J.D.I. (Father), Appellant/Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee/Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] J.D.I. (“Father”) and E.R. (“Mother”)¹ (collectively, “Parents”) are the biological parents of D.I., who was born in 2010. Father is required to register as a sex offender for life due to his 2016 conviction for Level 3 felony child molesting and has not had any contact with Child since 2022. In October of 2023, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) petitioned to have Child found to be a child in need of services (“CHINS”) after receiving reports that he had not been receiving proper nutrition from Mother and her husband. In August of 2024, the juvenile court found Child to be a CHINS. In June of 2025, DCS petitioned to terminate Father's parental rights to Child, which the juvenile court did in January of 2026. Father contends that DCS failed to produce evidence sufficient to sustain the juvenile court's termination of his parental rights to Child. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born on June 8, 2010, to Parents, and, later that year, DCS substantiated Father for neglect of Child after he left Child in the care of Mother, who was unable to meet Child's special needs. In August of 2010, DCS initiated an informal adjustment due to the neglect allegations, and that informal adjustment was closed in January of 2011. Meanwhile, in November of 2010, DCS had substantiated Father for sexual abuse after receiving a report that he had performed oral sex on Mother's then-sixteen-year-old cousin.

[3] In May of 2015, DCS again substantiated Father for sexual abuse of a minor after Father had performed oral sex on his then-twelve-year-old first cousin and had had her perform oral sex on him, which led to criminal charges. In April of 2016, Father pled guilty to Level 3 felony child molesting and was sentenced to twelve years of incarceration, with nine years executed and three years suspended to probation. Following this conviction, Father was required to register as a sex offender for life.

[4] Father has not had any physical contact with Child since June of 2015 but did have some contact with Child through letters and telephone while he was in prison. On April 4, 2021, Father was released from prison but was reincarcerated for failing to register as a sex offender in June of 2021. In October of 2021, Father pled guilty to Level 6 felony failing to register as a sex offender, and he was sentenced to one year in jail. The last time Father spoke to Child was in March of 2022. Father was released from jail in April of 2022, but he was reincarcerated again in August of 2023. Even when not incarcerated, Father was not allowed to have contact with Child.

[5] In October of 2023, DCS received a report alleging that Mother and her husband (“Stepfather”) had failed to provide Child with appropriate nutrition. On October 17, 2023, DCS petitioned to have Child found to be a CHINS, and the juvenile court issued an order removing Child from Mother and Stepfather's care on October 25.

[6] In March or April of 2024, Father was released from prison. Father did not oppose the CHINS petition, and the juvenile court found Child to be a CHINS on August 7, 2024. The juvenile court found that Mother and Stepfather had failed to provide Child with proper nutrition and medical care, then-fourteen-year-old Child had been diagnosed with a failure to thrive due to weight loss, and Father was a sex offender currently on parole and unable to have contact with Child.

[7] On August 19, 2024, the juvenile court held a dispositional hearing, after which it ordered Parents to participate in services. The juvenile court ordered Father to refrain from engaging in criminal activity, attend all scheduled visits, enroll in counseling, complete parenting education, submit to a diagnostic assessment and follow all recommendations, and follow all rules of probation.²

[8] During the underlying CHINS case, “Father was not cooperative with services[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 58. In April of 2024, Father completed a psychological evaluation with Dr. David Lombard. Father responded defensively, so Dr. Lombard was unable to fully diagnose him. Dr. Lombard, however, made a provisional diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and addiction issues. Dr. Lombard requested that Father retake the assessment so he could accurately evaluate Father, but Father never did. Dr. Lombard attempted to contact Father to schedule that appointment, but Father had blocked his telephone number. Moreover, DCS did not receive any reports regarding Father's participation in individual counseling. While Father had “some participation” in fatherhood engagement and parenting education, he never completed a parenting program or homebased services. Tr. Vol. I p. 29. Father also never had any visits with Child due to him being unable to have contact with Child.

[9] On June 26, 2025, DCS petitioned to terminate Parents’ parental rights to Child. On December 4, 2025, the juvenile court conducted a termination hearing. At the time, Father was unemployed, living in a one-bedroom apartment, and unable to afford a larger apartment. Father was also on lifetime parole and a registered sex offender. Father could not have any contact with Child until after he turned sixteen, which was still over six months away. Father had not yet completed sex-offender treatment and testified that he did not intend to start treatment until 2028.

[10] As for Child, he had been living in the same foster home since December of 2023. Child was doing well in that placement, aside from some behavioral issues, and his foster mother had expressed an interest in adopting him. DCS family case manager Barbara Blevins (“FCM Blevins”) testified that Child did not know Father, and Guardian ad Litem Jennifer Young (“GAL Young”) testified that he had no bond with him.

[11] GAL Young had been appointed in November of 2023 and recommended that Father's parental rights be terminated because Child had no relationship with Father, Child was not allowed to have contact with Father until Child was sixteen years old, Father was a registered sex offender, and Father's pattern of conduct demonstrated that Child was unsafe around him. GAL Young opined that termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interests. FCM Blevins, who had been involved in the case since around March 15, 2025, also opined that termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interests. DCS's plan for Child upon the termination of Father's parental rights was adoption.

[12] On January 15, 2026, the juvenile court issued its order terminating Father's parental rights to Child, finding that there was a satisfactory plan for Child's care and treatment and that termination of the parent-child relationship is in Child's best interests. The juvenile court also found that Child had “been removed from the parents’ care since October of 2023, or for the last 26 months consecutively without having been returned to any parent through the child in need of services cases involving the Allen County DCS” and that Father had “not remedied the circumstances that resulted in [Child] being placed outside of the parents’ home[,]” “there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in [Child's] removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied by [Father,]” and “there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship of [Father] poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health or life of [Child].” Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 67, 68, 69, 70.

