IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of S.B. and C.C. (Minor Children) and D.C. (Father) and K.B. (Mother) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] K.B. (“Mother”) and D.C. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) appeal the trial court's termination of their parental rights to C.C. (born 2016) and S.B. (born 2017) (collectively, “Children”) on petition of the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”). Parents present multiple issues for appellate review, which we consolidate and restate as: Did the trial court clearly err in terminating Parents’ rights to Children?

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In June 2020, the trial court adjudicated Children CHINS on Parents’ admission and removed them to foster care because of unsuitable living conditions.¹ Mother lived with a boyfriend. Father was in custody facing various criminal charges, including allegations of sexual misconduct with a minor and child solicitation.

[4] In 2021, Father pleaded guilty to Level 4 felony sexual misconduct with a minor and Level 5 felony child solicitation. The criminal court sentenced Father to consecutive sentences in the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”) for a total of ten years with three years suspended to probation. He was required to register as a sex offender and prohibited from having contact with a person less than sixteen years of age.

[5] Mother reunified with Children in early 2022. But, in January 2024, DCS filed another petition alleging Children were CHINS because Parents were unable to provide them with suitable housing. The trial court approved Children's removal and their placement with the same foster parents with whom they were first placed in 2020. DCS and Parents participated in court-ordered facilitation and Parents again admitted Children were CHINS. The parties noted in the mediated agreed order:

Mother needs assistance in finding and maintaining appropriate housing, finding and maintaining employment and transportation, enrolling the children in school and providing for the basic needs of the children. Father is currently incarcerated ․ and is unable to provide for the safety and well-being of the children.

Ex. Vol. 1 at 85. In the same order, the parties agreed to the following dispositional goals:

a. The parent(s) will maintain housing that is appropriate for family size that provides at least the minimum level of care. This includes being safe, clean, free of any illegal drugs, drug activity, or individuals under the influence. Housing must also be safe, structurally sound, and free of clutter and debris and any other conditions that would pose a risk of harm to the children in the home․

b. The parent(s) will provide proof of financial resources adequate and stable enough to support the household. This includes the use of public assistance.

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d. The parent(s) will complete a parenting assessment and successfully complete all recommendations developed as a result of the parenting assessment. Such recommendations may include, but are not limited to, Parenting Classes, Home-Based Counseling Services or other Counseling Services.

e. The parent(s) will complete a psychological evaluation(s) as referred and approved by DCS and successfully complete any recommendations that result from the evaluation(s).

f. The parent(s) will demonstrate the ability to meet the child's physical and age-appropriate supervisory needs. This includes, but is not limited to, providing appropriate clothing, diapers, and food during parenting time. The parent(s) will also demonstrate the ability to meet the child's medical and mental health needs. This includes demonstrating the ability to follow through with recommendations and treatments recommended by service providers. The parent(s) will also demonstrate the ability to meet the child's educational needs.

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h. The parent(s) will participate in parenting time as scheduled through DCS. The parent(s) will also participate in case planning conferences and/or child and family team meetings regarding permanency for the child.

i. The parent(s) will obey the law, and if arrested, notify DCS of the arrest within five (5) days of the arrest.

j. The parent(s) will meet their own personal, medical and/or mental health needs in a timely manner, and follow through with the reasonable recommendations of the providers.

k. The parent(s) will submit to Home Based Case Work and follow all recommendations of said service.

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m. The parent(s) will engage in individual therapy and follow all recommendations of the therapist.

Id. at 86–87. The trial court approved the agreed order and adjudicated Children CHINS. The court continued Children's removal, with a plan for reunification.

[6] Mother participated in a psychological evaluation in summer 2024. The clinical psychologist, Dr. Pfeffer, noted Mother “appeared largely in denial regarding the seriousness of her current circumstances.” Id. at 16. Mother reported a history of depression and self-harm in the past. She minimized Father's criminal record, and she expressed a willingness to live with him and Children together after his release. At the time of the assessment, Mother had no employment or means of transportation. According to Dr. Pfeffer, Mother was aware of the need to obtain housing and employment, but “she blamed others for her inability to achieve and sustain such needs.” Id. at 25. Dr. Pfeffer diagnosed Mother with persistent depressive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and major depressive disorder. The psychologist recommended Mother seek medication management, therapy, and parenting services focused on securing permanent housing and employment.

