S.G., Appellant-Respondent v. Kids’ Voice of Indiana, Appellee-Guardian ad Litem, (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] S.G. (Mother) appeals the involuntary termination of her parental rights to her minor children, J.G., L.G., and A.G. (collectively, the Children).¹ She contends that the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) failed to present sufficient evidence that termination of parental rights is in the Children's best interests.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] On October 17, 2023, the Children were removed from Mother's care by DCS on an emergency basis, and the next day, DCS filed a petition alleging that the Children were children in need of services (CHINS). At the time of removal, L.G. was five weeks old, A.G. was fourteen months old, and J.G. was three years old. They had been living with Mother.

[4] DCS became involved after L.G. was brought to the hospital on October 16, 2023, with extensive physical injuries that were consistent with abuse. Specifically, the infant had suffered traumatic brain injury and multiple fractures. Mother was arrested and then charged, on October 19 under Cause No. 49D31-2310-F3-029496 (the Felony Case), with multiple counts of Level 3 felony battery and neglect based on L.G.’s serious injuries. As a condition of her pretrial release, the criminal court ordered Mother to have no contact with the Children or Father. Mother violated the no contact order on December 24, 2023. As a result, her bond was revoked in the Felony Case, and new charges were filed under Cause No. 49D31-2312-CM-035932 (the Misdemeanor Case) for Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy.

[5] In the meantime, J.G. had been placed by DCS with Father on a temporary trial home visit (TTV), and so too were L.G. and A.G. after their eventual discharge from the hospital. Both L.G. and A.G. had (and still have) significant medical needs that required medical and therapeutic appointments.

[6] Following a factfinding hearing in December 2023, the Children were adjudicated CHINS on April 2, 2024. The CHINS court noted, among other things, that Father had not demonstrated the ability to provide for the Children's needs, particularly related to medical care, without the assistance of DCS-funded service providers. The court observed that although Father had maintained regular involvement in their lives prior to removal, the Children “still sustained injuries consistent with abuse while in their mother's care.” Exhibits Vol. at 82. The court continued to authorize the TTV.

[7] At the dispositional hearing on April 18, 2024, the CHINS court ordered Father to participate in Father Engagement and ensure that the Children attend all medical appointments. The court ordered Mother to contact DCS within seventy-two hours of her release from incarceration and to participate in homebased therapy, a parenting assessment, home based case management, medication management, a psychological evaluation, and follow the recommendations of all services.

[8] Just over a month later, the CHINS court held a detention hearing based on DCS's report that the Children had missed several medical appointments while in Father's care. The court authorized DCS to place the Children in foster care and end the TTV on May 21, 2024. Thereafter, Father refused to participate in services, did not complete Father Engagement, and would not exercise parenting time with the Children.

[9] On May 22, 2024, Mother entered into a plea agreement to resolve both of her pending criminal cases. In the Felony Case, Mother pled guilty to one of the Level 3 felony counts pending against her – Count 1, domestic battery resulting in serious bodily injury to a person less than fourteen years old – and the other counts were dismissed. In the Misdemeanor Case, Mother pled guilty as charged, and the parties agreed to a one-year sentence to be served consecutively to the sentence in the Felony Case. The criminal court then sentenced Mother in the Felony Case to six years, with three years suspended, and provided that one year of the executed sentence could be served in community corrections if appropriate and that Mother would serve two years on probation, which could terminate after one year on probation with no violations. In the Misdemeanor Case, Mother received a one-year suspended sentence. Also, pursuant to the agreement, the court issued a no contact order in both cases, preventing Mother from having any contact with the Children, as well as several other individuals, for the duration of her aggregate sentence or until vacated by the court.

[10] A year later, at a permanency hearing, the CHINS court changed the permanency plan for the Children to adoption. Thereafter, on June 2, 2025, DCS filed the instant petitions to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of both Mother and Father to the Children. At that point, Mother had been released from prison since March 20, 2025, and placed on home detention to complete the executed portion of her sentence.² While on home detention, Mother participated in mental health and case management services through Aspire but not through the DCS referrals. These services included a psychological evaluation, ongoing therapy, medication management, a parenting assessment, and home based case management.

[11] The termination factfinding hearing was held on November 17 and 20, 2025. Mother testified and acknowledged that she had not seen the Children since October 17, 2023, due to a no contact order that remained active at the time of the hearing. Mother was scheduled to complete home detention in about a month and to begin serving two years of probation. She remained unemployed and had just moved out of a home where she was renting a room. With rental assistance from the Interdisciplinary Defense System, a reentry program, Mother was then able to move into her own rental home. Pointing to services she had engaged in since being on home detention, as well as in prison, Mother asked the court for more time to work toward reunification with the Children.

