Todd D. Johnston, Appellant-Petitioner v. Belynda K. Johnston, Appellee-Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Approximately three years after marrying Belynda Johnston (“Wife”), Todd Johnston (“Husband”) filed a petition to dissolve their marriage. The trial court dissolved the marriage, divided the marital estate equally, ordered Husband to pay an equalization judgment, and imposed interest on Husband's payment of that judgment. Husband now appeals and presents three issues for our review, which we revise and restate as the following two issues:

1. Whether the trial court clearly erred in dividing the marital estate; and

2. Whether the trial court erred by imposing interest on the equalization judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In 2013, Husband and Wife began living together; in 2021, they married, and they lived together in Avon, Indiana. Prior to the marriage, Husband started his own specialty product label business—Law Label Services, LLC (the “Business”)—of which he is the sole employee. During the marriage, Wife did not work, but she received disability retirement. In 2024, Husband filed a petition to dissolve the parties’ marriage.

[4] In November 2025, following a four-day evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Dissolution (the “Decree”). The trial court made the following relevant findings and conclusions:

14. Husband owns 100% of [the Business] ․

15․ Husband started the business in 2006 and grew it to a point of his full-time job. His knowledge and skill necessary to operate the business cannot be sold․

16. In 2024, [the Business] generated approximately $1.54 million dollars in gross income. Husband expects that to slightly increase in 2025.

17. Husband's present weekly gross income is approximately $6,611.00 and he does not expect that to change.

* * *

19. Wife's contributions to the business were de minimis ․

* * *

26. In July 2013, the parties began cohabitating.

27. Shortly after they began cohabitating, Husband added Wife as an authorized user on his credit cards and insisted that she utilize the credit cards for the payment of household expenses and personal expenses, including groceries, cleaning supplies, etc.

Appellant's App. Vol. II at 53–54.

122. Wife reported weekly gross income of $577.43 on her financial declaration form (Exhibit 43, 44).

123. Wife has not searched for any form of work since 2013, even after the filing of this divorce. According to Wife, there are no jobs she can manage under any circumstances. Wife will not voluntarily work again.

Id. at 67.

130. The Court did not find Wife's testimony that there are no jobs she could manage under any circumstances to be credible.

Id. at 68.

144. The Court finds the value of [the Business] to be $483,000.00 as of the date of filing.

145. Both Husband and Wife brought assets into the marriage.

146. On the date of marriage, Husband owned the following assets:

a. 7814 East C. R. 200 North, Avon, Indiana, with mortgage.

b. Hilton Grand time share.

c. Fidelity/Nationwide 401(k) and retirement savings plan.

d. Nationwide annuity from his deceased wife.

e. Mass Mutual Whole Life insurance policy-payments continued during the parties’ marriage.

f. 2006 GMC truck, a 1999 BMW M class, Suretrac car hauler, Haul mark car trailer.

g. Cryptocurrency purchased a few weeks before

. h. Law Label Services, LLC.

i. His personal effects.

Id. at 69–70.

171. Husband's income and earning capacity, historically and currently, are far superior to Wife's income and earning capacity

․

172. Husband's assets, historically and currently, are also far superior to Wife's assets.

173. After the Decree is entered, Wife will have to relocate and secure a new home. Husband will remain in the marital residence with equity of over $350,000.00.

Id. at 73–74.

[5] The trial court valued the marital estate at $1,684,645.09, divided the marital estate equally, and ordered Husband to pay Wife an equalization judgment of $411,771.48, payable at $4,000.00 every six weeks with interest accruing at 8% per annum until satisfied in full. Husband now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

1. The Trial Court Did Not Clearly Err in Dividing the Marital Estate

[6] Husband contends the trial court erred when dividing the marital estate. We ordinarily review the trial court's division of marital property for an abuse of discretion. Roetter v. Roetter, 182 N.E.3d 221, 225 (Ind. 2022) (citing Luttrell v. Luttrell, 994 N.E.2d 298, 304–05 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied). Here, however, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law at Wife's request, so we will set aside the trial court's decision on those issues only if it is clearly erroneous. Roetter, 182 N.E.3d at 225 (quoting Dunson v. Dunson, 769 N.E.2d 1120, 1123 (Ind. 2002)). A decision is clearly erroneous “if the findings lack factual support in the record or if the judgment applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.” Norris v. Norris, 275 N.E.3d 505, 509 (Ind. 2026) (citing Wysocki v. Johnson, 18 N.E.3d 600, 603–04 (Ind. 2014)). We will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, id. (citing Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123 (Ind. 2016)), and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision, In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019) (citing In re K.E., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015)). For issues not covered by the findings, we apply our general judgment standard, meaning we “should affirm based on any legal theory supported by the evidence.” State ex rel. Dep't Nat. Res. v. Leonard, 226 N.E.3d 198, 202 (Ind. 2024) (citing Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 123–24; Ind. Trial Rule 52(D)).

