IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of I.G. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] B.G. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's order terminating her parental rights over her three minor children.¹ Mother raises five issues, which we consolidate and restate as the following three issues:

1. Whether certain of the court's findings of fact are unsupported by the evidence.

2. Whether the court clearly erred when it terminated her parental rights.

3. Whether the court violated her due process rights.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Mother and F.G., Sr. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) were married, and they have three children: I.G., born November 14, 2011; F.G., born June 24, 2017; and J.G., born February 6, 2021 (collectively, “the Children”). Parents and the Children lived at a home in Westfield. Father used marijuana and crystal methamphetamine, and Mother smoked crystal methamphetamine. Mother and Father often argued because they were “just on drugs.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 33. Around Mother's Day 2024, Mother took the family's only vehicle and moved out of the home, leaving the Children with Father. After that, Mother was “in and out” of the home. Id. at 26.

[4] On September 24, law enforcement officers obtained and executed a search warrant for Parents’ home. During the search, officers found a crystal substance “consistent with the appearance of methamphetamine,” a tan powder “consistent with the appearance of fentanyl,” a glass smoking device with what appeared to be burnt marijuana, and a glass smoking device with residue consistent with burnt methamphetamine. Ex. at 21. The officers also observed “exposed” electrical wiring in multiple rooms, broken glass, and “[r]otting food” in the house. Id. at 22. Officers further noticed that the home “was riddled with insects” and that one of the mattresses in the Children's bedroom was “saturated with brown stains” and that the “odor of urine and feces also permeated the air.” Id.

[5] Following the officers’ discoveries, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) removed the Children from Parents’ home. At the time DCS removed the Children, I.G. had a tooth that had been broken for approximately one year; F.G.’s teeth were decaying, and he had to have several extracted and others capped; and J.G.’s teeth were also decaying.

[6] On September 25, DCS filed a petition alleging the Children to be Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”). In its petition, DCS alleged that law enforcement officers had found methamphetamine in the home and that the home “was noted to be in deplorable condition[.]” Id. at 80. DCS also alleged that Parents had used drugs, that Father had been arrested, and that Parents had neglected the Children's basic needs and education.

[7] Thereafter, Mother was arrested and charged with one count of possession of methamphetamine, as a Level 5 felony; one count of possession of a narcotic drug, as a Level 5 felony; six counts of neglect of a dependent, as Level 6 felonies; and one count of possession of paraphernalia, as a Class C misdemeanor. Mother and the State entered into a plea agreement pursuant to which Mother agreed to plead guilty to three counts of neglect of a dependent, as Level 6 felonies.²

[8] On November 20, Mother entered into a “Deny and Submit Agreement” in which she denied the allegations in the CHINS petition but stipulated “that the Court may use the Preliminary Inquiry and Verified CHINS Petition for purposes of making a CHINS finding.” Id. at 88. Based on that agreement, the court adjudicated the Children to be CHINS and ordered Mother to participate in home-based case work and follow all recommendations, submit to a substance abuse assessment and follow all recommendations, submit to random drug screens, participate in supervised visitation, and submit to a parenting assessment and follow all recommendations.

[9] Mother remained incarcerated during the pendency of the CHINS proceedings. She was initially in custody at the Hamilton County Jail but was ultimately transferred to the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”) after she pleaded guilty. While at the county jail, Mother engaged in home-based case work, which included a parenting assessment. DCS also put a referral in place for Mother to participate in supervised visitation, but the provider was unable to set up visits with Mother in jail, so the provider discharged Mother from the service. After Mother was transferred to the DOC, the home-based case work provider discharged her because it was unable to continue providing the services while Mother was at the DOC.

[10] In June and October 2025, Mother filed motions to compel visits with the Children. The court denied the motions as to F.G. and J.G. and left it to I.G.’s discretion to determine whether he wanted to visit Mother. I.G. declined visits. On October 15, DCS filed petitions to terminate Mother's parental rights as to the Children.

