Jeff Henderson, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In September of 2025, Jeff Henderson was convicted of Level 2 felony dealing in cocaine, Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine, and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. Henderson was also found to be a habitual offender. On January 22, 2026, the trial court sentenced Henderson to an aggregate, forty-two-year sentence. Henderson contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for Level 2 felony dealing in cocaine. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On November 17, 2023, Hammond Police Officer Keon Parker received a call from the local Motel 6 “for a removal of a patron.” Tr. Vol. II p. 143. Upon arriving at the Motel 6, Officer Parker learned that the patron at issue was Henderson and that he had threatened motel staff. When Officer Parker approached Henderson's room and announced himself as a police officer, Henderson answered the door and identified himself. Officer Parker's partner, Corporal Christopher Doughty, discovered that there was an active warrant for Henderson's arrest. Henderson, who had been in a state of undress, requested permission to put on more clothing before being arrested, a request that Officer Parker and Corporal Doughty granted.

[3] Officer Parker stood in the doorway of Henderson's hotel room to “keep [Henderson] in [his] sight” due to officer-safety concerns. Tr. Vol. II p. 148. Officer Parker observed that Henderson became “visibly uncomfortable.” Tr. Vol. II p. 150. Henderson had “a thousand-yard stare” and positioned his body in a manner that made Officer Parker believe that he was attempting to conceal something. Tr. Vol. II p. 151. Officer Parker decided to “close the distance” between himself and Henderson and “angled [himself] a little bit into the room[,]” at which time he could “clearly see that [Henderson] was hiding something.” Tr. Vol. II p. 151.

[4] Officer Parker observed “a substantial amount of, like, clear baggies.” Tr. Vol. II p. 152. Officer Parker described the baggies as “the little corners of the baggies ․ enough to put rock-like objects at the corners of them and then just break them off the corners of the bag.” Tr. Vol. II p. 161. The “baggies” contained either “a white powdery substance” or a “rock-like substance[ ].” Tr. Vol. II p. 161. Based on Officer Parker's training and experience, he believed the baggies to contain “some type of narcotic.” Tr. Vol. II p. 161.

[5] Henderson “grab[bed] a handful of the substances and tr[ied] to put it to his mouth.” Tr. Vol. II p. 152. Officer Parker instructed Henderson to stop and to “[p]ut your hands down. Keep them to the side.” Tr. Vol. II p. 153. Officer Parker attempted to grab Henderson by the wrists, but Henderson, who was “significantly taller” and “much bigger” than Officer Parker, resisted and struggled for “a minute or two[.]” Tr. Vol. II pp. 153, 180, 155. Eventually Corporal Doughty announced that “he was going to deploy his taser,” which led Officer Parker “to briefly let go and back away so that the taser would be [e]ffective.” Tr. Vol. II p. 155. After Corporal Doughty deployed his taser, Henderson “fell to the ground[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 156.

[6] Even after falling to the ground, Henderson continued to try to put the baggies in his mouth. Officer Parker took steps to prevent Henderson from ingesting the baggies. He and Corporal Doughty were eventually able to secure Henderson in handcuffs, after which Officer Parker “ma[d]e sure everything was cool with” Henderson before going “outside of the hotel room to catch [his] breath.” Tr. Vol. II p. 158.

[7] After securing a search warrant, Detective Sergeant David Hornyak searched Henderson's motel room, describing it as “a mess.” Tr. Vol. III p. 25. During the search of the room, Detective Sergeant Hornyak found the following items, which, in his experience and training, were indicative of drug dealing and use: narcotics in baggies; empty baggies; a possible cutting agent; a scale; a crack pipe; a dollar bill; a razor blade; tinfoil with what appeared to be black, burnt drug residue; and $75.00 in cash. The dollar bill appeared to have been used to consume or package drugs, and the razor blade was significant because a razor blade “is used to package drugs to separate it and also to mix in cutting agents into the drugs.” Tr. Vol. III p. 31.

[8] Detective Sergeant Hornyak secured seven bags of suspected narcotics from Henderson's room. While one bag contained something other than a controlled substance and the contents of another bag were not tested, the remaining bags contained the following: one bag contained “1.78 grams” of cocaine, two bags contained a combined total of “5.79 grams” of cocaine, one bag contained “0.65 gram[s]” of cocaine, and one bag contained “0.27 gram[s]” of methamphetamine and a cutting agent. Ex. Vol. pp. 29, 30. The total weight of cocaine examined from the bags was “8.22 grams.” Tr. Vol. II p. 218.

[9] Detective Sergeant Hornyak testified that the street value “for about [eight] grams of cocaine” would be “[a]round $750, $800.” Tr. Vol. III p. 16. Detective Sergeant Hornyak further testified that, in his experience, an average drug user would not stockpile a large amount of drugs or be able to come up with that much money to make a purchase and that the “general pricing” for a gram of cocaine was “around $100.” Tr. Vol. III p. 16. Detective Sergeant Hornyak indicated that generally, a drug user would possess only enough of the drug for personal use, which he estimated to be approximately one gram. Additionally, during the course of law enforcement's investigation, Detective Sergeant Hornyak discovered that Henderson had previously been convicted of possessing a controlled substance with the intent to deliver in Illinois.

