IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationships of: A.B. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] S.G. (“Mother”) and K.B., Sr. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) separately appeal the involuntary termination of their parental rights to their respective children. Father contends the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that the conditions leading to A.B. and K.A.B.’s removal would not be remedied. Mother makes that same argument regarding her three children – A.B., K.A.B., and A.G. (collectively, “Children”) – and she also asserts the evidence does not support certain findings regarding her participation in services and the trial court's findings do not support the conclusion that termination is in the best interests of Children. Because evidence supports the trial court's findings, which in turn support its conclusions, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother is the biological mother of A.B., born in January 2018; K.A.B., born in May 2020; and A.G.,¹ born in July 2022. Father is the biological father of A.B. and K.A.B. In May 2024, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) became involved with the family after a report of domestic violence between Parents and physical abuse of K.A.B. After an investigation, DCS filed a petition alleging Children were Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”) and the trial court subsequently adjudicated Children as such. DCS removed Children from Parents’ care and placed them in kinship and foster placement, where they have remained throughout the proceedings.

[3] The trial court entered a dispositional decree ordering Mother to participate in services including a diagnostic assessment, home-based casework, and domestic violence counseling through the Center for Nonviolence. The trial court also ordered Mother to cooperate with all orders in any criminal case. In the same order, the trial court also required Father to complete counseling through the Center for Nonviolence, submit to drug screens, and abide by all no-contact and protection orders. In October 2024, Mother entered a pretrial diversion program related to charges stemming from the May 2024 incident that prompted DCS intervention.

[4] Parents did not consistently participate in services. In June 2025, DCS filed its petition to terminate Mother's parental rights to Children and to terminate Father's parental rights to A.B. and K.A.B. The trial court held fact-finding hearings on October 27 and 29, 2025. It entered its written order on January 5, 2026, terminating Mother's parental rights to Children and Father's parental rights to A.B. and K.A.B.

Discussion and Decision

[5] To terminate a parent-children relationship, DCS must prove one or more of the circumstances in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) (2024). Those circumstances include a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in the children's removal or continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3) (2024), and a reasonable probability that continuation of the parent-children relationship poses a threat to the children's well-being, Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(4) (2024). In addition, DCS must prove that there is a satisfactory plan for the children's care and treatment, and that termination is in the children's best interests. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(3) (2024).

[6] When reviewing the trial court's decision, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the judgment. In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1043 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. Where, as here, the trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we apply a two-tiered standard of review: we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and whether the findings support the judgment, and we will set the judgment aside only if it is clearly erroneous. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). We accept unchallenged findings as true. Henderson v. Henderson, 139 N.E.3d 227, 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

Father's Argument

[7] Father argues the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion under Section 31-35-2-4(d)(3) (2024) that the conditions under which A.B. and K.A.B. were removed from his care would not be remedied. However, the trial court also concluded under Section 31-35-2-4(d)(4) (2024) that the continuation of the father-children relationship posed a threat to A.B. and K.A.B.’s well-being, and Father does not challenge that conclusion. DCS needed to prove only one of these conclusions. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d) (2024) (petition “must allege one (1) or more of the following circumstances”). Father's failure to challenge the trial court's conclusion regarding “threat” means that we accept that conclusion as true. See In re J.T., 742 N.E.2d 509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (satisfaction of either “removal” or “threat” requirement needed to terminate parental rights and, on appeal, we accept the unchallenged conclusion as true), trans. denied. Because that unchallenged conclusion is all that we need to support the trial court's judgment, we need not address Father's argument that the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that the conditions under which A.B. and K.A.B. were removed from his care would not be remedied. See In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d at 1047 n.3 (when appellate court has determined evidence and findings support one ground for termination under Section 31-35-2-4(d), it need not consider arguments under other subsections of Section 31-35-2-4(d)). Father has not demonstrated error by the trial court.

Mother's Arguments

1. Conditions Would Not Be Remedied

[8] Like Father, Mother argues the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that the conditions under which Children were removed from her care would not be remedied. However, as with Father, the trial court also concluded that the continuation of the mother-children relationship posed a threat to Children's well-being, and Mother failed to support a challenge regarding that element with cogent argument. As noted above, DCS need only prove one of these conclusions. Thus, Mother's argument that the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that the conditions under which Children were removed from her care would not be remedied is not dispositive and need not be addressed. See id. (when appellate court can affirm on one statutory ground it need not conduct analysis under other statutory grounds).

2. Children's Best Interests

[9] Mother asserts the evidence does not support the trial court's findings and conclusion that termination of her parental rights was in Children's best interests because she was close to completing the services needed for reunification with Children. In determining children's best interests, the trial court looks to the totality of the evidence, subordinates the parents’ interests to those of the children, and need not wait until children are irreversibly harmed. Z.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 108 N.E.3d 895, 903 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. Additionally, the recommendations of service providers may support a finding that termination is in children's best interests. Id.

[10] First, Mother challenges ten of the trial court's findings regarding her participation in services. In its dispositional order, the trial court ordered Mother to participate in services including a diagnostic assessment, home-based casework, and domestic violence counseling through the Center for Nonviolence, and to cooperate with all orders in any criminal case. Mother's diversion program required her to complete parenting classes. All but one challenged finding concerns Mother's participation and completion of parenting skills services. The remaining finding concerns Mother's participation in domestic violence prevention services.

[11] The record supports the trial court's findings. The guardian ad litem related that Mother had not completed a parenting course, that her pretrial diversion agreement required her to complete a parenting course, and that Mother declined the parenting services DCS offered. Bowen Health employee Amy McAfee told the trial court that Bowen Health did not offer structured parenting curriculum, and Mother's home-based goals addressed housing and employment rather than parenting. Mother also contends that her participation in services at the Center for Nonviolence should count as her parenting class. However, the Center for Nonviolence was a domestic-violence program distinct from the parenting requirement, and Mother had completed only two-thirds of the domestic violence prevention sessions at the time of the hearing. Mother's arguments are invitations to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d at 1047 (appellate court will not reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses).

[12] Having determined that the evidence supports the trial court's findings, we turn to Mother's argument that the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that termination of her parental rights to Children was in Children's best interests. Children had been removed from Mother's care for approximately seventeen months without Mother progressing beyond short, supervised visits; the guardian ad litem recommended termination and adoption; and the trial court found a satisfactory plan of adoption. Mother did not complete services that the trial court ordered. The findings support the conclusion that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Children's best interests.

Conclusion

[13] We need not address Father's argument that the conditions under which A.B. and K.A.B. were removed from his care would not be remedied or Mother's argument regarding her failure to remedy the conditions under which Children were removed from her care. As to Mother's challenge to the trial court's conclusion that termination of her parental rights was in Children's best interests, we conclude the evidence supports the trial court's findings and those findings support its conclusion. We therefore affirm.

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   A.G.’s father is unknown.

May, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Scheele, J., concur.