[7] DCS helped Mother find housing at a women's shelter in August 2024, but she left not long after arriving because she claimed to have panic attacks. Mother's caseworker assisted her in applying for subsidized housing, creating a resume, and preparing for job interviews. Even so, Mother lived in a tent for some time and secured only temporary housing with friends through the end of the year. As for employment, Mother worked at four different locations in 2024.

[8] Father was released from prison in August 2024. About three months later, Father was charged with Level 6 felony failure to register as a sex offender. He spent the next several months in jail, then pleaded guilty as charged and was released to a term of probation in summer 2025.

[9] In November, the trial court altered the permanency plan to reunification concurrent with adoption.

[10] Mother began employment at a fast food restaurant around February 2025. In the same month, the trial court altered Children's permanency plan to adoption only. In March, Mother moved to another friend's house. Mother paid rent from income she earned at her most recent job at a different restaurant chain. DCS filed a petition to terminate Parents’ rights to Children in April, alleging there was a satisfactory plan for Children's care; termination was in Children's best interests; there was a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in Children's removal or reasons for placement outside the home would not be remedied; and there was a reasonable probability the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Children. Specific to Father, DCS alleged he was required to register as a sex or violent offender.

[11] The trial court held a termination factfinding in July and August 2025. Mother testified she recently secured employment at a manufacturing center—her sixth job since early 2024—which she hoped would allow her to provide the stability Children required. Mother admitted to setbacks but insisted she would “keep on fighting” to reunify with Children. Tr. Vol. 2 at 119.

[12] As for Father, he called his failure-to-register offense a “technical violation” caused by a paperwork misunderstanding. Id. at 133. Father testified he expected to resume contact with Children soon, once he was able to remove the probation condition which prevented him from doing so.

[13] The current Family Case Manager (“FCM”) recommended adoption because Parents had not established a “pattern of stable housing, of stable employment, stable use of resources, [or] stable mental health[.]” Id. at 150. The FCM testified the same unsuitable living conditions which had twice led to Children's removal continued, as “[n]either parent ha[d] a home where the children [could] return.” Id. at 154. Although the FCM acknowledged Parents completed some services offered, she testified Parents were never able to reach “full engagement, full participation, [and] follow[ ] all recommendations.” Id. at 152. For instance, the FCM testified Mother did not complete all home-based casework; Mother did not meet her therapy goals; and Mother did not provide a budget nor demonstrate the financial means to pay rent. Mother herself admitted she had only begun to take her recommended medication in anticipation of the factfinding hearing.

[14] Father recognized he had no contact with Children in the years before the termination factfinding. His brief engagement with services following his release from prison was interrupted when he returned to custody for failing to register as a sex offender. Father testified he lived with his grandfather, who expected Father to find his own place. Yet at the time of the factfinding Father was unable to secure a job to support himself. Father's case manager underscored his progress, but acknowledged Father had not “accomplished the goals that DCS requested[.]” Id. at 197.

[15] The Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) also recommended adoption. She testified to “a pattern of instability with [Mother].” Id. at 179. The CASA noted despite over nineteen months of working with Mother in the underlying CHINS cases, “we're not anywhere closer to being able to reunify the children with her.” Id. at 180. The CASA also expressed concerns with Mother's dating preferences, as she had “a pattern of choosing people with criminal history that involves sexual misconduct with minors.” Id.²

[16] Children's prospective adoptive mother—Lorene Schwartz—testified at the hearing. Schwartz had cared for Children since their removal in early 2024, and previously during the first CHINS proceedings. She testified Children were attending school and doing well academically. The FCM testified Children were “very, very happy” at their placement. Id. at 154. The CASA explained Children had received therapy and their behavior had improved since their removal. The CASA further testified Children had bonded with their adoptive parents: “They have spent almost half of their [lives] with the placement that they live with now, and so looking at all of the facts of the case, it's my recommendation that they would be best to stay where they are and be adopted.” Id. at 181.

