Nycea Elder, Appellant-Petitioner v. Oakbrook Village Apartments Care of Anthony Ardizzone, Appellee-Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Nycea Elder appeals the small claims court's judgment in favor of her landlord, Oakbrook Village Apartments (“Oakbrook”), on Elder's claim that conditions in her apartment made it uninhabitable. Elder contends the court misapplied habitability law, erroneously determined she had no right to terminate her lease, wrongly found that Oakbrook timely addressed her work orders, and improperly admitted one of Oakbrook's exhibits. Each of those contentions asks us to examine either the evidence admitted or the circumstances under which that evidence was admitted at the hearing. However, Elder elected to proceed on appeal without a transcript of the hearing, and without a transcript we cannot review her claims. Because all of Elder's arguments are waived, we affirm.¹

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On January 6, 2026, Elder filed a notice of claim against Oakbrook in the Pike Township Division of the Marion County Small Claims Court. As the small claims court later described the claim,² it concerned “mice, bugs[,] and slugs” and related conditions in the apartment, which Elder maintained rendered the unit uninhabitable and entitled her to terminate the lease and to recover her deposit and other amounts. (Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 6.)

[3] The small claims court held a hearing on March 18, 2026, and took the matter under advisement. On April 27, 2026, the court entered judgment for Oakbrook after finding that Elder had occupied the unit; that the conditions had not made the unit uninhabitable; that Elder had no right to terminate the lease; that Oakbrook timely responded to work orders; and that Elder could not recover her deposit or hotel expenses.

[4] Elder filed a motion to correct error on April 29, 2026. The small claims court denied that motion on May 14, 2026, because the alleged newly discovered evidence had been in Elder's possession at the time of the hearing and would not have changed the judgment, and because it declined to reweigh the evidence.

[5] On May 18, 2026, Elder filed her notice of appeal and requested preparation of the transcript of the March 18 hearing. The transcript remained incomplete, however, because the trial court clerk was “Waiting for Fee Waiver to be ruled on, as Appellant wishes transcript to be included in waiver.” (Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 2.) Elder thereafter filed a motion in our Court asking to withdraw her request for the transcript, and our Court granted her leave to proceed without one.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Judgments in small claims actions are “subject to review as prescribed by relevant Indiana rules and statutes.” Ind. Small Claims Rule 11(A). We will not set aside the small claims court's findings or judgment unless they are clearly erroneous. Jones v. Full Spectrum Prop. Mgmt., 277 N.E.3d 961, 967 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026). As we conduct our review, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses, and we “consider only the evidence supporting the judgment and the reasonable inferences” therefrom. Id. We nevertheless review questions of law de novo. Id.

[7] Appellants bear “the burden of presenting a complete record with respect to the issues raised on appeal.” Finke v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 862 N.E.2d 266, 272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. An appellant who intends to argue on appeal that a finding of fact or conclusion is unsupported by, or contrary to, the evidence must “request a Transcript of all the evidence.” Ind. Appellate Rule 9(F)(5). Our Indiana Supreme Court has held that, “[a]lthough not fatal to the appeal, failure to include a transcript works a waiver of any specifications of error which depend upon the evidence.” In re Walker, 665 N.E.2d 586, 588 (Ind. 1996) (quoting Campbell v. Criterion Group, 605 N.E.2d 150, 160 (Ind. 1992) (internal citation omitted)). We recently applied that rule to affirm where the appellant provided no transcript, did not prepare a statement of the evidence, and advanced no argument that we could review without a record of the hearing. Maw v. Pringle, 263 N.E.3d 790, 794 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025).

