IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationships of A.M. and T.M. (Minor Children) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] C.M. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental rights to her two children, A.M. and T.M. (the Children), arguing: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion to continue the fact-finding hearing; and (2) the trial court's conclusions of law were erroneous. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother gave birth to A.M. in November 2021. Throughout her pregnancy, she used drugs—even using heroin four days before she gave birth. As a result, A.M. experienced withdrawal symptoms after he was born. Two days after his birth, Mother agreed to take an instant drug screen at the hospital which returned positive for fentanyl and buprenorphine. Mother could not explain the reason for those results.

[3] The next day, the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) filed a petition alleging A.M. was a Child in Need of Services (CHINS) because Mother had “failed to provide [him] with a safe, stable, and appropriate living environment free from substance abuse.” Exhibits at 29. While still in the hospital, A.M. was ordered to be removed from Mother's care on November 24, 2021. The fact-finding hearing was continued several times before the trial court adjudicated A.M. a CHINS on August 17, 2022.¹ After the dispositional hearing, the court continued A.M.’s placement outside Mother's care, and the permanency plan was set as reunification with Mother. The court ordered Mother to complete a substance abuse assessment and follow its recommendations as well as participate in home-based case management and random drug screening. Mother was homeless at the time, and the home-based case management was intended to help her obtain housing, stable employment, and address other issues. Mother did not complete the substance abuse assessment and never submitted a drug screen. She enrolled in drug treatment programs three times but did not complete any of them.

[4] In February 2024, while A.M.’s CHINS case was still open, Mother gave birth to T.M. On the day she gave birth, Mother admitted to a DCS family case manager (FCM) that she'd used fentanyl earlier that same day before going to the hospital because “she was stressed and withdrawing[.]” Transcript at 30. Mother also told the FCM that she had used drugs “daily for the first [four] months before finding out she was pregnant and then ․ continue[d] to use throughout her pregnancy ․ intermittently.” Id. at 31. T.M. was admitted to the NICU and required specialized treatment. Mother was still homeless when T.M. was born, but she told the FCM she planned to participate in a substance use treatment program through Volunteers of America.

[5] Based on Mother's continued substance abuse and housing instability, DCS filed a petition alleging T.M. was a CHINS shortly after she was born, and she was later removed from Mother's care. In July 2024, Mother admitted T.M. was a CHINS. The trial court accepted Mother's admission, adjudicated T.M. a CHINS, and continued her placement in foster care. After the dispositional hearing in August, the court entered a parental participation order similar to the one from A.M.’s case requiring Mother to participate in home-based case management, home-based therapy, and random drug screening. And again, the court ordered her to complete a substance abuse assessment and follow its recommendations. T.M.’s permanency plan was reunification with Mother.

[6] Meanwhile, back on March 4, 2024, the trial court granted DCS's request to change A.M.’s permanency plan from reunification to adoption, finding Mother “ha[d] a long-standing active heroin addiction which she ha[d] failed to address” and “ha[d] not engaged in any rehabilitative services offered by DCS.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 37. The next day, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights as to A.M. Mother began participating in home-based case management in July 2024 but did not participate in the other court-ordered services.² In August, the court suspended Mother's parenting time until she had “consistently engaged in all Court ordered services for at least 2 months ․” Ex. at 56.

[7] In November, DCS submitted a progress report in T.M.’s case indicating that Mother had recently been incarcerated for a month and “ha[d] not addressed her substance abuse [or] her homelessness.”³ Mother visited with T.M. in August prior to her incarceration but had not asked for visits to resume since she'd been released. The report also noted that Mother met with her home-based caseworker twice in July, zero times in August, twice in September, and zero times in October. During one of the September sessions, the caseworker suspected that Mother was under the influence of some substance. And Mother had not participated in home-based therapy, submitted any drug screens, or completed a substance abuse assessment. As of January 2025, Mother was still not participating in any services.

