Tremain Vanness Cabell, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a bench trial, Tremain Cabell was convicted of resisting law enforcement and refusal to identify self, both misdemeanors, and found to have committed the infraction of failure to wear a safety belt. Cabell appeals and asserts that he did not knowingly and intentionally waive his right to counsel.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] On February 2, 2025, Evansville Police Officer Aaron Hadley stopped a vehicle for speeding. As he approached, Officer Hadley observed that the two backseat passengers – one later determined to be Cabell – were not wearing their seat belts. Because the window was inoperable, Officer Hadley opened a door to speak to the vehicle's occupants. Cabell rotated his body to turn away from Officer Hadley and had his hat pulled down over his face. Officer Hadley asked for identification, and Cabell refused, stating that he was not the driver and that Officer Hadley had “no right to identify him.” Transcript at 34. After asking Cabell for about ten minutes to provide his name or identification, Officer Hadley called for backup assistance. Officer Hadley and another officer pulled Cabell from the vehicle as he resisted and had to forcibly bring Cabell's arms behind his back and hold him to handcuff him. Cabell continued to not cooperate as officers attempted to conduct a search of his person incident to arrest, and, when they tried to walk Cabell to the police vehicle, Cabell fell to his knees such that the officers had to carry him to the car.

[4] The next day, the State charged Cabell with Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, Class C misdemeanor refusal to identify self, and Class D infraction for failure to use a safety belt. Cabell's initial hearing was held the same day, and the trial court advised him of his rights and the charges against him and appointed counsel. Cabell requested a speedy trial; the trial court noted his request and instructed Cabell to discuss that matter with counsel.

[5] On February 14, 2025, Cabell and his counsel appeared for a hearing, and Cabell pled not guilty. Counsel also requested discovery and noted specifically that Cabell desired to personally watch “the bodycams, and any other video that they have.” Id. at 9. The matter was set for a pretrial conference on March 7.

[6] At the March 7 hearing, counsel notified the court that Cabell had rejected the State's plea offer and wanted the matter set for trial. Speaking directly to the trial court, Cabell asked the court to grant the “motion of discovery,” with the court then inquiring whether discovery had been received. Id. at 12. Cabell responded that he had not received any, but counsel advised that he believed discovery had probably been received from the State. To allow time for Cabell to personally review the discovery materials before trial, the court set the matter for another pretrial hearing.

[7] At the pretrial hearing on March 28, before a different judge, the court asked how Cabell intended to proceed, with counsel responding that he was “unclear.” Id. at 16. Counsel explained that he had given Cabell a CD of evidence to review and that Cabell was to bring it with him to court but did not, adding “and now I think he's kind of threatened me a little bit here.” Id. The trial court set the matter for another pretrial hearing on May 8 and directed that Cabell was to advise the court at that time whether he was accepting or rejecting the State's plea offer. At that hearing, counsel informed the court that Cabell was requesting a trial date; the court set the matter for bench trial on July 11, 2025.

[8] When the parties appeared on July 11, the State moved for a continuance, and Cabell's counsel moved to withdraw. The trial court then engaged in the following exchange with Cabell:

Court: Okay. And sir, do you have any objection to him withdrawing as your public defender?

Cabell: No, I have no problem.

Court: Okay. Are you going to represent yourself in this case, or are you going to hire --

Cabell: Looks like I don't --

Court: -- a private attorney?

Cabell: Looks like I don't have any choice.

Court: Okay.

Cabell: Represent myself, I guess.

Court: So you're going to represent yourself?

Cabell: Most definitely.

Id. at 22-23. The court granted the continuance and set the matter for trial on August 14, 2025. Cabell also presented the court with a pro se written motion to dismiss, which the court explained would be considered at the upcoming bench trial.

