IN RE: A.T. (Minor Child) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] C.T. (“Mother”) and Au.T. (“Father”) filed separate briefs appealing the adjudication of their daughter, A.T. (“Child”), as a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”). Mother asserts the trial court's CHINS determination was clearly erroneous because DCS failed to demonstrate that Child was endangered or that court intervention was necessary. Father argues he was denied due process, the trial court ordered drug screens without authority, the CHINS determination was clearly erroneous, and the dispositional order was an abuse of discretion. Because none of the parties’ arguments justify reversal of the trial court's CHINS adjudication or dispositional order, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On an undisclosed date in the past, Father and Mother married. Their union produced Child in October 2017. Thereafter, Mother and Father stopped living together, but they did not divorce. Child lived primarily with Mother but also routinely spent time with Father.

[3] On November 4, 2024, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received an anonymous report that Mother was neglecting Child while abusing drugs with an unidentified man who was living in her house (“Man1”). On November 7, 2024, Stephanie Cooke, a Family Case Manager (“FCM”) for DCS, (“FCM Cooke”) went to Mother's home and spoke to Mother about the report. Mother indicated Man1 no longer lived in her home because he had moved out and entered “rehab.” (Tr. Vol. 1 at 61.) FCM Cooke asked Mother to screen for drugs, but Mother refused and said FCM Cooke “would have to court order her to do it.” (Id.) FCM Cooke spoke to Mother on at least two other occasions to ask her to voluntarily submit to a drug screen. On one occasion, Mother agreed to perform the screen, but Mother never arrived for the screen.

[4] DCS then sought a court order under a separate cause number ¹ to require Mother to submit to a drug screen. On December 16, Mother failed to appear for the hearing on DCS's motion, and the trial court ordered Mother to submit a sample for screening. Mother submitted the sample that same day. On January 2, 2025, DCS received the results of Mother's test, which indicated Mother was positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. Her test results were “well above” the level required to demonstrate intentional use of the drugs. (Tr. Vol. I at 30.) The levels indicated she had used the drugs “one to three days before the sample was collected.” (Id. at 36.) FCM Cooke gave those results to Mother.

[5] On January 5, 2025, the court authorized DCS to file a CHINS petition and to take custody of Child. On January 6, 2025, FCM Cooke went to Mother's house with two police officers and a second family case manager from DCS to take custody of Child. The police were “banging on the door and windows for about ten minutes” before Mother answered the door. (Id. at 62.) Police had to give Mother a chair to sit on so that she did not fall down, Mother's speech did not make sense, and she kept “gazing off.” (Id.) The officers and DCS staff all believed Mother was intoxicated on an unidentified substance.

[6] That same day, FCM Cooke spoke with Father for the first time when Father came to the DCS office. Father – who had a 2021 conviction of misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance – asked for custody of Child, but FCM Cooke indicated he needed to screen for drugs before he could be given custody. Father submitted a sample for drug screening and visited with Child for an hour. His screen returned as positive for marijuana, amphetamine, and methamphetamine, and his results indicated he had consumed those drugs between one and five days before the sample was collected. DCS placed Child with her paternal aunt.

[7] The trial court held an initial hearing on the CHINS petition on January 7, 2025. Parents each entered denials, and the trial court appointed counsel to represent each parent. The trial court thereafter continued Child in relative placement and ordered parents to screen for drugs when they arrived for supervised visitation with Child. Nonetheless, Parents were not regularly screened when they arrived for visitation, and Parents did not attend the substance abuse assessment referrals provided by DCS.