[11] The trial court held a two-day hearing on DCS's petitions on January 6 and January 20, 2026. Following the hearing, the court entered the following pertinent findings of fact and conclusions thereon:

2. Mother was in and out of the family home prior to removal of the children. Mother left the children with Father and took the only car for the family, leaving them without transportation. Mother became pregnant from a[nother] man and Mother and Father fought about this in front of the children.

3. Mother used illegal substances while the [C]hildren were still in her care, specifically crystal meth.

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6. Mother resided at 126 N. Union Street in Westfield. On September 24, 2024, during the search warrant a pouch containing substances suspected of being methamphetamine and fentanyl were found in a women's shoe rack in a closet at mother's home which also contained women's deodorant, cosmetics, shoes, and clothing consistent with [M]other's size. A glass smoking device was found by a pair of women's underwear. Mother did not have a valid prescription that would legitimize the possession of these substances.

7. Mother's home where the [C]hildren resided was in deplorable condition. There were insects, stagnated food on dirty dishes, and dirty clothes everywhere.

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9. Mother made a plea deal that was rejected by the Court. Mother ultimately pleaded guilty to three counts of neglect of a dependent and was sentenced to 910 days in the Indiana Department of Correction, 730 days executed. The executed term shall be served as 365 days in the Department of Correction[ ] followed by 365 days as a direct commitment in the Hamilton County Residential Work Release Facility. Mother remained incarcerated at the time of the first day of the termination hearing. Mother had just been released to community corrections on the second and final day of the termination hearing which occurred on January 20, 2026.

10. [I.G.] remains in therapy with Tyrone Humphrey working on the following goals: a) anger management; b) processing trauma; c) substance use therapy for THC and nicotine; d) effective communication; and e) mood regulation. [I.G.] works on identifying and responding to triggers of his past trauma. The trauma was identified as physical abuse, neglect and abandonment by [M]other, not having his basic needs met by [M]other, exposure to sex and pornography in the home, and exposure to [M]other's substance use.

11. [I.G.] has been truthful with his therapist. In response to his past trauma [I.G.] has exhibited behaviors including physical and verbal aggression, depression, threats to elope, and substance use.

12. [I.G.] needs continued therapeutic treatment. There is a direct correlation between [I.G.’s] poor relationships with female peers and his relationship with his mother.

13. It would not be in [I.G.’s] best interest to be placed back with his Mother. [I.G.] has no interest in maintaining a relationship with [M]other. He remains adamant he wants no contact with [M]other.

14. When [I.G.] first came to his current placement, he was experiencing anxiety and depression. There has been a lot of improvement [i]n [I.G.’s] behaviors. He is using better coping skills and engages better with his peers.

15. [I.G.] is doing well now in his current placement. He has bonded with his foster mother and feels safe enough to share his past traumas with her. Foster mother is working therapeutically with [I.G.] through his behaviors.

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18. [F.G.] is in ongoing therapy with Dr. Haisley Adeshina to work on his traumatic experiences prior to removal. [F.G.] meets with his therapist twice a week to work on overcoming trauma, emotional challenges resulting from neglect, anger management and coping skills, and emotional regulation. [F.G.’s] trauma was identified as neglect by [P]arents, exposure to illegal drugs by [P]arents, removal from his siblings, and knowledge that his parents were in jail.

19. [F.G.] understands the therapeutic process and has been truthful with his therapist. He has held back information at times because of fear of the repercussions.

20. [F.G.] has been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). He required a stay at Bloomington Meadows where his medication was regulated. [F.G.] has experienced suicidal ideations. He does not feel wanted and does not feel he deserves to be alive. These feelings of not being wanted relate back to his removal from his family and his past before removal.

21. [F.G.] needs continued therapeutic services.

22. It is not in [F.G.’s] best interest to reunify with [M]other. He has not resolved the issues that necessitated his removal.

23. [F.G.] is placed in a stable home where he is the only child. When [F.G.] arrived in this placement, he exhibited high levels of ADHD behaviors which had not been diagnosed or treated.

24. Placement had to work with 8-year-old [F.G.] to teach him basic hygiene habits such as using the bathroom, washing his hands, and brushing his teeth. Placement took [F.G.] to several dental and eye appointments to get caught up and address tooth decay.

25. [F.G.] was old enough to be in second grade, but he did not have the skills needed for second grade. He could not recite the alphabet or count numbers.

26. [F.G.] has experienced improvement in his social behaviors and is using more appropriate language since living with current placement. He has learned to get along with other children in a more appropriate manner.

27. [F.G.] has grown comfortable with placement so that now he can begin to express traumas. Placement and [F.G.] are receiving support through wrap around services, a National Youth Advocate Program (NYAP) treatment coordinator, and Dr. Adeshina.

* * *

32. Samantha Wiley provided home based case work to placement in the form of a parenting curriculum to help aid them in dealing with [J.G.’s] extreme behaviors and how to achieve effective consequences for [J.G.] with those behaviors. Samantha also provides therapy for [J.G.], who is four years old. The treatment goals for [J.G.] are to work on emotional regulation and age-appropriate coping skills.

33. [J.G.] demonstrated an understanding of the therapeutic process and has been truthful with his therapist. [J.G.] was observed to have heightened emotions, failure to listen, throwing things, running away from his therapist, and throwing himself to the ground or into anything hard.

34. [J.G.’s] behaviors have lessened since the start of therapy. However, if his therapist tries to talk about past traumas [J.G.] becomes extremely dysregulated, has outbursts, and throws himself to the ground.

35. [J.G.] needs continued therapeutic services

36. It is not in [J.G.’s] best interest to have contact with [M]other.

37. [J.G.] does not recognize Mother as his mother, nor does he have a psychological connection to her. [J.G.] identifies [Mother] as [F.G.’s] mother. [J.G.] identifies two older siblings as his parents.

38. [J.G.] is doing well and making progress in his current placement. They are receiving intensive foster care services through NYAP.

* * *

40. When [J.G.] arrived at placement, he exhibited violent and aggressive behaviors. He would throw himself to the floor and hit himself. [J.G.’s] behaviors have improved in his time with placement. He engages better with other children now and is less aggressive.

41. [J.G.] has developed a bond with [foster parents] Jennifer and Alyssa, calling them Mom and Mommy. He gets along well with placement's 10-year-old son and extended family that live nearby. [J.G.] has integrated well into the family. Placement will continue to seek out therapeutic services for [J.G.] and intend to send him to the local STEM school when he is ready.

* * *

45. [Guardian ad Litem (“GAL”)] believes it is in the best interest of [the Children] that [M]other's parental rights be terminated as the [C]hildren need stability and permanency now. Having the established routines and stability provided by their placements will help them overcome the trauma that brought them into DCS care.

46. The GAL is concerned that [M]other cannot provide the stability these children need, and that [M]other will not follow through with their therapeutic needs.

47. DCS became involved due to lack of supervision, drug use by [P]arents, and dirty home conditions.

48. The [C]hildren all had extensive dental needs and significant mental health needs when they came into the care of DCS. All of the [C]hildren needed therapy and continue to need therapy.

49. Mother did not provide stability for the [C]hildren as she herself was in and out of the home.

50. Mother exposed the [C]hildren to illegal substances and domestic violence.

51. All of the [C]hildren have had to change placement due to behaviors. [F.G.] and [J.G.] had to be placed in intensive foster care services with additional support from NYAP before they were able to stabilize in their placements.

52. All of the children have shown signs of improvement since being placed in their current foster homes.

53. Communication between [M]other and DCS was difficult at best. Mother was disruptive, aggressive, and cursed at the DCS [Family Case Manager “FCM”].

54. Mother has not taken responsibility for the reasons the underlying CHINS matters were opened. Mother did plead guilty to neglect of a dependent but continues to place blame on others for the issues in the underlying CHINS case.

55. Mother failed to provide DCS with any information regarding the substance treatment she claimed to receive in jail. It is unknown if this substance abuse treatment meets any minimum standards.

56. Mother does not have stable housing. She is currently in Work Release through Community Corrections. Children are not allowed to stay at Community Corrections.

57. Mother does not know where she will live when she completes Community Corrections. She has not secured housing.

58. Mother is currently unemployed and has no means to support herself or her children. She does not have a stable income.

* * *

62. Returning the [C]hildren to [M]other at this time will have a catastrophic effect on them as it would be returning them to the cause of their problems.

63. The Court considered the testimony of [M]other regarding her claims that she has changed and that she can adequately provide for her children upon her release from community corrections. Mother's testimony is not credible.

* * *

67. The [C]hildren need stability and permanency. Mother has failed to demonstrate that she provided stability in the past, that she can provide stability now or in the future.

68. Mother has failed to demonstrate that she can or will be able to provide financially for the [C]hildren or provide a safe and stable living environment. Mother has failed to remedy the reasons that necessitated the opening of the underlying CHINS matters.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 28-32.

[12] Based on those findings, the court concluded that: there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal or the continued placement outside of the home will not be remedied; there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Children's well-being; termination of parental rights is in the Children's best interests; and there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the Children, that being adoption. Accordingly, the court terminated Mother's parental rights as to the Children. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[13] Mother challenges the trial court's termination of her parental rights over the Children. We begin our review of this issue by acknowledging that “[t]he traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Bailey v. Tippecanoe Cnty. Div. of Fam. & Child. (In re M.B.), 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. Schultz v. Porter Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re K.S.), 750 N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where a child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one's own child should not be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. Id. at 836.

[14] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Peterson v. Marion Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re D.D.), 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover, in deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court's judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Judy S. v. Noble Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re L.S.), 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.

Issue One: Findings of Fact

[15] Mother first contends that the trial court erred when it terminated her parental rights because several of the court's findings are not supported by the evidence. Here, in terminating Mother's parental rights, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon. When a trial court's judgment contains special findings and conclusions, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the trial court's decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208. Further, “[w]hen findings of fact are unchallenged, this Court accepts them as true.” L.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re S.S.), 120 N.E.3d 605, 608 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[16] On appeal, Mother specifically challenges two findings related to when and how DCS first got involved with the family, one finding related to a permanency hearing, two findings that DCS had made reasonable efforts to finalize permanency plans, one finding that provided the date on which the Children were removed, and one finding related to Mother's use of substances.

[17] However, we need not address Mother's argument regarding the challenged findings. Even if Mother were correct, we may reverse a trial court's judgment based on erroneous findings only if the findings “constitute prejudicial error.” K.W. v. Marion Cnty. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re B.J.), 879 N.E.2d 7, 20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. Indeed, an erroneous finding is cause for reversal only if it is the “sole support for any conclusion of law necessary to sustain the judgment of the court.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). An erroneous finding is “merely harmless surplusage” when the unchallenged findings “provide ample support for the trial court's ultimate conclusion[.]” Id.

[18] Any error in the challenged findings was not prejudicial because the remaining findings support the court's termination of Mother's parental rights. Indeed, the unchallenged findings, which must be accepted as true, demonstrate that officers found methamphetamine in the home Mother shared with the Children, that the home was in an unclean and unsafe condition, that Mother was convicted and sentenced on three counts of neglect of a dependent, that at least two of the Children had severe dental issues that needed treatment, that all three Children have experienced significant trauma because of Mother, that all three Children have needed and continue to need extensive therapy, that eight-year-old [F.G.] was unable to recite the alphabet or count, that Mother did not present any evidence to show that she had remedied her issues with drug use, and that Mother does not have a job or place to live. Because the remaining findings support the court's conclusion, any error in the challenged findings was harmless and therefore not grounds for reversal.

