Centrell Lanier, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In February 2017, pursuant to a guilty plea, Centrell Lanier was convicted of Class B felony conspiracy to commit robbery resulting in serious bodily injury. He later appealed the sentencing order, alleging he was erroneously denied credit time for pretrial confinement served on wholly unrelated offenses. We affirmed.

[2] Since then, Lanier has filed numerous motions reasserting errors in his sentence or credit time calculation. Lanier now appeals the court's denial of his most recent motion: a motion for relief pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(2). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] This is the second time this case has come before our court. As we explained in Lanier's direct appeal:

On July 20, 2009, the State charged Lanier with conspiracy to commit robbery, a Class B felony. At the time, Lanier was incarcerated in Illinois serving an executed sentence on an unrelated weapons charge. At some point on or after July 20, 2009, Lanier was served with a warrant for the Indiana charge. On July 23, 2009, Lanier signed a waiver of extradition.

In January 2010, while still incarcerated in Illinois, Lanier was charged with murder in Illinois. In December 2010, he was discharged from the Illinois sentence on his weapons conviction, but he remained in Illinois custody pending the trial on the murder charge.

On September 13, 2011, the State filed an amended information, charging Lanier with three counts of felony murder, one count of Class A felony robbery, three counts of Class B felony criminal confinement, and one count of Class B felony conspiracy to commit robbery.

On April 21, 2016, Lanier was acquitted of murder in Illinois. He was turned over to Indiana on May 16, 2016, on the pending charges. On February 1, 2017, the State filed an additional count of Class B felony conspiracy to commit robbery resulting in serious bodily injury. The following day, Lanier pleaded guilty to one count of Class B felony conspiracy to commit robbery resulting in serious bodily injury in exchange for the dismissal of the other charges. The trial court sentenced Lanier to twenty-five years incarceration pursuant to the plea agreement.

On July 21, 2017, after a sentencing hearing, the trial court credited Lanier with 287 days for time served, beginning on the date of his acquittal of the Illinois murder charge, April 21, 2016, and ending on the date he pleaded guilty in Indiana, February 2, 2017.

Lanier v. State, No. 49A02-1708-CR-1794, 2018 WL 1124448, at *1 (Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2018) (mem.) (footnote omitted), trans. denied, (Lanier I).

[4] On appeal, Lanier argued that “the trial court erred by awarding him credit time dating back only to April 21, 2016, totaling 287 days” and that he was “entitled to credit time beginning on July 23, 2009, the date on which he waived extradition to Indiana, totaling 2,757 days.” Id. Observing our prior interpretation of Indiana Code section 35-50-6-3, we reiterated as follows:

Although IC 35-50-6-3 states that a defendant is allowed credit for time ‘confined awaiting trial or sentencing,’ we conclude the Legislature clearly intended the credit to apply only to the sentence for the offense for which the presentence time was served. Any other result would allow credit time for time served on wholly unrelated offenses.

Id. at *2 (quoting Maciaszek v. State, 75 N.E.3d 1089, 1093 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Dolan v. State, 420 N.E.2d 1364, 1373 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981)), trans. denied). Finding that Lanier was not being held on the Indiana charges until he was acquitted of murder on April 21, 2016, we concluded the trial court did not err in calculating Lanier's 287 days of credit time. Id. Our Supreme Court denied transfer.

[5] Between March 2023 and December 2024, Lanier filed two petitions for jail time credit, a motion for jail time credit, a motion to correct sentence, and a motion for relief from judgment, all of which were denied by the trial court. In December 2025, he filed a verified motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(2), alleging that he discovered an error in the presentence investigation report. However, his arguments were based on the same period discussed in Lanier I, and he requested that the court relieve him from the prior sentencing order and grant him 2,757 days of credit time. The court denied his motion for relief from judgment and his subsequent motion to correct error. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[6] We first note Lanier proceeds in this matter pro se. “It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). “This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Id. at 983-84. “A litigant is not given special consideration by virtue of his pro se status.” Kelley v. State, 166 N.E.3d 936, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).

[7] Below, Lanier asserted he was entitled to relief from judgment under Trial Rule 60(B)(2). On appeal, Lanier wholly fails to acknowledge this procedural posture, let alone provide the applicable standard of review. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(b). He also fails to provide citations to the record throughout his brief. See App. R. 46(A)(6), (8)(a). His failure to comply with our appellate rules arguably results in waiver of his argument. See Burnell v. State, 110 N.E.3d 1167, 1171 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (appellate court will not review undeveloped arguments or make up an argument for a party). Nevertheless, we exercise our discretion under Appellate Rule 1 to deviate from the rules and proceed to the merits. We conclude that Lanier's claim is barred by res judicata and the law of the case.¹

[8] In his motion for relief from judgment, Lanier requested 2,757 days of credit for his pretrial incarceration from July 23, 2009, to February 2, 2017. In his opening brief, Lanier now asserts that he is entitled to credit time from the date he pled guilty to his 2009 weapons charge (i.e., November 10, 2009) to February 2, 2017. Thus, he calculates that he is owed 1,952 days of credit time. Then, in his reply brief he asserts entitlement to 2,463 days of credit. Despite the changes in his calculations, Lanier's argument for additional credit time is based on the same period that we reviewed in Lanier I.

[9] The State argues that Lanier's argument is barred by res judicata, and we agree. The principle behind the doctrine of res judicata “is the prevention of repetitive litigation of the same dispute.” Dunigan v. State, 191 N.E.3d 851, 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (emphasis omitted), reh'g denied, trans. denied. Lanier's motion for relief from judgment, now before us for review, is an attempt to relitigate the alleged sentencing error that he raised on direct appeal. At that time, Lanier had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim that he was entitled to additional credit time based on his pretrial incarceration for wholly unrelated charges from either July 23, 2009, or November 10, 2009, to February 2, 2017. He did so, and we concluded that he was not entitled to additional credit time for his incarceration during that period.

[10] In addition, our decision on this issue in Lanier I is the law of the case. The law-of-the-case doctrine “provides that an appellate court's determination of a legal issue binds both the trial court and the court on appeal in any subsequent appeal involving the same case and substantially the same facts.” In re Adoption of Baby W., 796 N.E.2d 364, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Cha v. Warnick, 476 N.E.2d 109, 114 (Ind. 1985)), reh'g denied, trans. denied. The doctrine stands for the proposition that “[f]acts established at one stage of a proceeding, which were part of an issue on which judgment was entered and appeal taken, are unalterably and finally established as part of the law of the case and may not be relitigated at a subsequent stage.” Id. (quoting Platt v. State, 664 N.E.2d 357, 361 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)). Application of this doctrine is discretionary, see id., and we choose to apply it here. Lanier attempts to relitigate whether he is entitled to additional credit time based on the exact period of pretrial incarceration for the same unrelated crimes that we considered in his direct appeal. Thus, the trial court was bound by our decision in Lanier I, and we find no extraordinary circumstances that would persuade us to revisit our decision now. See id. (appellate courts retain the power to revisit their prior decisions but are generally loath to do so absent extraordinary circumstances).

[11] For all these reasons, the court did not err in denying Lanier's motion for relief from judgment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In addition, Lanier asserted ineffective assistance of trial counsel in his Rule 60(B)(2) motion below. Although the State addresses this issue on appeal, Lanier failed to re-raise it. As such, that issue is also waived. See Burnell, 110 N.E.3d at 1171.

Scheele, Judge.

May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.