[7] The division of marital property requires a two-step process. Roetter, 182 N.E.3d at 226. “First, the trial court must identify the property to include in the marital estate.” Id. at 226–27 (citing O'Connell v. O'Connell, 889 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)). The marital estate includes “both assets and liabilities and encompasses ‘all marital property,’ whether acquired by a spouse before the marriage or during the marriage or procured by the parties jointly.” Roetter, 182 N.E.3d at 227 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Eads v. Eads, 114 N.E.3d 868, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)). Second, the trial court “must then distribute the property in a ‘just and reasonable’ manner.” Id. at 227 (quoting O'Connell, 889 N.E.2d at 10–11).

[8] The trial court begins with a presumption that an equal division of marital property is the just and reasonable result. Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5. When a party seeks to rebut this presumption, the party must present evidence “that an equal division would not be just and reasonable,” including evidence of (1) each spouse's contribution to the acquisition of the property, (2) “[t]he extent to which the property was acquired” before marriage or through inheritance, (3) each spouse's “economic circumstances” at dissolution, and (4) each spouse's earning abilities (collectively, the “Rebuttal Factors”). Id. “This statutory list is nonexclusive, and no single factor controls the division of property.” Roetter, 182 N.E.3d at 227 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).

[9] Husband does not challenge any of the trial court's findings, so we take those findings as true. See R.M. v. Ind. Dep't Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)). Husband instead contends that the trial court ignored its findings and “relied on the cohabitation period as the primary basis for its property division.” Appellant's Br. at 19. Essentially, Husband challenges the trial court's conclusion that he failed to rebut the presumption of an equal division of the marital estate.¹ In making this argument, Husband “must overcome a strong presumption that the court considered and complied with the applicable statute.” Roetter, 182 N.E.3d at 227 (quoting Wanner v. Hutchcroft, 888 N.E.2d 260, 263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)).

[10] “In dividing marital property, a trial court must consider all of the statutory factors regarding reasonableness, but ‘it is not required to explicitly address all of the factors in every case.’ ” Israel v. Israel, 189 N.E.3d 170, 176 (Ind. Ct. App.) (quoting Rose v. Bozeman, 113 N.E.3d 1232, 1235 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)), trans. denied, 199 N.E.3d 789 (Ind. 2022). After valuing the marital estate and acknowledging Indiana's presumptive equal division of marital property, the trial court considered whether either party met its burden of rebutting that presumption:

189. The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of property weighs in Husband's favor. Husband was the primary earner and contributor to the parties’ income and assets throughout the cohabitation and marriage.

190. Husband brought significantly more assets into the marriage.

* * *

192. Husband's earning ability and economic circumstances far exceed those of Wife. Wife is not currently employed and based upon the denial of her request for incapacity maintenance she will have to seek gainful employment. After the Decree, Husband has a home, whereas Wife will have to establish a residence. This weighs in Wife's favor.

193. Neither side rebutted the presumption of an equal division of the marital estate. While this was a short-term marriage, the period of cohabitation prior to marriage was not. The parties cohabitated continuously without interruption from 2013 until the date of marriage. In 2014 the parties engaged in estate planning leaving their individual estates to the other. Wife also contributed $30,000.00 from her great uncle's inheritance in 2014. The parties purchased two (2) undeveloped lots in 2018 that were jointly titled. In 2019, Husband added Wife's name to the title of the marital residence as a joint tenant with a right of survivorship.

Appellant's App. Vol. II at 77.

[11] We cannot agree with Husband's characterization of these findings and conclusions—i.e., that the trial court “relied on the cohabitation period as the primary basis” for adhering to the presumptive equal split. Appellant's Br. at 19. Based upon the plain language of the Decree, the trial court considered the Rebuttal Factors, weighed them, and determined that an equal split was just and reasonable. Thus, Husband has not overcome the strong presumption that the trial court properly considered and complied with the division of property statute. See Roetter, 182 N.E.3d at 227.

[12] To the extent that the trial court also considered the parties’ lengthy cohabitation period, this is “relevant evidence” bearing on property division especially when, as here, the marriage was short-lived. See I.C. § 31-15-7-5; see also Roetter, 182 N.E.3d at 227 (explaining the Rebuttal Factors are nonexclusive); Hendricks v. Hendricks, 784 N.E.2d 1024, 1027 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding the trial court did not err by considering one party's contributions during the cohabitation period preceding the marriage when dividing the marital pot). Here, the parties purchased real property and jointly owned a home prior to their marriage. In cases such as this where there is a lengthy cohabitation period followed by a brief marriage, the cohabitation period is particularly relevant to the consideration of the property acquired before marriage. See Hendricks, 784 N.E.2d at 1027 (concluding trial court did not err by considering cohabitation period when dividing the marital pot after considering parties started a business together during cohabitation period); cf. Glasgo v. Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d 1325 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (affirming trial court's judgment in favor of one cohabiting partner after considering that she contributed to the construction of a home on the other partner's land).

[13] Husband makes much ado about the need for the trial court to have included specific findings regarding Wife's cohabitation contributions before it could consider the parties’ cohabitation in the property division context. See Appellant's Br. at 21–29. The Decree includes such findings. For instance, Wife was working when she and Husband began dating, but Husband was not; Wife used her annuity payments to pay for shared household items; Wife used her lump-sum Social Security payment for household expenses and to pay off one of Husband's credit cards; Wife shopped for groceries, planned meals, cooked, and cleaned. Husband has not demonstrated that the trial court's equal division of the marital estate was unjust or unreasonable. See I.C. § 31-15-7-5. The trial court adhered to the presumptive equal split and did not clearly err in doing so.

2. The Trial Court Did Not Err By Imposing Interest on the Equalization Judgment

[14] Husband also argues that the trial court erred by imposing annual interest of 8% on the equalization judgment because the trial court did not enter specific findings addressing interest. Indiana Code section 24-4.6-1-101 permits a trial court to impose an annual interest rate of 8% on money judgments. In the dissolution context, the imposition of interest is “wholly within the discretion of the trial court,” Cohen v. Cohen, 120 N.E.3d 1083, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied, and “[w]e presume on appeal that ․ ‘trial courts are aware of the time value of money and take it into consideration when dividing property and deciding whether interest should be awarded,’ ” id. at 1086 (quoting In re Marriage of Merrill, 455 N.E.2d 1176, 1177–78 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983)).

[15] Here, the trial court divided the marital estate equally but awarded the majority of the property to Husband and ordered him to pay an equalization judgment to Wife. The trial court permitted Husband to make installment payments to Wife on the equalization judgment until it is satisfied. Although the trial court imposed annual interest on Husband's payment of the equalization judgment, Husband may avoid the accrual of interest by paying off the debt early. The imposition of interest was nothing more than a mechanism to encourage Husband to satisfy his obligation to make the equalization payment. See Rovai v. Rovai, 912 N.E.2d 374, 375 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Poehlman v. Feferman, 717 N.E.2d 578, 583 (Ind. 1999)) (observing that post-judgment interest incentivizes “judgment debtors to satisfy expeditiously their debt obligations to avoid this accrual of interest”). Husband's citations to cases wherein a trial court failed to enter specific findings on material issues (such as rehabilitative maintenance) are unavailing. See, e.g., Appellant's Br. at 38 (citing Justus v. Justus, 581 N.E.2d 1265 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)). For the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not err by imposing interest on the equalization judgment.

Conclusion

[16] In sum, the trial court did not clearly err in dividing the marital estate and did not err by imposing interest on the equalization judgment. We therefore affirm the trial court on all issues raised.

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Husband appears to argue that the trial court further erred by not applying the Rebuttal Factors to each discrete asset. See Appellant's Br. at 31 (arguing the findings “favor deviation ․ with respect to the business”), 34 (arguing the same with respect to “three Nationwide-related assets”); see also Appellant's Reply Br. at 10–12 (noting Husband's arguments are “asset-specific”). In making this argument, Husband ignores our established two-step process to the division of marital property. See supra ¶ 7.

Felix, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.