Jaylen White, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Jaylen White perpetrated numerous acts of physical and sexual violence and intimidation against his girlfriend (“Victim”) and then violated a court order not to contact her. During the investigation and at the bench trial, Victim made inconsistent statements about the relevant events. The trial court convicted White of eighteen offenses. On appeal, White contends there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions, essentially arguing the trial court should have given more weight to sworn statements Victim made after the underlying incidents than the court gave to other evidence. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] As of September 2024, White and Victim had been dating for six years and had several children together. Victim had an apartment where White sometimes stayed. On the morning of September 6, Victim went to work, and her coworker and boss observed her crying and acting “really out of it.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 33. Victim told them she had been involved in an altercation with her boyfriend and had been awake all night. Based on her disclosures and at her request, Victim's boss called 9-1-1 and requested an ambulance. When Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (“IMPD”) officers and medical personnel arrived, Victim described being physically and sexually assaulted by her boyfriend and being forced to eat feces under threat of him hurting her. In the ambulance, paramedics documented several bruises on her body while she gave a statement to the police describing how the injuries occurred. These interactions were recorded on a police body camera.

[3] After being medically cleared in the emergency room, Victim spoke to Stephanie Spielman, a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner, who completed a forensic exam. Victim told the nurse White had subjected her to physical and sexual violence over the past several days, including that morning. According to Victim, in the early morning hours of September 6, White told her to take her clothes off and perform oral sex on him. While doing so, she was struggling to breathe, had to use her inhaler, and vomited. Anytime she stopped, White spit on and hit her. He then inserted a wine bottle into her anus. Later, he penetrated her anus with his penis and again put his penis in her mouth until he ejaculated. Victim had dried blood in her underwear; reported pain in her pelvis, anus, and throat; and reported having suicidal thoughts that morning. Spielman observed bruises of various ages and sizes on Victim's body, including an indentation on her forehead reportedly caused when White hit her with a gun during a physical fight earlier in the week. Victim also had injuries to her hand caused when White “made her put her hand on the ground during questioning and was smashing down a gun on her hand upon her answer.” Id. at 60. As part of her exam, Spielman conducted a domestic violence danger assessment; based on Victim's answers, she scored in the “extreme danger” category. Id. at 64.

[4] Police obtained a search warrant for Victim's apartment, in which they found two guns and a wine bottle.

[5] On September 9, Victim gave a recorded statement to IMPD Sex Crimes Unit Detective Cory Drum, providing more detail about the events of the previous week. She stated that on September 3, while White was at her apartment and their children were at daycare, White became angry and accused her of infidelity. While trying to get Victim to admit to cheating, White hit her with a gun on the hand, head, and back. He then forced her to remove her clothing and to eat dog excrement. On the morning of September 6, while their children were asleep in the apartment, he made her eat human feces under threat of hitting her. He then sexually assaulted her over the course of several hours. Consistent with her earlier statements to the nurse, she stated he forced her to perform oral sex on him, causing her to gasp for breath, gag, and vomit; inserted a wine bottle into her anus; inserted his penis into her anus; and again forced her to fellate him. He threatened to hit her if she did not comply.

[6] Police obtained a search warrant for White's phone records, which contained text messages between White and Victim. In a message sent the morning of September 6, Victim wrote to White, “you make me eat shoot [sic] put stuff in my a** [a]nd ․ I'm really scared to be home this weekend.” Ex. Vol. 2 at 54. White responded, “Unsend that.” Id. at 55. He then sent a message saying, “I'm sorry again and we won't have no problems this weekend[.] I'm done putting physical harm on you [because] I don't even like to see it.” Id. Detectives also found “several very disturbing, horrific sexual videos” on the phone and photographs and a video taken September 3 of Victim eating feces out of a toilet while White stands over her. Tr. Vol. 2 at 98.

[7] On September 11, the State charged White with twenty-three offenses, which we summarize as follows:

• For the September 6 acts: four counts of Level 3 felony rape (Counts 1–4); Level 5 felony criminal confinement (Count 5); Level 6 felony intimidation (Count 6); Level 6 felony domestic battery in the presence of a child less than sixteen years of age (Count 7); Class A misdemeanor battery by bodily waste (Count 8); Class A misdemeanor domestic battery (Count 9); Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury (Count 10); and Class A misdemeanor battery by bodily waste (Count 21).

• For the September 3 acts: Level 3 felony criminal confinement (Count 11); three counts of Level 5 felony domestic battery by means of a deadly weapon (Counts 12–14); three counts of Level 5 felony battery by means of a deadly weapon (Counts 15–17); two counts of Level 5 felony intimidation (Counts 18–19); Class A misdemeanor battery by bodily waste (Count 20); Class A misdemeanor domestic battery (Count 22); and Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury (Count 23).

See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 111–17 (charging information). The trial court ordered White to have no contact with Victim.

[8] Thereafter, White made numerous video and phone calls to Victim from jail. As a result, the State moved to amend the charging information and add three counts of Level 5 felony attempted obstruction of justice (Counts 24–26) and five counts of Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy (Counts 27–31). See id. at 117–19.

[9] In November 2024, White deposed Victim. In her sworn testimony, Victim explained she had previously lied to police and medical personnel about the September incidents. She explained she had initiated “aggressive” sex, she voluntarily ate feces as part of a “scat fetish,” and “[e]verything was consensual.” Ex. Vol. 2 at 92–93, 99.

[10] White waived his right to a jury trial, and a bench trial began on April 23, 2025. The State did not call Victim, instead presenting its case through witness testimony; Victim's medical records; photographs of Victim's injuries; text messages, videos, and photos obtained from White's cell phone; and records of over 1,500 phone and video calls White made to Victim from jail. At the close of the State's case-in-chief, the trial court granted White's motion to continue the trial so Victim could appear as a defense witness.

[11] Trial resumed on July 24. Victim appeared and said she did not remember anything about the September 3 or 6 incidents. She testified that any statements she made to her employer, the police, or during her hospital examination were false. Because she could not recall the incidents, White requested the trial court consider her an unavailable witness under Evidence Rule 804. White then offered and the trial court admitted the transcript of Victim's November deposition in which she stated all acts were consensual. On cross-examination, the State attempted, without success, to refresh Victim's recollection with her recorded statements to police. At the State's request, the trial court admitted the police body camera footage taken at Victim's workplace and in the ambulance on September 6 and the audio recording and transcript of Victim's formal statement to Detective Drum.

[12] The trial court took the matter under advisement, and on August 14, 2025, found White guilty of twenty-five offenses and not guilty of six charges.¹ Due to double jeopardy concerns, the court entered judgment of conviction only on eighteen offenses: four counts of Level 3 felony rape ² (Counts 1–4); Level 5 felony criminal confinement ³ (Count 5); Level 6 felony intimidation ⁴ (Count 6); Level 6 felony domestic battery in the presence of a child less than sixteen years of age ⁵ (Count 7); Class A misdemeanor battery by bodily waste ⁶ (Count 8); Level 3 felony criminal confinement ⁷ (Count 11); three counts of Level 5 felony domestic battery by means of a deadly weapon ⁸ (Counts 12–14); Level 5 felony intimidation ⁹ (Count 18); and five counts of Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy ¹⁰ (Counts 27–31).¹¹

Sufficient evidence supports White's convictions.

[13] White argues insufficient evidence supports his convictions. A sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim warrants a “deferential standard of review in which we ‘neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility[.]’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied). Instead, we respect the factfinder's exclusive province to weigh conflicting evidence, Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1195 (Ind. 2018), and consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact, Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). It is “not necessary that the evidence ‘overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’ ” Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ind. 1995)).