[12] Although Mother claimed to be unaware of the Children having any special needs, Family Case Manager (FCM) Brittany Sammons testified that she had explained to Mother their medical issues and need for many medical appointments. Further, DCS presented evidence regarding the Children's removal from Mother “due to severe physical abuse [and] medical neglect” and their extensive special needs. Transcript at 94.

[13] As a result of her traumatic brain injuries, L.G. has hydrocephalus – a buildup of cerebral fluid around her brain – that is controlled with a shunt that drains the fluid from her head to her stomach. Her foster mother (Foster Mother A.W.), a retired registered nurse of thirty years, testified that the shunt requires constant monitoring because if it fails and L.G. does not receive timely medical attention, she could die. L.G. also developed cerebral palsy, and she was still healing from the multiple bone fractures sustained while an infant in Mother's care. L.G. is followed by multiple medical and therapeutic specialists including a neurologist, neurosurgeon, orthopedist, physical therapist, occupational therapist, and developmental therapist. Beyond treatments and appointments with specialists, L.G. receives daily care from Foster Mother A.W., who wishes to adopt L.G.³

[14] A.G. and J.G. were placed in foster care together and, since March 2025, have been in the care of M.M. (Foster Mother M.M.). At the time of the hearing, J.G. had just been diagnosed with autism. Foster Mother M.M. testified that he participates in weekly physical therapy at Riley Hospital and occupational and speech therapies at his developmental preschool. Additionally, A.G. has extensive medical needs related to fractured bones that healed without medical care and a dislocated hip and femur that will require surgery in a couple of years. A.G. has difficulty walking because her legs are different lengths. She sees an orthopedist at Riley Hospital and participates in physical and occupational therapies at the developmental preschool. A.G. also attends the foster care bridge clinic, genetic clinic, and dental clinic at Riley Hospital. Foster Mother M.M. testified that she wishes to adopt A.G. and J.G., and she and Foster Mother A.W. testified that they were committed to continuing regular contact between the Children.

[15] The Children's guardian ad litem (GAL), Rabia Baksh, testified that the Children had “devastating and life changing [injuries]” upon removal from Mother's care. Id. at 80. After detailing their conditions at removal and their ongoing special needs, GAL Baksh testified that she believed termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the Children. She explained that Mother had not demonstrated the ability to care for the Children in an appropriate manner and had not seen them for more than two years. GAL Baksh opined that there was “likely no bond there anymore.” Id. at 63. And the Children were currently “in stable nurturing homes where they can receive the care that they need free of injury or neglect” and were thriving. Id. GAL Baksh testified that she did not believe it would be in the best interests of the Children to give Mother more time to work toward reunification. On cross-examination, acknowledging that Mother had been participating in services and doing well since being released from prison, GAL Baksh testified that such did not change her recommendation regarding termination of parental rights, which was based on the totality of the circumstances.

[16] Similarly, FCM Sammons testified that she believed termination of parental rights was in the Children's best interests despite Mother's recent participation and progress in services. She noted that DCS had been unable to observe Mother with the Children, which was particularly important given the prior physical abuse; that the Children “have significant ongoing medical needs that will need to be met constantly”; and “just overall ․ they've not had any contact with mom.” Id. at 100. FCM Sammons testified further:

I believe it's in their best interest. [I]t'll provide them permanency. It will provide them a place that is going to allow them to be free from abuse and neglect. I mean, consistently, they will be able to have their medical needs met on a consistent basis. The kids are starting to become school aged. We don't know at this time if they might need educational support, which they very well might need. But yeah, I mean, I just know that they're going to have their needs met and that they're going to be safe.

Id. at 101-02. FCM Sammons added that Mother was not in a position, at that time, to provide permanency for the Children.

[17] In addition to her own testimony, Mother presented the testimony of two of her services providers through Aspire. Marta Ritz provided weekly individual therapy to Mother from April to September 2025, working on emotional regulation, mindfulness, and coping skills, and then transitioned in September to life skills training. Ritz testified that Mother had been diagnosed with borderline personality disorder (which Mother disputed at the hearing),⁴ PTSD, anxiety, and depression. Ritz acknowledged on cross-examination that she could not make a recommendation to the court regarding whether the Children would be safe in Mother's care and that she had not discussed with Mother the reasons for DCS's initial involvement with the family.

[18] Madison Teskey, a behavioral health consultant with Aspire, also offered brief testimony for Mother. Teskey began working with Mother in July 2025 and saw her about once a month for weight loss and smoking cessation, along with related coping skills to address stress.

