Vincent Anderson, Appellant-Intervenor v. Katelyn (Parton) Anderson, Appellee-Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Vincent Anderson (“Stepfather”) appeals the Morgan Circuit Court's order denying his verified petition for third party visitation. Stepfather presents one issue for our review: whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his petition.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Stepfather and Katelyn Anderson (“Mother”) started dating in mid- to late 2017. Mother was pregnant, and she gave birth to A.C. (“Child”) in January 2018. Thomas Cunningham (“Father”) is Child's biological father,¹ and he established his paternity of Child shortly after she was born. Still, Child called Stepfather “Daddy,” and Child and Stepfather enjoyed an extremely close relationship.

[4] Stepfather and Mother married in February 2022. At some point, a woman named Katelyn Walls (“Walls”) and her minor son L. moved in to live with Stepfather, Mother, and Child. And at some point, Stepfather and Walls became romantically involved. Stepfather filed a petition for dissolution of his marriage to Mother in October 2024. In his petition, Stepfather did not request visitation with Child.

[5] Mother and Child moved, and, for a time, Mother arranged for Child and Stepfather to see each other via video chats. Stepfather asked Mother for visits with Child, but Mother did not respond to his requests. Mother coordinated visits between Child and Stepfather's mother, Tammy Dorris (“Dorris”). Mother had told Dorris that she did not want Stepfather to visit with Child. But Dorris disregarded Mother's wishes and took Child to visit Stepfather twice. Stepfather last saw Child in April 2025.²

[6] In August, Stepfather filed a motion to intervene in this paternity action, and in September he filed a verified petition for third party visitation with Child. During a hearing on that petition, Mother, Father, Child's maternal grandmother, Stepfather, Walls, and Dorris testified. Stepfather testified at length regarding his close relationship with Child. Mother acknowledged that Stepfather and Child were close before and during the marriage, but she testified that she believed that granting Stepfather visitation with Child is not in Child's best interests. Mother testified that Child was extremely upset after Stepfather filed for divorce, and Child felt like she and Mother had been replaced by Walls and L. Mother testified that Child had struggled emotionally both during the marriage and in the aftermath. But Child is thriving now. Father testified that he did not want Stepfather to have visitation with Child. Mother and Father testified that Child's relationship with Father is strong, and Father hopes to increase his parenting time.

[7] The trial court found that it is not in Child's best interests to have visitation with Stepfather, and the court denied Stepfather's petition. Stepfather filed a motion to correct error, which the court denied. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Stepfather argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his petition for third party visitation. Our standard of review is well settled:

In matters of child custody and visitation, foremost consideration must be given to the best interests of the child. Lindquist v. Lindquist, 999 N.E.2d 907, 911 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). “We will generally reverse child visitation decisions only upon a showing of a manifest abuse of discretion.” Id. We do not reweigh the evidence or reexamine the credibility of the witnesses. Id. Instead, we view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision to determine whether the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom support the trial court's ruling. Id.

It is well established that stepparents have standing to seek visitation rights and that a trial court has authority to grant the same. In re I.E., 997 N.E.2d 358, 366 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Worrell v. Elkhart Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 704 N.E.2d 1027, 1028 (Ind. 1998)), trans. denied (2014); see also[,] Francis v. Francis, 654 N.E.2d 4, 7 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (dissolution court had authority to grant and modify visitation rights with stepfather), trans. denied; Caban v. Healey, 634 N.E.2d 540, 543 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (although dissolution court lacked authority to award custody of child to stepmother, it did have authority to grant visitation to stepmother), trans. denied (1995). A stepparent relationship is a strong indicator that a custodial and parental relationship exists, and by recognizing a right to visitation in nonparent third parties such as stepparents, we have acknowledged that a child's interest in maintaining relationships with those who have acted in a parental capacity will sometimes trump a natural parent's right to direct the child's upbringing. A.C. v. N.J., 1 N.E.3d 685, 697 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

Richardson v. Richardson, 34 N.E.3d 696, 701 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).³ Our Supreme Court has recognized that a stepparent may be granted visitation upon establishing (1) the existence of a custodial and parental relationship and (2) that visitation is in the child's best interests. Id. (citing Worrell, 704 N.E.2d at 1028).

[9] We note that neither Mother nor Father has filed an appellee's brief. When an appellee fails to file a brief on appeal, we may reverse the trial court's decision if the appellant makes a prima facie showing of reversible error. McGill v. McGill, 801 N.E.2d 1249, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). In this context, prima facie error is defined as “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Orlich v. Orlich, 859 N.E.2d 671, 673 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). This rule was established to make clear that it is not the burden of the court on appeal to rebut apparently valid arguments advanced for reversing the trial court's judgment. See McGill, 801 N.E.2d at 1251. That said, it is affirmatively the appellant's burden to show prima facie error.

[10] Stepfather first contends that the evidence supports but one conclusion, namely, that granting Stepfather visitation with Child is in Child's best interests. Stepfather argues that the evidence “establishes the hallmark of a custodial and parental relationship: an extended period acting as [Child]’s Father figure, [Child] identifying Stepfather as ‘daddy,’ Mother's admissions confirming the parental bond, and [Child]’s distress upon severance of the relationship.” Appellant's Br. at 12. Accordingly, we agree with Stepfather that he has made a prima facie showing that the evidence established the first Worrell prong: a parental relationship. 704 N.E.2d at 1028.

[11] However, as to the second prong of Worrell, the trial court found that visitation is not in Child's best interests. In support of his best interests argument, Stepfather cites several scientific treatises, which were not submitted to the trial court, and he ignores evidence that supports the trial court's finding and conclusion. In particular, Stepfather ignores Mother's testimony that Child's emotional health has improved since the divorce. Mother testified that Child felt that Stepfather had “replaced” her and Mother with Walls and L. Tr. p. 70. Indeed, Stepfather did not file his petition until several months had passed after his separation from Mother and Child. And Stepfather ignores the evidence that Child's relationship with Father is flourishing.

[12] Stepfather's argument amounts to a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do on appeal. The evidence supports the trial court's finding that granting Stepfather visitation with Child is not in Child's best interests. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion when it denied Stepfather's petition for visitation with Child.

[13] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At the time of the final hearing on Stepfather's petition, Father was transitioning to become a woman, and he had changed his legal name. During the hearing, Mother, who has a good relationship with Father, used “he/him” pronouns for Father, and, for ease of discussion, we do the same.

2.   The record is not clear whether Mother sanctioned the April 2025 visit, but it appears that she did.

3.   In a footnote, the Richardson panel “decline[d] to extend the parental presumptions applicable to a statutory grandparent visitation proceeding to a stepparent visitation order․” 34 N.E.3d at 703 n.4. Specifically, in a grandparent visitation case, there is a presumption that a fit parent acts in his or her child's best interests, and the court must give special weight to a fit parent's decision to deny or limit visitation. Id. (citing In re K.I., 903 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ind. 2009)). Stepfather asks that we follow Richardson and decline to extend the parental presumptions here, and we agree. Accordingly, we need not address Stepfather's argument in the alternative that, if the trial court should have given Mother and Father those presumptions, the trial court must also issue findings on each of the factors applicable to grandparents’ visitation cases.

Mathias, Judge.

Kenworthy, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.