[14] White does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support any specific conviction or element of an offense. Rather, he more generally argues all the convictions are unsupported by “substantial evidence of probative value” because the trial court erroneously relied on Victim's medical records and the nurse's testimony when the court instead “should have believed” the version of events Victim gave in her deposition. Appellant's Br. at 13–14.¹²

[15] White's argument focuses on Victim's out-of-court statements recorded in her medical records and deposition. But these were not the only statements the State presented in which Victim described the physical and sexual assaults White perpetrated on her. The State also introduced (1) the police body camera footage taken at Victim's workplace and in the ambulance, in which she gave an account of White's offenses; and (2) an audio recording and transcript of Victim's formal statement to Detective Drum, which was largely consistent with her prior statements and provided greater detail about the offenses. White does not challenge, or attempt to challenge, the admission of these statements, which establish the essential elements of the offenses. Through these recordings, the trial court was able to assess Victim's demeanor and credibility and then weigh it against her subsequent deposition testimony and in-court presentation. The trial court was entitled to give more weight to Victim's statements made shortly after the events than those she made later (and after White repeatedly violated the no contact order issued to protect her). See Chambless v. State, 119 N.E.3d 182, 193 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (noting this Court “will not second guess [a factfinder's] assessment of witness credibility unless the witness's testimony is inherently improbable”), trans. denied. Although White claims otherwise, his argument that the trial court should have believed Victim's later version of events is a request for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do. Hancz-Barron, 235 N.E.3d at 1244.

[16] Moreover, the State did not rely entirely on Victim's out-of-court statements to support White's convictions. The State also presented substantial independent evidence of White's guilt, including photographs of Victim's injuries; physical evidence seized from Victim's apartment corroborating aspects of Victim's initial accounts of the events; and text messages, videos, and photos taken from White's cell phone, some of which depict his crimes in disturbing detail. In the text messages, Victim describes some of the offenses and expresses fear of being at home; in response, White apologizes and promises to stop inflicting physical harm on her. Where, as here, a victim recants, independent evidence is especially important because “a conviction may not rest on a repudiated out-of-court statement unless there is substantial independent evidence of probative value from which the [factfinder] could find that the repudiated statement is credible.” Chambless, 119 N.E.3d at 193. Having reviewed Victim's statements and the independent evidence of guilt, we conclude there was substantial evidence of probative value from which a trial court could find White committed the offenses, despite Victim's inconsistent statements.

Conclusion

[17] Sufficient evidence supports each of White's convictions.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The court found White guilty of Counts 1–18, 22–23, and 27–31, and not guilty of Counts 19–21 and 24–26.

2.   Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1(a)(1) (2022).

3.   I.C. § 35-42-3-3(a) & (b)(1)(C) (2019).

4.   I.C. § 35-45-2-1(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A) (2022).

5.   I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1) & (b)(2) (2021).

6.   I.C. § 35-42-2-1(c)(2) & (e)(1) (2024).

7.   I.C. § 35-42-3-3(a) & (b)(3)(A) (2019).

8.   I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1) & (c)(2) (2021).

9.   I.C. § 35-45-2-1(a)(1) & (b)(2)(A) (2022).

10.   I.C. § 35-46-1-15.1(a)(5) (2023).

11.   The trial court vacated the following seven guilty findings: Counts 9–10, 15–17, and 22–23.

12.   White also suggests the trial court erred in admitting Victim's medical records (Exhibits 53 and 54) in violation of his confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution. See id. at 14–16. But he does not fully develop this argument, despite citing and attempting to distinguish a leading case on the issue, Ward v. State, 50 N.E.3d 752 (Ind. 2016) (holding defendant's federal and state constitutional rights were not violated when a paramedic and nurse who treated the victim testified to the victim's out-of-court statements identifying her attacker). Rather, he describes the trial court's admission of the medical records as a “tactical error” which “pav[ed] the way for the admission of [Victim's] taped [deposition] statement” and argues the trial court should have credited the deposition testimony over her other statements. Appellant's Br. at 17–18. Accordingly, we construe White's argument as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, consistent with the standard of review he cites. To the extent White attempts to challenge the admissibility of Exhibits 53 and 54, his arguments are waived for failure to present cogent reasoning supported by authority. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8) (providing the argument must “contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning [and] citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on”); Shabazz v. State, 274 N.E.3d 114, 119–20 (Ind. 2026) (holding defendant waived his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights challenge for failure to develop an argument and analyze supporting authority).

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.