[19] At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court took the matter under advisement. On January 16, 2026, the court issued an order terminating Mother's (and Father's) parental rights. The order included specific findings of fact, consistent with the facts set out above. The court's conclusions also contained findings of fact and provided in part as follows:

5. Conditions Resulting in Removal or Reasons for Placement Outside the Home - IC 31-35-2-4(d)(3).

a. There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal and [ ] continued placement outside the home of parents will not be remedied.

b. The Children were removed from Mother's care after Mother seriously injured [L.G.]. The Children have remained outside of Mother's care as she served an executed prison sentence, there is a criminal no contact order in place, and Mother has not proven that she can safely care for the Children and provide for their extensive medical needs.

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d. As of the date of the termination factfinding, these conditions have not been remedied.

e. While Mother has engaged in services regarding her mental health since her release from incarceration in May 2025, there was no evidence presented that she has therapeutically addressed the reasons for DCS involvement with her family. Notably, Mother did not acknowledge her role in causing [L.G.’s] injuries when asked about the reasons for initial DCS involvement.

f. Similarly, there was no evidence that Mother has successfully engaged in the parenting curriculum as recommended by her parent/family functional assessment or that she has improved her ability to properly parent the Children since the filing of the CHINS case.

g. Mother has not had meaningful contact or parenting time with the Children since October 2023 and has not proven that she can safely care for the Children and provide for all of their needs. As of the trial dates, Mother has a criminal no contact order in place with all of the Children.

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l. Due to Mother's and Father's inability to safely care for the Children after more than two years since the CHINS case was filed, the Court finds that DCS has shown by clear and convincing evidence that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal and for continued placement outside the home of parents will not be remedied.

6. Threat to the Children's Well-Being - IC 31-35-2-4(d)(4)

a. There is a reasonable probability that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Children's well-being.

b. The Children have special medical needs and need consistency and structure in the home environment, and a caregiver who understands their medical needs and can ensure these needs are met.

c. The Children have no relationship or bond to Mother. They have not had contact with her since October 2023.

d. At the beginning of the trial in these matters, she was not aware that they had any special medical needs.

e. In addition, Mother has not acknowledged that her actions lead to [L.G.] being seriously injured or provided evidence that she has engaged in services that have addressed this issue.

f. Mother has not demonstrated that she can safely parent the Children and provide for their needs.

g. Mother's lack of relationship with the Children, her lack of understanding of the Children's extensive medical needs, and her lack of acknowledgement of her role in causing extensive injuries to [L.G.], along with the Children's need for stability and permanency illustrate that continuation of the parent-child relationship between Mother and the Children is a threat to the Children's emotional, mental, and physical well-being.

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j. The Court finds that DCS has shown by clear and convincing evidence that there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship between Mother and Father and the Children poses a threat to the Children's wellbeing.

7. Termination in the Children's Best Interests - IC 31-35-2-4(c)(3)

a. When deciding whether termination is in a child's best interests, a court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed. Recommendations of the family case manager and court-appointed advocate to terminate parental rights, coupled with evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. See Stewart v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re J.S.), 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

b. FCM Sammons and GAL Baksh believe that termination of parental rights is in the Children's best interests.

c. The Children need permanency and a safe and stable home environment, necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, and supervision, which neither parent has provided nor is poised to provide.

d. Neither Mother nor Father has demonstrated the ability to provide the Children with a permanent, safe, and stable home environment or provide for their needs.

e. There is clear and convincing evidence that the conditions which led to continued removal of the Children from the care of the parents is unlikely to be remedied. Coupled with the recommendation from the Family Case Manager and Guardian ad Litem, there is sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that termination is in the Children's best interests. The Court finds that DCS has shown by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the Children's best interests.

Appendix at 153-55. The court also determined that DCS has a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the Children, which is adoption by their respective foster placements.

[20] Mother now appeals the termination order, challenging only the best interests determination. Additional information will be provided below as needed.

Standard of Review

[21] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we cannot reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses, and thus we will consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's judgment. Matter of Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019). In deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside its judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

[22] Our review for clear error is confined to two steps: whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the trial court's findings of fact and whether the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). Reviewing whether the evidence “clearly and convincingly” supports the findings, or the findings “clearly and convincingly” support the judgment, is not a license to reweigh the evidence. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014) (observing that weighing the evidence under the clear and convincing evidence standard applicable to termination cases is the trial court's prerogative, not ours). Further, we must accept any unchallenged findings as true. See Matter of To.R., 177 N.E.3d 478, 485 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied.

Discussion & Decision

[23] Although parental rights are of constitutional dimension, the law provides for the termination of these rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In re R.H., 892 N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). In addition, a court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding the termination. In re J.W., 27 N.E.3d 1185, 1188 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.

