IN RE: Je.J. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Je.J. (“Child”) was born to M.LaC. (“Mother”) and Ji.J. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) on August 2, 2022. Child was alleged to be a child in need of services (“CHINS”) on October 21, 2025, after the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received reports that Mother was unable to provide Child with the necessary care and supervision. Mother admitted that Child was a CHINS. The juvenile court conducted a fact-finding hearing relating to Father, after which it adjudicated Child to be a CHINS. Father contends that DCS presented insufficient evidence to sustain the juvenile court's CHINS adjudication as to him.¹ The evidence at the fact-finding hearing did not show any negligent or abusive acts by Father and demonstrated that Father is the nonoffending parent and, at the time of the fact-finding hearing, was providing Child with adequate care. As such, we agree with Father that the evidence is insufficient to prove that Child is a CHINS and reverse the juvenile court's order adjudicating Child to be a CHINS as it relates to Father.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] As of December of 2025, Parents had been married for “about four years ․, going on five.” Tr. Vol. II p. 85. Child was born on August 2, 2022, during the course of Parents’ marriage. At some point in 2023 or 2024, Parents separated and lived apart for “a year and a half, almost two years.” Tr. Vol. II p. 91. In 2024, while still married to Father, Mother began living with K.R. and had a child with him. In 2025, Mother's relationship with K.R. was “on again, off again[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 99. During this period, Mother and Child lived with Maternal Grandmother but would also sometimes stay with K.R.

[3] During 2024 and 2025, DCS was called to Mother and K.R.’s home multiple times to investigate allegations of domestic violence, substance use, and neglect. In June of 2024, Child's half-sister “was born with her cord blood positive for marijuana.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 90. In August 2024, DCS was called to the home after Child “had essentially escaped” while Mother and K.R. were asleep. Tr. Vol. II p. 113. In April of 2025, “Child witnessed domestic violence within the home when Mother and [K.R.] lived together. [K.R.] perpetrated domestic violence against Mother in [Child's] presence.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 90. During this episode of domestic violence, “Child witnessed [K.R.] jump through a window, tackle Mother, and destroy property within” the home after Mother had locked him out of the home. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 91. DCS also received reports of marijuana use in the home. When DCS came to investigate one of those reports, Mother “denied a screen. But [the DCS case workers] could smell the odor of marijuana in the home.” Tr. Vol. II p. 113.

[4] In August of 2025, Mother and DCS family case manager (“FCM”) Brooke Guerrier discussed a safety plan, pursuant to which Mother agreed that she would not allow K.R. to be around Child and would obtain a protective order against K.R. Mother did not follow the safety plan and “did not end up filing a protective order.” Tr. Vol. II p. 114. At some point during the late-summer or early-fall of 2025, Mother and Child moved back into Father's home.

[5] On October 21, 2025, DCS petitioned to adjudicate Child a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1. Following the filing of the CHINS petition, Child remained placed in Parents’ care. “On November 21, 2025, Mother admitted that Child is a” CHINS. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 91. Father, however, did not and a fact-finding hearing was held on December 15, 2025, to determine Child's status as it related to Father. As it relates to Father, the juvenile court heard evidence that he was employed at Benedix, was participating in services, and had agreed that the services had benefitted Child. Notably, the juvenile court did not hear any evidence detailing wrongdoing or neglectful or abusive behavior towards Child by Father.

[6] On January 7, 2026, the juvenile court adjudicated Child to be a CHINS in relation to both Mother and Father. In reaching this decision, the juvenile court concluded that

17. Mother's on-again and off-again relationship with [K.R.] and her need for continued connection to [K.R.] because he is the father of her youngest child indicates to the Court that Mother needs services to engage in the relationship safely for her own benefit and the benefit of the Child.

18. More likely than not, [Child's] needs for supervision and protection from domestic violence will not be met without the coercive intervention of the Court because Mother has the present ability to separate from the Child's father, return to living with [K.R.], and there are no court orders that would keep the Child in Father's care or custody.

19. This Court does not need to wait until the Child witnesses more domestic violence or is unsupervised to intervene in lives of the [ ] family.

