Jade Secor, Appellant-Respondent v. Richard Secor and Marie Secor, Appellees-Petitioners (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Jade Secor (“Mother”) (now Jade Kerr) appeals the trial court's award of grandparent visitation to her parents. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Richard Secor (“Grandfather”) and Marie Secor (“Grandmother”) (collectively, “Grandparents”) adopted Mother when she was a child. Mother lived with Grandparents while she was pregnant with C.S. (“Child”), and she gave birth to Child in May 2017. Paternity for Child was never established.

[3] Mother and Child lived with Grandparents for the first couple of years of Child's life. When Child was around two and a half, Grandparents helped Mother find her own home. Even after Mother and Child moved out, Child and Grandparents maintained a loving relationship. Child stayed with Grandparents every weekend while Mother worked as well as some weeks when Mother was on vacation. Child also had relationships with his extended family on Mother's side, including aunts, uncles, and cousins.

[4] Grandparents maintained “significant involvement” with Child until he was five. Ex. p. 7. In 2022, Mother started dating Jill Smiley (“Stepmother”), and the two later married. Grandfather has been a minister for over 30 years, and his “world view is based off of the ․ Christian Holy Scripture,” including the part of “the Bible where it says that homosexuality is an abomination.” Tr. pp. 32, 43. After Mother and Child moved in with Stepmother, Mother's relationship with Grandparents deteriorated, “in part due to conflicts arising from [Grandparents’] views regarding [Mother's] marriage to another woman, and [Mother's] perception of those views.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 12. As a result, Mother began restricting Grandparents’ contact with Child. Grandfather mentioned Mother and Child in some of his sermons, which are recorded and posted online. He stated in one that he was “praying for [Mother] to come back to God by any means necessary” and in another that Mother “was trying to keep his grandchild from him.” Tr. pp. 42, 73. Child struggled in school and experienced anxiety due to the family tension, so he began counseling at Bowen Health with clinical psychologist Dr. Peter Russell.

[5] In August 2022, Grandparents petitioned for guardianship of Child due to concerns about Mother's mental health and her ability to meet Child's needs. The trial court appointed Susan Rutz as guardian ad litem (GAL). In July 2023, the parties participated in mediation and agreed to stay the guardianship proceeding so they could attend family-reunification counseling. They also agreed that Grandparents would have therapeutic visitation with Child supervised by Dr. Russell. Therapeutic visitation took place for one hour every other week, and Mother and Stepmother were always present.

[6] Beginning in August 2023, Grandparents, Mother, and Stepmother attended reunification counseling every other week with Courtney Chaffee. The goal was to repair the relationships between Mother and Grandparents so that court intervention would no longer be necessary. Chaffee observed that Child must have been “very confused because mixed messages were being sent to him”—sometimes, Mother would say that he shouldn't have contact with Grandparents, but then, Mother, Stepmother, and Child would get together with them outside of therapeutic visitation. Id. at 67. For example, one night in 2023, the parties met at a restaurant for dinner. It took Child “a little while ․ to warm up” to Grandparents, but he grew “excited” to update them on his life, and they had “great conversation.” Id. at 34.

[7] Despite the therapeutic visitation and continued counseling with Dr. Russell, Child's anxiety and struggles at school continued. In December, Dr. Russell suspended visitation to focus on working with Child individually. Additionally, Mother and Stepmother began missing reunification counseling sessions. Chaffee suspended the counseling in February 2024 after Mother and Stepmother told her they were moving to Georgia.

[8] In April 2024, Grandparents dismissed their petition for guardianship and brought this action for grandparent visitation. At a hearing on the petition in October, the parties agreed to resume therapeutic visitation. The trial court subsequently issued an interim order requiring the family to attend visitation with Dr. Russell every other week for one hour. This schedule continued until Dr. Russell left Bowen Health in the spring of 2025. Around the same time, in March, Mother's biological grandmother, Cynthia Kerr, adopted her as an adult in the state of Georgia.¹ But the following month, Mother, Stepmother, and Child went to Grandparents’ home for Easter along with some extended family, which was “a positive interaction.” Id. at 12. Grandparents “welcomed” Mother and Stepmother, who “acted as if nothing had ever happened.” Id. at 35.

[9] The parties stipulated to the appointment of Rutz as GAL in the visitation case given her familiarity with the family. In her report, GAL Rutz recommended that Grandparents have visitation with Child one day a month for two hours plus ten minutes of phone contact once a week. Mother had provided GAL Rutz with clips of Grandfather's sermons, and GAL Rutz noted that “although [Grandfather] does make reference to his family and their perceived issues,” the clips “do not appear worthy of cutting [Child] away from his extended family.” Ex. p. 8. GAL Rutz explained that Child had “some fear and confusion about [Grandparents’] role in his life,” but there wasn't “much logical reason for this fear,” and she was “concerned” that the fear was caused by “the picture that has been painted of [Grandparents] to [Child] (justified or not).” Id. at 7, 8.