[24] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, DCS must allege and prove by clear and convincing evidence: (1) the existence of one or more of the circumstances described in Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d) (Subsection (d)); (2) there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child; and (3) termination is in the child's best interests. I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c); Ind. Code § 31-34-12-2.

[25] On appeal, Mother challenges only the trial court's determination regarding the best interests of the Children. That is, she does not challenge the court's determinations under Subsection (d) that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal and continued placement outside of Mother's home will not be remedied and that there is a reasonable probability that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Children's well-being. Moreover, Mother does not directly challenge any of the trial court many findings of fact.

[26] Mother's argument is that the Children are thriving in their current foster placements and thus no harm would likely befall them if she was given an opportunity to continue working toward completion of services and to demonstrate her abilities over a longer period. In this regard, Mother notes her compliance and participation in services while incarcerated and on home detention.

[27] When making a best-interest determination, a trial court must look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parent's interests to those of the child, with the child's need for permanency being a central consideration. See Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. Further, “we have previously held that recommendations of the case manager and court-appointed advocate, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights is in a child's best interests[.]” In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1006 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[28] Mother attempts to liken this case to that of In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257 (Ind. 2009), in which the Supreme Court overturned a termination order on the basis that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother's parental rights was in her child's best interests. But G.Y. is easily distinguishable. In that case, the mother was incarcerated due to a drug offense that occurred prior to her child's conception and for which she was not incarcerated until he was twenty months old. She was the child's sole caretaker for those first twenty months, and “there [were] no allegations that she engaged in any criminal behavior during this period of time or that she was an unfit parent in any way.” Id. at 1258. Further, while incarcerated, she “maintained a consistent, positive relationship” with her child, with regular visits at the prison facility and by sending cards, pictures, and letters to him. Id. at 1264. The Supreme Court also noted that although the GAL testified that termination was in the child's best interests due to the need for permanency and stability, she “qualified her recommendation” by recognizing the bond she had observed between the mother and child and noting that continued contact with the mother would be in the child's best interests. Id. at 1265. Ultimately, the Supreme Court determined that the general need for permanency and stability was not sufficiently strong to establish that termination of the parent-child relationship was in the child's best interests, as the mother was soon to be released from prison and had worked hard toward reunification and been committed to maintaining her bond with the child while incarcerated, and there was no evidence that waiting to be reunited with her would be harmful to the child.

[29] Mother is in a very different situation than that before the Supreme Court in G.Y. In this case, Mother's incarceration was directly linked to repeated criminal behavior during the lifetime of the Children, and L.G., at only one month old, was Mother's victim in the Felony Case. L.G. suffered serious, life-altering brain damage and other injuries while in Mother's care. At removal, A.G. and J.G., then only one and three years old, had also suffered injuries, medical neglect, or other neglect while in Mother's care. And even after the Children were removed from her care and while the CHINS case was proceeding, Mother committed another criminal offense involving the Children – she violated the no contact order that the criminal court had put in place.

[30] Mother participated in services and treatment while serving her sentence in prison and on home detention, which is commendable, but the fact remains that by the time of the final termination hearing, she had not seen the Children in more than two years. The no contact order had precluded Mother from maintaining or developing a bond with the Children, and the order was in place due to Mother's own criminal actions. Given their young ages at the time of removal, and their total lack of contact with Mother throughout the CHINS proceedings, they had no bond with her. On the other hand, the Children were bonded with their respective foster mothers and were thriving in safe, loving environments where their special medical and therapeutic needs were being met. Further, there was no indication that Mother would be able to meet those special needs, as she testified that she was unaware that the Children even had special needs.

[31] Both FCM Sammons and GAL Baksh unreservedly opined that termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the Children. Indeed, Mother was not in position to safely and properly care for the Children at that time, the Children had no bond with Mother, and the Children have extensive special needs. And as determined by the trial court, there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal and continued placement outside of Mother's home will not be remedied and that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to their well-being.

[32] Considering the totality of the evidence, we cannot say that the trial court's conclusion that termination was in the best interests of the Children was clearly erroneous. Moreover, we reject the notion that because the Children are thriving in safe foster placements, Mother should be given more time to work toward reunification. These children, who are not bonded with Mother, need and deserve permanency now.

[33] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Children's father, RB.M. (Father), also had his parental rights terminated, but he does not participate in this appeal.

2.   In June 2025, Father was arrested and criminally charged under two separate causes with Level 4 felony possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon and Level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine. He remained incarcerated at the time of the termination factfinding hearing.

3.   L.G. has been placed with Foster Mother A.W. since May 2024.

4.   Mother claimed that she was suffering from postpartum psychosis when the Children were in her care, but she presented no evidence to support this claim.

Altice, Judge.

Vaidik, J. and Foley, J., concur.