20. The Court's decision is not one taken lightly. This court takes its responsibility to guard against unwarranted State interference in the family life seriously. If the Court believed that Mother and Father would remain in the same home, Mother accepted her need for services so she does not engage in unsafe relationships again, and [P]arents recognized their Child's need for services due to her witnessing domestic violence, the Court's decision would be different.

21. Instead, Parents’ on-going and current choices indicate that the Court must intervene to ensure the Child's safety and her needs are met.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 95.

Discussion and Decision

[7] The purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect children, not to punish parents. A CHINS adjudication is not a determination of parental fault but rather is a determination that a child is in need of services and is unlikely to receive those services without intervention of the court. A CHINS adjudication focuses on the condition of the child․ The acts or omissions of one parent can cause a condition that creates the need for court intervention. Matter of N.E., 228 N.E.3d 457, 475–76 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (internal brackets and quotations omitted, ellipses in original).

[8] “A CHINS proceeding is a civil action; thus, [DCS] must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code.” In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012) (internal quotation omitted). In reviewing a juvenile court's CHINS determination, we “do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility.” In re D.J. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 68 N.E.3d 574, 577–78 (Ind. 2017).

Instead, we consider only the evidence that supports the [juvenile] court's decision and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. When a [juvenile] court supplements a CHINS judgment with findings of fact and conclusions [of] law, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. We consider, first, whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the judgment. We will reverse a CHINS determination only if it was clearly erroneous. A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do not support the findings or if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.

Id. at 578 (one set of brackets omitted, brackets added, internal quotations omitted).

[9] DCS alleged that Child was a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1, which provides that

A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

[10] In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the CHINS adjudication, Father argues that

it is evident that the [juvenile] court focused much attention on Mother and [K.R.] and about their issues in their home.․ The trial court did not find any deficiencies on Father's parenting except that he did not believe that Child needed any services as he was providing for Child's care and she was doing well.

Appellant's Br. p. 17. Father further argues that “[a]t no time did the [juvenile] court find that Father neglected or harmed Child, save the exception that he didn't think Child needed anything because he was taking care of her already and meeting her needs.” Appellant's Br. p. 18. Father asserts that coercive intervention of the juvenile court was unnecessary, stating that “[u]ltimately, DCS failed to present any evidence as to how Father was failing his duties.” Appellant's Br. p. 19. We agree.

[11] Again, “[t]he purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect children rather than to punish parents.” In re R.S., 987 N.E.2d 155, 158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). However, as we have previously discussed, “a CHINS determination, especially one indicating that a parent had neglected or abandoned a child, could result in adverse job consequences or preclude a parent from serving as a foster parent in the future.” Matter of A.T., 219 N.E.3d 90, 98 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). In addition, “a CHINS finding can relax the State's burden for terminating parental rights” as “the State may terminate parental rights if a child has been adjudicated CHINS on two prior occasions, without proving either that the conditions resulting in a child's removal will not be remedied or that continuing the parent-child relationship threatens the child's well-being.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1290 (Ind. 2014).

[12] The evidence presented by DCS demonstrated that Child had suffered neglect and trauma while in the care of Mother and K.R. DCS did not present any evidence or argument detailing any abuse, neglect, or trauma that was alleged to have been perpetrated by Father. As it related to Father, FCM Megan Craig merely testified that she believed that DCS intervention and services were necessary to help Father learn “to parent a child who has [experienced] a serious trauma.” Tr. Vol. II p. 122. While Father may have expressed that he did not believe that such services were necessary, he had nevertheless voluntarily participated in such services, suggesting that coercive intervention was not necessary.

[13] When determining whether coercive intervention is necessary, “the question is whether the parents must be coerced into providing or accepting necessary treatment for their child.” Matter of E.K., 83 N.E.3d 1256, 1262 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. Moreover, “[a] CHINS finding should consider the family's condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290. As of the date of the fact-finding hearing, the record demonstrates that Father was providing adequate care for Child. As such, based on the record before us, we cannot agree with the juvenile court's conclusion that coercive intervention is necessary.

[14] The judgment of the juvenile court is reversed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother does not participate in the instant appeal.

Bradford, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.