David W. Brankle, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Brooke Schmell, Appellee-Defendant (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] During discovery in his defamation lawsuit against Brooke Schmell, David Brankle propounded more than 25 interrogatories on Schmell without first seeking and obtaining the trial court's permission to do so, as required by a local rule of court. When Schmell refused to respond to the unauthorized interrogatories, Brankle filed a motion to compel, which the trial court denied. The trial court also ordered Brankle to pay Schmell's motion-to-compel-related expenses. Brankle now appeals from that sanctions order, and the parties collectively raise three issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred by denying Brankle's motion to compel;

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Brankle to pay Schmell's motion-to-compel-related expenses; and

3. Whether Schmell is entitled to appellate attorneys’ fees pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 37(A)(4).

[2] We affirm and remand with instructions.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In January 2025, Brankle sued Schmell for defamation in Marion County, Indiana. As relevant here, Marion County Local Rule LR49-TR33-213(A) limits the number of interrogatories a party may propound to 25, including subparts; if a party wants to serve more than 25 interrogatories, the party must obtain leave of court and make a good cause showing. In July, both parties filed motions for leave to serve more than 25 interrogatories on one another, and both parties attached their proposed interrogatories to their motions. After a hearing, the trial court granted those motions.

[4] In December, without seeking and obtaining leave of court, Brankle served a second set of interrogatories on Schmell. Schmell refused to answer the interrogatories without a court order, believing Brankle had failed to comply with Marion County Local Rule LR49-TR33-213(A). Brankle filed a motion to compel based on Indiana Commercial Court Rule 7 and Trial Rules 26, 33, and 37. The trial court denied Brankle's motion, stating in relevant part as follows:

Brankle's motion is totally without merit. First, Commercial Court Rules are inapplicable to this case[,] and Brankle should not cite to them again. Brankle's repeated citations to rules that do not exist or fictitious cases leads the Court to opine that Brankle is using ChatGPT or other form of artificial intelligence to prepare his numerous motions, responses, and notices to the Court which is a violation of Ind. Trial Rule 11(A).

Secondly, Marion County Local Rule 49-TR33-213(A) limits the number of interrogatories to 25 including subparts. To serve any interrogatories in excess of 25 requires leave of court. On November 18, 2025, the Court granted both parties’ motions for leave to serve additional interrogatories beyond 25 ․ The interrogatories were attached to the parties’ motions and the Court's November 18, 2025[,] order pertained to only those additional interrogatories. Under no circumstances did the Court authorize[ ] a blanket request to serve an unlimited number of additional interrogatories in perpetuity. If Brankle intends to serve additional interrogatories upon Schmell, he is required to seek leave of court to do so. The Court will then decide if he is allowed to serve those interrogatories. Regardless, Brankle has maintained a motion to compel that is premature, improper, and not supported by the trial rules.

Appellant's App. Vol. II at 48–49. The trial court awarded attorneys’ fees to Schmell for “having to respond to [Brankle's] baseless motion,” instructing her to “file a fee request with an itemized statement within 7 days.” Id. at 49.

[5] Schmell complied with the trial court's instruction and requested $1,636.00 in motion-to-compel-related expenses. Specifically, Schmell's attorneys spent ten hours reviewing the motion, preparing a response thereto and proposed order, reviewing Brankle's reply in support of the motion, reviewing the trial court's fee-granting order, and drafting the fee request and proposed order. Schmell's counsel charged “$180 per hour for partner time and $160 per hour for associate attorney time. Both rates are at or below market value for work of this type in Indianapolis.” Appellee's App. Vol. II at 52.

