IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: A.T. (Minor Child) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] A.T. (“Child”) is the biological child of C.T. (“Father”) and J.H. (“Mother”). Child was adjudicated a child in need of services (“CHINS”) due to Father's unstable mental health. After Father failed to meaningfully engage in services, a petition to terminate his parental rights was filed. The trial court granted that petition. Father now challenges the termination ¹ and presents one issue for our review: Whether the trial court's decision to terminate Father's parental rights was clearly erroneous.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In August 2024, Child was living with Father, who had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and was not taking his medications as prescribed.² On August 9, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report that Father was using methamphetamine, had driven Child while under the influence thereof, and was otherwise unable to care for Child. When DCS investigated the report, Father “admitted that he had not been taking his medication as prescribed” and “was unable to answer basic questions surrounding his mental health.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 48; Ex. Vol. I at 27. During a Child and Family Team Meeting later that month, “Father appeared paranoid and was unable to receive or process information being provided to him.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 48; Ex. Vol. I at 27. DCS subsequently filed a CHINS petition, Child was removed from Father's care, and the trial court adjudicated Child a CHINS on Father's admission. In the ensuing dispositional order, the trial court ordered Father to “participate in random drug screens, complete a psychological evaluation, maintain his medical and mental health needs, and attend visitations and comply with visitation rules.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 49.

[4] In February 2025, Father's supervised visits with Child were suspended “due to Father's erratic behavior and unstable mental health at a supervised visitation.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 49. From March 24 to April 1, Father was hospitalized for his mental health. In August, the trial court reinstated Father's supervised visitation. By September, “Father had partially complied with the case plan by completing some diagnostic testing, but [his] erratic mental health behaviors had been a barrier to productive progress in sustaining his mental health and he was unable to have productive conversations regarding the case and his mental health needs.” Id.

[5] On October 17, DCS filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights. Less than one month later, Father's supervised visits with Child were once again suspended due to his unstable mental health. After a factfinding hearing in January 2026, the trial court terminated Father's parental rights to Child. The trial court entered the following relevant findings and conclusions in support of that termination:

3. [Father's psychiatrist] has treated Father for his diagnoses of Sc[h]izophrenia and Cannabis use disorder and manages his psychotropic medications. Father has been resistant to treatment for his mental health diagnosis and has refused to take his prescribed medication consistently and has continued to abuse cannabis ․

4․ Father has failed to meet his psychiatrist monthly and failed to take his medication as prescribed as evidenced by his drug screens to monitor compliance.

5. [Father's psychiatrist] opined that Father did not have stable mental health at the time of the Termination of Parental Rights Fact Finding hearing. Further, efforts to encourage Father to refrain from his persistent marijuana usage were ineffective as [were] efforts to engage Father in consistently taking his prescribed medication.

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7. [During a Comprehensive Parental Evaluation, Father provided] a trauma history that contained significant falsehoods and misrepresentations. These include florid delusions that Father had engaged in incestual relationships with his parents; had suffered physical abuse by family members; reports of strangers breaking into his home to steal money and marijuana and cousins breaking into his apartment to steal money and marijuana ․

8. Father reported to [the evaluator] that “family members must procreate among each other in order to stay [‘]pure.[’]” The Court finds that this delusional thought processing by a diagnosed schizophrenic, who is not maintaining his mental health, poses a threat to the health and well-being of his child ․

9. Numerous visitation providers were referred to provide services to Father. These services included Home Based Casework and Supervised visitation ․ from Seeds of Life ․ The Court finds that Father was non-compliant with [these] services ․

10. DCS referred Father for additional therapy at Centerstone ․ Father was non-compliant with these services and was discharged unsuccessfully ․

11. Father was referred for Supervised Visitation services ․ at Firefly ․ Father was non-compliant with these services and his visitation was suspended at the time of the Termination of Parental Rights Fact Finding hearing.

12. Father appeared at the [termination factfinding] hearing and provided testimony. His testimony was largely incoherent and consisted of mumbling and non-sensical phrases and comments to the point that it amounted to gibberish. Father repeatedly stated he was being “finagled.”

13. [The] Family Case Manager ․ worked exhaustively with Father in an attempt to engage him to maintain his mental health and to engage in services to reunify despite repeated threats and hostility and erratic behavior on the part of Father.

14. Father consistently tested positive for marijuana throughout the proceedings and by his own self-reports did not consistently disclose the medication he was prescribed for his mental health . .

. .

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17. The Court finds that [F]ather has failed to maintain his mental health and has failed to follow prescribed treatment and medication recommendations. The Court finds that Father has been diagnosed with schizophrenia for many years and there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal will not be remedied by Father.

Appellant's App. Vol. II at 50–51. This appeal ensued.³

Discussion and Decision

The Trial Court's Decision to Terminate Father's Parental Rights to Child Was Not Clearly Erroneous

[6] Father challenges the trial court's termination of his parental rights over Child. “Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute. When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45–46 (Ind. 2019) (internal citations omitted) (citing In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013)), cert. denied.

[7] We will affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights unless that decision is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014)). In reviewing for clear error, “we determine whether the evidence supports the court's findings and whether those findings support the court's judgment.” Norris v. Norris, 275 N.E.3d 505, 509 (Ind. 2026) (citing Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123 (Ind. 2016)). A decision is clearly erroneous “only if the findings lack factual support in the record or if the judgment applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.” Id. (citing Wysocki v. Johnson, 18 N.E.3d 600, 603–04 (Ind. 2014)). We will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, id. (citing Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 123), and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision, Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing In re K.E., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015)). Furthermore, we accept as true any findings which Father does not challenge on appeal. See R.M. v. Ind. Dep't Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)).

