenses under Cause No. 1733. A revocation hearing was held in September. At the hearing, Cole testified that she and Miller argued throughout the weekend of May 29 to June 1. She stated that, during one of the arguments, Miller “shoved” her and “struck [her] on the left side of [her] head and face.” Tr. Vol. I p. 36. She described another argument that weekend during which he was “yelling at [her]” and began “choking” her. Id. at 37-38. She further stated that Miller was armed with a gun during these arguments, and that he held the gun up to her head and threatened to shoot her and her family. Cole also testified that, during one of the arguments, Miller took her phone and destroyed it, and “block[ed] the door” so she could not leave. Id. at 55.

[5] Miller testified at the hearing and admitted he and Cole argued but denied any physical violence and denied possessing a gun. Miller's grandmother, who resided with Miller, testified she did not hear or see any fighting or physical violence that weekend.

[6] Following the testimony, the trial court stated:

The court finds that there are certainly some inconsistencies in Ms. Cole's testimony. That's not unusual with witnesses to any proceeding, particularly when talking about ․ a complicated matter, a transaction that spanned several days․ I do find there are, however, some internal inconsistencies there․ I couple that, or compare that rather with the defendant's testimony, which is in comparison rather skeletal. It wasn't in the same level of detail. Um, as to demeanor, I generally find that Ms. Cole's demeanor [ ] was consistent with truthful testimony.

Id. at 95-96. The court found the State had proved Miller committed the new offenses by a preponderance of the evidence, and therefore that Miller violated the conditions of his probation. The court then revoked Miller's probation. With regard to the sanction, the court noted Miller “was under court supervision already for serious felony offenses” and nonetheless “committed more serious offenses involving a weapon and significant battery against an individual.” Id. at 105. The court ordered him to serve the entirety of his three-year suspended sentence in the DOC. Miller now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Probation “is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). A trial court has discretion to set the conditions of probation and “to revoke probation if the conditions are violated.” Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013). Revocation of probation is a two-step process. Id. The court must first determine whether a violation occurred. Id. An offender need only violate one condition of probation for the trial court to revoke his probation. Luke v. State, 51 N.E.3d 401, 421 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. Second, if the trial court finds the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court may continue the probation, extend the term of probation, or “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h) (2015).

I. Revocation

[8] A probation revocation proceeding is civil in nature, and therefore the State must prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Smith v. State, 727 N.E.2d 763, 765 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). When the sufficiency of evidence is at issue, “we use the same standard as in any other sufficiency question[,]” id., and consider only the evidence “most favorable to the judgment without reweighing that evidence or judging the credibility of the witnesses[,]” Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 639 (Ind. 2008). We will affirm a probation revocation “[i]f there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's decision that a defendant has violated any terms of probation[.]” Id. at 639-40. When the State alleges a probation violation based on a new offense, it must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the offense. Jackson v. State, 6 N.E.3d 1040, 1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

[9] Miller argues the evidence is insufficient to show he violated probation by committing the new offenses. Specifically, he emphasizes evidence favorable to the defense—including his testimony, his grandmother's testimony, and the lack of physical evidence. But as noted above, we consider only evidence favorable to the trial court's judgment and do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. Here, Cole testified in detail regarding Miller's physical attacks against her, including that he hit her, choked her, threatened her with a gun, took and destroyed her cell phone, and at times would not allow her to leave his residence. This testimony is sufficient to prove Miller committed the new offenses by a preponderance of the evidence.

[10] Miller also argues Cole's testimony was not credible, citing various alleged inconsistencies in her testimony. However, the trial court heard all of the evidence, acknowledged these inconsistencies, and still concluded Cole was a credible witness. We will not second-guess this determination, as to do so would require us to reweigh the evidence and reassess the credibility of witnesses in contravention of our standard of review. See Terpstra v. State, 138 N.E.3d 278, 285 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. Because the State produced sufficient evidence to prove by a preponderance of the evidence Miller committed the new offenses, we affirm the revocation of his probation.

II. Sanction

[11] Miller next challenges the sanction imposed by the trial court. As noted above, Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(h) offers the trial court the following options when it finds a defendant has violated the terms of his probation: (1) “[c]ontinue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions[,]” (2) “[e]xtend the person's probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period[,]” or (3) “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” We review a trial court's selection of a sanction for an abuse of discretion. Overstreet v. State, 136 N.E.3d 260, 263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id.

[12] Here, the trial court ordered Miller to serve the entirety of his three-year suspended sentence. In doing so, the trial court emphasized that Miller, who was on probation for felony convictions, committed “more serious offenses” involving a handgun and “significant” battery. Tr. Vol. I p. 105. It is well within the trial court's discretion to determine this warrants full revocation of Miller's probation. Miller emphasizes that the new offenses were “unproven,” but, as noted above, the State sufficiently proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Miller committed the new offenses. Appellant's Br. p. 17. As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the entirety of Miller's three-year suspended sentence.

[13] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Miller later pled guilty to all counts, and the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate of twelve years, with ten years executed in the DOC and two years suspended to probation. See Cause No. 1733.

Scheele, Judge.

May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.