Issue Two: Termination of Parental Rights

[19] Mother next contends that the court erred when it terminated her parental rights. Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS must file a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship. As the Indiana General Assembly has provided:

(c) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

(d) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege the existence of one (1) or more of the following circumstances:

* * *

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4. If the court finds that the allegations in the petition are true, “the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a). DCS's “burden of proof in termination of parental rights cases is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’ ” R.Y. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re G.Y.), 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009) (quoting I.C. § 31-37-14-2).

[20] On appeal, Mother contends that the trial court erred when it concluded that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal or placement outside of her care will not be remedied and that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Children.³ However, because Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(d) is written in the disjunctive, we need not address the remedy argument.

[21] To prove whether there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Children, DCS must demonstrate that the “evidence shows that the emotional and physical development of a child in need of services is threatened[.]” K.S. v. Miami Cnty. Div. of Fam. and Child. (In re E.S.), 762 N.E.2d 1287, 1290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). A trial court “need not wait until a child is irreversibly influenced by a deficient lifestyle such that her physical, mental, and social growth is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” Id.

[22] On appeal, Mother contends that the court erred when it concluded that there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Children because she “participate[d] in services while incarcerated to help better her ability to parent the [C]hildren sober.” Appellant's Br. at 27. She further contends that the “complete lack of visitation between Mother and the [C]hildren frustrated Mother's ability to maintain her bond with the [C]hildren.” Id.

[23] However, the undisputed findings demonstrate that Mother has a history of neglecting the Children and exposing them to an environment of drugs that resulted in each of them having significant needs. Indeed, all three Children need extensive and ongoing therapy to address the trauma that resulted from Mother's abuse, neglect, abandonment, and exposure to drugs. As a result of the trauma, I.G. has exhibited physical and verbal aggression, depression, threats to elope, and substance use. F.G. has experienced suicidal thoughts and does not feel like he deserves to be alive. And J.G. has heightened emotions, fails to listen, throws things, and runs himself into the ground or other hard objects.

[24] In addition to the psychological harm, at least two Children suffered neglect as well. The placement for eight-year-old F.G. had to teach him basic hygiene habits, such as using the bathroom, washing his hands, and brushing his teeth. F.G. was also unable to recite the alphabet or count. And both F.G. and J.G. had severe dental decay when they were removed from Mother's care. All of the Children have seen improvements in their behavior and social skills since being placed in foster care.

[25] We agree with the trial court that returning the Children to Mother's care “will have a catastrophic effect on them as it would be returning them to the cause of their problems.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 32. The unchallenged findings support the court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the Children. As such, the court did not err when it terminated Mother's parental rights.

Issue Three: Due Process

[26] Finally, Mother contends that the court violated her due process rights when it terminated her parental rights after she was denied visitation with the Children during the CHINS proceedings and because of “procedural irregularities” in the termination proceedings. Appellant's Br. at 32. However, we agree with DCS that Mother has waived these claims for failing to raise them to the trial court. It is well settled that “a party on appeal may waive a constitutional claim, including a claimed violation of due process rights, by raising it for the first time on appeal.” A.C. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re N.G.), 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016). Because Mother failed to raise any of her due process concerns to the trial court, we decline to consider them.

Conclusion

[27] Any error in the challenged findings of fact is harmless, as the unchallenged findings support the court's conclusions. The court did not err when it terminated Mother's parental rights. And Mother has waived her due process claims. We therefore affirm the trial court.

[28] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The children's father consented to their adoption and does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Father was convicted of crimes related to possessing controlled substances.

3.   Mother does not challenge the court's conclusions that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the Children and that the termination of the parent-child relationship is in the Children's best interests.

Bailey, Judge.

Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur