Justin Lee Jones, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After Justin Lee Jones pleaded guilty to charges against him and admitted to being a habitual offender, the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of thirty-two and one-half years. Jones appeals his sentence, claiming the trial court abused its discretion by failing to find certain mitigating circumstances. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] As a Shelbyville Police Department officer initiated a traffic stop on the afternoon of January 15, 2025, the driver of the vehicle—later identified as Jones—pulled to the curb and stepped out. When instructed to return to the vehicle, Jones complied but then drove away. He traveled at high speeds past a high school, through residential areas, and onto country roads, disregarding all stop signs along the way. A pursuing officer saw Jones throwing items out of the vehicle shortly before the vehicle skidded on ice and ran into a ditch. Jones was quickly apprehended and a bag he had thrown out was recovered. The bag contained over 350 grams of methamphetamine. At the time of these events, Jones had three prior unrelated felony convictions.

[3] The State charged Jones with Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine,¹ Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement,² Level 6 felony criminal recklessness,³ and alleged he was a habitual offender.⁴ Without an agreement with the State as to sentencing, Jones pleaded guilty to the offenses as charged. The trial court accepted the plea, ordered a presentence investigation report (“PSI”) to be prepared, and set a date for sentencing.

[4] The PSI reported Jones was thirty-eight years old. He had two contacts with the justice system as a juvenile: he was adjudicated a delinquent when he was nine years old for being a runaway, violating curfew, and committing battery and theft; and he was placed on an informal adjustment for leaving home without permission as a teenager. This is Jones’ twelfth criminal case as an adult, including a case that was pending in Georgia at the time he committed these offenses. Jones has been convicted of five felonies and five misdemeanors and had an active warrant for his arrest because of failure to appear in the pending Georgia case. He was placed on probation three times, with one probation revoked, and a violation pending in another because of this case.

[5] Jones was diagnosed with ADD/ADHD and manic depression in his youth. He was raised by his mother and maternal grandmother and lived for a while with his maternal uncle and his wife. He never met his father. He recounted being physically abused by his stepfather, sexually abused by a neighbor, and spending time in foster care and at the Shelby County Youth Center. He began using marijuana daily when he was eight years old and progressed to using cocaine and then heroin. Eventually, when he was twenty-seven years old, he was introduced to methamphetamine and it became “a daily, uncontrollable habit.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 79. He has also used spice, bath salts, LSD, and mushrooms. He stated he “sometimes lacks control of his life due to his addiction.” Id. at 80. His risk assessment score places him in the “very high” category to reoffend. Id.

[6] At Jones’ sentencing hearing, the State noted Jones’ open plea was a mitigator but also identified several aggravators. The State asked for an executed sentence of thirty-two years. Jones’ counsel acknowledged Jones has an extensive criminal history but asked the court to consider “the whole picture of Mr. Jones’ life and the disadvantages that he had,” including his “terrible family situation.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 59. Jones’ counsel advocated for a twenty-two-year sentence. And Jones spoke in allocution:

All the crimes I've committed in the past and the ones I face today have stemmed from my addiction and the lack of control over it․ I never had the urge or the opportunity for recovery until I came to the JIP Program here in Shelby County Jail.

Before ․, I was lost, sick, hopeless, living in pain, killing myself and others around me by helping spreading this disease we call addiction, and for that I'm deeply sorry․ This program ․ has given me the tools I need to recover and to be a part of society again one day; for that I'm grateful.

So that being said, I'm begging that the Courts allow me to continue my recovery and send me to prison with hope of RWI or purposeful incarceration, for I am sincere about my commitment to change and [am] willing to do anything to recover and make our world a better place.

Id. at 54. He offered into evidence certificates showing he completed the Heart of Addiction Study and MRT-Moral Reconation Therapy while incarcerated awaiting resolution of this case.

[7] The trial court found Jones had no physical or mental health issues and further found he had a high risk of committing another crime. The court gave the nature and circumstances of Jones’ offenses—including an “immense amount of narcotics” and a “horrendous” police chase— significant aggravating weight because they were “incredibly serious” and far exceeded the elements of the crimes. Id. at 60. And the trial court also gave Jones’ criminal history and the fact he was on probation and pretrial release when he committed these offenses significant weight as aggravators. The trial court gave the open plea moderate weight as a mitigator. And the court acknowledged the circumstances of Jones’ upbringing but did not find it to be a mitigator, stating, “I'm sorry about your childhood, but all kinds of people have bad childhoods and don't commit crimes.” Id. at 61.

[8] Finding the aggravators outweighed the mitigator, the trial court imposed an enhanced sentence: twenty years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction for the dealing conviction, enhanced by ten years for the habitual offender finding; a consecutive term of two and one-half years for resisting law enforcement; and a concurrent term of two and one-half years for the criminal recklessness conviction.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Jones.