[6] After a hearing, the trial court ordered Brankle to pay $1,546.00 of Schmell's motion-to-compel-related expenses (the “Expenses Award”). Brankle then initiated this interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 14(A)(1).¹

Discussion and Decision

[7] Brankle challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to compel and the Expenses Award. See AMW Invs., Inc. v. Town of Clarksville, 246 N.E.3d 1213, 1218–19 (Ind. 2024) (holding a party may challenge a contempt sanction and underlying discovery order on interlocutory appeal). “We review discovery orders and discovery sanctions for an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 1222 (citing State v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 964 N.E.2d 206, 209 (Ind. 2012); Care Grp. Heart Hosp., LLC v. Sawyer, 93 N.E.3d 745, 751 (Ind. 2018)). An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court's decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights.” Jennings v. Smiley, 249 N.E.3d 1071, 1075 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Hall v. State, 36 N.E.3d 459, 466 (Ind. 2015)), reh'g denied (Mar. 25, 2025). “This deferential standard gives way to de novo review when it comes to interpreting” rules of court. Id. (citing Minges v. State, 192 N.E.3d 893, 896 (Ind. 2022)); see also Morrison v. Vasquez, 124 N.E.3d 1217, 1219 (Ind. 2019) (citing State v. Holtsclaw, 977 N.E.2d 348, 349 (Ind. 2012)).

[8] First, we address Brankle's challenge to the denial of his motion to compel. Second, we address Brankle's challenge to the Expenses Award. Third, we address Schmell's request for appellate attorneys’ fees.

1. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Denying Brankle's Motion to Compel

[9] Brankle contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to compel because “[u]nder the plain meaning of LR49-TR33-213 once the court granted leave to exceed the 25[-]interrogatory limit, the numerical ceiling was lifted.” Appellant's Br. at 11. In construing Marion County Local Rule LR49-TR33-213(A)’s meaning, “our objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent underlying” it, In re P.R., 267 N.E.3d 1101, 1104 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Coronado v. Coronado, 243 N.E.3d 1121, 1124 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024)), trans. not sought. If the rule's language “is clear and unambiguous, it is not subject to judicial interpretation.” Id. (citing Coronado, 243 N.E.3d at 1125). “We do not presume that the language was intended to be applied illogically or to bring about an unjust or absurd result.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Gaudin, 42 N.E.3d 82, 86 (Ind. 2015)).

[10] Marion County Local Rule LR49-TR33-213(A) provides as follows: “Interrogatories shall be limited to a total of 25 including subparts and shall be used solely for the purpose of discovery and shall not be used as a substitute for the taking of a deposition. For good cause shown and upon leave of Court additional interrogatories may be propounded.” This language simply does not give litigants carte blanche to serve interrogatories ad infinitum once they have obtained leave of court. Even if Marion County Local Rule LR49-TR33-213(A) is ambiguous on this point, Brankle's reading would defeat the rule's purpose of regulating discovery and render superfluous the good cause requirement.²

[11] And the trial court here did not “lift[ ]” Marion County Local Rule LR49-TR33-213(A)’s “numerical ceiling,” Appellant's Br. at 11, nor did Brankle request it to do so. In Brankle's first motion for leave to serve more than 25 interrogatories on Schmell, he sought only leave to serve the interrogatories attached to his motion: “[Brankle] respectfully requests this Court GRANT leave to serve thirty-one (31) interrogatories, inclusive of subparts upon [Schmell].” Appellee's App. Vol. II at 3. Furthermore, nothing about the trial court's order granting Brankle's motion for leave granted him free rein to propound as many interrogatories as he saw fit. The trial court thus did not err by denying Brankle's motion to compel.

2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Entering the Expenses Award

[12] Brankle contends the trial court erred by entering the Expenses Award.³ Pursuant to Trial Rule 37(A)(4), when a trial court denies a motion to compel, it must award the party “who opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney[s’] fees, unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.”