[10] The trial court held an evidentiary hearing in November. Grandparents asked for six hours of visitation with Child one day a month and phone contact once a week. Grandfather added that he would “love to have [Mother] involved” with the visitation and phone calls if she wanted to join. Tr. p. 37. Grandparents both testified that they wanted to have a relationship with Mother and Stepmother. Grandmother asserted that she would never try to alienate Child from Mother or Stepmother. As for her views on homosexuality, Grandmother explained, “I may have beliefs or disagreements about things, but ․ I would go out of my way not to interfere with, to do anything that would hurt a relationship between whether it be my child or grandchild and their parent.” Tr. p. 17. And for his part, Grandfather testified, “My world view is based off of the scripture ․ We are taught, as Christ has taught us, that we are to love one another and to love others. And that's what ․ I try to do. I try to follow that․ I would never say anything to [Child] ever in ever [sic] to hurt his relationship with his mother and lose respect for her or [Stepmother].” Id. at 32-33. He testified that the LGBTQ+ “lifestyle is different than how we have been originally created. So, there has to, in my opinion, there has to be some type of maybe a disconnect ․” Id. at 41. But ultimately, he testified that Mother's homosexuality wouldn't change the way he would treat her or Child and that Mother and Stepmother would “always be welcome.” Id. at 44.

[11] GAL Rutz reiterated that it would be in Child's best interests to have contact with Grandparents. She didn't know whether Child “would say that he wants to see them,” but she wasn't “sure how much of that is his true feelings on the subject” versus “a reflection of how he knows his mother feels about it and just all the tension that's surrounding it.” Id. at 62. GAL Rutz opined that Child “would benefit from having a continued relationship with the family that he knew and that he was raised in.” Id. at 63. Dr. Russell testified that Mother offered Grandparents “some visitation outside of therapeutic visitation,” but Grandparents had said the offer “was wholly inadequate” and “[t]hey wanted more time with” Child. Id. at 78. No further evidence or testimony was presented about this purported offer.

[12] In February 2026, the trial court granted Grandparents visitation. In its order, the court found that Mother had been denying visitation entirely rather than merely limiting it. The court noted that it “does not want [Child's] mental or emotional health to suffer based upon disagreements between [Grandparents and Mother],” but in light of Grandparents’ testimony, it was “assured that [Child] will not be subjected to such things from [Grandparents].” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 17. Accordingly, the court concluded that visitation with Grandparents is in Child's best interests and adopted GAL Rutz's recommendation, ordering visitation for two hours one day per month and phone contact for 10 minutes once a week. The court also ordered the parties to “refrain from making any negative comments about each other in the presence of [Child].” Id. at 19.

[13] Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[14] Mother contends that the trial court erred in granting visitation to Grandparents. In family-law matters, including actions for grandparent visitation, we afford trial courts a great deal of deference because of their opportunity for extended face-to-face interactions with the parties. Welbourne v. Mays, 165 N.E.3d 117, 121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).

[15] Under the Grandparent Visitation Act, in granting or denying grandparent visitation, the trial court must issue a decree setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Ind. Code § 31-17-5-6. Thus, we apply a two-tiered standard of review: we first determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and then whether the findings support the judgment. In re Visitation of M.L.B., 983 N.E.2d 583, 585 (Ind. 2013). The trial court's findings and conclusions must address the following factors set forth in McCune v. Frey, 783 N.E.2d 752 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), which our Court derived from the United States Supreme Court decision Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000):

(1) a presumption that a fit parent's decision about grandparent visitation is in the child's best interests (thus placing the burden of proof on the petitioning grandparents);

(2) the “special weight” that must therefore be given to a fit parent's decision regarding nonparental visitation (thus establishing a heightened standard of proof by which a grandparent must rebut the presumption);

(3) “some weight” given to whether a parent has agreed to some visitation or denied it entirely ․ ; and

(4) whether the petitioning grandparent has established that visitation is in the child's best interests.

Id. at 586.

[16] Mother challenges the trial court's finding that she denied Grandparents visitation entirely, the weight it gave to her decision about visitation, and its conclusion that visitation with Grandparents is in Child's best interests. We address each challenge in turn.

I. The trial court did not err in finding that Mother denied Grandparents visitation

[17] Mother challenges the trial court's finding that she denied Grandparents visitation with Child entirely. “We set aside findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous, deferring to the trial court's superior opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Id. at 585 (quotations omitted).

[18] In determining whether a parent has denied or simply limited visitation, both the parent's recent decisions as to visitation and earlier patterns of visitation are relevant. Id. at 587. The trial court considered both here. It explained that while Grandparents had “regular contact” with Child until he was around five years old, their contact “has been sporadic over the past three years” because “[s]ince the end of the family counseling, the contact [Mother] has permitted between [Grandparents and Child] has been limited.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 12, 14. Indeed, although the parties agreed to therapeutic visitation in both the guardianship and visitation cases, it was suspended from December 2023 until October 2024, and there is no evidence that it continued after Dr. Russell left Bowen Health in the spring of 2025—meaning there were no therapeutic visits from that spring until the evidentiary hearing in November. And other than therapeutic visitation, the record shows that the only visits between Child and Grandparents since Mother's relationship with Grandparents deteriorated were one dinner in late 2023 and a family gathering for Easter in 2025.

[19] Nevertheless, Mother contends that the evidence shows that she merely limited Grandparents’ visitation with Child rather than denying it entirely. In addition to the visits described above, she points to her participation in reunification counseling and attempt to facilitate visitation outside the therapeutic setting. But the reunification counseling was between Mother, Stepmother, and Grandparents; Child was never present, see Tr. pp. 62, 65, so this does not amount to visitation. And although Dr. Russell testified that Mother had offered Grandparents visits outside of therapeutic visitation, he didn't specify what the offer was or when it was made. And neither Mother nor Grandparents testified about or presented any other evidence of this purported offer.

[20] Contrary to Mother's argument, there is ample evidence to support the court's finding that she denied visitation entirely. In her GAL report, Rutz stated that Child “has had sporadic contact with his grandparents over the past 3 plus years” and that Mother “has shown a great deal of resistance to any real contact between [Child] and his grandparents.” Ex. pp. 7, 8. At the evidentiary hearing, GAL Rutz testified, “I don't know that [Child] had any visits with [Grandparents] other than the dinner and then Easter. I'm not sure that they had quote visits since this whole thing has started.” Tr. p. 69. The trial court asked Grandmother whether she and Grandfather were allowed limited contact with Child or if visitation was being completely denied, and Grandmother said it was being denied. The court confirmed, “Not being allowed to see him at all at this point?” and Grandmother answered, “Correct.” Id. at 29. And, although not evidence, Mother's own counsel acknowledged during her opening statement that Mother “has terminated her relationship” with Grandparents and “does not want her son to maintain a relationship” with them. Id. at 7. The trial court did not err in finding that Mother denied visitation. See Spaulding v. Williams, 793 N.E.2d 252, 259 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming trial court's finding that “Father's actions amounted, in effect, to a denial of visitation” where Father initially allowed visitation on a limited basis but later “stopped allowing [Child] to visit with Grandparents in the manner in which [Child] and Grandparents had enjoyed previously”).

II. The trial court properly weighed Mother's decision to deny visitation

[21] Mother also argues that the trial court failed to give her decision about visitation the required weight. She contends that the court “inverted [the McCune] framework” and treated her denial of visitation “as a reason to discount [her] constitutional judgment, rather than as a limited factor to be given ‘some weight’ after giving her decision the required ‘special weight’ deference.” Appellant's Br. pp. 15, 16. As to the first three McCune factors, the court found:

33. There is no evidence that [Mother] isn't a fit parent to [Child]. Therefore, the Court presumes that [Mother] acts in the best interests of [Child].

34. Accordingly, the Court gives special weight to [Mother's] decision to deny [Grandparents] visitation with [Child].

35. The Court also considers that [Mother] is not merely limiting visitation but denying it entirely, a factor recognized as relevant in evaluating whether [Mother's] decision remains consistent with [Child's] best interests. Without even limited contact or communication, [Grandparents] are completely severed from any relationship with [Child].

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 17.

[22] Mother primarily takes issue with the court's statement that it gave “special weight” to her decision to deny visitation. She contends that the court “misapplie[d] the required framework” because “ ‘special weight’ belongs to the fit parent's decision” about visitation, while “whether the parent denied visitation entirely or merely limited it is a separate consideration entitled to ‘some weight.’ ” Appellant's Br. p. 15. To the extent Mother is arguing that, in giving special weight to a fit parent's decision about grandparent visitation, the trial court should not consider what the parent's decision is, such an interpretation is not supported by our case law. In listing the four factors, McCune itself states that “special weight ․ must be given to a fit parent's decision to deny or limit visitation.” 783 N.E.2d at 757. And other decisions have described and applied this factor the same way. See, e.g., K.I. ex rel. J.I. v. J.H., 903 N.E.2d 453, 462 (Ind. 2009); Crafton v. Gibson, 752 N.E.2d 78, 97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“[T]he trial court was required under Troxel to give special weight to [Mother's] decision not to allow [Grandmother] visitation with her minor children.”). The trial court did not err in applying this factor.