[9] We review a trial court's sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion. Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 269 (Ind. 2023). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id. (citation omitted). A trial court may abuse its sentencing discretion in a number of ways, including by (1) failing to enter a sentencing statement; (2) relying on aggravators or mitigators unsupported by the record; (3) failing to find aggravators or mitigators that are supported by the record and advanced for consideration; or (4) relying on reasons that are improper as a matter of law. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1223 (Ind. 2008).

[10] “An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 493, clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007).

[11] Jones argues the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to consider his troubled childhood a mitigator, when it “found that Jones does not suffer from mental health issues,” and when it did not consider his long history of substance use. Appellant's Br. at 8–9.⁵

[12] First, the trial court acknowledged Jones’ troubled childhood was a sad circumstance but declined to give it mitigating weight. The trial court is not obligated to accept the defendant's contention as to what constitutes a mitigating circumstance or to give it the same weight the defendant would. Lee v. State, 246 N.E.3d 1265, 1270 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). And evidence of a difficult childhood is generally entitled “to little, if any, mitigating weight.” Wright v. State, 168 N.E.3d 244, 269 (Ind. 2021) (citation omitted); see Hudson v. State, 135 N.E.3d 973, 979 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (holding trial court did not abuse its sentencing discretion when it acknowledged the defendant's difficult childhood but stated it did not eliminate her responsibility and refused it as a mitigator). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in its treatment of this proffered mitigator.⁶

[13] Second, Jones argues on appeal that the trial court's finding he has no mental health issues is “not supported by the record” Appellant's Br. at 9. However, Jones did not advance his mental health as a mitigator at sentencing and did not object when the trial court made this observation in open court. “Generally, if the defendant fails to advance a mitigating circumstance at sentencing, the court will presume that the factor is not significant, and the defendant is precluded from advancing it as a mitigating circumstance for the first time on appeal.” Fisher v. State, 264 N.E.3d 696, 707 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (internal quotation omitted). Moreover, the only evidence concerning Jones’ mental health was his self-report of being diagnosed with ADD/ADHD and manic depression as a child. He denied any adult mental health diagnosis. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 73. Even if Jones had proffered this mitigator, the trial court could have properly rejected it as not clearly supported by the record. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493 (stating a defendant must show overlooked mitigating evidence is “both significant and clearly supported by the record”).

[14] And finally, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in not finding a history of addiction to be a mitigating circumstance. Rose v. State, 810 N.E.2d 361, 367 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Jones’ long history of substance use is clearly supported by the record. But he has failed to show it is significantly mitigating. Jones has multiple criminal convictions related to drug activity.⁷ He reported his substance use contributed to the demise of his marriage. Yet he described no attempts at treatment or rehabilitation until he was incarcerated for this crime. “[A] defendant's failure to address a known substance-use problem is not mitigating.” Angulo v. State, 191 N.E.3d 958, 974 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied; cf. Caraway v. State, 959 N.E.2d 847, 852 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding failure to obtain treatment for substance use can be considered an aggravator, not a mitigator), trans. denied. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to identify Jones’ history of substance use as a mitigating factor.

Conclusion

[15] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Jones to thirty-two and one-half years for his convictions.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1 (2017).

2.   I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1 (2024).

3.   I.C. § 35-42-2-2 (2019).

4.   I.C. § 35-50-2-8 (2023).

5.   Jones states in the opening paragraph of his argument that the trial court “violated [his] rights to due process and fundamental fairness at sentencing, under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article One, Sections Twelve, Thirteen, and Sixteen of the Indiana Constitution[.]” Id. at 9. Because he does not develop this argument, it is waived. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).

6.   Jones cites Coleman v. State for the proposition that “[e]vidence of childhood trauma is only recognized as mitigating if the defendant can show that the criminal act is ‘attributable’ to the trauma” and requests we reconsider this “rule.” Appellant's Br. at 13 (citing 741 N.E.2d 697, 701 (Ind. 2000), cert. denied) (emphasis added). We decline to do so for two reasons. First, Coleman does not restrict use of childhood trauma in the way Jones suggests; it merely comments on the relative weight it should be afforded. Second, if it were a rule, it was established by the Supreme Court, and we are not at liberty to reconsider Supreme Court precedent. Hill v. State, 122 N.E.3d 979, 982 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

7.   Jones was first convicted of a substance-related offense in 2008, when he was convicted in Kentucky of misdemeanor possession of marijuana. In total, five of Jones’ twelve criminal cases have involved illegal substances.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Mathias, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.