Christopher Harrold and Amy Harrold, Individually as Husband and Wife, and as Natural Parents and Legal Guardians of Logan Harrold, a Minor, Appellants-Plaintiffs v. LLC (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judges Kenworthy and DeBoer concur.

[1] Christopher Harrold and Amy Harrold, Individually as Husband and Wife and as Natural Parents and Legal Guardians of Logan Harrold, a Minor (collectively, “the Harrolds”), appeal the trial court's entry of summary judgment for Pulte Homes of Indiana, LLC (“Pulte”) on their complaint alleging breach of contract and negligence. The Harrolds present three issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court erred when it entered summary judgment for Pulte.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In 2015, the Harrolds bought a newly built home from Pulte in McCordsville. The parties’ purchase agreement included a limited warranty. The limited warranty provided in relevant part that it

excludes any loss or damage which is not a Covered Defect, including:

* * *

4.14 Any condition which does not result in actual damage to the home, including, but not limited to, uninhabitability or health risk due to the presence or consequence of electromagnetic fields (EMFs), radon gas, mold, formaldehyde, or other pollutants and contaminants; or the presence of hazardous or toxic materials.

Appellants’ App. Vol. 2, pp. 76-77.

[4] Shortly after the Harrolds moved into the house, they experienced problems with water intrusion due to defective construction. Pulte responded to the Harrolds’ requests for repairs and attempted to fix the defects. But, in January 2021, the Harrolds discovered “latent structural defects and toxic mold” in the house. Id. at 25. And all three of them had experienced health problems which they attributed to mold exposure. As a result, the Harrolds had the structural defects repaired, and they sold the house.¹

[5] In December 2022, the Harrolds filed an amended complaint against Pulte alleging, among other claims, breach of contract and negligence.² The Harrolds alleged in relevant part that Pulte had breached the parties’ contract “by improperly and negligently constructing the home and causing a toxic mold infestation” in their home. Id. at 24. And they alleged that Pulte's negligent construction of the home caused “a toxic mold infestation ․” Id. at 26. The Harrolds alleged that they suffered from “serious illness” and had incurred “damages” as a result of the breach of contract, and they alleged “personal injuries resulting in medical expenses, lost wages, property damage, physical pain and suffering, as well as mental anguish and suffering and injuries that are permanent in nature” as a result of Pulte's negligence. Id. at 25-26.

[6] In September 2025, Pulte moved for summary judgment. Pulte argued that “[a]ll Counts against Pulte in the Complaint sound in personal injuries from mold exposure, which are explicitly addressed in the Home Protection Plan ․, which specifically excludes claims involving mold.” Id. at 141. Pulte's designated evidence included Section 4.14 of the limited warranty. Pulte argued that, because the Harrolds’ “claimed damages are for personal injury and not ‘actual damage to the home,’ and are allegedly caused by mold, all loss and damage resulting therefrom are explicitly excluded and are not recoverable from Pulte.” Id.

[7] In opposition to summary judgment, the Harrolds argued that the language of Section 4.14

expressly requires the absence of actual damage for the exclusion to apply. The Home in this matter presented evidence of water intrusion, structural saturation, damage to building materials, compromised insulation, and failures of the building envelope. Because the exclusion applies only where no physical damage exists, and the evidence shows significant physical damage, Pulte's reliance on the mold exclusion fails as a matter of law.

Appellants’ App. Vol. 3, p. 130 (emphases original). In the alternative, the Harrolds argued that the language is ambiguous and creates a question of fact precluding summary judgment.³

[8] During a hearing on Pulte's motion, the Harrolds conceded that they were not claiming damages for any pecuniary loss related to the construction defects. Rather, they were only claiming “personal injur[ies] from mold exposure[.]”⁴ Tr. p. 9. The trial court entered summary judgment for Pulte. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[9] The Harrolds argue that the trial court erred when it entered summary judgment for Pulte. Our standard of review is well settled.