[13] First, Brankle claims the motion to compel was substantially justified. A party is “substantially justified” in filing a motion to compel “if reasonable persons could conclude that a genuine issue existed as to whether a person was bound to comply with the requested discovery.” Yount v. Carpenter Co. Inc., 219 N.E.3d 127, 132 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Huber v. Montgomery Cnty. Sheriff, 940 N.E.2d 1182, 1186 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)). A motion riddled with citations to hallucinated authorities is hardly “substantially justified.” And while the parties clearly disagreed regarding the plain meaning of Marion County Local Rule LR49-TR33-213(A), that disagreement does not create ambiguity, cf. Sawyer, 93 N.E.3d at 753 (citing Jernas v. Gumz, 53 N.E.3d 434, 444 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied) (holding parties’ disagreement over plain meaning of contract does not create ambiguity), and thus did not mean a genuine issue existed as to whether Schmell was bound to comply with the requested discovery, see Ledden v. Kuzma, 858 N.E.2d 186, 189–90 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)) (explaining “substantially justified” is “satisfied” if “reasonable people” could differ as to the contested action's “appropriateness”). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that Brankle's motion was not substantially justified.

[14] Second, Brankle asserts the Expenses Award is unjust. Brankle's arguments on this front are wholly unsupported by citations to authority and the record, as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a), so he has waived them for our review. See Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015). Waiver notwithstanding, Brankle does not address the trial court's findings that he cited to inapplicable Commercial Court Rules and hallucinated authorities. Brankle also fails to fully appreciate that as a pro se litigant, he is “ ‘held to the same standards as a trained attorney’ and ‘afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.’ ” Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Liu, 250 N.E.3d 406, 410 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014)). On the facts of this case, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by determining that “other circumstances” did not make the Expenses Award unjust.

3. Schmell Is Entitled to Appellate Attorneys’ Fees Pursuant to Trial Rule 37(A)(4)

[15] Schmell requests that we award her reasonable appellate attorneys’ fees incurred in responding to Brankle's appeal. A Trial Rule 37(A)(4) award “includes the reasonable expenses incurred by the party in defending the award on appeal.” M.S. ex rel. Newman v. K.R., 871 N.E.2d 303, 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing City of Hammond v. Marina Entm't Complex, Inc., 681 N.E.2d 1139, 1145 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied), trans. denied. Schmell has prevailed in this appeal, so she is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to Trial Rule 37(A)(4).

Conclusion

[16] In sum, the trial court did not err by denying Brankle's motion to compel or entering the Expenses Award, and Schmell is entitled to her reasonable appellate attorneys’ fees incurred in responding to Brankle's appeal. We therefore affirm the trial court on all issues raised and remand for a determination of Schmell's reasonable appellate attorneys’ fees.

[17] Affirmed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Brankle fails to support numerous statements of fact with citations to the Record, as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(5), (6)(a), and (8)(a). Brankle improperly includes statements of law in his Statement of Case. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(5) (providing the Statement of Case is a brief description of “the nature of the case, the course of the proceedings relevant to the issues presented for review, and the disposition of these issues by the trial court”). Additionally, instead of attaching to his appellate brief the order he is appealing herein, as required by Appellate Rule 46(A)(12), Brankle attached an order from this court that is unrelated to the instant appeal. We remind Brankle that his decision to proceed pro se does not loosen the requirements of our Appellate Rules. See Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Liu, 250 N.E.3d 406, 410 (Ind. 2025).

2.   For the first time in his reply brief, Brankle argues that Marion County Local Rule LR49-TR33-213(A) conflicts with the Indiana Trial Rules. Because Brankle did not raise this argument in his opening brief, he has waived appellate review thereof. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(C) (“No new issues shall be raised in the reply brief.”); Bowman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1174, 1179–80 (Ind. 2016) (citing Curtis v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1143, 1148 (Ind. 2011)) (explaining parties may not raise an issue for the first time in a reply brief).

3.   As noted by Schmell, Brankle does not expressly challenge the amount of the Expenses Award. Brankle instead focuses his arguments on the propriety of the Expenses Award. To the extent his appellate arguments can be read to challenge the reasonableness of that award, Brankle does not present any cogent reasoning in support thereof, so he has waived that claim for our review. See App. R. 46(A)(8)(a)(requiring cogent reasoning); Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)) (explaining we will not “ ‘address arguments’ that are ‘too poorly developed or improperly expressed to be understood’ ”).

Felix, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.