Svetislav Arsich, Appellant v. Town of Brownsburg, Indiana, Appellee (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Svetislav Arsich, pro se, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for relief from judgment. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On January 17, 2024, the Town of Brownsburg (the “Town”) filed a complaint alleging that Arsich was the owner of certain real property on Main Street in Brownsburg (the “Property”) and was in violation of the Town's Unified Development Ordinance (the “UDO”). The Town alleged that Arsich had commenced construction of a parking lot on the Property without first obtaining approval of the Town and without using required and appropriate materials. It alleged that its enforcement office sent Arsich a notice of violation in June 2023, in July 2023, and in September 2023 and attached the notices. The first two notices asked Arsich to stop work on installing a parking area and to complete permit paperwork with the Town, and the third notice stated that a parking lot was being installed without permission; trucks and trailers were parked on the grass; all off-street parking shall utilize a paved surface; gravel, stone, and grass were not permitted as parking surfaces; and Arsich had a fine of $1,950 for thirty-nine days of noncompliance. The complaint requested that Arsich be enjoined from continuing to violate the UDO, pay a fine of no less than $50 and no more than $2,500 for each day the Property was in violation of the UDO, and pay court costs. The chronological case summary (“CCS”) indicates that service was issued on January 23, 2024.

[3] On February 6, 2024, the court received correspondence from Arsich consisting of a three-page, single-spaced letter with attached emails and photographs. An entry in the CCS on February 7, 2024, states, “Court takes no action on correspondence filed.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 5.

[4] On June 5, 2025, the Town filed a motion for default judgment which asserted that Arsich was liable for $7,500 plus interest and court costs. It also filed an affidavit by Ryan Beres, a Code Compliance Officer for the Town, stating that Arsich had failed to bring the Property into compliance with § 5.14 and § 8.7 of the UDO.¹ He further stated the Town may impose a fine for violations pursuant to § 9.10 of the UDO, the maximum civil penalty for the second or subsequent violation is $7,500 under § 9.14(A), and Arsich was liable to the Town for $7,500 plus interest and court costs.² Also on June 5, 2025, the court issued an order granting the Town's motion for default judgment and entering judgment in its favor in the amount of $7,500, post-judgment interest, and court costs of $185. On June 24, 2025, the Town filed a motion to amend judgment to include the requirement that Arsich bring the Property's parking area into compliance with the UDO and, if he fails to do so, that the Town is allowed to bring the parking area into compliance. The Town also filed a motion for proceedings supplemental. On July 1, 2025, the court granted the Town's motion to amend judgment.

[5] On July 7, 2025, Attorney Russell Jones filed an appearance to represent Arsich and a “Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment Pursuant to Trial Rules 55(C) and 60(B)(1), (6) and (8) or, Alternatively, to Correct Errors, and to Stay Proceedings Supplemental Hearing.” Id. at 56 (capitalization omitted). Arsich attached his February 2024 letter as an exhibit. He argued the court granted the Town's motion for default judgment on the same day that the Town filed the motion, “thus wrongfully precluding” him of “the right to be heard.” Id. at 57. Arsich cited Ind. Trial Rule 55(B).³ He argued that he timely responded to the complaint. He also argued the attached letter “confirm[ed]” his “meritorious defenses.” Id. at 61. The Town filed a response. The court stayed the proceedings supplemental and scheduled a hearing. On August 16, 2025, Attorney Jones filed a motion to withdraw appearance, which the court granted.

[6] On September 16, 2025, the court held a hearing at which Arsich appeared pro se. Arsich testified that “[t]he case ․ does not make any since [sic] because property by itself has already [been] a parking lot for last almost hundred years,” “[w]e added a little bit more gravel to protect it,” and “immediately we have a ․ letter from the Town ․ asking us if it can get the permit for that.” Transcript Volume II at 3-4. The court stated, “a Plaintiff files a complaint, serves the Defendant and you were served, in fact you wrote a letter to the Court which we never act on okay, we can[’]t take letters from people,” “[t]here [are] rules of procedure that we have to follow,” and “[s]o you have so many days to file an answer okay, denying or agreeing or whatever and then after that if you haven't filed an answer alright, then [ ] the Plaintiff can ask for Default Judgment which is what they did and now you are asking me to vacate the Default judgment but there are rules I have to follow.” Id. at 8.

[7] Beres testified that photographs from 2012 through 2022 showed that the Property was a grass lot. The Town's counsel asked, “basically these pictures demonstrate that during the ten-year period between 2012 and 2022 it was a grass lot and grass had overgrown this gravel area,” and Beres answered, “[t]hat is correct.” Id. at 20. When asked, “even if there was some gravel allegedly under this grass, [Arsich] was still in violation of the UDO,” Beres replied, “[y]es that is correct,” and when asked, “why is that again,” he testified, “because it was no longer a lot, it had turned into grass” and “[h]e added additional area of gravel without the [T]own[’]s permission.” Id. Beres testified that photographs showed vehicles and a trailer parked on the grass and on a gravel parking area on the Property in violation of the UDO. On December 3, 2025, the court denied Arsich's motion for relief from judgment.

Discussion

[8] Arsich, pro se, asserts that he replied to the complaint and cites his February 2024 letter. He argues that he “received a default judgement, with no notice, no communication and no due process from his response to the complaint nearly 15 months earlier.” Appellant's Brief at 16. He cites Ind. Trial Rule 60(B)(1) and argues, “[t]he ‘surprise’ occurred when [the Town] neglected to provide the requisite notice before seeking default Judgment.” Id. at 18. He also claims the default judgment was void.