[8] Elder's challenges to the habitability finding, to the determination that she had no right to terminate the lease, and to the finding that Oakbrook timely addressed the work orders all depend on the evidence presented at the March 18 hearing. Whether the conditions in an apartment render it uninhabitable “is an objective factual determination.” Johnson v. Scandia Assocs., Inc., 717 N.E.2d 24, 30 (Ind. 1999). The small claims court resolved that factual question against Elder, and it likewise found, on the evidence before it, that Elder had no right to terminate the lease and that Oakbrook addressed the work orders in a timely manner. (Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 8.) Without a transcript, we cannot review whether the evidence supports these findings, and Elder has therefore waived any argument that depends on that evidence. See Maw, 263 N.E.3d at 794 (waiving sufficiency arguments when appellant failed to provide transcript).

[9] Elder argues her claims present pure questions of law that we may review without a transcript. (Reply Br. at 3-6.) The exception she invokes is a narrow one: where an appellant accepts the trial court's findings of fact and argues only that those findings do not support the judgment, review may proceed without a transcript. See Walker, 665 N.E.2d at 588-89 (reviewing whether findings support conclusions and judgment when appellants provided no transcript). Elder does not, however, accept the small claims court's findings. She disputes them, asking us to conclude that the conditions she described made the unit uninhabitable. That is a challenge to a factual determination, not a pure question of law, and we cannot review it on the record before us.

[10] Elder also contends that the trial court erred in admitting Oakbrook's move-in checklist exhibit. While we generally review the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion, Matter of K.R., 154 N.E.3d 818, 820 (Ind. 2020), we cannot analyze this issue on the record Elder has provided. Without a transcript of the March 18 hearing, we cannot determine what foundation was laid for the exhibit, whether Elder objected to its admission and on what grounds, or whether its admission affected her substantial rights. Thus, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion. See Maw, 263 N.E.3d at 794 (holding court unable to review father's argument regarding admission of evidence when father failed to provide a transcript).

[11] Neither Elder's self-representation nor her indigency changes this result. We hold a litigant who proceeds without counsel to the same standard as a trained attorney, and she must comply with the same procedural rules. Maw, 263 N.E.3d at 793. Indigency does not entitle an appellant to a transcript prepared “at public expense.” Id. at 794 (quoting Campbell v. Criterion Grp., 605 N.E.2d 150, 160 (Ind. 1992)). Instead, the appellate rules allow an indigent appellant to provide a verified statement of the evidence under Appellate Rule 31 or an agreed statement of the record under Appellate Rule 33. Elder perfected a statement under neither mechanism,³ and on the record before us her evidence-dependent claims remain unreviewable and thus are waived. See Maw, 263 N.E.3d at 794 (waiving father's evidence-based arguments when he failed to provide transcript or statement of the evidence).

Conclusion

[12] Because Elder elected to proceed without a transcript of the hearing and because each error she raises depends on the evidence presented there, she has waived her claims. We affirm the small claims court's judgment.

[13] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Oakbrook has moved to strike several documents included in Elder's Appendix. Because we dispose of Elder's arguments based on her failure to provide a transcript, we did not need to consider the contents of Elder's Appendix. We therefore deny Oakbrook's motion by separate order issued today.

2.   We must rely on the trial court's description of Elder's complaint because neither party provided a copy of Elder's complaint.

3.   In her Reply Brief, Elder asks for leave to pursue a statement of the evidence under Appellate Rule 31 or an agreed statement under Appellate Rule 33. By motion filed the same day as her Reply Brief, Elder also moves for leave to amend brief and cure record. Oakbrook filed a response in which it indicated it had no interest in submitting an agreed statement and objected to the re-briefing that would be required by a new statement of the evidence. We agree with Oakbrook that Elder's request – which was not made until appellate briefing was complete – was too late to justify leave being given at this juncture. Elder needed to request an extension of time to obtain the agreed statement of evidence prior to briefing. See Ind. Appellate Rule 35(A) (“Any motion for an extension of time shall be filed at least seven (7) days before the expiration of time ․”). Accordingly, by separate order entered today, we deny Elder's motion for leave to amend her brief and cure the record with a certified statement of the evidence.

May, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Scheele, J., concur.