[9] Cabell and the State appeared on August 14 for trial, before a different judge, who immediately observed, “Mr. Cabell, I show that you previously had the public defender, and then that public defender was discharged. Are you wanting to continue to represent yourself at this time for trial?” Id. at 27. Cabell responded, “He discharged hisself [sic]” and that “it was [counsel's] choice” to withdraw. Id. The court then explained to Cabell that it was going to “go over some information with you about representing yourself.” Id. The trial court's advisements to Cabell included that: he had the right to represent himself, to hire an attorney, or have one appointed to represent him; an attorney could help him identify strengths and weaknesses of his case and assist in negotiating a favorable plea or dismissal of the case; if the case were to go to trial, an attorney would have skills to assist with presenting a defense, investigating the case, interviewing witnesses, and gathering evidence; an attorney also would have the necessary skills to file motions, examine and cross-examine witnesses at trial, object to evidence, present sentencing information, and understand how to preserve the record for appeal.

[10] The court further advised Cabell that, if he decided not to have an attorney, he would not receive special treatment and would have to follow all the same rules and procedures in court as attorneys do. The court noted that deadlines may exist for certain defenses, which an attorney would know, that the State would have the advantage of having an attorney, and that the court would not be able to provide assistance to Cabell. The court advised that, while Cabell had the right to decide against having an attorney, “you must be aware that deciding not to have an attorney is usually a bad decision.” Id. at 29. Cabell affirmed that he understood all that the court had told him. When the court asked Cabell again whether he wanted to represent himself, Cabell maintained, “I'm not the problem in this situation.” Id. The court clarified that its inquiry to Cabell was whether he wanted a public defender or whether he wanted to represent himself, and Cabell replied that “we been wasting a lot of time” and “let's proceed on.” Id. at 30. Then the court had the following exchange with Cabell:

Court: Okay. At this time, are you wanting to waive your right to have an attorney and represent yourself?

Cabell: Yeah, let's do that. Let's do that.

Court: Okay. All right. I'm going to show that decision is knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made then.

Cabell: Yes, ma'am.

Id.

[11] The two police officers testified for the State. Cabell presented no evidence but filed, in open court, a written motion to dismiss, which asserted that he was wrongfully seized during an unlawfully-extended traffic stop. The trial court denied the motion and found Cabell guilty of the two misdemeanors and adjudged Cabell to have committed the infraction. At the subsequent sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Cabell to 180 days executed in the Vanderburgh County Jail on the resisting law enforcement conviction and, for refusal to identify himself, the court imposed a “time-served sentence” of sixty days. Id. at 68; Appendix Vol. 2 at 70. The court waived fees and costs for the infraction. Cabell now appeals.

Discussion & Decision

[12] The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to counsel. Jones v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1132, 1138 (Ind. 2003). A defendant may waive counsel and proceed pro se, but the trial court must ensure the choice is “made with eyes open” and admonish the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Wright v. State, 168 N.E.3d 244, 259 (Ind. 2021). The waiver of counsel must be knowing, intelligent, unequivocal, and voluntary. McGraw v. State, 241 N.E.3d 1175, 1181 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied. Cabell contends that the trial court “violated Cabell's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by accepting his purported waiver of counsel without ensuring it was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” Appellant's Brief at 10.

[13] We review de novo the trial court's determination that a defendant validly waived counsel. Van Hawk v. State, 275 N.E.3d 954, 975 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026), trans. denied. Our Indiana Supreme Court has observed that “when [the trial] court ‘has made the proper inquiries and conveyed the proper information,’ and then ‘reaches a reasoned conclusion about the defendant's understanding of his rights and voluntariness,’ an appellate court, after a careful review of the record, ‘will most likely uphold’ the trial court's ‘decision to honor or deny the defendant's request to represent himself.’ ” Wright, 168 N.E.3d at 255 (quoting Poynter v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1122, 1128 (Ind. 2001)); Van Hawk, 275 N.E.3d at 976.

[14] This court has suggested several guidelines for a trial court to advise a defendant who is considering self-representation:

(1) The defendant should know the nature of the charges against him, the possibility that there may be lesser included offenses, and the possibility of the defenses and mitigating circumstances; (2) the defendant should be aware that self representation is almost always unwise, that he may conduct a defense which is to his own detriment, that he will receive no special treatment from the court and will have to abide by the same standards as an attorney, and that the State will be represented by experienced legal counsel; (3) the defendant should be instructed that an attorney has skills and expertise in preparing for and presenting a proper defense; and (4) the trial court should inquire into the defendant's educational background, familiarity with legal procedures and rules of evidence and mental capacity.