[8] That month, the court granted DCS's request to change T.M.’s permanency plan from reunification to adoption, noting Mother's “long-standing history of illicit substance use[,]” lack of stable income or housing, and failure to consistently engage in services or parenting time with T.M. Id. at 96. On February 3, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights to T.M. The trial court later granted DCS's motion to consolidate the fact-finding hearings on the Children's petitions. Two weeks before the scheduled fact-finding hearing, the court granted Mother's attorney's motion to withdraw. Then, at the fact-finding hearing on March 27, Mother arrived late (after testimony had been heard and concluded) and orally moved to continue the hearing. The court granted her motion, appointed her a public defender, and ordered Mother to appear at the next hearing.

[9] Nine days before the rescheduled fact-finding hearing, Mother's public defender filed a motion to withdraw, which the court denied. At the fact-finding hearing on December 17, Mother did not appear. Mother's attorney renewed the motion to withdraw, arguing she had not been able to get in contact with Mother. The court again denied that motion. Counsel then orally moved for a continuance on account of Mother's absence. She argued Mother “ha[d] a due process right to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to assist in her defense” and that she was “not up to date on [Mother's] positions on the issues in th[e] case” and didn't feel as though Mother was “being adequately represented ․” Tr. at 7. Counsel explained that since being appointed to the case in March, she had tried to contact Mother several times, to no avail. DCS and the Guardian ad Litem (GAL) objected, and DCS noted that it sent Mother the requisite notice at her two last-known addresses as well as an email address she had provided. Moreover, a DCS worker had specifically advised Mother on December 3 of the date and time of the fact-finding hearing. The court denied the motion to continue and noted that DCS staff had communicated with Mother and informed her of the December 17 hearing.

[10] At the fact-finding hearing, the court heard testimony from the Children's foster parent, two DCS FCMs, a home-based caseworker, the Children's Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA), and the GAL, all of whom testified consistently with the facts above. DCS also admitted several exhibits, including the Children's CHINS records and the records related to several of Mother's drug convictions. The Children's foster parent testified that A.M. had been in their care since January 2024, and T.M. had been in their care since shortly after her birth in February of that same year. Both Children were doing well—T.M. was “almost fully potty trained” at approximately two years old, and A.M., who had just turned four, was “full of energy[,]” and “so smart.” Tr. at 18. A.M. participated in First Steps until he turned three and was engaged in speech therapy once a week at the time of the fact-finding hearing. The foster parent testified that she and her spouse intended to adopt the Children and had already filed a petition to do so. The CASA testified similarly, explaining the Children were happy and had bonded with their foster parents. The CASA believed it was in the Children's best interests for Mother's parental rights to be terminated, as neither child had spent much time with Mother during their lives, they were thriving in their placement, and Mother had addressed neither her substance use nor housing instability over the last four years.

[11] The two FCMs and the home-based caseworker testified about their interactions with Mother and her almost complete lack of participation in services since A.M.’s case opened in 2021. The home-based caseworker testified that she had just recently joined Mother's case in October 2025 and met with Mother once that month. At that meeting, Mother told the caseworker that she was still using drugs, was pregnant, and planned to enroll in a drug treatment program through Bridges of Hope. Mother was accepted into the program and began treatment later that month, but she did not complete it. Despite her attempts to stay in contact with Mother, the caseworker never spoke to or met with Mother again.

[12] The FCM who had been involved in Mother's case since March 2022 testified that Mother had not remedied DCS's concerns about her sobriety or housing instability. She confirmed that Mother had never provided “any evidence that she ․ successfully completed a service to help her address her substance use issues[.]” Id. at 60. Additionally, the Children had never been in Mother's care, and Mother never progressed beyond supervised parenting time. The FCM believed it was in the Children's best interests for the court to terminate Mother's parental rights because she had “not proven that she would be able to keep the [C]hildren safe and provide stable housing free [from] substance use.” Id. at 63-64.

[13] On February 6, 2026, the trial court entered an order delineating findings of fact and conclusions of law and terminating Mother's parental rights to the Children. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[14] Mother argues that denying her motion to continue and holding the fact-finding hearing in her absence violated her right to due process. She also challenges several of the trial court's conclusions of law. We address each issue in turn.

