MYER v. LIGHT (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Cindy Meyer ¹ appeals the small claims court's judgment for Vicky Light in a breach of contract dispute. Meyer raises several issues for appellate review, which we consolidate and restate as: Did the trial court clearly err by awarding Light $4,000? We reverse.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In March 2022, Light saw a social media post for a recently born paint horse, “I Sensational.” The foal belonged to Meyer, who was in the business of breeding horses. Light and Meyer formed an oral understanding in which Light agreed to pay Meyer $4,000 for the animal. As part of the arrangement, Meyer kept I Sensational at her property until it was weaned. Light examined I Sensational herself before she ultimately retrieved the animal in June.

[3] Meyer sent Light I Sensational's certificate of registration, which the American Paint Horse Association issued in May 2023. The document indicated the horse had Hereditary Equine Regional Dermal Asthenia (“HERDA”), an incurable genetic skin disease. In October, Light sold I Sensational to a third party for $10,000. That individual subsequently attempted to sell the horse again sometime in the spring of 2025, but the transaction fell through when the prospective buyer—after receiving I Sensational's registration—realized the horse had HERDA. After learning of the horse's condition from the third-party buyer, Light returned the $10,000 and got I Sensational back.²

[4] In August 2025, Light sued Meyer in small claims court seeking $10,000 in damages. Her notice of claim alleged: “Breeder sold a horse with a genetic condition[.] [F]orced to euthanize[ ] [h]orse because of [HERDA].” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 8. Light testified at trial she did not understand the HERDA notation in the registration. According to Light, “[t]he only thing [she] was concerned about [in] those papers [was] that the horse was regular registry[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 11. Meyer testified she made no guarantees or assurances about I Sensational's health and first learned of the horse's condition after Light informed her. The trial court took the matter under advisement.

[5] In an order issued about two weeks later, the trial court entered judgment in Light's favor and awarded her $4,000 in damages. The court found Meyer had “advised [Light] the pony was in good health and condition.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 6. In addition, the trial court determined there had been “an unequal bargaining power[ ] between” the litigants because Meyer “was the expert horse breeder and had superior knowledge of such things.” Id. at 7.³

The trial court clearly erred by ruling in Light's favor.

[6] On appeal, Meyer argues, among other things, the trial court erred in (1) finding Meyer had affirmatively represented I Sensational to be healthy without support in the evidence; and (2) granting judgment for Light when she failed to timely revoke her acceptance of the horse. See Appellant's Br. at 11–13. We agree.

[7] We first note Light has not filed an appellate brief. When an appellee has not filed a brief, “we need not undertake the burden of developing an argument on the appellee's behalf.” Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2006). “[W]e will reverse the trial court's judgment if the appellant's brief presents a case of prima facie error.” Id. Prima facie error is error “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Id. (citation omitted). If an appellant is unable to meet this burden, we will affirm. Id.

[8] Judgments in small claims actions are “subject to review as prescribed by relevant Indiana rules and statutes.” Ind. Small Claims Rule 11(A). We will not set aside the factual findings or judgment entered in a bench trial unless clearly erroneous. Ind. Trial Rule 52(A); Trinity Homes, 848 N.E.2d at 1067. In determining whether a judgment is clearly erroneous, we do not reweigh the evidence or determine witness credibility. City of Dunkirk Water & Sewage Dep't v. Hall, 657 N.E.2d 115, 116 (Ind. 1995). We consider only the evidence supporting the judgment and the reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. Id. This “deferential standard of review is particularly important in small claims actions, where trials are ‘informal, with the sole objective of dispensing speedy justice between the parties according to the rules of substantive law.’ ” Id. (quoting S.C.R. 8(A)). We review questions of law de novo, just as we do in appeals from a court of general jurisdiction. Trinity Homes, 848 N.E.2d at 1068.

[9] Trials in small claims actions may be informal, but “the parties in a small claims court bear the same burdens of proof as they would in a regular civil action on the same issues.” LTL Truck Serv., LLC v. Safeguard, Inc., 817 N.E.2d 664, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Each party is “responsible for bringing evidence to court that is sufficient to sustain that burden.” Muldowney v. Lincoln Park, LLC, 83 N.E.3d 130, 132 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).

