DEWALD v. FARLEY (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Eric J. Dewald (“Father”) appeals the trial court's order addressing his parenting time and child support obligation. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Father and Tiffany N. Farley (“Mother”) were previously married and have two children together, E.D., born in June 2007, and A.D., born in February 2012. In March 2014, the trial court dissolved the parties’ marriage and ordered Father to pay child support of $252 per week. On February 27, 2019, the State of Indiana filed a Notice of Arrears stating Father's arrearage as of January 16, 2019, was $17,559.70. On August 20, 2019, the court issued an order that Father pay child support of $210 per week plus an additional $42 per week toward his child support arrearage. On June 2, 2021, the court issued an order that Father pay child support of $237 per week and continue to pay an additional $42 per week toward his child support arrearage. On June 4, 2024, the court issued an order that Father pay weekly child support of $112. Later in June 2024, Father moved to Missouri.

[3] On September 2, 2025, Father filed a Motion for Modification to Parenting Time and a Motion for Modification of Child Support. In January 2026, the case was transferred from the Allen Superior Court to the Howard Superior Court. On February 23, 2026, Mother filed a Petition to Modify Custody, Support, and to Establish College Expenses and a Motion to Show Cause alleging Father failed to pay the $42 per week toward his arrearage as ordered. Father filed a Motion for Continuance on March 5, 2026, Mother objected, and the court denied Father's request. On March 11, 2026, the court held a hearing on the pending motions at which Father appeared pro se and Mother appeared with counsel.

[4] On March 16, 2026, the trial court issued an order providing:

ORDER FOLLOWING MARCH 11, 2026 HEARING

* * * * *

1. There has been a change of circumstance in that the weekly income of [Father] has increased, [Father] has moved to Missouri, and one of the children is now in college. Therefore, the Petition to Modify Child Support is granted.

2. Retroactive to the date of filing, September 2, 2025, [Father] is ordered to pay $188.00 per week in child support for the two children. (see attached CSOW-1)

3. The parties’ eldest child, [E.D.], turns 19 years of age on June 18, 2026. Effective, June 18, 2026, [Father] shall be ordered to pay $188.00 per week in child support for the parties’ one remaining minor child, [A.D.]. (See attached CSOW-2).

4. The eldest child, [E.D.], is currently in college at Indiana University–Indianapolis. As a result of [Father's] service in the military, [E.D.] is eligible for the Chapter 33 college benefit. This benefit pays for her tuition, books, and includes a monthly stipend. [Father] is ordered to ensure that the Chapter 33 benefit remains in place for [E.D.] until the benefit is exhausted, [E.D.] stops attending college full time, or she graduates with an undergraduate degree, whichever occurs first.

5. If [E.D.] is still a full-time college student when the Chapter 33 benefit runs out, [Father] is ordered to ensure that [E.D.] receives the Chapter 35 benefit which pays for her tuition and books, but does not include a monthly stipend. [Father] is ordered to ensure that the Chapter 35 benefit remains in place for [E.D.] until the benefit is exhausted, [E.D.] stops attending college full time, or she graduates with an undergraduate degree, whichever occurs first.

6. Any college expenses not covered by the military benefit shall be paid 1/3 by [Father], 1/3 by [Mother], and 1/3 by [E.D.]. [E.D.’s] portion shall be considered paid by the Chapter 33 and/or Chapter 35 benefit. Therefore, as long as [E.D.] receives a military benefit, [Father] and [Mother] are ordered to divide other college expenses equally.

7. As a result of [Father's] move to Missouri, there has been a change in circumstances that necessitates a change in parenting time. Distance is now a major factor. [Father] is hereby ordered the opportunity for parenting time as follows:

a. At all times that he is in central Indiana after providing advance notice to [Mother];

b. Spring Break, including both weekends;

c. Fall Break, including both weekends;

d. One-half of the school Christmas vacation beginning at the end of the school day Friday and ending on the evening of the day prior to the first day school resumes. [Father] shall have the first half in even-numbered years, and [Mother] shall have the first half in odd-numbered years.

e. Three (3) weeks of the summer recess from school. [Father] shall select his weeks, in writing, before April 1 of each year. If [Father] fails to select his weeks, [Mother] may select the weeks for [Father]. The three weeks may be taken in one section or two. [Father] shall not select weeks that conflict with the child's annual week at camp.

f. [Father] shall pay 100% of the costs incurred for travel expenses necessary to effectuate parenting time.

8. For the summer of 2026, [Father] may select his three weeks from the period of time between June 20, 2026, and July 21, 2026.