1. Motion to Continue and Due Process

[15] Mother argues the trial court violated her due process rights by denying her attorney's day-of-hearing motion to continue on her behalf. “A court's ruling on a motion to continue is generally subject to review for an abuse of discretion.” In re A.R., 271 N.E.3d 1161, 1168 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). We find an abuse of discretion where the court's ruling “ ‘was against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before’ it ․, or if it misinterpreted the law[.]” In re Z.R., 272 N.E.3d 546, 550 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Willow Haven on 106th St., LLC v. Nagireddy, 252 N.E.3d 418, 422 (Ind. 2025)). We will not find an abuse of discretion unless the moving party shows she was prejudiced by the denial of her motion. In re K.W., 12 N.E.3d 241, 244 (Ind. 2014).

[16] As an initial matter, we note that Mother's argument here largely turns on her characterization of the court's order as a default judgment. She asserts that because the court “proceeded to take evidence in [her] absence and ․ considered only the merits presented by DCS[,] [t]he resulting determination [was] therefore a default judgment of the type disfavored by law.” Appellant's Brief at 20. This is not supported by the record. “A termination order entered in a parent's absence does not necessarily have to be a default.” In re R.S., 158 N.E.3d 432, 438 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). Here, although Mother herself was not present at the fact-finding hearing, her attorney was present, exhibits were offered and admitted into evidence, witness testimony was given, and Mother's attorney made several objections to DCS's evidence. At no point did the trial court suggest or insinuate that its judgment was a default judgment. And following the hearing, the court issued a twenty-three-page order replete with findings and conclusions regarding the required statutory elements for termination. This was clearly a judgment on the merits. See id. (concluding “the trial court's judgment was a judgment on the merits” despite its reference to the father's “default” because DCS presented testimony from the FCM and evidence of the parent's drug screens and criminal record at a hearing, and the judgment was supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law).

[17] We thus turn to Mother's overarching argument that denying her motion to continue and proceeding with the fact-finding hearing in her absence violated her right to due process. “[W]here, as here, review of a termination order hinges on alleged due process violations, we apply a de novo standard of review.” In re A.W., 273 N.E.3d 1131, 1138 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025).

[18] Though parents do not have an absolute right to be present at termination proceedings, “[t]hey must receive an ‘opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” A.R., 271 N.E.3d at 1168 (quoting In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 917 (Ind. 2011)). Parents also have the statutory rights to cross-examine witnesses, subpoena witnesses and evidence, and introduce evidence on their behalf. C.G., 954 N.E.2d at 917 (citing Ind. Code § 31-32-2- 3(b) (1997)). To determine whether Mother was afforded due process here, we must balance three factors: “(1) the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the State's chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure.” Id. at 917; see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (establishing these factors for due process analysis). “However, it is well-settled that because ‘[b]oth the State and the parent have substantial interests affected by [TPR] proceeding[s][,]’ the determinative factor in whether a due process violation occurred is ‘the risk of error created by DCS's actions and the trial court's actions.’ ” A.W., 273 N.E.3d at 1138 (quoting C.G., 954 N.E.2d at 917-18) (alterations in original).

[19] Focusing on the second prong, we consider the risk of error created by the challenged procedure—here, proceeding with the fact-finding hearing in Mother's absence. See In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. Mother asserts that because she was not present at the hearing, “the testimony and exhibits offered by DCS were not fully subject to objection, cross-examination, or rebuttal.” Appellant's Br. at 22. But the record reveals otherwise. Mother was represented by counsel at the fact-finding hearing, who either cross-examined or had the opportunity to cross-examine each witness, lodged objections to testimony and several of the exhibits offered by DCS, and presented arguments on Mother's behalf. This Court has consistently held that where a parent was represented by an attorney at the fact-finding hearing, the risk of error was minimal and proceeding in the parent's absence was not a violation of their right to due process. See In re C.C., 170 N.E.3d 669, 678 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (“In balancing [the mother's] ․ absence, where [she] was represented by counsel, we conclude that the trial court did not violate [her] right to due process in denying her counsel's motion to continue the fact-finding hearing.”); B.J., 879 N.E.2d at 17 (concluding the father's right to due process was not violated where he “was zealously represented by counsel throughout the entire termination hearing” and “counsel was provided with the opportunity to cross-examine the State's witnesses and to introduce evidence in defense of the action”).⁴

