Noel Bulmer, Appellant-Defendant v. LVNV LLC (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In February of 2019, LVNV Funding LLC (“LVNV”) obtained a default judgment against Noel Bulmer for a $980.26 debt owed by Bulmer. Approximately seven years later, on March 5, 2026, Bulmer moved to set aside the default judgment. After his motion to set aside was denied by the trial court, Bulmer filed a motion to reconsider, which was also denied by the trial court. Bulmer contends that the default judgment should have been set aside because the trial court had lacked personal jurisdiction over him. Concluding otherwise, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On November 6, 2018, LVNV filed a complaint against Bulmer, seeking to recover a $980.26 debt owed by Bulmer to LVNV. Summons for the complaint, which was served at Bulmer's residence on November 27, 2018, indicated the following manner of service:

SHERIFF shall serve this Summons as follows:

_X_ personal

-or-

_X_ leaving a copy at dwelling or place of employment followed by mailing a copy via US First Class mail

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 21 (emphasis in original). A handwritten notation at the bottom of the summons indicated that it had been “served to adult female at [the] above address[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 21.

[3] On February 25, 2019, the trial court entered default judgment against Bulmer, finding that he had “failed or refused to respond or answer to [LVNV's] Complaint.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 11. The trial court entered judgment “in the sum of $980.26, plus costs of $185.00 for a total of $1,165.26, plus post judgment interest thereon at a rate of 8% per annum and post judgment costs of collection[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 11 (emphasis omitted).

[4] On March 5, 2026, Bulmer moved to set aside the default judgment, claiming that service had been legally defective and that he had “never received a summons or complaint in this matter.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 12. Bulmer did not dispute that a copy of the summons had been left at his residence but argued that a copy of the summons had not also been mailed to his residence as required by Trial Rule 4.1(B). After the trial court denied Bulmer's motion, Bulmer moved for the trial court to reconsider.¹ The trial court denied Bulmer's motion to reconsider.

Discussion and Decision

[5] At the outset, we note that LVNV has not filed an appellees’ brief. “In such a case, we need not undertake the burden of developing arguments for the appellees.” Dreyer & Reinbold, Inc. v. Leib, 811 N.E.2d 858, 860 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). “Applying a less stringent standard of review, we may reverse the trial court if the appellant establishes prima facie error.” Id. “ ‘Prima facie’ is defined as ‘at first sight,’ ‘on first appearance,’ or ‘on the face of it.’ ” Id. (quoting Painter v. Painter, 773 N.E.2d 281, 282 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)).

[6] Bulmer contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to set aside the default judgment, arguing that the judgment is void because the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. “In general, we review a trial court's denial of a motion to set aside [the] judgment for an abuse of discretion and, in so doing, determine whether the trial court's judgment is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and inferences supporting the judgment.” Thomison v. IK Indy, Inc., 858 N.E.2d 1052, 1055 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). However,

“[t]he existence of personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a question of law․ Thus, we review a trial court's determination regarding personal jurisdiction de novo.” Munster v. Groce, 829 N.E.2d 52, 57 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). A plaintiff is responsible for presenting evidence of a court's personal jurisdiction over the defendant, but the defendant ultimately bears the burden of proving the lack of personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence, unless that lack is apparent on the face of the complaint. Id.

Id. (ellipsis in original).

[7] Bulmer argues that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction because service of the complaint was ineffective.

Ineffective service of process prohibits a trial court from having personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Taco Bell Corp. v. United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 567 N.E.2d 163, 164 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), trans. denied. A judgment entered against a defendant over whom the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction is void. Fidelity Fin. Serv., Inc. v. West, 640 N.E.2d 394, 396 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).

Id. Therefore, in determining whether the trial court's judgment against Bulmer is void, we must determine whether LVNV's service of process upon Bulmer was effective. See id. at 1055–56.

[8] The appropriate method for serving process on an individual is outlined in Indiana Trial Rule 4.1, which provides that

[s]ervice may be made upon an individual, or an individual acting in a representative capacity, by:

(1) sending a copy of the summons and complaint by registered or certified mail or other public means by which a written acknowledgment of receipt may be requested and obtained to his residence, place of business or employment with return receipt requested and returned showing receipt of the letter; or

(2) delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to him personally; or

(3) leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at his dwelling house or usual place of abode; or

(4) serving his agent as provided by rule, statute or valid agreement.

Ind. Trial Rule 4.1(A). “When service is made under subdivision (A)(3) or (A)(4), the person making the service also must send by first class mail, a copy of the summons and the complaint to the address on the summons of the person being served, and this fact must be shown upon the return.” Ind. Trial Rule 4.1(B). However, “[n]o summons or the service thereof shall be set aside or be adjudged insufficient when either is reasonably calculated to inform the person to be served that an action has been instituted against him, the name of the court, and the time within which he is required to respond.” Ind. Trial Rule 4.15(F).

[9] In Thomison, we considered whether Indiana Trial Rule 4.15(F) cured potential noncompliance with Indiana Trial Rule 4.1(B). 858 N.E.2d at 1058. Thomison argued that a “lack of personal jurisdiction [was] apparent on the face of the complaint because the Sheriff's return, on its face,” did not show that a copy of the summons had been mailed to Thomison's address after a copy of the summons had been left at Thomison's home. Id. We concluded that a lack of personal jurisdiction was not apparent on the face of the complaint and, as such, Thomison bore “the burden of proving the lack of personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id.

[10] We reach the same conclusion in this case. Again, the Summons indicated that the manner of service would be as follows:

SHERIFF shall serve this Summons as follows:

_X_ personal

-or-

_X_ leaving a copy at dwelling or place of employment followed by mailing a copy via US First Class mail

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 21 (emphasis in original). A handwritten notation at the bottom of the summons indicated that it had been “served to adult female at [the] above address[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 21. While the handwritten notation did not indicate that the summons had been mailed to Bulmer's residence, the summons indicated that a copy of the summons had been left at the dwelling “followed by mailing a copy via US First Class mail[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 21. Given the indication that the summons would also be mailed, we cannot say that a lack of personal jurisdiction was apparent on the face of the complaint. See Thomison, 858 N.E.2d at 1055. Bulmer, therefore, bears “the burden of proving the lack of personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 1058.

[11] In this case, Bulmer does not dispute that a copy of the summons had been left at his residence, arguing only that a copy of the summons had not also been mailed to his residence. In making this argument, Bulmer relies on his own self-serving statements asserting as much. The trial court, acting as the trier-of-fact, was not obligated to credit Bulmer's self-serving statements, and apparently did not. See Kimbrough v. State, 911 N.E.2d 621, 636 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (providing that the factfinder was not required to credit the defendant's self-serving version of the events). Based on the record before us, we conclude that Bulmer has failed to overcome his burden of proving that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction. Thomison, 858 N.E.2d at 1058.

[12] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   LVNV responded to Bulmer's motion to reconsider, arguing that Bulmer's motion to set aside the judgment—which was filed approximately seven years after default judgment had been entered—was untimely because it was not filed within a reasonable period of time. It does not appear that the trial court considered LVNV's arguments because it appears to have issued its order denying Bulmer's motion to reconsider before LVNV's response had been filed.

Bradford, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.