[9] Pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys and are bound to follow the established rules of procedure. Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-984 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh'g denied. We will not become an advocate for a party or address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood. Id. at 984. To the extent Arsich has failed to develop cogent argument to support his allegations of error, he has waived review of his claims. See id. at 985 (“Appellants have failed to develop cogent argument to support any of their assertions of error. As such, they have waived review of these issues.”).

[10] A grant of equitable relief under Ind. Trial Rule 60 is within the discretion of the trial court, and generally we review a trial court's ruling on Rule 60 motions for abuse of discretion. Outback Steakhouse of Fla., Inc. v. Markley, 856 N.E.2d 65, 72 (Ind. 2006). The burden is on the movant to demonstrate that relief is both necessary and just. Wagler v. W. Boggs Sewer Dist., Inc., 980 N.E.2d 363, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), reh'g denied, trans. denied, cert. denied, 571 U.S. 1131, 134 S. Ct. 952 (2014).

[11] Ind. Trial Rule 60 provides:

(B) Mistake--Excusable Neglect--Newly Discovered Evidence-Fraud, etc.

On motion and upon such terms as are just the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a judgment, including a judgment by default, for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect;

* * * * *

(6) the judgment is void;

* * * * *

(8) any reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment, other than those reasons set forth in sub-paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4).

The motion shall be filed within a reasonable time for reasons (5), (6), (7), and (8), and not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken for reasons (1), (2), (3), and (4). A movant filing a motion for reasons (1), (2), (3), (4), and (8) must allege a meritorious claim or defense.

To satisfy Ind. Trial Rule 60(B)’s requirement of a meritorious defense, the movant must “present evidence that, if credited, demonstrates that a different result would be reached if the case were retried on the merits and that it is unjust to allow the judgment to stand.” Outback Steakhouse, 856 N.E.2d at 73-74 (citation and quotations omitted).

[12] To the extent Arsich asserts that the Town neglected to provide him with notice before seeking a default judgment, the service requirement in Ind. Trial Rule 55(B) applies only where “the party against whom judgment by default is sought has appeared in the action.” Neither Arsich, nor an attorney on his behalf, appeared in the action prior to the date that the Town filed its motion for default judgment on June 5, 2025.⁴ Moreover, on appeal, Arsich does not argue that he alleged a meritorious defense. In his motion for relief from judgment, he stated: “Exhibit ‘1’ attached hereto confirm[s] the meritorious defenses of Arsich.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 61. The attached exhibit contained Arsich's February 2024 letter to the court. Arsich did not point to any specific portion of the letter which, if credited as true, demonstrates that a different result would be reached with respect to his compliance with the UDO and the imposed fines. Arsich's three-page single-spaced letter contains statements about his calls and emails with the Town's staff and his visit with the staff which “ended in no solution nor result.” Id. at 65. Arsich stated the Property “has always had a small parking area covered with rock and I merely put a fresh layer of rock on top of that area.” Id. At the hearing, the Town presented testimony and photographs showing that, for approximately a ten- year period prior to Arsich's application of gravel to the Property to create a parking area, the area was grass. Beres, in his affidavit and testimony, explained that Arsich failed to bring the Property into compliance with the parking standards set forth in the UDO. On this record, we cannot say that Arsich established a meritorious defense.

[13] Further, in Indiana, whether a judgment is void turns on whether the defendant was served with process effective for that purpose under the Indiana Rules of Procedure. Jordache White & Am. Transp., LLC v. Reimer, 61 N.E.3d 301, 304 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh'g denied, trans. denied. Arsich acknowledges that a copy of the complaint and summons was served at his residence on January 23, 2024, and he does not argue that the service of process was ineffective or should have been set aside for any reason. The court received correspondence from Arsich on February 6, 2024. Arsich did not demonstrate that the court's entry of default judgment was void.

[14] Finally, as for the amount of the fine, the Town's complaint requested that Arsich be ordered to pay a fine of no less than $50 and no more than $2,500 for each day the Property was in violation of the UDO, Beres's affidavit stated the maximum civil penalty for the second or subsequent violation is $7,500 under § 9.14 of the UDO, and the Town's motion for default judgment asserted that Arsich was liable for $7,500. We cannot say that Arsich as the movant met his burden to demonstrate that the relief he requested was necessary and just.

[15] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's denial of Arsich's motion for relief from judgment.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   UDO § 5.14 contains various parking standards including permit, setback, and surface material requirements, and § 8.7 contains a development plan approval procedure.

2.   UDO § 9.10 provides for the issuance of notices of violation and civil penalties, and § 9.14(A) includes a schedule of penalties for first and subsequent violations and provides that the maximum civil penalty for the second or subsequent violation is a fine of $7,500.

3.   Ind. Trial Rule 55(B) relates to default judgment and provides in part: “If the party against whom judgment by default is sought has appeared in the action, he (or, if appearing by a representative, his representative) shall be served with written notice of the application for judgment at least three [3] days prior to the hearing on such application.”

4.   Ind. Trial Rule 3.1 sets out the information which must be included in a party's appearance and provides that the Indiana Office of Judicial Administration shall prepare and publish a standard format for compliance with the Rule's provisions. Arsich's February 2024 letter did not constitute an appearance. Also, Arsich's letter did not constitute an answer or responsive pleading. See Ind. Trial Rule 8(B) (“A responsive pleading shall state in short and plain terms the pleader's defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or controvert the averments set forth in the preceding pleading․ If he lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state and his statement shall be considered a denial․”).

Brown, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.