[20] Mother compares her case to Thompson v. Clark Cnty. Div. of Fam. & Child., 791 N.E.2d 792 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. There, the mother called the trial court moments before the termination hearing began and reported that she could not attend because she had checked herself into a rehabilitation facility. Thompson, 791 N.E.2d at 794. The mother's attorney appeared and requested a continuance based on her client's assertion. Id. The court tentatively agreed to the continuance but later denied the motion after the rehabilitation facility confirmed the mother “was not a patient there ․ nor had she ever been a patient there.” Id. Subsequently, the court terminated the mother's parental rights after conducting a summary proceeding, during which the attorneys summarized expected witness testimony in lieu of actual testimony subject to cross-examination and introduced exhibits without the required foundation. Id. This Court reversed the termination on appeal as a violation of the mother's due process rights, reasoning that “[e]ssentially, what happened here was no hearing at all.” Id. at 796.

[21] The same cannot be said of Mother's case here, where the court conducted a full fact-finding hearing on the merits with witness testimony, cross-examination, and admission of evidentiary exhibits in accordance with the Rules of Evidence. In light of these facts, we conclude the trial court's denial of Mother's motion to continue did not violate her due process rights.⁵

2. Conclusions of Law

[22] Next, Mother challenges several of the trial court's conclusions of law. In order to terminate a parent-child relationship, DCS must allege and prove that termination is in the child's best interests, that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child, and of most relevance to this appeal, that at least one of the following is true:

(2) That:

(A) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of services or a delinquent child; and

(B) despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c), (d)(2)-(4) (2024) (amended 2025).⁶ DCS must prove these elements “upon clear and convincing evidence.” Ind.Code § 31-37-14-2 (1997). Because the termination statute is written in the disjunctive, DCS only had to prove one of the circumstances above—(2), (3), or (4)—to support the termination of Mother's parental rights. In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“[T]he trial court need only find that one of the ․ requirements ․ has been established by clear and convincing evidence.”), trans. denied.

[23] Here, the trial court concluded that DCS proved all of the elements above,⁷ and Mother challenges each of those conclusions.⁸ On appeal, we show great deference to the trial court's judgment. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014). We will not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility, and we “consider only the evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” Id. (quoting Egly v. Blackford Cnty. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 1992)). Our analysis typically proceeds in two steps: “whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings, and then whether the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.” In re Te.R., ___ N.E.3d ___, 2026 WL 1968070, at *3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026). However, because Mother does not challenge any of the court's findings, we accept them as true. Moriarty v. Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d 616, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. Thus, if the unchallenged findings support the trial court's judgment, we will affirm. Id.

2.1. Reasonable Probability the Conditions Causing Removal Will Not Be Remedied

[24] Mother first challenges the court's conclusion that there was a reasonable probability she was unlikely to remedy the conditions that led to the Children's removal. To determine whether this conclusion was supported by the court's findings, we must first identify the conditions that led to the Children's removal and continued placement outside Mother's care. In re K.T., 137 N.E.3d 317, 326 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Next, we consider “whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” Id. (quoting E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643). The trial court was required to judge Mother's fitness to care for the Children at the time of the termination hearing as well as consider any “habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the” Children. In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. “The trial court may also consider services offered to the parent ․ and the parent's response to those services[ ] as evidence of whether conditions will be remedied.” Id. In this respect, DCS only had to prove “that there [was] a reasonable probability that [Mother's] behavior [would] not change.” Id. (quoting In re Kay.L., 867 N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)).

[25] Here, the Children were removed from Mother's care shortly after each of their births due to her substance use and homelessness. From the initiation of A.M.’s case in 2021 up to the time of the fact-finding hearing in December 2025, Mother failed to demonstrate changed behavior. The trial court's findings clearly reflect this:

DCS ․ recommended, and the Court ordered, that Mother participate in [home-based case management] to address issue of homelessness and lack of employment.

․

[The home-based caseworker] accepted DCS's referral for services for Mother in ․ October 2025.

On or about October 10, 2025, [the caseworker] transported Mother from the latter's home to the local library for an intake session, during which Mother informed [the caseworker] that she was pregnant but would not disclose her due date as she did not want DCS to know.

Mother had been using illicit substances throughout her current pregnancy ․

․

[The caseworker] did not speak with Mother again until the end of October 2025 ․

․

․ [D]espite multiple efforts to contact Mother via phone and text, [the caseworker] had no further meaningful conversations with Mother, nor did Mother engage in [the caseworker's] services[.]