[17] In November 2025, the trial court issued an order terminating Parents’ rights to Children. The court found, in relevant part:

14. [Father] has participated in services. [Father] also has the need to establish stable housing and employment and has been working on those goals with his home based case manager. At the time of the second [termination] hearing, [Father] does not have stable housing and will have to move out of his grandfather's home. He is not regularly employed but picks up odd jobs here and there. [Father] continues to engage in service and works on his parenting skills. He has acquired a vehicle but needs to insure it. He does not have the ability to care for the children at the present time.

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21. [Mother's] greatest obstacle to completing the dispositional goals was obtaining permanent housing. Between January 2024 and the date of the second [termination] hearing, [Mother] had resided in approximately eight different locations. She never acquired permanent housing. The home based provider had exhausted all of the options for [Mother] to find housing. At one point, [Mother] resided in a woman's shelter ․ but she left due to the environment there because she was having panic attacks. DCS could have provided [Mother] with some financial assistance for housing, but [Mother] did not request assistance, did not produce a budget, and did not produce evidence of a job in order to qualify for that assistance.

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Appellants’ Joint App. Vol. 2 at 24–25.

[18] The court further concluded:

DCS has submitted clear and convincing evidence that there is a reasonable likelihood that the conditions that led to the children's removal from the parents’ care will not be remedied. The children were removed due to lack of stable and appropriate housing. At the time of the hearing, [Mother] had not acquired housing of her own. In the time that the case was open, she had lived in approximately eight places, none of which were appropriate for children. The providers had exhausted nearly all of the options available to [Mother] in the Lawrence County area. [Mother's] housing history and lack of stable income has been a barrier. However, [Mother] could have explored the financial support that DCS has for housing, if she had submitted a budget and could demonstrate that she had employment sufficient to maintain the housing. She did not take advantage of that.

․ [Mother] has a mental health diagnosis for which she could have, but did not, explore recommended treatment․

[T]he Court look[ed] at the history of [Mother's] involvement with DCS. [Mother] has had over four years of services to address housing instability. There have been times of temporary progress, such as when [Mother] acquired employment, but overall, very little progress has been made, and the Court concludes that the problematic situation will not improve.

[Father] is in a substantially similar situation. [Father's] criminal history is a tremendous obstacle in his ability to acquire housing and employment. To his credit, he continues to improve himself. However, the evidence supports the conclusion that [Father's] circumstances are not likely to change soon. [Father] does not have housing. At the time of the hearing, he is unemployed and consistently has difficulty getting hired. He is not able to care for the children at this time. As to [Father] termination is further support[ed] by [statute], in that DCS has proven that [Father] is required to register as a sex offender.

Id. at 28. Regarding best interests, the trial court determined:

DCS has met its burden on this issue. Both the FCM and the CASA expressed the opinion that termination is in the children's best interests. The CASA noted the improvement in the children in the care of placement. These children need permanency in order to continue to thrive, and given that [Mother] is no closer to stable housing than she was at the beginning of the case, and that [Mother] had not made adequate progress to improve her circumstances, the Court finds that termination is in the children's best interest.

Id. at 29. Father and Mother filed a joint notice of appeal but separate briefs. DCS filed a consolidated brief responding to both.

Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's termination decision.

A. Standard of Review

[19] Decisions to terminate parental rights are among the most difficult trial courts are called to make. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. 2014). These decisions are “among the most fact-sensitive—so we review them with great deference to the trial courts, recognizing their superior vantage point for weighing the evidence and assessing witness credibility.” Id. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the judgment. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016). “We confine our review to two steps: whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings, and then whether the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.” In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1170 (Ind. 2016) (quoting E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642). In deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will affirm the termination of parental rights unless the trial court's judgment is clearly erroneous. In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019). Findings are clearly erroneous when the record contains no facts supporting them either directly or by inference. In re A.L., 273 N.E.3d 481, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). Trial court findings not challenged on appeal are accepted as true. See In re A.M.J., 228 N.E.3d 1132, 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

B. Statutory Requirements

[20] A parent has a constitutionally protected right to establish a home and raise his or her child. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). But the right is not absolute. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45. “When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” Id. at 45–46.