[8] The court held a CHINS fact-finding hearing over two days – April 15, 2025, and May 12, 2025. On July 28, 2025, the trial court declared Child a CHINS in an order containing numerous findings of fact, including the following:

6. The Court hereby finds and concludes that [Mother] is unable to provide a safe and stable home free from illegal drugs. In support of their conclusion the Court found the following evidence in support of their findings convincing:

a. Mother tested positive for 456.71 ng/ml of amphetamines and 1502.04 ng/ml of methamphetamines on December 16, 2024 as shown on the admitted Exhibit 1 as well as testified to by Dr. Aaron Brown, toxicologist for Cordant Health Solutions.

b. The compelling testimony of Officer Andy Williams of the Madison County Sheriff's Department stating that on January 6, 2025 [Mother] was acting under the influence, was falling asleep during conversations, was unable to track conversations and based on his training and experience [Mother] was under the influence on January 6, 2025. Officer Williams further testified there were no other sober adults in the home at the time of the removal of the child.

c. The compelling testimony of Officer Kim Stigall of the Madison County Sheriff's Department who testified that on January 6, 2025 [Mother] was acting under the influence, was falling asleep during conversations, was unable to track conversations and based on her training and experience [Mother] was under the influence on January 6, 2025.

d. The testimony of DCS Assessment Family Case Manager Stephanie Cooke who testified that during the removal of the child on January 6, 2025 [Mother] was acting under the influence of substances and was unable to track conversations with the FCM or the officers assisting in the removal, that [Mother] was falling asleep during conversations and in her experience she believed [Mother] was under the influence.

e. The testimony of DCS Assessment Family Case Manager Kelcie Snyder who testified that she assisted in the removal of the child on January 6, 2025 and that [Mother] was acting under the influence of substances and was unable to track conversations with the FCM or the officers assisting in the removal, that [Mother] was falling asleep during conversations and in her experience she believed [Mother] was under the influence.

7. The Court hereby finds and concludes that [Father] is unable to provide a safe and stable home free from illegal drugs. In support of their conclusion the Court found the following evidence in support of their finding convincing:

a. Father tested positive for 3373 ng/ml of amphetamines and 19310 ng/ml of methamphetamines on January 6, 2025, the date the child was removed from [Mother]’s care, as shown on the admitted Exhibit 2 as well as testified to by Dr. Aaron Brown, toxicologist for Cordant Health Solutions.

b. Testimony of Stephanie Cooke that [Father] admitted to her during a conversation on January 6, 2025 that he would not pass a drug screen.

c. Testimony of paternal grandmother, [J.W.], who testified during cross examination by DCS that she heard [Father] admit to the family case manager that he would not pass a drug screen.

d. Testimony by Father and Grandmother admitting that [Father] has a prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance under 33C03-2101-CM-000016.

e. Father was unable to [ensure Child was][2] residing in a home free from substance abuse either because he was unable to verify [Mother] was not using illegal drugs or because he was unwilling to act to ensure the safety of his child.

8. The Court further finds that neither parent made any effort to show and prove to the Court that they had obtained their sobriety. In support of said finding the Court found the following evidence convincing:

a. Testimony by Family Case Manager Shannon Vannatta that she had referred [Mother] for random drug screens, but [Mother] did not regularly screen and only submitted to one additional drug screen since the opening of the case.

b. Testimony by FCM Vanatta that she referred [Father] for random drug screens, but he did not submit to any additional drug screens since the case was opened.

c. Testimony of FCM Vanatta that she referred both parents for Substance Use Evaluations and neither parent had engaged in the service.

d. A lack of evidence presented at trial by either parents [sic] showing they had engaged in random drug screens or any substance treatment services to counteract DCS’ assertion of their drug use or any evidence they sought treatment outside of DCS’ referrals.

9. In their findings the Court further finds the memorandum decision issued by the Court of Appeals of Indiana persuasive in the case of In re KB and ML under 24A-JC-2063 where the court held “But when children under five years old are living with a meth addict, no other evidence of endangerment is necessary.” In the present case the evidence shows and proves to this Court that we have a 7 year old child residing in the home of a meth addict with no other sober caregivers and [Father] also tested positive for high levels of methamphetamines on the same date as the date of removal where [Mother] was observed to be under the influence leaving the child with no sober parents as [sic] a young age where they cannot reasonably care for themselves.