[10] Elements of a breach of contract action are the existence of a contract, the breach thereof, and damages. Hawa v. Moore, 947 N.E.2d 421, 426 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). An individual injured by a breach of contract may recover the benefit of the bargain. Hi-Tec Props., LLC v. Murphy, 14 N.E.3d 767, 776 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[11] Indiana Code Section 26-1-2-104(1) defines merchant as:

[A] person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.

Goods are defined as all things, other than the money in which the price is to be paid, which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale. Ind. Code § 26-1-2-105(1) (1995).

[12] As courts have long held, “If a man sells a horse generally, he warrants no more than that it is a horse.” Merchs.’ & Mechs.’ Sav. Bank. v. Fraze, 36 N.E. 378, 380 (Ind. Ct. App. 1894) (quoting Jones v. Bright, 5 Bing. 533 (1829)). Nevertheless, under Indiana's version of the Uniform Commercial Code, “a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.” I.C. § 26-1-2-314(1) (1986). And under Subsection (2), for the goods to be merchantable, they should be fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used. This so-called “implied warranty of merchantability is imposed by operation of law for the protection of the buyer and must be liberally construed in favor of the buyer.” Irmscher Suppliers, Inc. v. Schuler, 909 N.E.2d 1040, 1048 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citation omitted).

[13] In some circumstances, a buyer may revoke acceptance of a non-conforming good in whole or in part. See I.C. § 26-1-2-608 (1963). “Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any substantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects. It is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller of it.” I.C. § 26-1-2-608(1)(b)(2); see also I.C. § 26-1-2-607(3)(a) (1986) (stating, “the buyer must, within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach, notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy”). “What is a reasonable time for taking any action depends on the nature, purpose, and circumstances of such action.” I.C. § 26-1-1-204(2) (1986). There are important policy considerations for the notice requirement, including (1) allowing the seller to settle the issue through negotiation or other non-litigious means; and (2) permitting the seller to prepare for negotiation and litigation. Courtesy Enters., Inc. v. Richards Labs., 457 N.E.2d 572, 577 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). “The final policy consideration involved is that notice is required to discourage the assertion of stale claims in the same way as, and for the same reason as, do statutes of limitation.” Id.

[14] In this case, Light testified she paid Meyer $4,000 for I Sensational. Light picked up the animal from Meyer about four months after its birth and without having it examined by a professional. At trial, Light did not provide any evidence indicating Meyer had guaranteed the animal's good health. For her part, Meyer testified she made no assurance to Light regarding I Sensational's longevity. Light did not carry her burden to demonstrate that any assurances entitled her to relief. See Muldowney, 83 N.E.3d at 132. Based on the record before us, it was clearly erroneous for the trial court to find Meyer advised Light the horse was in good health and condition.

[15] The trial court also ruled for Light because Meyer “was the expert horse breeder [who] had superior knowledge” during the transaction. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 7. Meyer testified she had “been in business for over” twenty years, with the last ten focused on breeding horses. Tr. Vol. 2 at 22. Even if we construed the implied warranty of merchantability in Light's favor, the record shows Light did not give Meyer notice of nonconformity until some two years after she learned or should have learned of the horse's genetic condition. See I.C. § 26-1-2-608(1)(b)(2); I.C. § 26-1-2-607(3)(a). As Meyer persuasively argues, Light “missed her opportunity to revoke her acceptance because she waited an unreasonable length of time to do so.” Appellant's Br. at 20–21; see also Courtesy, 457 N.E.2d at 577 (commenting on the “seller's right to rely upon the finality of a transaction after the elapse of a particular period of time”). Based on these facts, we hold it was clearly erroneous for the trial court to award Light $4,000 in damages.

Conclusion

[16] The trial court clearly erred by ruling in Light's favor.

[17] Reversed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Appellant's name shows as both “Myer” and “Meyer” in the record, but it appears “Meyer” is the correct spelling. We use “Meyer” moving forward.

2.   I Sensational was eventually euthanized.

3.   Meyer filed a counterclaim alleging defamation, which the trial court found was unsupported by the evidence. Meyer does not challenge the court's defamation ruling, and we do not address the claim.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.