[23] The trial court also properly considered the third McCune factor. As our Court explained there, “[a]nother factor the Troxel Court determined that a trial court should give some weight to is whether a parent has agreed to some visitation.” 783 N.E.2d at 759. The significance of this factor is that it “defines what interest of the child's is at stake”—if the parent has denied visitation entirely, the issue is “whether the child will have any relationship with the grandparents, which may strengthen the case for judicial intervention.” M.L.B., 983 N.E.2d at 587 (citation omitted). This is exactly what the trial court recognized here in noting that “[w]ithout even limited contact or communication, [Grandparents] are completely severed from any relationship with [Child].” We disagree with Mother that the court treated her denial of visitation “as a reason to discount [her] constitutional judgment”; it merely identified the interest at stake in light of this denial, as contemplated by McCune and its progeny.

[24] Mother has failed to show error in the court's application of the McCune framework.

III. The trial court did not err in concluding that Grandparents established that visitation is in Child's best interests

[25] Finally, Mother argues that the trial court erred in concluding that visitation with Grandparents is in Child's best interests. The Grandparent Visitation Act allows the trial court to “grant visitation rights if the court determines that visitation rights are in the best interests of the child.” I.C. § 31-17-5-2(a). In determining the best interests of the child, “the court may consider whether a grandparent has had or has attempted to have meaningful contact with the child.” Id. at (b). Because trial courts are able to assess the credibility and character of the parties involved, they are in a superior position to resolve a best-interests dispute. Welbourne, 165 N.E.3d at 121.

[26] For the first five or so years of Child's life, Grandparents had a close relationship with Mother and regular, meaningful contact with Child. But the relationship between Mother and Grandparents soured after Mother began dating (and later married) a woman. As GAL Rutz explained and the trial court found, the deterioration of the relationship was due in large part to Mother's perception that Grandparents disapproved of her lifestyle. Grandmother testified that even though she had different beliefs about homosexuality, she wanted to have a relationship with Mother and Stepmother and would never try to alienate Child from them. Although Grandfather said that he agreed with the part of the Bible that “says that homosexuality is an abomination,” he also testified that “Christ has taught us, that we are to love one another and to love others. And that's what ․ I try to do,” and that Mother being gay wouldn't change the way he'd treat her or Child. And although Grandfather referenced Mother and Child in some of his sermons, GAL Rutz viewed clips of the sermons and opined that the references “do not appear worthy of cutting [Child] away from his extended family.”

[27] In arguing that grandparent visitation is not in Child's best interests, Mother relies on Child's emotional struggles during the therapeutic visitation and his fear surrounding Grandparents. But GAL Rutz observed that there wasn't “much logical reason for this fear,” and she was “concerned” that the fear was caused by “the picture that has been painted of [Grandparents] to [Child] (justified or not).” She also testified that while Child might have said he didn't want to see Grandparents, this may have been based on Mother's feelings rather than his own. And some of Child's emotional issues may have been due to the “mixed messages” Mother was sending. Reunification counselor Chaffee observed that Child must've been confused because Mother would tell him he shouldn't have contact with Grandparents, but then Mother, Stepmother, and Child would get together with them. Additionally, when the family went to Grandparents’ house for Easter 2025, Mother and Stepmother acted as if nothing had ever happened.

[28] The trial court's order shows that it carefully considered the parties’ history of conflict and its impact on Child. The court didn't “want [Child's] mental or emotional health to suffer based upon disagreements between [Grandparents and Mother],” but in light of Grandparents’ testimony, it was “assured that [Child] will not be subjected to such things from [Grandparents].” After GAL Rutz opined that visitation with Grandparents is in Child's best interests and that Child “would benefit from having a continued relationship with the family that he knew and that he was raised in,” the court adopted her recommendation of visitation for two hours one day a month and phone contact for 10 minutes once a week. And the court ordered the parties to “refrain from making any negative comments about each other in the presence of [Child].”

[29] Given the great deference afforded to trial courts in these matters, we cannot say the court erred in concluding that two hours of visitation with Grandparents a month is in Child's best interests.

[30] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother argued below that because her adoption by Kerr severed her parent-child relationships with Grandparents, Grandparents lacked standing to seek visitation. But the trial court rejected this argument, and Mother does not renew it on appeal.

Vaidik, Judge.

Altice, J., and Foley, J., concur.