․

Even with the Court's authorization to complete a [Substance Use] Assessment through a community-based provider of her choosing ․, DCS never received documentation that Mother ever successfully completed an Assessment.

Indeed, although Mother enrolled in multiple treatment programs over the course of the underlying CHINS matters, she typically left each program within a week of starting.

Most recently, Mother independently entered the Bridges of Hope treatment program on or about October 13, 2025. By the end of October 2025, however, Mother had exited the program before successfully completing it.

Finally, DCS recommended, and the Court ordered, that Mother participate in [random drug screening] to ensure she obtained and maintained sobriety from illicit substances.

As of the date of the ․ trial, Mother had never complied with [random drug screening].

․

The FCM ․ never received information indicating that Mother has adequately addressed her sobriety, successfully completed substance abuse treatment, or obtained stable housing despite all ordered services remaining available even as of the day of the ․ trial.

Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 42-44, 45.

[26] Mother argues that “although [her] past efforts at substance abuse treatment [were] met with relapse, [she] was at least willing to initiate efforts at substance abuse treatment.” Appellant's Br. at 23. She “believes that despite the facts of her past convictions and substance abuse,” we should reverse the trial court's order. Id. at 24. However, this is a merely a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. K.T., 137 N.E.3d at 326 (noting we do not reweigh evidence, but rather “we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment”). DCS offered Mother services consistently for approximately four years, and she failed to take advantage of them. Just three months before the fact-finding hearing, Mother was still using drugs, had left another treatment program without completing it, and provided no indication that she had secured stable housing. In light of the trial court's unchallenged findings, it did not err in concluding there was a reasonable probability Mother would not remedy the conditions that led to the Children's removal and placement outside of her care.

[27] Because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) requires proof of only one of the circumstances listed in the statute, the clear and convincing evidence presented by DCS of the reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in the Children's placement outside of Mother's care would not be remedied was sufficient to support the trial court's decision. See A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1158 n.6 (finding it unnecessary to address the trial court's “threat to the [c]hildren's well[-]being” conclusion because there was sufficient evidence supporting the conclusion that the conditions causing the children's placement outside the home would not be remedied). Therefore, we do not address Mother's arguments regarding the trial court's other conclusions under section 31-34-2-4(d).

2.2. Best Interests

[28] Next, Mother challenges the court's conclusion that termination of her parental rights was in the Children's best interests. To determine whether termination was in the best interests of the Children, the trial court must consider the totality of the evidence and in doing so, Mother's interests are subordinated to the Children's. In re Z.B., 108 N.E.3d 895, 903 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. A central factor in this assessment is the Children's need for permanency. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. dismissed. Critically, “the recommendations of the case manager and court-appointed advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” In re J.S., 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

[29] As noted in the facts above and in the trial court's findings, both the FCM and the CASA testified that it was in the Children's best interests for Mother's parental rights to be terminated because she hadn't shown she could provide a safe and stable home free from substance use, and the Children deserve permanency. And as we concluded in part 2.1., the evidence supported a conclusion that the conditions that led to the Children's removal would not be remedied. Thus, there is sufficient evidence to show that termination was in the Children's best interests. Moreover, the trial court found the Children had been removed from Mother's care since each of them were born and while Mother attended a handful of visits at most, she never progressed beyond supervised visitation. In fact, Mother's visitation with A.M. had been suspended for over a year by the time of the fact-finding hearing because she did not participate in court ordered services. Furthermore, the CASA and the Children's foster parent testified that the Children were happy and cared for in their pre-adoptive foster home.

[30] Mother cites several cases, depicting them as similar to hers and arguing,

Indiana has repeatedly postponed termination where a parent faces grave challenges, including not only battles with substance abuse, criminal charges, and incarceration – even where the parent may ultimately fail to overcome his challenges. See, for example, R.Y. [v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs.], 904 N.E.2d 1257 [(Ind. 2009), reh'g denied]; In re J.M., 908 N.E.2d 191 (Ind. 2009); H.G. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 959 N.E.2d 272, 293 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)[, trans. denied, reh'g denied].

Appellant's Br. at 26. Mother's attorney unsuccessfully presented an almost verbatim argument in a recent appeal to this Court. In re L.J., No. 25A-JT-2847, 2026 WL 1195020, at *9 (Ind. Ct. App. May 1, 2026) (mem.). And we reiterate that panel's reasoning in rejecting it:

[Mother's] attempt to analogize this case to the cases upon which [she] relies is not well taken. In re J.M. involves an appeal taken from the trial court's denial of DCS's petitions to terminate the parents’ parental rights to their child. 908 N.E.2d at 193. Given the fundamentally different standard of review here, the analysis in In re J.M. is inapplicable. And the parents in R.Y. and H.G. were extremely engaged with DCS and completed several services in their efforts to maintain their relationships with their respective children.

Id. Here, Mother did not engage in services and demonstrated little, if any, effort to maintain her relationship with her Children. And having considered the totality of the evidence in this case, we cannot say the trial court erred in concluding that termination was in the Children's best interests.

Conclusion

[31] Finding the trial court did not err in denying Mother's motion to continue, and that its conclusions of law were supported by its findings of fact, we affirm.

[32] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother and DCS entered into a Deny and Submit agreement, in which they stipulated to the admissibility of two documents: (1) the Intake Officer's Report of Preliminary Inquiry and Investigation (filed November 24, 2021), and (2) the CHINS Petition (filed November 24, 2021). The agreement permitted the trial court to consider these stipulated documents to determine whether A.M. was a CHINS.

2.   While the progress reports filed in the Children's CHINS cases were not included in DCS's Exhibits or the record on appeal, the trial court's Orders Regarding Periodic Case Review are included in the record and incorporated the progress reports by reference. See e.g., Ex. at 53, 92 (“[H]aving read the Periodic Case Review Report prepared by DCS, which is incorporated herein by reference, ․”). We have therefore accessed the relevant progress reports through our Odyssey Case Management System.

3.   Progress Report at 3, No. 49D09-2402-JC-1287 (Nov. 19, 2024).

4.   To the extent Mother argues DCS did not prove it provided her statutory notice of the termination hearing, she did not raise this issue with the trial court. See C.C., 170 N.E.3d at 676 (“Counsel for Mother failed to argue a lack of statutory notice in the trial court. Accordingly, this issue is waived.”). Waiver notwithstanding, the record shows DCS mailed the required statutory notice to Mother's last known addresses as well as an email address she provided. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 30; Tr. at 6. Additionally, Mother received actual notice of the date and time of the hearing two weeks before from the FCM.

5.   The State argues the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother's motion to continue because her motion did not satisfy the requirements set forth in Trial Rule 7(D), which governs written motions to continue. However, because we find Mother's primary argument regarding due process to be dispositive, we do not reach the merits of the State's argument regarding Trial Rule 7(D).

6.   DCS filed its petition to terminate Mother's parental rights as to A.M. on March 4, 2024. Effective March 11, 2024, the requirements under section (b)(2)(A)(i), (b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), and (b)(2)(C)-(D) of the termination statute were modified and rewritten as Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(2)-(3), (d)(2)(A)-(B), and (d)(3)-(4) (2024). See Public Law 70-2024, SEC. 4, eff. March 11, 2024.The trial court noted this amendment in its final order and applied the newer version in A.M.’s case even though his termination petition was filed a week before that version came into effect. However, neither below nor on appeal did Mother assert that the court erred in applying the newer version of the statute in A.M.’s case. In fact, she applies the same version in her brief. See Appellant's Br. at 17. Thus, we proceed without deciding whether the trial court erred in applying the 2024 version of the statute.

7.   The court's conclusion under section (d)(2) pertained to A.M. only, as he had been removed from Mother's care for almost twenty-seven months. See Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 19.

8.   In the Summary of the Argument section of Mother's brief, she also purports to challenge the trial court's conclusion that “[a]doption is a satisfactory plan for her Children.” Appellant's Br. at 14. However, nowhere in the Argument section of her brief does she support that argument or otherwise reference it again. Thus, she has waived consideration of that issue for appeal for failure to support it with cogent argument. See Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 985 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (noting that appellant's failure to develop a cogent argument in support of her assertions of error waived the issue on appeal), reh'g denied.

DeBoer, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.