T.R., Appellant-Respondent, v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] T.R. received a nude photo of her underage ex-boyfriend, B.H., from an unknown person. She used a messaging app, TextNow, to anonymously send the photo to B.H.’s mother, K.H., with a message saying, “Yuh son got leaked,” along with a crying emoji and a laughing emoji. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 6. T.R. then deleted the app, the message, and the photo off of her phone.

[2] T.R. appeals the juvenile court's determination that she is a delinquent child. The court concluded that sending the photo to K.H. was child exploitation, an act that would be a Level 5 felony for an adult. The court also concluded that T.R. had engaged in obstruction of justice, an act that would be a Level 6 felony for an adult.

[3] T.R. argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to show that: (1) the photo she sent meets the requisite definition of “sexual conduct;” (2) she had the requisite culpability to commit child exploitation; and (3) she had the requisite culpability to commit obstruction of justice. Concluding that the State's evidence is sufficient, we affirm the juvenile court's true findings.

Facts and Procedural History

[4] T.R. and B.H. dated for about one (1) year, and then their relationship ended on poor terms. T.R. claimed the breakup was due to B.H.’s mother, K.H. T.R. had K.H.’s phone number, and the two had texted each other throughout T.R.’s relationship with B.H.

[5] On or around April 1, 2025, fifteen-year-old B.H. started messaging with an unknown individual (“Individual”) on TikTok. The conversation eventually moved from TikTok to another app. During the conversation, Individual asked B.H. what he looked like. B.H. sent a photo of his face. Individual called him “really cute[.]” Tr. Vol. 3, p. 40. Individual sent B.H. a photo, purportedly of themself, depicting a young woman. Individual told B.H., “I was hoping you're interested in having fun with me[.]” Id. at 42. After further discussion, Individual asked B.H. to send a photo of his penis. B.H. then sent a photo of himself, with his shirt pulled up to expose his stomach and his shorts pulled down, holding his erect penis and testicles.

[6] After receiving the nude photo, Individual demanded money, threatening to post the photo on TikTok and to send the photo to B.H.’s family. When B.H. told Individual that he could not pay, Individual asked if B.H. “[had any] friends I can get money from.” Appellant's App. Vol. 3, p. 46. Inexplicably, B.H. gave Individual T.R.’s phone number. Individual then threatened to send the nude photo of B.H. to T.R., among others.

[7] On April 1, 2025, T.R. received B.H.’s nude photo from an unknown number. Approximately an hour later, T.R. sent the photo to K.H. along with the text “Yuh son got leaked” with a crying emoji and a laughing emoji. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 6. T.R. used TextNow, a third-party messaging app, to conceal her identity. K.H. responded to the unknown number, asking “Who is this[?],” but T.R. never responded. Id. After sending the nude photo and message to K.H., T.R. deleted the TextNow app, the photo, and the message off of her phone “because she knew she could get in trouble.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 127.

[8] K.H. contacted the police about the nude photo. The detective assigned to the case sought information from Apple Inc. and TextNow, seeking to identify: (1) Individual; and (2) the person who sent the nude photo to K.H. The detective never learned Individual's identity, but he discovered that Individual was in Nigeria. The detective was able to identify the iCloud account associated with the TextNow account that was used to send K.H. the nude photo. The iCloud account had a mailing address that was associated with T.R.

[9] Meanwhile, before T.R. had sent the nude photo to K.H., T.R. had reported to a hotline that there was an inappropriate photo of herself posted on social media. While investigating her report, the police uncovered the evidence linking T.R. to the TextNow account that had sent the nude photo to K.H. During the investigation, T.R. failed to show up to three scheduled interviews with a detective. When T.R. finally appeared for an interview with the detective, she initially denied sending the nude photo of B.H. to K.H. She eventually admitted that she was the sender.

[10] In Cause Number 35C01-2506-JD-24, the State alleged that T.R. committed child exploitation, a Level 5 felony if committed by an adult, and obstruction of justice, a Level 6 felony if committed by an adult.¹

[11] An evidentiary hearing occurred on January 13, 2026, and the juvenile court concluded that T.R. had committed both acts. The court ordered T.R. to serve six (6) months on formal probation followed by six (6) months of informal probation. This appeal followed.

Discussion and Decision

[12] T.R. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile court's true findings. “When the State seeks to have a juvenile adjudicated delinquent for committing an act that would be a crime when committed by an adult, the State must prove every element of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” E.S. v. State, 198 N.E.3d 701, 703 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile adjudication, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility.” B.T.E. v. State, 108 N.E.3d 322, 326 (Ind. 2018). “We consider only the evidence favorable to the judgment and the reasonable inferences supporting it.” Id. “We will affirm a juvenile-delinquency adjudication if a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

I. Child Exploitation

[13] To obtain a delinquency adjudication against T.R. for child exploitation as alleged, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) T.R. knowingly or intentionally; (2) disseminated to another person; (3) a matter that depicts or describes sexual conduct; (4) by a child under eighteen (18) years of age. Ind. Code § 35-42-4-4(b)(2) (2022); Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 71. T.R. claims that: (1) there is not enough evidence to support the finding that the photo in question depicts “sexual conduct” as is required by Indiana Code section 35-42-4-4(b)(2); and (2) there is not enough evidence to support the finding that T.R. had the requisite culpability to commit the act.

A. Sexual Conduct

[14] “Sexual conduct,” for purposes of Section 35-42-4-4(b)(2), is defined in relevant part as “exhibition of the ․ uncovered genitals ․ intended to satisfy or arouse the sexual desires of any person[.]” Ind. Code § 35-42-4-4(a)(5)(C)(i). In Evans v. State, this Court found that displaying the genitals of a minor can constitute sexual conduct in the absence of a justifiable context. Evans v. State, 274 N.E.3d 1013, 1019-20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026). Here, it is undisputed that the nude photo displays B.H.’s genitals. Additionally, it is undisputed that B.H. was under 18 at the time of taking the nude photo, and therefore a minor. The key question is whether, when T.R. received the photo and sent it to K.H., it was clear that the photo depicted sexual conduct.

[15] T.R. received the nude photo from an unknown number. It depicts B.H. with his shirt pulled up and his shorts pulled down, and he is holding his erect penis and testicles. There were no other texts sent with the nude photo to provide context. There is no context in the nude photograph to suggest any other justification for the photo other than to satisfy or arouse the sexual desires of any person. T.R. admitted that she was “disgusted” by the photo and unhappy to have received it. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 119. Consistent with this Court's determination in Evans, this evidence is sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the photo depicts sexual conduct for purposes of the offense of child exploitation, as defined by Ind. Code § 35-42-4-4(a)(5)(C)(i).

B. Culpability

[16] T.R. argues that she did not have the required culpability to commit child exploitation because she was only concerned about B.H.’s welfare and was simply notifying his mother about the existence of the nude photo. We must determine whether a defendant had the required knowledge or intent by considering both direct and circumstantial evidence that shows a defendant's mental state. Stokes v. State, 922 N.E.2d 758, 764 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.

[17] The evidence favorable to the juvenile court's judgment is as follows: (1) T.R. sent the photo to K.H. using a number T.R. believed K.H. would not recognize, as opposed to using her actual phone number; (2) T.R. sent crying and laughing emojis after sending the nude photo to K.H; and (3) T.R. later stated that her justification for sending K.H. the nude photo was that “it was kind of that karma for hurting me kind of thing.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 120. These facts could lead a reasonable trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that T.R. had the required mental state to commit child exploitation.

[18] T.R., citing to her own trial testimony, claims she was merely concerned for B.H.’s well-being. T.R.’s argument is merely a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. B.T.E., 108 N.E.3d at 326.

II. Obstruction of Justice

[19] To obtain a delinquency adjudication against T.R. for obstruction of justice as alleged, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) T.R. deleted the TextNow app; (2) with the intent to prevent it from being produced or used as evidence in any criminal investigation. Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-2(a)(3) (2023); Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 71. T.R. claims that there is not sufficient evidence to show beyond a reasonable doubt that she had the requisite culpability to commit the act.

[20] The evidence favorable to the juvenile court's true finding is as follows: (1) T.R. deleted the TextNow app, the photo, and the message from her phone; (2) T.R. failed to show up to three interviews with the detective; (3) T.R. initially lied to the detective about sending the nude photo to K.H.; (4) when confronted with evidence that showed otherwise, T.R. admitted sending the photo; and (5) T.R. admitted to the detective that “she deleted everything because she knew she could get in trouble.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 127.

[21] These facts could lead a reasonable trier of fact to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that T.R. intentionally deleted the TextNow app to prevent it from being produced or used as evidence in a criminal investigation. See Horns v. State, 218 N.E.3d 591, 595 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (holding that State presented sufficient evidence of defendant's intent to obstruct justice by destroying evidence where defendant threw away evidence related to automobile collision and later admitted to officer he was trying to conceal crime), trans. denied. T.R.’s argument again amounts to a request to reweigh the evidence, which our standard of review forbids.

Conclusion

[22] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the juvenile court's true findings of delinquency.

[23] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   When the State opened Cause Number 35C01-2506-JD-24, T.R. was on probation under Cause Number 35C01-2501-JD-1. The State alleged that T.R. had violated the terms of her probation by committing new delinquent acts. The juvenile court later determined that T.R. had violated the terms of her probation but did not impose any sanction. T.R. is not raising any claims in connection with her probation.

Baker, Senior Judge.

Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur