Levi Quincy Grant, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Levi Grant challenges the trial court's revocation of his placement in the Vanderburgh County Therapeutic Work Release Program. He argues there was insufficient evidence to show he violated a condition of the program. Finding otherwise, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In December 2024, under Cause No. 82D03-2412-F6-7931, the State charged Grant, a repeat theft offender, with two counts of Level 6 felony theft for stealing from JCPenney on two separate occasions. The next month, Grant pled guilty to both counts and was sentenced to 547 days suspended to probation.

[3] In March 2025, the Vanderburgh County Probation Department filed a petition to revoke Grant's probation alleging he'd failed to attend an appointment with his probation officer. The department filed a second petition in April alleging Grant had been charged with a new crime. In May, Grant admitted to the violations and pled guilty to Level 6 felony possession of a narcotic drug under Cause No. 82D03-2504-F6-2667. As a sanction in F6-7931, the court ordered him to serve 547 days on community corrections through the Vanderburgh County Therapeutic Work Release Program. In F6-2667, the court imposed a 547-day sentence to be served in the same program and consecutive to his sentence in F6-7931.

[4] In July, and then as amended in August, the work release program filed a petition to revoke Grant's placement in both causes. As a consequence for his admission to the violation, he spent thirty-three days in jail before he was returned to the program. On November 12, the work release program filed another petition to revoke in both causes. The petition alleged that Grant had violated program rules by (1) “being under the influence of an unknown substance[,]” (2) disrespecting work release and jail staff, and (3) failing to pay program fees in the amount of $2,170. Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 64.

[5] The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on December 16. At the outset, Grant admitted he was behind on his fees, but he denied the other allegations. The State then called Community Corrections Residential Officer Supervisor Justin Feazel. Feazel testified that on November 11, 2025, he received reports that Grant had returned to the work release facility in an impaired state. Feazel was familiar with Grant and had observed him in a sober state. When Feazel, who had received training from certified drug recognition experts, arrived at the facility, he put Grant through various field sobriety tests and noticed several “indicators that were consistent with being under the influence.” Transcript at 11. Grant lacked focus, slurred his speech, had rapid mood changes, displayed disorganized thinking, and had body and eyelid tremors. His pupils were pinpointed, and his eyes were bloodshot and did not cross properly when Feazel conducted a convergence eye evaluation. Feazel testified that in the process of performing these tests, Grant called him “a piece of sh[**]” and “attack[ed] [his] personal character ․” Id. at 16. Based on his testing and observations, Feazel believed Grant was impaired and had him complete a urine drug screen, which came back negative.

[6] The State then called Zachary Bass, another officer who worked within the work release program. He testified that Grant “seemed to be under the influence of some sort of substance” when he returned to the work release facility on November 11. Id. at 20. Bass explained that Grant was slurring his speech, seemed sluggish, and his eyes were red. Bass was one of the officers who escorted Grant to the nearby jail after it was determined that he was impaired, and Grant “became erratic” during that process. Id. at 21. He threatened the officers, saying “he was going to sue every one of [them,]” and called them “pieces of sh[**].” Id. Grant also said “he was going to piss himself” if he was not allowed to go to the bathroom. Id. at 23.

[7] Feazel testified that Grant gave no explanation for his symptoms and behavior at the time of the incident. However, at the hearing, Grant testified that the supposed signs of “impairment” he exhibited on November 11 were caused by a learning disability, lazy eye, and allergies. As for the allegation of disrespect, Grant claimed the officers considered it disrespectful that he asked them to slow down their testing procedures, and that it was the officers who told him to “shut up[,]” used “vulgar language” toward him, and “insulted [him] while [he] was trying to explain that [he] didn't know what was going on.” Id. at 25.

[8] At the end of the hearing, the court found that Grant had violated the conditions of his community corrections placement by being under the influence of a substance and being disrespectful to staff. It granted the petition to revoke Grant's placement and ordered him to execute the entirety of his previously suspended consecutive sentences in the Department of Correction. Grant now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Placement on probation or in a community corrections work release program are alternatives to incarceration through the DOC. Ewing v. State, 273 N.E.3d 1107, 1111 (Ind. 2026). Defendants are not entitled to such placements; “[e]ach is a ‘matter of grace,’ a ‘conditional liberty that is a favor, not a right.’ ” Id. (quoting Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ind. 1999), reh'g denied). When a defendant appeals the trial court's decision to revoke his community corrections placement, we apply the same standard as in probation revocation proceedings. Johnson v. State, 62 N.E.3d 1224, 1229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). That is:

When the sufficiency of evidence is at issue, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment—without regard to weight or credibility—and will affirm if “there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's conclusion that a probationer has violated any condition of probation.”

Murdock v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1265, 1267 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Braxton v. State, 651 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 1995), reh'g denied). The State need only prove a violation by the preponderance of the evidence, and a single violation is sufficient to support revocation. DePalma v. State, 258 N.E.3d 1081, 1085 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025).¹

[10] On appeal, Grant argues “[t]he State failed to carry its burden of proof for either alleged violation.” Appellant's Brief at 8. Specifically, he contends the “evidence was not sufficient to prove [he] was under the influence of an unknown substance” or that his comments to staff violated a program rule. Id. at 9.²

[11] Regarding his first argument, Grant concedes “that if he was indeed under the influence of a substance, it would constitute a violation of the conditions of his work release placement.” Id. at 8. However, he disputes the trial court's finding for two reasons: (1) the work release “supervisor's ‘impairment testing’ was not reliable[;]” and (2) “[t]he negative urine screen ․ affirmatively established that [he] was not impaired.” Id. at 9-10.

[12] At the revocation hearing, Grant did not object to Feazel's testimony about the field sobriety tests he administered and his observations of Grant's symptoms. Consequently, to the extent Grant argues on appeal that the trial court should not have admitted and considered Feazel's testimony about the testing given Feazel's lack of “scientific training[,]” he waived this issue for review. Id. at 9; see Wilkerson v. State, 918 N.E.2d 458, 462 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (finding defendant waived appellate review of whether evidence was properly admitted at a probation revocation hearing by failing to object at the hearing).

[13] On the issue of whether Feazel's and Bass’ testimonies were sufficient to prove the violation, this case strikes us as similar to Miller v. State, No. 23A-CR-1690, 2023 WL 8258629 (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2023) (mem.). There, the State filed a petition to revoke the defendant's probation alleging he had been under the influence of a prohibited substance. Id. at *1. At the revocation hearing, the community corrections supervisor, residential officer with the community corrections facility, and residential supervisor with the work release center all testified that the defendant had exhibited symptoms (bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, unsteadiness) indicating he was under the influence of an intoxicant beyond the prescribed dose of suboxone he'd taken eight and a half hours prior. Id. at *2-3. At least two of the supervisors were familiar with the defendant and testified that his behaviors were “not normal.” Id. Though no drug screen was admitted into evidence, the trial court revoked the defendant's probation for being under the influence of an intoxicant and the appellate panel affirmed its decision. Id. at *1-3. The panel found the supervisors’ testimony sufficient to support revocation and deemed the defendant's arguments to the contrary a request to reweigh the evidence. Id. at *3.

[14] Here, as in Miller, the officers’ testimonies detailing Grant's symptoms of intoxication were sufficient to prove he was under the influence of an unknown substance. Furthermore, Grant's reliance on his own testimony pointing to “his lazy eye and ․ learning disability” as “innocent explanations for [his] alleged physical indicators of impairment” is an impermissible request to reweigh the evidence. Appellant's Br. at 9. In this case, however, at the time the officers observed Grant's symptoms, he returned a negative urine screen. Thus, Grant argues on appeal that “[t]he only objective indicator of impairment ․ affirmatively established that [he] was not impaired.” Id. at 10.

[15] However, Feazel testified that Grant appeared to be “currently under the influence[.]” Tr. at 13. He explained that “[i]t takes time for whatever they've taken ․ to metabolize and come out in the urine[.]” Id. at 14. Grant did not object to this testimony, and he asked questions which prompted Feazel to decline to give a precise answer about how long after ingestion certain drugs show up in urine. Feazel conceded, though he was familiar with the concept that it takes time for a substance to show up in a user's urine, he was “not a scientist” and had not been given specific training “on the amount of hours ․” Id. Nonetheless, on this record, the trial court could have reasonably concluded by a preponderance of the evidence that Grant was under the influence of a substance he'd taken so recently that it did not register on the urine screen. Thus, his negative urine screen was not fatal to the State's claim that he was under the influence of an unknown substance.

[16] We are likewise unpersuaded by Grant's claim that the trial court did not have the requisite information to find he violated a program rule by being disrespectful to staff. Initially, we note that this Court has analyzed—and affirmed—revocation sanctions imposed in part on a violation caused by the defendant disrespecting work release staff. See Watson v. State, No. 23A-CR-1191, 2023 WL 8540631, at *3 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2023) (mem.); Reed v. State, No. 23A-CR-568, 2023 WL 5421970, at *2 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2023) (mem.) (affirming probation revocation sanction and noting defendant violated his work release contract by making “disrespectful comments to the community corrections officers[,]” though such violation “could be viewed as minor”).

[17] And here, Grant does not challenge the sanction the trial court imposed; he simply disputes whether a violation occurred at all. He takes issue with the general program rule the State cited for the proposition that disrespecting staff was a violation of a condition of the placement. The petition to revoke alleged that his disrespect was

a direct violation of the following program rule:

1. I [ ] agree to comply with the special conditions stated in this contract and handbook. I am signing this contract with the understanding that failure to comply with any of these conditions may result in a petition to revoke being filed with the Court, which can result in removal from the program.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 64.

[18] Grant argues there was no evidence “what the [special] condition actually prohibited” because the State “never introduced the contract or the handbook into evidence.” Appellant's Br. at 12. However, given that Grant agreed to comply with incorporated special conditions, did not raise this issue at the revocation hearing, and the work release program filed a progress report with its petition showing Grant had been internally sanctioned before the November 11, 2025 incident for being “[d]isrespectful to [s]taff[,]” we can reasonably infer this was indeed a condition of the program. Appellants App. Vol. 2 at 65, 67. To the extent Grant argues the court could not have determined his statements were “disrespectful” without being provided a definition of the word, he is asking us to reweigh the evidence. Grant clearly disrespected those involved in his arrest when he called them “pieces of sh[**]” in addition to making other aggressive and threatening comments. Tr. at 21.

[19] In short, we conclude that substantial evidence of probative value supports the trial court's determination that Grant violated multiple conditions of his placement. Thus, the court did not err in granting the State's petition to revoke.

Conclusion

[20] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[21] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Grant challenges the trial court's factual determination that he violated a condition of the work release program. He does not independently challenge the sanction imposed by the court. See DePalma, 258 N.E.3d at 1085 (noting probation revocation involves a finding that a violation occurred and a determination of the appropriate sanction, and the latter step considers the severity of the violation).

2.   Covering his bases, Grant argues his failure to pay program fees could not, “standing alone,” support revocation. Appellant's Br. at 12. Indeed, the trial court said as much on the record at the December 16, 2025 hearing. See Tr. at 10 (“[W]e've never removed anyone just for the fee balance.”). The State does not raise Grant's program arrearage as a basis for affirming revocation.

DeBoer, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.