9. [Father] is found to be in indirect contempt of court for his willful failure to pay child support as previously ordered. The Court finds that [Father] is $19,952.42 in arrears as to child support through March 11, 2026. This arrearage amount does not include additional arrearage created due to the retroactivity of the new child support amount contained in this order. [Father] may purge himself of contempt by paying the weekly ordered child support, plus an additional $52.00 per week toward the arrearage, for a total weekly child support payment of $240.00 per week. Said support shall be paid by way of Income Withholding Order. Counsel for [Mother] to prepare a proposed Order for the Court.

10. Additionally, due to his failure to pay child support, [Mother] was forced to retain counsel to enforce the order. [Father] is ordered to pay [Mother's] attorney fees of $5,005.00, said amount is reduced to judgment.

Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 28-31.

Discussion

[5] Father argues the trial court erred in several respects. The Indiana Supreme Court has held:

Appellate deference to the determinations of our trial court judges, especially in domestic relations matters, is warranted because of their unique, direct interactions with the parties face-to-face, often over an extended period of time. Thus enabled to assess credibility and character through both factual testimony and intuitive discernment, our trial judges are in a superior position to ascertain information and apply common sense, particularly in the determination of the best interests of the involved children.

Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011).

A. Motion for Continuance

[6] Father asserts the trial court erred in denying his Motion for Continuance. The decision to grant or deny a motion for a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court. J.P. v. G.M., 14 N.E.3d 786, 789 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). No abuse of discretion will be found when the moving party has not shown that he was prejudiced by the denial. Id. at 790.

[7] On March 5, 2026, six days before the scheduled March 11, 2026 hearing, Father filed a Motion for Continuance stating, “[t]he reason for this request is to obtaining [sic] counsel which I had representation then a couple days later I received a phone call that they were unable to represent me,” “I have an appointment with a new lawyer on 03/09/2026,” and “on 02/17/2026 I under went [sic] surgery for the replacement of a disk in my neck and currently I am on bed rest for 4 to 6 weeks.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 65. Mother filed an objection stating that Father did not retain counsel for seven months and that she had no objection to Father appearing by Zoom. Father filed his motions to modify parenting time and child support on September 2, 2025, and did not obtain counsel prior to his February operation. Moreover, Father does not identify any evidence or argument which he was prevented from presenting, and the record demonstrates that Father presented evidence, testified at length, and cross-examined Mother. We cannot say the court abused its discretion in denying Father's Motion for Continuance or that he was prejudiced by the denial.

B. Parenting Time

[8] Father argues the court abused its discretion in awarding him three weeks of summer parenting time and requiring him to pay the associated travel expenses. We review parenting time decisions for an abuse of discretion. Perkinson v. Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ind. 2013). We will not substitute our own judgment if any evidence or legitimate inferences support the trial court's judgment. Id.

[9] Section III of the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines states, “[w]here there is a significant geographical distance between the parents, scheduling parenting time is fact sensitive and requires consideration of many factors which include: employment schedules, the costs and time of travel, the financial situation of each parent, the frequency of the parenting time and others.” The Commentary provides, “[w]hen distance is a major factor, the following parenting time schedule may be helpful: ․ (C) For a child 5 years of age and older who attends a school with a traditional school calendar, seven (7) weeks of the school summer vacation period and seven (7) days of the school winter vacation plus the entire spring break, including both weekends if applicable.” “In exercising parenting time with a teenager, the noncustodial parent shall make reasonable efforts to accommodate a teenager's participation in his or her regular academic, extra-curricular and social activities.” Parenting Time Guidelines, Section II(E)(2).

[10] Here, the trial court awarded Father summer parenting time of three weeks during the summer recess as well as parenting time for all of spring and fall break including both weekends, half of Christmas break, and with notice anytime Father is in central Indiana. Mother testified that Father exercised only sixty-four overnights in 2024 and forty-nine overnights in 2025. She testified, with respect to the summer of 2025, she and Father had agreed that A.D. would attend church camp for one week and would play softball, she paid the fees for these activities up front, Father later wanted to change their agreement, and she did not change A.D.’s plans at the last minute. She testified that softball takes place during the beginning of the summer, the church camp is in June, and she would like Father to exercise his summer parenting time in July. The court fashioned a reasonable award of parenting time under the circumstances.

[11] As for the cost of travel, the Commentary to Ind. Child Support Guideline 6 states, “[w]hen transportation costs are significant, the court may address transportation costs as a deviation from the child support calculated by the Worksheet, or may address transportation as a separate issue from child support” and “[c]onsideration should be given to the reason for the geographic distance between the parties and the financial resources of each party.” The court found Father's weekly gross income to be $1,602 and Mother's weekly gross income to be $1,050. Mother is employed full time. Father's income consists of monthly retirement pay and VA disability benefits. Father relocated to Missouri with his girlfriend and had been paying for the travel costs. We cannot say the court abused its discretion.

C. Support

[12] Father challenges his basic child support obligation and postsecondary educational support obligation. We place a strong emphasis on trial court discretion in determining child support obligations. Lea v. Lea, 691 N.E.2d 1214, 1217 (Ind. 1998). We also review a court's decision to order the payment of postsecondary educational expenses for an abuse of discretion. Hirsch v. Oliver, 970 N.E.2d 651, 662 (Ind. 2012).

1. Basic Child Support

[13] Father claims the court abused its discretion in “applying a one-child subsequent-children multiplier” in calculating his weekly child support obligation. Appellant's Brief at 16. Ind. Child Support Guideline 3(C)(1) provides: “There shall be an adjustment to Weekly Gross Income of parents who have a legal duty or court order to support children (1) born or legally adopted subsequent to the birthdate(s) of the child(ren) subject of the child support order and (2) that parent is actually meeting or paying that obligation.” The Commentary states, “[t]he parent seeking the adjustment has the burden to prove the support is actually paid if the subsequent child does not live in the respective parent's household.” The Commentary also states, “[c]alculate the subsequent child credit by multiplying the parent's Weekly Gross Income by the appropriate factor listed in the table below ․ 1 Subsequent child .065[,] 2 Subsequent children .097[,] 3 Subsequent children .122 ․” Ind. Child Support Guideline 3(C)(2) provides that “[t]he amount(s) of any court order(s) for child support for prior born children shall be deducted from Weekly Gross Income.”

[14] The child support obligation worksheets attached to the trial court's order apply a factor of 0.065, the factor used for one subsequent-born child. At the hearing, Father stated, “I had subsequent child (inaudible).” Transcript Volume II at 8. On cross-examination, Mother's counsel asked, “[y]ou understand that your subsequent children will be accounted for in the Indiana worksheet” and “you'll already be giving [sic] the credit for having a subsequent child,” Father stated, “[w]ell the one subsequent accounted for but step children (inaudible) naturally,” Mother's counsel stated, “stepchildren don't count,” and Father stated, “[y]es.” Id. at 22. Mother's counsel asked, “[s]o, in the her step kids don't count but you will get a credit from your one subject child,” and Father replied, “[t]hat's correct. (inaudible).” Id.

[15] Mother presented two child support worksheets, one for E.D. and A.D. and the other for A.D. when E.D. turned nineteen years old. Mother's counsel stated, “[w]e also did not indicate that he has one subsequent child, so that needs to be changed, correct,” and Mother replied, “[t]hat's correct.” Id. at 38. The court admitted Mother's worksheets.¹ Father later stated, “I do have another subsequent child support payment for my son, [P.],” and “[s]o there's a subsequent child a [Zap.] and they're also.”² Id. at 47. The transcript contains the following exchange:

[Mother's Counsel]: I think he's looking at paragraph one either uh B. He says have a child support order.

[Father]: Correct. B, B or C.

[Mother's Counsel]: Is that child older than [E.D.] and [A.D.]?

[Father]: No.

[Mother's Counsel]: Okay.

[Father]: She's younger.

[Mother's Counsel]: So this is a court order for a prior born?

[Father]: Correct.

[Mother's Counsel]: That's a [ ] subsequently born child Judge and that would not count.

Id. at 48.

[16] Father testified that he has seven natural children. Mother indicated that Father was expecting a baby in the summer of 2025. The court's worksheets apply the factor for one subsequent born child, and the court did not make any findings or statements that it considered all of Father's natural children, prior or subsequent born. Father stated, “I do have another subsequent child support payment for my son, [P.].” Id. at 47. If P. was born before E.D. and A.D., and there is a court order that Father pay child support for P., then Father is entitled to an adjustment on line 1(B) of the child support worksheet. See Ind. Child Support Guideline 3(C)(2). If P. was born after E.D. and A.D., then the worksheet should have applied the appropriate multiplier to calculate the adjustment to Father's gross income on line 1(A) of the worksheet. See Ind. Child Support Guideline 3(C)(1). We reverse and remand for a determination of the adjustments to which Father is entitled and recalculation of his weekly child support obligation.

2. Postsecondary Educational Support

[17] Father asserts the court's educational support order does not comply with Ind. Code § 31-16-6-2, which provides that an educational support order may include amounts for a child's education at a postsecondary educational institution, “taking into account: (A) the child's aptitude and ability; (B) the child's reasonable ability to contribute to educational expenses through: (i) work; (ii) obtaining loans; and (iii) obtaining other sources of financial aid reasonably available to the child and each parent; and (C) the ability of each parent to meet these expenses.”