[21] When terminating a parent's rights to his or her child, DCS must allege and prove:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c) (2024). DCS alleged the following Subsection (d) circumstances as to both Parents:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(3)–(4); see Appellants’ Joint App. Vol. 2 at 32, 36. Specific to Father, DCS alleged:

(12) That the parent is required to register as a sex or violent offender under IC 11-8-8.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(12); Appellants’ Joint App. Vol. 2 at 32, 36. The State bears the burden of proving the allegations by clear and convincing evidence. I.C. § 31-37-14-2 (1997). Because Subsection (d) of the termination statute is written in the disjunctive, “the trial court need only find that one requirement of Subsection (d) has been established by clear and convincing evidence.” A.L., 273 N.E.3d at 489. In the event the court finds the allegations of a termination petition proven, the court “shall” terminate the parent-child relationship and enter findings of fact supporting that conclusion. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a), (c)(1) (2012).

C. Remediation of Conditions

[22] To determine whether there is a reasonable probability the reasons for a child's removal or continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, trial courts look first at what conditions led to the child's placement outside the home and then determine whether those conditions will not be remedied. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231. The trial court must evaluate a parent's fitness to care for his or her child at the time of the termination hearing, considering evidence of changed conditions. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. But the court must balance recent improvements against a parent's habitual patterns of conduct to decide whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” Id. DCS is not required to eliminate all possibilities of change; DCS need only establish there is a reasonable probability a parent's behavior will not change. In re C.C., 153 N.E.3d 340, 348 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

[23] Parents in this case both argue DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence there was a reasonable probability the reasons for Children's removal will not be remedied. See Appellant Father's Br. at 14; Appellant Mother's Br. at 9. We address their arguments in turn.

1. Father

[24] Father argues the trial court's decision to terminate his parental rights was clearly erroneous because “he had taken significant steps to engage in programming and services after his release [from] incarceration.” Appellant Father's Br. at 14.

[25] During Children's first adjudication as CHINS, Father was faced with allegations of Level 4 felony sexual misconduct with a minor and Level 5 felony child solicitation. He later pleaded guilty and was imprisoned in the DOC for several years as a result. Father had to register as a sex offender upon his release to probation, and he was prohibited from having contact with minors under the age of sixteen. Approximately three months after his release from prison, Father was charged with Level 6 felony failure to register as a sex offender.

[26] Father's criminal history prevented him from developing a relationship with Children. See J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1046 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (noting those who pursue criminal activity are at risk of being denied the chance to form meaningful relationships with their children), trans. denied. Father presented no evidence of participation in services during his time in the DOC. At the time of termination, Father lacked permanent employment and housing. Although Father expected to lift the probation restriction prohibiting contact with Children, the trial court had no obligation to credit his testimony. As DCS argues, “Father's future plans are not evidence upon which a trial court can base its termination decision, because the parent's fitness to care for the children must be assessed as of the time of the hearing.” Appellee's Br. at 32 (citing In re B.D.J., 728 N.E.2d 195, 202 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)). Father's case manager testified he had not “accomplished the goals that DCS requested[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 197. In short, clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's conclusion there is a reasonable probability the reasons for Children's removal from Father's care will not be remedied.

[27] Father additionally contends the court's determination was erroneous because his responsibility to register as a sex offender, “without any nexus ․ to his ability to parent his children, should not be sufficient to support a termination of his parental rights[.]” Appellant Father's Br. at 21. Father does not challenge the trial court finding he is required to register as a sex offender. We accept unchallenged findings as true. A.M.J., 228 N.E.3d at 1139. Moreover, under Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(d)(12), DCS only had to prove he was required to register as a sex or violent offender. See also In re J'S.P., No. 25A-JT-2230, at *10 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2026) (mem.) (noting an unchallenged Subsection (d)(12) finding, standing alone, permitted the trial court to terminate the parent-child relationship). Having already concluded DCS met its burden under (d)(3), we need not rely on (d)(12) to affirm as to Father, see A.L., 273 N.E.3d at 489, but the unchallenged findings regarding (d)(12) are another ground supporting termination of his parental rights.