When this Court reviews a grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, we “stand in the shoes of the trial court.” Burton v. Benner, 140 N.E.3d 848, 851 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Murray v. Indianapolis Public Schools, 128 N.E.3d 450, 452 (Ind. 2019)). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Campbell Hausfeld/Scott Fetzer Co. v. Johnson, 109 N.E.3d 953, 955-56 (Ind. 2018) (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 56(C)). We will draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non- moving party. Ryan v. TCI Architects/Engineers/Contractors, Inc., 72 N.E.3d 908, 912-13 (Ind. 2017). We review summary judgment de novo. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014).

Arrendale v. Am. Imaging & MRI, LLC, 183 N.E.3d 1064, 1067-68 (Ind. 2022).

[10] This appeal turns on the interpretation of Section 4.14 of the limited warranty. Again, the limited warranty provided in relevant part that it

excludes any loss or damage ․, including:

* * *

4.14 Any condition which does not result in actual damage to the home, including, but not limited to, uninhabitability or health risk due to the presence or consequence of electromagnetic fields (EMFs), radon gas, mold, formaldehyde, or other pollutants and contaminants; or the presence of hazardous or toxic materials.

Appellants’ App. Vol. 2, pp. 76-77.

[11] Construction of the terms of a written contract is a pure question of law that we review de novo. See Layne v. Layne, 77 N.E.3d 1254, 1265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. The goal of contract interpretation is to determine the intent of the parties when they made the agreement. Id. This court must examine the plain language of the contract, read it in context and, whenever possible, construe it so as to render every word, phrase, and term meaningful, unambiguous, and harmonious with the whole. Id. If contract language is unambiguous, this court must determine the parties’ intent from the four corners of the instrument. See id. If, however, a contract is ambiguous, the parties may introduce extrinsic evidence of its meaning, and the interpretation then becomes a question of fact. Broadbent v. Fifth Third Bank, 59 N.E.3d 305, 311 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. “A word or a phrase is ambiguous if reasonable people could differ as to its meaning.” Id.

[12] The Harrolds maintain that Section 4.14 does not bar their claims. They argue that, under the “plain language” of the provision, the fact that the defective construction by Pulte “resulted in actual damage to the home” means that their claims are not excluded. Appellants’ Br. at 10-11. In particular, they argue that

[t]he trial court's error stems from a misinterpretation of the word “damage” in Section 4.14.[5] Rather than analyzing whether the conditions resulted in physical damage to the home, the court focused on the nature of the damages sought by the Harrolds. That is not what the warranty says. The provision turns on whether the condition resulted in actual damage to the property, not whether the plaintiff seeks property damage as a category of recovery. Pulte's interpretation effectively rewrites the warranty. Under its theory, any claim involving mold would be excluded, regardless of whether the underlying condition caused damage to the home. However, the exclusion is expressly limited to conditions that do not result in actual damage.

Id. at 11.

[13] In its brief on appeal, Pulte points out that

[t]he Warranty exclusion begins by addressing the “conditions” that are excluded. The “condition” at issue here, as is addressed in the Warranty, is a “health risk due to the presence or consequence of ․ mold ․ or other pollutants and contaminants ․” The qualifier, which Appellants attempt to use to make the exclusion inapplicable, is actually not as they wish to perceive it when read in context. Again, the “condition” (health risk from mold), in fact does NOT “result in actual damage to the home.”

Appellee's Br. at 9.

[14] We agree with Pulte that Section 4.14 is unambiguous and excludes from the limited warranty the Harrolds’ claims for personal injuries from mold exposure. The Harrolds focus on the word “damage” in their argument on appeal, but we agree with Pulte that the primary focus should be on the word “condition.” Excluded from the limited warranty is “[a]ny condition which does not result in actual damage to the home, including, but not limited to, uninhabitability or health risk due to the presence or consequence of ․ mold ․” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2, p. 77. The condition underlying the Harrolds’ alleged damages is “health risk due to the presence or consequence of ․ mold ․” Id. And the “health risk due to” mold did not result in any alleged actual damage to the home. Rather, the actual damage to the home allegedly resulted in the mold exposure. Or, as the Harrolds explain in their reply brief, “defective construction and [the] resulting water intrusion created conditions that ultimately caused their injuries.” Reply Br. at 9 (emphasis added). Simply said, Section 4.14 excludes conditions that result “in” actual damage, not “from” actual damage.