Taylor v. State, 944 N.E.2d 84, 90 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Dowell v. State, 557 N.E.2d 1063, 1066-67 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990)). Our Supreme Court has clarified, however, that those guidelines “do not ‘constitute a rigid mandate setting forth specific inquiries that a trial court is required to make before determining whether a defendant's waiver of right to counsel is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.’ ” Jones, 783 N.E.2d at 1138 (quoting Leonard v. State, 579 N.E.2d 1294, 1296 (Ind. 1991)).

[15] “Waiver of assistance of counsel may be established based upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Van Hawk, 275 N.E.3d at 975. Among the factors we consider are: (1) the extent of the trial court's inquiry into the defendant's decision; (2) other evidence in the record establishing whether the defendant understood the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation; (3) the defendant's background and experience; and (4) the context of the defendant's decision to proceed pro se. Id. (quoting Poynter, 749 N.E.2d at 1127-28).

[16] Cabell maintains that the trial court “conducted no meaningful inquiry” on July 11 when counsel moved to withdraw – asking Cabell only whether he objected to counsel withdrawing (he did not) and whether he planned to represent himself going forward – and argues that the court's inquiry on August 14 “remained insufficient” and “was perfunctory at best.” Appellant's Brief at 10. While we agree that the initial exchange with Cabell about self-representation on July 11 was lacking, we disagree with Cabell's characterization of the August 14 advisements. On that day, the court reopened the self-representation matter, initiated waiver-of-counsel advisements, and fully satisfied the need “to acquaint the defendant with the advantages of attorney representation and the drawbacks of self-representation.” Jones, 783 N.E.2d at 1138; see also Taylor, 944 N.E.2d at 90.

[17] The trial court advised Cabell about the right to counsel, including appointed counsel if he could not afford an attorney, identified various specific skills and advantages that an attorney could provide, including examining witnesses, making objections, and preserving issues for appeal, and warned Cabell of the dangers of self-representation. The court explicitly explained to Cabell that the State would have the advantage of an attorney and that Cabell would receive no special treatment if he represented himself and would have to follow all the same rules as a lawyer. The court even offered that self-representation is “usually a bad decision.” Transcript at 29. The court asked Cabell if he understood all that the court had told him, and Cabell confirmed that he did and further stated that he desired to proceed with trial.

[18] To the extent that Cabell argues the trial court's inquiry was inadequate because it did not ask about his education, mental health, or experience with the criminal justice system, our Supreme Court has recognized that there are “no prescribed ‘talking points’ ” that a trial court must recite, and rather, the court need only come to “a considered determination” that the defendant is making a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver. Poynter, 749 N.E.2d at 1126. Considering the record in its entirety, the absence of specific inquiries about Cabell's education, experience, or mental health did not render the court's advisements inadequate.

[19] Cabell also contends that his remarks to the court, indicating that he did not have any choice about representation, “reveal confusion and coercion.” Appellant's Brief at 10. We are unpersuaded that Cabell's statements that his attorney discharged himself and that withdrawal was counsel's choice demonstrate confusion. Rather, we agree with the State that, read in context, the statements “reflect [Cabell's] frustration with his former attorney – not confusion about his rights.” Appellee's Brief at 12-13. And we discern no hint of coercion in the record. Regardless, following Cabell's statements, the trial court provided the litany of advisements, asked Cabell if he understood, and inquired whether Cabell still desired to represent himself. The record does not support Cabell's argument that he elected to proceed pro se because he was confused or coerced.

[20] In sum, the court's inquiry and the responses were adequate to establish that Cabell knowingly, willingly, and voluntarily exercised his right to represent himself in the proceedings.

[21] Judgment affirmed.

Altice, Judge.

Brown, J. and DeBoer, J., concur.