[10] On November 18, 2023, Henderson was charged with Level 2 felony dealing in cocaine, Level 5 felony dealing in methamphetamine, and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. Following multiple amendments to the charging information, on December 5, 2025, Henderson was charged with Level 2 felony dealing in cocaine, Level 3 felony dealing in cocaine, Level 4 felony possession of cocaine, Level 4 felony dealing in methamphetamine, Level 5 felony possession of cocaine, Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine, and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. Henderson was also alleged to be a habitual offender.

[11] Following a jury trial, Henderson was found not guilty of Level 4 felony dealing in methamphetamine but guilty of the remaining charges. Henderson subsequently admitted to being a habitual offender. The trial court entered judgments on conviction for Level 2 felony dealing in cocaine, Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine, and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement and found Henderson to be a habitual offender and sentenced him to an aggregate, forty-two-year term of incarceration.

Discussion and Decision

[12] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure, when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, they must consider it most favorably to the trial court's ruling. Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.

Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146–47 (Ind. 2007) (internal brackets, citations, emphasis, and quotations omitted). Stated differently, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the convictions, neither reweighing evidence nor reassessing witness credibility” and “affirm the judgment unless no reasonable factfinder could find the defendant guilty.” Griffith v. State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 958 (Ind. 2016).

[13] Henderson contends that the State produced insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for Level 2 felony dealing in cocaine. Indiana Code section 35-48-4-1(a)(2) provides that a person who possesses, with the intent to deliver cocaine commits dealing in cocaine.

A person may be convicted of an offense under subsection (a)(2) only if: (1) there is evidence in addition to the weight of the drug that the person intended to manufacture, finance the manufacture of, deliver, or finance the delivery of the drug; or (2) the amount of the drug involved is at least twenty-eight (28) grams.

Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(b). “The offense is a Level 2 felony if: ․ (2) the amount of the drug involved is at least five (5) grams but less than ten (10) grams and an enhancing circumstance applies[.]” Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(e). Relevant to this case, “a prior conviction for dealing in a controlled substance that is not marijuana, hashish, hash oil, or salvia divinorum” qualifies as an “[e]nhancing circumstance.” Ind. Code § 35-48-1-16.5 (2020).¹

[14] In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction for Level 2 felony dealing in cocaine, Henderson does not dispute that an enhancing circumstance applied, and the record reveals that he had a prior conviction from Illinois for possession of a qualifying controlled substance with the intent to deliver. Henderson merely argues that the State failed to prove that he possessed the cocaine with the intent to deliver, rather than for personal use. We disagree.

[15] “Intent, being a mental state, can only be established by considering the behavior of the relevant actor, the surrounding circumstances, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Richardson v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1222, 1227 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. “An intent to deliver may be demonstrated by either direct or circumstantial evidence.” Elvers v. State, 22 N.E.3d 824, 835 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “Circumstantial evidence of intent to deliver, such as possession of a large quantity of drugs, large amounts of currency, scales, plastic bags, and other paraphernalia as well as evidence of other drug transactions, can support a conviction” for dealing in cocaine. McGuire v. State, 613 N.E.2d 861, 864 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), trans. denied. “Intent involves a person's state of mind, and a factfinder may infer its existence from the surrounding circumstances.” Wilson v. State, 966 N.E.2d 1259, 1266 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. “Additionally, we reiterate that we may not substitute our own judgment for that of the jury” when it comes to the question of intent. Richardson, 856 N.E.2d at 1227–28.

[16] In this case, Henderson possessed over eight grams of cocaine, scales, plastic bags, a razor blade, a cutting agent, $75.00 in cash, and other drug paraphernalia. The cocaine was divided into four plastic bags, with one bag containing 0.65 grams of cocaine, another containing 1.78 grams of cocaine, and the other two bags containing a combined 5.79 grams of cocaine. Detective Sergeant Hornyak testified that the street value for eight grams of cocaine would be approximately $750.00 to $800.00 dollars and, in his experience, average drug users would not be able to accumulate the funds necessary to purchase or stockpile that amount of cocaine. He further testified that, in his experience, a typical drug user would usually possess approximately a gram of cocaine, which is valued at approximately $100.00, for personal use. In finding Henderson guilty, the jury found that this evidence supported a reasonable inference that Henderson had possessed the cocaine with the intent to deliver. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury in this regard. Id. at 1227–28.

[17] In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction, Henderson points to Detective Sergeant Hornyak's acknowledgement that it was hypothetically reasonable that someone could possess eight grams of cocaine for personal use. Henderson also asserts that his use of a razor blade and the scale could reasonably be connected to personal use rather than to an intent to deal. Henderson claims that “[t]aken as a whole, the evidence here falls well short of” evidence that is sufficient to prove an intent to deal but rather merely proved possession for personal use. Appellant's Br. p. 12. The jury, however, found otherwise. Henderson's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence effectively amounts to nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Griffith, 59 N.E.3d at 958.

[18] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At the time that Henderson committed the charged conduct, the list of enhancing circumstances was found at Indiana Code section 35-48-1-16.5. After recent amendments to Indiana's criminal code, it is now found at Indiana Code section 35-48-1.1-18.

Bradford, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.