[15] Still, the Harrolds argue that, “[e]ven if the warranty provision were applicable, it cannot serve as a complete bar to [their] claims” because Pulte had an “independent duty to construct the home in a workmanlike manner and in compliance with applicable standards.” Appellants’ Br. at 12. But their argument on appeal is not based on an implied warranty. Rather, they continue their argument by pointing out that any contract provision that “purport[s] to relieve a party of liability for its own negligence ․ must be expressed in clear and unequivocal terms ․” Id. at 13 (citing Moore Heating & Plumbing, Inc. v. Huber, Hunt & Nichols, 583 N.E.2d 142, 146 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)). And they maintain that

[t]he warranty provision at issue contains no such clear and unequivocal language. It does not state that Pulte is relieved of liability for negligent construction or that all personal injury claims are barred. It addresses only a limited category of damages. At a minimum, the applicability of the exclusion depends on disputed issues of fact, namely, what caused the Harrolds’ injuries and whether those injuries fall within the scope of the exclusion. Those questions cannot be resolved as a matter of law.

Id.

[16] As this Court has held,

[i]n the absence of legislation to the contrary, it is not against public policy in Indiana to enter into a contract that exculpates one from the consequences of his own negligence. Marshall v. Blue Springs Corp., 641 N.E.2d 92, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). However, in order to ensure a party's knowing and willing acceptance of this harsh burden, we have held that such exculpatory clauses must specifically and explicitly refer to the negligence of the party seeking release from liability. See Powell v. Am. Health Fitness Ctr. of Fort Wayne, Inc., 694 N.E.2d 757, 761 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); Moore Heating & Plumbing, Inc.[ ], 583 N.E.2d [at] 146 ․ An exculpatory clause may be found sufficiently specific and explicit on the issue of negligence even in the absence of the word itself. See Moore, 583 N.E.2d at 146.

Avant v. Cmty. Hosp., 826 N.E.2d 7, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.

[17] The Harrolds’ argument on this issue fails for two reasons. First, Section 4.14 is not an exculpatory clause ⁶ but a warranty exclusion. And second, the limited warranty includes the following provision: “It is understood and agreed that [Pulte's] liability, whether in contract, tort, statute, negligence, or otherwise, is limited to the remedy provided in this Limited Warranty.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2, p. 75. That provision clearly satisfies the specificity requirement as set out in Avant, 826 N.E.2d at 10.

Conclusion

[18] This appeal presents a pure question of law, and on the undisputed designated evidence Pulte is entitled to judgment. Section 4.14 is unambiguous and excludes the Harrolds’ claims for personal injuries resulting from alleged mold exposure. Each of the Harrolds’ claims in their amended complaint is barred as a matter of law. The trial court did not err when it entered summary judgment for Pulte.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Harrolds are not claiming any diminution in the home's value as a result of the defective construction, and they are not seeking reimbursement for the costs of any repairs.

2.   The Harrolds’ amended complaint includes eight counts, but they only include their claims for breach of contract and negligence in their brief on appeal.

3.   The Harrolds also made an argument to the trial court based on public policy. But they do not include that argument in their brief on appeal.

4.   On appeal, the Harrolds suggest that the trial court mischaracterized their claims as “involving only ‘personal injuries from mold exposure ․’ ” Appellants’ Br. at 14. But that is precisely what the Harrolds conceded to the trial court during the summary judgment hearing. Tr. p. 9.

5.   Notably, the trial court did not make findings and conclusions. Thus, the Harrolds can only speculate as to why the trial court entered summary judgment for Pulte.

6.   Notably, in their memorandum to the trial court, the Harrolds refer to Section 4.14 as an “exculpatory clause,” but they abandon that label on appeal. Appellants’ App. Vol. 3, pp. 132-33.

Mathias, Judge.

Kenworthy, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.