Discussion and Decision

[13] Father contends that the juvenile court erred in terminating his parental rights to Child. “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). Moreover, we acknowledge that the parent-child relationship is “one of the most valued relationships in our culture.” Id. (citation omitted). Although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their responsibilities as parents. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied.

[14] In order to terminate Father's parental rights to Child, DCS was required to prove the following:

(c) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

(d) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege the existence of one (1) or more of the following circumstances:

[․.]

(2) That:

(A) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of services or a delinquent child; and

(B) despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4.³

[15] We note that, because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) is written in the disjunctive, DCS is only required to establish one of the above circumstances. See, e.g., In re J.S., 183 N.E.3d 362, 369–70 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing to a previous version of Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4), trans. denied. We note that Father does not challenge the juvenile court's findings that there is a satisfactory plan for Child's care and treatment and that termination of the parent-child relationship is in Child's best interests.

[16] That leaves only the subsection 4(d) circumstances, of which, as mentioned, the juvenile court was only required to find one but found three. Of those three found circumstances, Father challenges the juvenile court's findings pursuant to subsections 4(d)(3) and 4(d)(4), i.e., that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that had led to Child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied and that there is a reasonable probability that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child's well-being. Father, however, does not challenge the juvenile court's finding pursuant to subsection 4(d)(2), that Child had been removed from the home for twenty-six consecutive months and that Father had not remedied the reason for removal. Because this unchallenged finding completes DCS's proof pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4, this is sufficient to sustain the juvenile court's judgment.

[17] We choose, however, to address Father's argument directly and find it to be without merit. At the very least, DCS produced more than enough evidence to sustain a finding pursuant to subsection (4)(d)(3), i.e., that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied. In determining whether there is a reasonable probability that a parent will remedy the conditions resulting in a child's removal, a juvenile court engages in a two-step inquiry. First, the juvenile court must determine what conditions led to the child's removal or continued placement in foster care. See Matter of K.T., 137 N.E.3d 317, 327 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“A trial court may consider conditions that emerge subsequent to initial removal and that would justify continued removal.”). Second, the juvenile court must determine whether a reasonable probability exists that the conditions justifying a child's continued placement outside the home will not be remedied. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., Dearborn Cnty. Off., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013); In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 266 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). In making the second determination, the juvenile court must judge a parent's fitness at the time of the termination hearing, In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 266, and must also “consider a parent's habitual pattern of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231 (citation omitted). We entrust the “delicate” balancing of current parental fitness and historical patterns of conduct to the juvenile court, which has discretion to weigh prior history more heavily than recent efforts. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014).

[18] The reason for Child's removal from Mother's and/or Father's care was that Mother and Stepfather were failing to provide him with proper nutrition and that Father was incarcerated. As for continued removal from Father's care, DCS did not place Child with Father after he was released because Father was a convicted sex offender and was not allowed to have contact with Child.

[19] Regarding the likelihood that the reasons for continued removal from Father's care would be remedied, the juvenile court concluded that Father would not likely remedy them because he is a convicted sex offender, is prohibited from having contact with Child until he is sixteen years old, failed to consistently participate in services during the CHINS case, and had not attempted to work on the issues that had led to his criminal conviction. The juvenile court's conclusion in this regard is not clearly erroneous.

[20] We have recognized that “evidence of a parent's pattern of unwillingness or lack of commitment to address parenting issues and to cooperate with service providers demonstrates the requisite reasonable probability that the conditions will not change.” In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 611 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). So it is here, as Father has failed to consistently participate in the services that DCS has provided to him. Father completed a court-ordered psychological evaluation with Dr. Lombard, but he was defensive during the evaluation and never completed a recommended second evaluation. Father never completed parenting or homebased services and has never completed sex-offender treatment as part of parole and testified that he was not planning to begin until 2028. By the time of termination—more than two years after DCS had removed Child—Father had not taken any steps to address his parental deficiencies or his sexual-abuse tendencies in order to be a better and more stable parent to Child.

[21] Moreover, Father has no bond with Child and seemingly has little inclination to form one. Father has had no physical contact with Child for over ten years, and, while he has had some contact via telephone and letters, has not spoken to Child since March of 2022. Father's lack of progress in addressing the issues keeping Child from being in his care, not to mention his apparent lack of interest in making progress, amply supports the juvenile court's conclusion that reasons for Child's removal will likely not be remedied.

[22] Father's argument that “the conditions that lead to the removal could not possibly re[ ]occur [because] Mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights” is not persuasive. Appellant's Br. p. 18. First, DCS took custody of Child not only because of Mother and Stepfather's neglect, but also because it could not place Child with Father due to his incarceration and criminal history. Father's pattern of behavior during the case showed that his engagement in criminal activity and incarceration could very well reoccur. For instance, Father failed to register as a sex offender and was arrested and charged. Father's argument also fails to take into account that the juvenile court does not just consider the conditions that led to Child's initial removal, but also the conditions that accounted for Child's continued removal from Parents’ care, as addressed above. See K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231. Father has failed to establish that the juvenile court erred in terminating his parental rights to Child.

[23] We affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In August of 2025, Mother voluntarily gave up her parental rights to Child and does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Parents appealed the CHINS adjudication, and on May 13, 2025, we affirmed the CHINS adjudication in an unpublished memorandum decision. See In the Matter of D.J.I., 2025 WL 1377396 (Ind. Ct. App. May 13, 2025).

3.   Father cites to language that appeared in previous versions of Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4, the last of which ceased to be effective on March 10, 2024, over fifteen months before DCS filed its termination petition in this case.

Bradford, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.