[18] The court's order directs Father to maintain the military service benefit E.D. receives until the benefit is exhausted, she stops attending college full time, or she graduates.³ The court ordered that “[a]ny college expenses not covered by the military benefit shall be paid 1/3 by [Father], 1/3 by [Mother], and 1/3 by [E.D.],” E.D.’s portion “shall be considered paid by the Chapter 33 and/or Chapter 35 benefit,” and “[t]herefore, as long as [E.D.] receives a military benefit, [Father] and [Mother] are ordered to divide other college expenses equally.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 29. Father testified that, due to his military service, E.D. receives a benefit which pays for her tuition and books and pays her a monthly stipend, and that after that benefit runs out, she will be entitled to a benefit which will pay for one hundred percent of her tuition. The record reveals that E.D. attended Indiana University in Indianapolis, and the parties’ incomes and the sources of their incomes were before the court. While the order indicates that E.D. is responsible for one-third of her college expenses, the order contemplates that E.D.’s portion is satisfied by the military benefit and thus that the parties will equally pay E.D.’s remaining college expenses. As E.D.’s portion is currently covered by Father's military benefit, and it is anticipated that the benefit will continue to cover her portion, we decline at this juncture to reverse for proceedings regarding E.D.’s ability to contribute to her educational expenses through work, loans, or other sources of financial aid. In the event the military benefit becomes unavailable, either party may request a hearing to determine their educational support obligations in light of the statutory factors. Mindful of our deference to trial court judges in domestic relations matters, we find no abuse of discretion.

D. Contempt

[19] Father claims the court abused its discretion in finding him in contempt, arguing the record does not support a “determination of willfulness” and he “believed the garnishment was covering the full ordered amount and that he had never been notified of any shortfall.” Appellant's Brief at 20. To be held in contempt, a party must have willfully disobeyed a court order. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 914 N.E.2d 747, 755 (Ind. 2009). The determination of whether a party is in contempt is a matter left to the discretion of the trial court. Id. We will reverse a trial court's contempt findings only if there is no evidence or inferences drawn therefrom to support them. Id.

[20] The Notice of Arrears filed by the State indicated that Father's arrearage as of January 16, 2019, was $17,559.70, and Father agreed that amount was correct. The court ordered him to pay an additional $42 per week toward his arrearage in its August 20, 2019 and June 2, 2021 orders. The June 2, 2021 order stated that Father “has the obligation to make sure all payments withheld are being received and applied to the correct case” and “[i]f an income withholding order does not withhold the full amount of the child support payment, [Father] is responsible for making up the difference.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 63. Mother introduced a calculation showing that Father's arrearage was $19,952.42 at the time of the March 2026 hearing, demonstrating that his arrearage had continued to increase rather than decrease. Father indicated that he understood that he was ordered to pay $42 per week toward his arrearage in addition to his weekly child support payment. Based on the record, the trial court could reasonably infer that Father's failure to satisfy his $42 weekly arrearage obligation over an extended period despite his income was willful rather than an isolated oversight. We find no abuse of discretion.

E. Attorney Fees

[21] Finally, Father contends the court's attorney fee award exceeded the scope of the contempt proceeding and the court failed to consider the parties’ relative financial resources. A trial court may periodically order a party to a child support proceeding to pay a reasonable amount for attorney fees. Ind. Code § 31-16-11-1. In assessing attorney fees, the court may consider such factors as the resources of the parties, the relative earning ability of the parties, and other factors that bear on the reasonableness of the award. McGuire v. McGuire, 880 N.E.2d 297, 303 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). A trial court has broad discretion to impose attorney fees on either parent. Thompson v. Thompson, 868 N.E.2d 862, 870 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). The court may also consider any misconduct on the part of either of the parties that creates additional legal expenses not otherwise anticipated. Id. The record reveals the parties’ incomes, the sources of their incomes, and the extent of Father's nonpayment of his support obligations over time. The court found that, due to Father's failure to pay child support, Mother was forced to retain counsel to enforce the court's order. Based on the record, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees.

[22] For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for a recalculation of Father's weekly child support obligation as discussed above, and we otherwise affirm the trial court's order.

[23] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The numeral “1” was handwritten on the line for “Subsequent Children Multiplier Credit” on the worksheets. Exhibits Volume III at 49, 54.

2.   Father's Motion for Modification of Child Support states: “Subsequent child born June 13th, 2025 (petitioner biological) [Zay.].” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 43.

3.   To the extent Father argues the trial court's order eliminated his “right to modify or revoke at any time any unused portion of a transferred entitlement,” Appellant's Brief at 19 (internal quotations omitted), Father did not raise the argument before the trial court and in fact expressly agreed E.D. would receive his benefit to cover the cost of her education.

Brown, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur