LLC v. Union Savings & Loan Association, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Plaza Utilities, LLC, Credo Investments, LLC, and McGee Corner, LLC (collectively, Borrowers) appeal the trial court's denial of their motion for relief from judgment. Borrowers raise one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court erred in denying Borrowers’ motion. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2010, Union Savings & Loan Association (USLA) made a $232,000 loan to Plaza Utilities, LLC and a separate $331,250 loan to Borrowers, both secured by commercial mortgages on undeveloped land in Hancock County (the Land). After extending seven forbearance agreements to Borrowers, USLA sued Borrowers in 2024, alleging breach of the notes and seeking foreclosure of the mortgages.¹ On June 6, 2025, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of USLA against Borrowers. Borrowers did not appeal the summary judgment.

[3] In November, Borrowers filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B), asserting that there was another mortgage on the Land and that the mortgagee, C. Victor Boring, had not been named as a party or served in the lawsuit.² The court denied Borrowers’ motion for relief.

[4] In December, USLA filed its own motion for relief pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B)(1), alleging its omission of Boring as a party was a mistake. Because Boring had died, USLA asserted that his estate (Boring's Estate) held his junior interest in the Land and requested that the court amend its judgment to reflect as much. USLA contemporaneously filed a motion to add Boring's Estate as a party. On January 2, 2026, Boring's Estate filed an appearance and an answer in the case, admitting that it holds an “unpaid” mortgage against the Land and that its mortgage lien is junior to USLA's lien. App. Vol. V p. 78.

[5] On January 4, Borrowers filed a renewed motion for relief from judgment, alleging that Boring had not been served with process and that “[u]nder Trial Rule 60(B)(6) and (8), the judgment is void since the proper service rules were not followed under Trial Rule 5.” Id. at 80. Following a status hearing, the trial court denied Borrowers’ renewed motion for relief. Borrowers now appeal the denial of their renewed Trial Rule 60(B) motion. After Borrowers initiated their appeal, the trial court granted USLA's motion to add Boring's Estate as a party.³

Discussion and Decision

I. Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(8)

[6] On appeal, Borrowers generally contend the trial court erred in denying their motion for relief. Below, Borrowers asserted the underlying summary judgment order should have been vacated pursuant to Indiana Trial Rules 60(B)(6) and (8). However, Borrowers’ only substantive claim is that the summary judgment order is void, a ground for relief that is expressly addressed by Trial Rule 60(B)(6).

[7] Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(8) allows a court to relieve a party from a judgment for “any reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment, other than those reasons set forth in sub-paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4).” But a 60(B)(8) motion must be filed in a reasonable time and allege a meritorious defense and “sufficient grounds showing exceptional circumstances justify relief” from the judgment. Dalton Corp. v. Myers, 65 N.E.3d 1142, 1145 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. Borrowers do not provide any argument as to Rule 60(B)(8), let alone allege a meritorious defense and demonstrate exceptional circumstances. Thus, to the extent Borrowers intend to challenge the court's denial of their motion under Trial Rule 60(B)(8), Borrowers have waived their argument. Burnell v. State, 110 N.E.3d 1167, 1171 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (appellate court will not review undeveloped arguments or make up an argument for a party).

II. Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(6)

[8] Borrowers assert the court erred in denying their motion for relief pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(6), contending the summary judgment order is void. Specifically, they allege the judgment is void because Boring—a third party—was not served with process. They do not allege the judgment is void due to lack of personal jurisdiction over themselves or any party to the case at the time the judgment was rendered.

[9] Although we typically review an order on a motion for relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion, a motion under Rule 60(B)(6) “requires no discretion on the part of the trial court because either the judgment is void or it is valid.” Anderson v. Wayne Post 64, Am. Legion Corp., 4 N.E.3d 1200, 1205 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citations omitted), trans. denied. Thus, we review de novo a trial court's judgment on a Rule 60(B)(6) motion. Id.

[10] Initially, to seek relief from the courts, a party must have standing. Simon v. Simon, 957 N.E.2d 980, 987 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). The doctrine of standing may, on one hand, concern whether a party has shown “adequate injury or the immediate danger of sustaining some injury[,]” Pence v. State, 652 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. 1995), and on the other, “whether the complaining party is the proper party to invoke the court's power.” S.B. v. Seymour Cmty. Schs., 97 N.E.3d 288, 293 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Schloss v. City of Indianapolis, 553 N.E.2d 1204, 1206 (Ind. 1990)), trans. denied. Borrowers unquestionably have standing to challenge the judgment under Trial Rule 60(B)(6) as to themselves; but whether Borrowers have standing to challenge the judgment on the basis that the court did not have personal jurisdiction over a third party is another matter.

[11] Our appellate courts have addressed some circumstances regarding whether a party has standing to challenge acts concerning a third party. See, e.g., S.B., 97 N.E.3d at 293 (holding that a school had standing to petition for a protection order on behalf of a student); Oman v. State, 737 N.E.2d 1131 (Ind. 2000) (addressing when a party has standing to challenge the validity of a subpoena issued to a third party), reh'g denied, cert. denied. But we have not addressed the circumstances presented here. And we will not develop an argument regarding Borrowers’ standing on their behalf. See Burnell, 110 N.E.3d at 1171. Because Borrowers have not developed any argument that they have standing to assert a defect personal to Boring, they have waived the contention that forms the basis of their Rule 60(B)(6) claim.

[12] Waiver notwithstanding, lack of personal jurisdiction is a defense typically asserted by an unserved party. Here, Boring's Estate ultimately filed an appearance and an answer in the instant case and did not assert a personal jurisdiction defense. See Heartland Res., Inc. v. Bedel, 903 N.E.2d 1004, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (“A party can waive lack of personal jurisdiction and submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court if he responds or appears and does not contest the lack of jurisdiction.”).

[13] In addition, Indiana law is well-settled that a junior lienholder's “interest in property [is] not extinguished by a foreclosure judgment when the party was not properly joined in the foreclosure action[.]” Hair v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 18 N.E.3d 1019, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014); see also Watson v. Strohl, 46 N.E.2d 204, 209 (Ind. 1943) (“against the holders of the judgment lien, who were not made parties, the foreclosure of the mortgage and the subsequent sale were without effect”); Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Mark Dill Plumbing Co., 903 N.E.2d 166 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (observing same), clarified on reh'g, 908 N.E.2d 1273. Because the junior lienholder's interest survives, remedies remain available to him to enforce said interest. However, Borrowers provide no authority establishing that the omission of a junior lienholder voids the original judgment between the parties, i.e., Borrowers and senior-lienholder USLA, and we find none.

[14] Borrowers have failed to establish that the judgment should be vacated pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B)(6). We affirm the court's denial of their motion.

[15] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Town of New Palestine and Trevor Lloyd-Jones were also named defendants below but do not participate in this appeal. After this appeal was initiated, the trial court granted USLA's motion to add the Estate of C. Victor Boring as a defendant, and the Estate does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Borrowers did not note under which Trial Rule 60(B) subsection they sought relief and simply requested a hearing on the matter. See App. Vol. V pp. 44-45.

3.   See Cause No. 30C01-2405-MF-1072.

Scheele, Judge.

May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.