2. Mother

[28] Mother argues the trial court's termination decision was clearly erroneous because she “was actively engaged in services and making significant progress toward reunification[,]” especially in the months before the termination factfinding. Appellant Mother's Br. at 9, 11.

[29] DCS has a long history of involvement with Mother and Children, starting with an informal adjustment in 2016 relating to Mother's eldest child and C.C. Children have twice been removed from Mother's care and adjudicated CHINS. In each of the CHINS cases, DCS removed Children because of unsuitable living conditions. To Mother's credit, she achieved reunification with Children once, and she has participated in some of the services DCS offered.

[30] But since the second CHINS adjudication, Mother has failed to find permanent housing and secure stable employment. Her conduct demonstrates a pattern of instability: she has lived in at least eight locations and had six different jobs in just the year before termination. Mother herself concedes her latest living arrangement “was not adequate” for Children. Id. at 11. She completed none of her therapy goals, and she recently started medication in anticipation of the factfinding hearing. Dr. Pfeffer noted Mother minimized Father's criminal history, and the CASA testified Mother was not “closer to being able to reunify” with Children. Tr. Vol. 2 at 180. DCS need not eliminate all possibilities of change, see C.C., 153 N.E.3d at 348, and the trial court was within its discretion to disregard efforts Mother made shortly before termination and weigh more heavily her history of conduct, see K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1234. Therefore, the evidence clearly and convincingly shows a reasonable probability exists that the conditions leading to Children's removal from Mother's care will not be remedied.

[31] Mother also asserts the trial court erred because she was not made “aware financial assistance could be available to assist with securing housing[.]” Appellant Mother's Br. at 12. Yet a previous FCM informed Mother of financial resources available to pay rent. The current FCM testified Mother never produced a budget, she did not identify an apartment for leasing, nor did she demonstrate the financial ability to cover rent. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 168 (the FCM stating, “[Mother] has never requested any such support or produced evidence that would warrant me to offer any such support.”). The trial court did not err in concluding there was a reasonable probability Mother's housing and employment instability was likely to be remedied.

D.Best Interests

[32] Only Father challenges the trial court's best interests conclusion. See Appellant Father's Br. at 21–22. Father specifically alleges the court's “best interest analysis fails to consider factors related to [him] and his ability to re-establish a parent-child relationship[.]” Id. at 22.

[33] A parent's right to raise their children cannot be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the children. See V.A., 51 N.E.3d at 1151. The need for permanency is but one factor in determining whether termination is in the children's best interest. Id. at 1152. Having said that, “children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification[.]” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648. Nor should the trial court “wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that the child's physical, mental and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” Id. (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235).

[34] To assess whether termination is in a child's best interests, “trial courts must look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the children.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. A recommendation by the case manager or child advocate “to terminate parental rights is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” In re C.D., 141 N.E.3d 845, 853–54 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

[35] At the termination hearing, the trial court heard testimony from Children's foster mother, Schwartz. She testified Children were in school and doing well academically. She and her husband hoped to adopt Children. The FCM testified Children were happy at their placement and had all their needs met. The CASA testified Children received therapy and their behavior had improved. Both the FCM and the CASA recommended termination. The CASA—who had been assigned to both prior CHINS cases involving Children—testified it was best for them “to stay where they are and be adopted.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 181. Although the trial court's best interests conclusion does not explicitly refer to Father, he was in no better position than Mother to provide Children with the stability they needed. See id. at 154 (the FCM observing, “[Father] just got out of incarceration, lacks his own housing, lacks employment, [and] has probation restrictions”). The recommendations of the FCM and the CASA—together with evidence of little progress toward reunification—are sufficient to demonstrate termination is in Children's best interests. See C.D., 141 N.E.3d at 853–54.

Conclusion

[36] The trial court did not clearly err in terminating Parents’ rights to Children.

[37] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At the time of the adjudication, Children lived with their maternal grandparents. DCS initially became involved with Parents in 2016 when the trial court approved an informal adjustment regarding their eldest child, J.C., and C.C. J.C. was later placed in a guardianship, and he is not part of this appeal.

2.   Apart from Father, two of Mother's other dating partners had either been convicted of, or accused of committing, sex offenses involving minors.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Mathias, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.