[8] To terminate Father's parental rights, DCS had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that, among other things, (a) there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside Father's home will not be remedied, Ind. Code § 31-35-2- 4(d)(3), and (b) termination of the parent-child relationship is in Child's best interests, id. § 31-35-2-4(c)(3). We address each element in turn.

a. Remediation of Reasons for Removal or Placement

[9] Father first challenges the trial court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside Father's home will not be remedied. To determine whether those conditions are not likely to be remedied, the trial court first “identif[ies] the conditions that led to removal” and then “determine[s] whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” K.E., 39 N.E.3d at 647 (quoting E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643); see also In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1134 (Ind. 2010). “The second step of the analysis requires judgment of the parent's fitness at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. Changed conditions are balanced against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect.” K.E., 39 N.E.3d at 647 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643 (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1234).

[10] Child was removed from Father's care because he was unable to care for her due to his mental health. The trial court determined that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal will not be remedied by Father because he “ha[d] failed to maintain his mental health and ha[d] failed to follow prescribed treatment and medication recommendations.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 51. Father does not challenge this or any other finding supporting the trial court's decision, so we accept them all as true. See R.M., 203 N.E.3d at 564 (citing Madlem, 592 N.E.2d at 687).

[11] To the extent Father's arguments can be read as challenging specific findings, those arguments are merely an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do. See Norris, 275 N.E.3d at 509 (citing Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 123). Father contends that he showed he “is stable enough to maintain housing,” and he blames DCS for allegedly not helping him obtain mental health assistance.⁴ Appellant's Br. at 20. Regardless of whether Father “is stable enough to maintain housing,” he was noncompliant with supervised visitation services, home-based case management services, and mental health services. And the trial court found that the DCS family case manager “worked exhaustively with Father in an attempt to engage him to maintain his mental health and to engage in services to reunify despite repeated threats and hostility and erratic behavior on the part of Father.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 51. Considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred by concluding that Father has not and likely will not remedy the reasons for Child's removal or placement outside of Father's care.⁵

b. Best Interests

[12] Father also challenges the trial court's conclusion that termination of his parental rights over Child is in Child's best interests. To determine the best interests of a child, a trial court looks at the totality of the evidence and subordinates the interests of the parents to those of the child. In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing In re A.B., 887 N.E.2d 158, 167–68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)), reh'g denied (Jan. 25, 2023), trans. denied sub nom. A.B. v. Ind. Dep't Child Servs., 209 N.E.3d 1168 (Ind. 2023). A central consideration in this determination is the child's need for permanency. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). The trial court also considers whether a child's emotional and physical development is threatened by the parent-child relationship. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). Permanent impairment of physical, mental, or social development is not necessary before a trial court may terminate the parent-child relationship. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235).

[13] Importantly, “the recommendation by both the case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” P.B., 199 N.E.3d at 799 (citing L.S. v. Ind. Dep't Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied). Both the family case manager and Court Appointed Special Advocate in this case testified that termination was in Child's best interests, and we have already determined that the trial court did not clearly err by concluding that Father likely will not remedy the reasons for Child's removal from his care. This alone is sufficient to show that termination is in Child's best interests.

[14] Next, in challenging the trial court's best-interests conclusion, Father does not specifically challenge any of the trial court's findings; consequently, we take all those findings as true. See R.M., 203 N.E.3d at 564 (citing Madlem, 592 N.E.2d at 687). To the extent Father's two-sentence argument ⁶ can be read to challenge particular findings or conclusions, that argument is merely an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do. See Norris, 275 N.E.3d at 509 (citing Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 123). Father twice had his supervised visitation with Child suspended because of his erratic behavior and unstable mental health, he was repeatedly hostile and threatening toward the family case manager, and he “was largely incoherent” at the factfinding hearing, Appellant's App. Vol. II at 51. Considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred by concluding that termination is in Child's best interests.

[15] Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not clearly err by terminating Father's parental rights to Child. We affirm that decision.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother died in 2023 before the underlying CHINS case was initiated.

2.   Child was born on March 28, 2020.

3.   Although there are record citation issues throughout Father's brief, his failure to provide any record citations in his Statement of Case, as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(5), requires us to remind counsel that record citations are necessary for our review. See Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015).

4.   Father does not provide any citations to the Record or to authority in his one-paragraph argument regarding the likelihood he would remediate the reasons for Child's removal, as required by Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). We remind counsel that the purpose of our appellate rules—especially Appellate Rule 46 governing the content of briefs—“is to aid and expedite review and to relieve the appellate court of the burden of searching the record and briefing the case.” Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (emphasis added) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)).

5.   Additionally, DCS alleged and the trial court concluded that Father's parental rights to Child should be terminated because the continuation of their parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d)(4). Father challenges this conclusion, as well, but DCS only needed to prove either that there was not a reasonable probability Father would remedy the reasons for removal or that Father's relationship with Child posed a threat to Child's well-being. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(1), (d). Because we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in concluding there was not a reasonable probability Father would remedy the reasons for removal, we need not address his argument regarding the threat posed to Child by the continuation of the parent-child relationship. However, we note that Father's arguments thereon are requests for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do, see In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019) (citing In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014)).

6.   We agree with DCS that Father “failed to make a cogent argument” concerning the trial court's best-interests conclusion, Appellee's Br. at 31. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring “cogent reasoning”). We nevertheless address Father's argument. See Pierce, 29 N.E.3d at 1267; M.I., 127 N.E.3d at 1170–71 (quoting Neal, 796 N.E.2d at 285).

Felix, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.