(Father's App. Vol. 3 at 10-11) (footnote added). The trial court then concluded, in necessary part:³

5. The child is a child in need of services as defined in IC 31-34-1 in that their physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or endangered as a result of the inability, refusal or neglect of their parents to provide her with the necessary suitable safe environments and home free from substance use and neglect without the intervention of the Court.

7. Mother herein has not demonstrated an ability to provide a safe and stable home environment for the [child] without court intervention due to her lack of engagement in services with DCS and due to her history of substance use including a positive drug screen and being observed to be under the influence by 2 police officers as well as 2 DCS employees while the child was solely in her care. Similarly, Father has not demonstrated an ability to provide a safe and stable home environment without court intervention due to a lack of engagement in services, due to his positive drug screen containing high levels of methamphetamines on the date the child was removed from [M]other's care and due to his criminal history for drugs.

8. Mother and Father both have current substance use issues [that] require intervention to assure that he can meet the child's basic physical and emotional needs and because she is unwilling to address those needs without court intervention as shown by their lack of willingness to voluntarily engage in services prior to the Fact-Finding Hearing.

9. The child's[sic] needs care[,] treatment, or rehabilitation that the child are [sic] not receiving and is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the Court.

(Id. at 12.)

[9] The court held a dispositional hearing on August 19, 2025. The dispositional order, which was entered on August 29, 2025, placed eighteen obligations on Father, including a requirement that he “be the only disciplinarian of the child and not allow others to use physical discipline on the child.” (Id. at 16.) Mother and Father appeal separately.⁴

Discussion and Decision

[10] “Indiana's juvenile law is founded on the parens patriae power of the State and the courts to ‘step into the shoes’ of parents, guardians, or custodians when necessary to safeguard a child's best interests.” Matter of E.K., 260 N.E.3d 901, 909 (Ind. 2025) (quoting In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d 631, 635-36 (Ind. 2004)) (italics in original). The focus of CHINS proceedings is “on protecting children, not punishing parents.” Id. Trial courts have “two overarching duties” during CHINS proceedings, “to exercise independent discretion in assessing a child's best interests and to safeguard parties’ rights by ensuring due process and entering CHINS adjudications only when all statutory elements are met.” Id. at 904.

1. Father's Due Process Argument

[11] Father asserts he was denied due process during the CHINS proceedings. “Due process requires ‘the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1257 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)). To determine whether a parent received the process due in a CHINS proceeding, we balance the three factors identified in Mathews: “(1) the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the State's chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure.” Id.

[12] Father asserts he was denied due process when: (1) Mother was ordered to participate in drug screening prior to the filing of the CHINS petition; (2) DCS required Father to complete a drug screen to get custody of Child; and (3) the juvenile referee did not rule on the record at the CHINS fact-finding hearing about the admissibility of the results of the drug screens of Father and Mother. Father mentions the three-factor test from Mathews, but he provides argument about the application of those factors only in the context of the order for Mother to participate in the initial drug screen. (Compare Father's Br. at 20-21 (“Applying Mathews at this stage․.”) with id. at 21-25 (containing no reference to Mathews).)

[13] DCS argues Father waived all his due process claims by failing to assert them before the trial court. DCS is correct that Father did not raise any such claims below. In fact, the phrase “due process” does not appear in the fact-finding transcript. Constitutional claims, including alleged due process violations, can be waived if they are raised for the first time on appeal. In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016). The rule that “a party must show that it gave the trial court a bona fide opportunity to pass upon the merits of the claim before seeking an opinion on appeal” applies “with particular force” when the claim is constitutional. Endres v. Ind. State Police, 809 N.E.2d 320, 322 (Ind. 2004). We accordingly would be justified in finding each of Father's due process claims waived. However, because due process at every stage of the interlocking CHINS and termination stages is vital, In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1258 (Ind. 2012) (procedural irregularities at CHINS stage might deprive parents of due process at a subsequent termination proceedings), we nonetheless address the merits of Father's three arguments.

1.1 The Motion to Compel proceedings

[14] Father first argues the motion to compel proceedings, wherein Mother was ordered by the trial court to screen for drugs, were “Riddled with Due Process Violations that Deprived Father of a Fair Trial and Opportunity to Be Heard.” (Father's Br. at 15) (initial capitalization in original). Father was not a party in those proceedings under cause number 48C02-2411-JM-000302, wherein the trial court ordered Mother to appear for a drug screen, and Father cannot obtain relief based on an alleged denial of due process to Mother. See, e.g., In re Z.C., 13 N.E.3d 464, 470 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (“Mother cannot assert error in the termination of her rights based on an alleged denial of due process to Father.”), trans. denied.

1.2 Requiring Father to Screen to get Custody

[15] Father next challenges the “due process violation as to himself when DCS coerced a drug screen out of him based on DCS’ erroneous or malevolent interpretation of its own policies during an assessment.” (Father's Br. at 21.) Father does not provide any analysis of the Mathews factors in support of his assertion. (See id. at 21-22.)

[16] Chapter 31-33-8 outlines DCS's responsibilities when a report of child abuse or neglect is received.⁵ A report of child neglect must be investigated “not later than five (5) days” after received. Ind. Code § 31-33-8-1(f). The assessment conducted by DCS must be “thorough” and the purpose of that assessment is “protection of the child.” Ind. Code § 31-33-8-6. To whatever extent is “reasonably possible” the assessment should include: “(4) An evaluation of the parent, guardian, custodian, or person responsible for the care of the child”; and “(6) All other data considered pertinent.” Ind. Code § 31-33-8-7.

[17] The following facts and circumstances prompted DCS to insist Father provide a drug screen prior to being considered for custody of Child. DCS received a report of drug abuse in Mother's house. When DCS investigated that report, Mother reported that Man1, who had been living in her house, had moved out and checked himself into a rehabilitation facility. These facts lead to an inference that the man who had been living in Mother's house was an addict. In such a circumstance, whether Mother also abused drugs would be “data considered pertinent” to collect for “the protection of the child.” Mother's drug screen confirmed that she was, in fact, using illegal drugs, and on the day that DCS and police went to remove Child from Mother's home, Mother was obviously intoxicated. Father had a prior conviction of possessing illegal substances, and DCS would not want to move Child from one home where she was being neglected due to drug abuse into another home where illegal drug use was occurring.

[18] We turn now to the Mathews factors. Father's private interest “in not having government interference in his relationship with Child” is substantial. (Father's Br. at 21.) However, the government's interest in protecting children from homes where drugs are abused is also substantial. These two factors are, thus, largely offsetting, and the analysis turns on the risk of error. The risk of error created by requiring a parent to submit a bodily fluid sample in this circumstance is low, as the screening tests at are sufficiently reliable and valid to routinely be used in civil and criminal contexts in Indiana's judicial system. DCS did not deprive Father of due process by insisting Father screen for drugs before Child was placed in his care.⁶

1.3 Judicial Rulings on Evidence

[19] Father next argues he was denied a fair trial because the juvenile referee who presided over the two-day fact-finding hearing deferred to the elected judge the final ruling on the admissibility of the initial drug screen of Mother. Father asserts he was placed in a position where he could not “litigate a crucial element” at trial. (Father's Br. at 23.) We disagree.

[20] At the hearing, the juvenile referee noted Father's objection for the record and admitted the evidence, subject to approval by the elected judge. (See Tr. Vol. II at 32.) This is precisely what our statutes require – a juvenile referee “shall submit findings and recommendations in writing to the juvenile court, which shall enter such order as it considers proper[.]” Ind. Code § 31-31-3-6. Father had the ability and opportunity to argue the screen should not be admissible and to argue why Child was not a CHINS. As Father has not demonstrated any risk of error from the statutory procedure, we reject his due process claim.

2. Court Authority for Drug Screens at Visitation

[21] Father argues the trial court lacked authority at the combined initial hearing and detention hearing to order Parents to submit to drug screens as a condition of visitation. In support, Father notes neither the chapter of the Indiana Code regarding initial hearings (Ind. Code ch. 31-34-10) nor the chapter regarding detention hearings (Ind. Code ch. 31-34-5) contains authorization for the court to so order. However, the juvenile court's authority is not limited to the contents of those two chapters. The court is authorized to “issue an order ․ to control the conduct of any person in relation to the child[,]” Ind. Code § 31-32-13-1, upon a finding of good cause. Ind. Code § 31-32-13-4. Moreover, when acting under Indiana Code article 31-34, a court “shall consider ensuring the child's safety to be the most important consideration in the determination of a child's best interests[.]” Ind. Code § 31-10-2-1.5. Given Mother's positive methamphetamine screen while she was Child's sole caregiver, Mother's intoxication on the day DCS and police arrived to remove Child, and Father's prior conviction for a drug possession offense, we cannot say the trial court acted outside its broad discretion when it ordered drug screens for visitations.

3. CHINS Adjudication

[22] Both Father and Mother challenge the trial court's adjudication of Child as a CHINS. Because CHINS determinations are “based on the status of the children, we need not conduct a separate analysis concerning each parent.” In re S.K., 57 N.E.3d 878, 881 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Nor is DCS required to demonstrate “culpability on the part of either or both parents.” Id.

A CHINS proceeding is a civil action; thus, “the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code.” We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. We consider only the evidence that supports the trial court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. We reverse only upon a showing that the decision of the trial court was clearly erroneous

In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1153 (Ind. 2012) (internal citations omitted). “A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do not support the findings or ‘if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.’ ” In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 578 (Ind. 2017) (quoting Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 1997)). When a trial court sua sponte supplements its determination with findings and conclusions, “we consider whether the evidence supports the findings and whether those findings support the judgment. But we review issues not covered by the findings under the general judgment standard, meaning we will affirm the court's decision if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence.” Matter of E.K., 260 N.E.3d at 909 (internal citation omitted).

2.1 Father's Challenges to Findings

[23] Father challenges Findings 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9, and we address them consistent with how Father raised them.

Findings 4 & 5

[24] Findings 4 and 5 deal with the results of the drug screen collected from Mother pursuant to the Motion to Compel proceeding under cause number 48C02-2411-JM-00302. Father's arguments regarding these Findings reiterate his due process arguments, (see Father's Br. at 29) (arguing the order and the admission of the results “both constitute due process deprivations”), and then he asserts he “should not be stuck with this erroneous order impacting his rights[.]” (Id.) As we held above, Father cannot assert a due process violation on Mother's behalf. Mother has not asserted a due process violation. Father has not demonstrated the drug test results in Findings 4 and 5 are clearly erroneous.

Finding 7

[25] Father alleges he is challenging “Finding 7 in its entirety[.]” (Father's Br. at 29.) That Finding provides:

7. The Court hereby finds and concludes that [Father] is unable to provide a safe and stable home free from illegal drugs. In support of their conclusion the Court found the following evidence in support of their finding convincing:

a. Father tested positive for 3373 ng/ml of amphetamines and 19310 ng/ml of methamphetamines on January 6, 2025, the date the child was removed from mother's care, as shown on the admitted Exhibit 2 as well as testified to by Dr. Aaron Brown, toxicologist for Cordant Health Solutions.

b. The testimony of Stephanie Cooke that [Father] admitted to her during a conversation on January 6, 2025 that he would not pass a drug screen.

c. Testimony of paternal grandmother, Julie Walker, who testified during cross examination by DCS that she heard [Father] admit to the family case manager that he would not pass a drug screen.

d. Testimony by Father and Grandmother admitting that [Father] has a prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance under 33C03-2101-CM-000016.

e. Father was unable to [ensure Child was] residing in a home free from substance abuse either because he was unable to verify mother was not using illegal drugs or because he was unwilling to act to ensure the safety of his child.

(Father's App. Vol. 3 at 10-11.)

[26] Father's actual argument, however, does not challenge the validity of any of the five underlying basic findings that the trial court included in support of its ultimate finding.⁷ Those five basic findings are all supported by the record and – given that Father has both a prior conviction for possession of illegal drugs and a recent positive drug test result – those basic findings support the finding that Father is unable to prove a home free from illegal drugs.

Finding 8

[27] Father also challenges Finding 8, which provides:

8. The Court further finds that neither parent made any effort to show and prove to the Court that they had obtained their sobriety. In support of said finding the Court found the following evidence convincing:

a. Testimony by Family Case Manager Shannon Vannatta that she had referred mother for random drug screens, but mother did not regularly screen and only submitted to one additional drug screen since the opening of the case.

b. Testimony by FCM Vannatta that she referred father for random drug screens, but he did not submit to any additional drug screens since the case was opened.

c. Testimony of FCM Vanatta that she referred both parents for Substance Use Evaluations and neither parent had engaged in the service.

d. A lack of evidence presented at trial by either parents [sic] showing they had engaged in random drug screens or any substance treatment services to counteract DCS’ assertion of their drug use or any evidence they sought treatment outside of DCS’ referrals.

(Father's App. Vol. 3 at 11.) Father asserts the evidence does not support this finding because the trial court improperly placed a burden on him to prove his sobriety, when the burden should have been on DCS to prove he lacked sobriety. We disagree. See In re A.B., 924 N.E.2d 666, 671 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“A parent whose drug use led to a child's removal cannot be permitted to refuse to submit to drug testing, then later claim the DCS has failed to prove that the drug use has continued.”). It is not impermissible burden-shifting for the trial court to find Parents did nothing to demonstrate they had dealt with their repeated involvement with illegal drugs.⁸ See In re. P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 798 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (not impermissible burden-shifting for court to find father did not present evidence to demonstrate his alleged sobriety), reh'g denied, trans. denied.

Finding 9

[28] Finally, Father challenges Finding 9, which provides:

9. In their findings the Court further finds the memorandum decision issued by the Court of Appeals of Indiana persuasive in the case of In re KB and ML under 24A-JC-2063 where the court held “But when children under five years old are living with a meth addict, no other evidence of endangerment is necessary.” In the present case the evidence shows and proves to this Court that we have a 7 year old child residing in the home of a meth addict with no other sober caregivers and father also tested positive for high levels of methamphetamines on the same date as the date of removal where mother was observed to be under the influence leaving the child with no sober parents as [sic] a young age where they cannot reasonably care for themselves.

(Father's App. Vol. 3 at 11.) Regarding this finding, Father argues: “There is no proof that Father is an addict, there is one screen.” (Father's Br. at 31.) However, the trial court did not find that Father was an addict. The trial court found that Father “tested positive for high levels of methamphetamines” on the day Child was removed from Mother's custody. (Father's App. Vol. 3 at 11.) Mother, on the other hand, had allowed an addict to live in her home, she tested positive on one day, and she was very intoxicated when authorities came to remove Child. The court's finding is supported by the evidence.

2.2. Father's Challenge to CHINS determination

[29] When declaring Child a CHINS, the trial court entered the following conclusions:

5. The child is a child in need of services as defined in IC 31-34-1 in that their physical and mental condition is seriously impaired or endangered as a result of the inability, refusal or neglect of their parents to provide her with the necessary suitable safe environments and home free from substance use and neglect without the intervention of the Court.

7. Mother herein as not demonstrated an ability to provide a safe and stable home environment for the [child] without court intervention due to her lack of engagement in services with DCS and due to her history of substance use including a positive drug screen and being observed to be under the influence by 2 police officers as well as 2 DCS employees while the child was solely in her care. Similarly, Father has not demonstrated an ability to provide a safe and stable home environment without court intervention due to a lack of engagement in services, due to his positive drug screen containing high levels of methamphetamines on the date the child was removed from [M]other's care and due to his criminal history for drugs.

8. Mother and Father both have current substance use issues require intervention to assure that he can meet the child's basic physical and emotional needs and because she is unwilling to address those needs without court intervention as shown by their lack of willingness to voluntarily engage in services prior to the Fact-Finding Hearing.

9. The child's[sic] needs care treatment, or rehabilitation that the child are [sic] not receiving and is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the Court.

(Father's App. Vol. 2 at 12) (footnote added).

[30] Father's primary argument is that caselaw demonstrates a single positive test for methamphetamine – which is what DCS had on Father – is insufficient to support a conclusion that Child was a CHINS. However, the cases that Father cites do not support Father's position to the extent he asserts because, in each of those cases, the parent who tested positive had thereafter cooperated with DCS by participating in multiple additional drug screens that produced negative results. See In re S.M., 45 N.E.3d 1252, 1256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (“Yes, Mother has a history of sporadic marijuana use․ But every single drug screen she provided during the CHINS case was clean. And her substance abuse assessment did not even recommend substance abuse treatment.”); and see In re L.P., 6 N.E.3d 1019, 1021 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (“even more compelling than [Mother having only a single positive drug test is the fact that] Mother thereafter voluntarily and consistently took drug screens with negative results”).

[31] Instead, this case is more like Matter of D.P., 213 N.E.3d 552 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), reh'g denied, trans. denied, in which we noted “there was no evidence Parents had stopped or were seeking to stop using methamphetamine.” Id. at 562. While only one positive result existed for Mother and Father, Mother had participated in only one additional test, and Father had participated in none. Both parents had been referred for substance abuse assessment, but neither had completed an assessment. Moreover, Mother was intoxicated when DCS and police arrived at her house to remove Child, and no other caregiver was in the house to care for Child. Father has not demonstrated the trial court's CHINS determination was clearly erroneous.

2.3. Mother's Challenge to CHINS determination

[32] Mother argues we should reverse the CHINS adjudication because the State failed to demonstrate a “nexus between parental drug use and child endangerment” (Mother's Br. at 11) or even that Child “was ever harmed, neglected or deprived of care.” (Id.) According to Mother, “Indiana law is clear that substance use alone is insufficient to support a CHINS adjudication without proof that the drug use actually endangered the child.” (Id. at 12.)

[33] While the record contained no evidence that Child had been physically injured by parents’ substance use, we cannot agree with Mother that the trial court's findings did not support a conclusion that Child had been endangered. The trial court found that Mother was so “under the influence of substances” on January 6, 2025, that Mother could not stay awake or track conversations and that Mother was the only adult in the household when DCS and the police arrived. (Father's App. at 10.) Child was only seven years old, which led the court to find:

[W]e have a 7 year old child residing in the home of a meth addict with no other sober caregivers and father also tested positive for high levels of methamphetamines on the same date as the date of removal where mother was observed to be under the influence leaving the child with no sober parents a[t] a young age where they cannot reasonably care for themselves.

(Id. at 11.) The trial court's findings support its conclusion that Child had been endangered by Parents’ substance abuse. See, e.g., Mater of K.B., 24A-JC-2063, 2025 WL 603770 *2 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2025) (mem.) (“when children under five years old are living with a meth addict, no other evidence of endangerment is necessary”).

[34] The trial court's findings also demonstrated that the circumstances would not be remedied without court intervention. The trial court found DCS had referred Mother and Father for drug screens and for substance use evaluations, but neither of them had attended the evaluation, Father had not submitted any samples for drug screening, and Mother had submitted only one sample for screening. When Parents would not cooperate with DCS's attempts to ensure Child can live in a home free of substance use or abuse, the necessity of court intervention is demonstrated. See Matter of D.P., 213 N.E.3d at 562 (when parents used methamphetamine while caring for child, did not appreciate danger presented by their use, and had not stopped use or sought to stop use, need for coercive intervention was demonstrated).

4. Dispositional Order

[35] Finally, Father challenges one of the trial court's eighteen requirements in the dispositional order as a “boilerplate requirement” that has no relationship to the evidence presented by DCS in support of the CHINS adjudication and, as such, could work to his disadvantage if termination is sought. (Father's Br. at 29.) Juvenile courts have broad discretion to order parents to participate in programs and services, but “the requirements must relate to some behavior or circumstances that was revealed by the evidence.” In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1258 (quoting A.C. v. Marion Cnty. Dep't of Child Servs., 905 N.E.2d 456, 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)).

[36] According to Father, “DCS neither alleged nor presented any evidence demonstrating a necessity to restrict physical discipline of the Child by either parent.” (Father's Br. at 28.) We agree with Father that there was no allegation or evidence of either parent using inappropriate physical discipline on Child. However, the challenged requirement does not prohibit Father from using appropriate physical discipline. (See Father's App. Vol. 3 at 16) (Father “shall: ․ [b]e the only disciplinarian of the child and not allow others to use physical discipline on the child. Demonstrate the ability to appropriately parent and supervise the child.”). Instead, it prohibits Father from allowing others to physically discipline Child. As Father's visitation with Child was to be supervised, we see nothing inappropriate about ordering Father to be responsible for disciplining Child when other adults are also present.

Conclusion

[37] Father has not demonstrated that he was denied due process in these CHINS proceedings or that the trial court did not have authority to order drug screens. The evidence supported the trial court's basic findings, which supported the ultimate findings and conclusions, which justified the adjudication of Child as a CHINS. Finally, Father has not demonstrated any error in the trial court's dispositional order. Accordingly, we affirm.

[38] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   According to the CHINS petition filed by DCS, cause number “48C02-2411-JM-000302” was the action in which the court ordered Mother to submit a sample for drug screening. (Father's App. Vol. 2 at 9.)

2.   The original text of the trial court's order states: “Father was unable to protect [Child] from residing in a home free from substance abuse ․” (Father's App. Vol. 3 at 11.) As children need not be protected from homes because they are free of substance abuse, the trial court cannot have intended what it wrote, and we modified the trial court's finding to indicate the opposite of the trial court's original language.

3.   The trial court's order does not contain a conclusion numbered “6.” (See Father's App. Vol. 2 at 12.)

4.   Our decision on appeal was delayed by the January 13, 2026, dismissal of Mother's appeal due to her failure to timely move to compel the trial court clerk to file a Notice of Completion of Transcript. (Mother's App. Vol. II at 17.) After Father's appeal was assigned to this panel, our Court reinstated Mother's appeal, (Mother's App. Vol. II at 15-16), and then, pursuant to a motion from DCS based on Appellate Rule 38(B), we consolidated the two appeals for review. We then withheld consideration of Father's appeal until Mother's appeal was fully briefed.

5.   While Chapter 31-33-8 contains no language that explicitly permits a trial court to order a parent to screen for drugs under the circumstances presented herein, neither does any language in that Chapter prohibit a court from so ordering. Father claims the trial court's decision to require drug screens of Father contradicts F.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 53 N.E.3d 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), but that case dealt with whether the trial court's order permitting DCS to interview children without their mother's consent complied with the explicit statutory authority controlling when and how DCS may interview children without a parent's consent. We disagree with Father's assertion that F.S. requires us to reverse when the facts herein indicate the trial court had good cause to order Parents to screen for drugs. See Ind. Code § 31-32-13-4 (court may enter order “if the court finds that good cause to issue the order is shown upon the record.”).

6.   Because Father was not denied due process, we need not determine whether DCS, in fact, breached its own policy by requiring Father to test.

7.   Instead, what Father argues is that “an isolated use of drugs, without more, and without a connection to an act of neglect or abuse that seriously endangered or impaired the child, is not sufficient to sustain a CHINS adjudication.” (Father's Br. at 29.) Because this argument is more properly framed as a challenge to the CHINS determination, we address it below when we consider whether the findings support the conclusions.

8.   To the extent Father is directing us to evidence about all the times he appeared sober and safe, that is a request to reweigh the evidence, which our standard of review prohibits. See In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1153 (stating standard of review).

May, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Felix, J., concur.