JOHNSON v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Eldon Scott Johnson (“Johnson”), proceeding pro se, appeals the denial of his Motion to Correct Erroneous Sentence, which challenged the application of credit time to the last sentence in a sequence of consecutive sentences. Consistent with this court's interpretation of credit time requirements in Paul v. State, 177 N.E.3d 472 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), we conclude the sentencing order is facially erroneous. We therefore reverse and remand with instructions to issue an amended sentencing order and abstract of judgment as outlined herein.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In July 2015, Johnson and the State entered into a plea agreement (“the Agreement”) to resolve pending criminal charges in four separate cases: Cause No. 45G03-1305-FB-50 filed on May 28, 2013 (“Case I”); Cause No. 45G03-1405-FB-36 filed on May 20, 2014 (“Case II”); Cause No. 45G03-1406-FA-23 filed on June 25, 2014 (“Case III”); and Cause No. 45G03-1406-FD-124 (“Case IV”).¹ Johnson agreed to plead guilty to specified offenses in Cases I, II and III—the remaining counts in those cases would be dismissed, and Case IV would be dismissed entirely. The Agreement required Johnson to serve an aggregate sentence of forty years, allocated as follows: Case I, ten years; Case II, ten years; and Case III, thirty years, with the sentences in Cases II and III to be served concurrently but with a consecutive sentence in Case I. As to the sequence of the sentences, the Agreement provided that “the sentence of (10) years in [Case I] shall be served consecutive to the sentences in [Case II] and [Case III], for a total of forty (40) years” in the Indiana Department of Correction. Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 86–87 (emphasis added).

[3] The trial court accepted the Agreement and sentenced Johnson accordingly. The court determined that Johnson was entitled to 1,200 days of credit time and applied the credit time to the ten-year sentence imposed in Case I, i.e., the sentence Johnson would serve last in the sequence of consecutive sentences. The trial court entered its sentencing order in each case on August 21, 2015.

[4] On August 8, 2025, Johnson filed in each case a pro se Motion to Correct Erroneous Sentence. He argued that the trial court “lacked statutory authority to order the 600 days [of] jail time credit and 600 days [of] good time credit for a total of 1[,]200[ ] ․ days to only be applied to [his] sentence in [Case I].” Id. at 40. Johnson requested that the court correct the alleged error by instead applying the credit time “to [the] 40[-]year aggregate consecutive sentence ․” Id. In his supporting memorandum, Johnson asserted that his sentence was facially erroneous because “[t]he court sentenced [him] to a (40)[-]year aggregate consecutive sentence” and he was “entitled to have the 1[,]200 credit days to be applied to the (40)[-]year aggregate consecutive sentence.” Id. at 50. He also argued that the trial court “lack[ed] the authority to hold the 1[,]200 credit days in abeyance in this way.” Id. In response, the State argued that the trial court “was not incorrect in applying [the] pretrial credit time toward [the] 10-year sentence in [Case I] rather than stating that the credit applies to [the] 40-year aggregate sentence.” Id. at 30.

[5] On November 7, 2025, the trial court summarily denied Johnson's Motion to Correct Erroneous Sentence. Johnson now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Johnson contends the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Correct Erroneous Sentence. Indiana Code section 35-38-1-15 authorizes a trial court to correct an erroneous sentence upon the defendant's written motion, but this remedy is limited to the correction of “sentencing errors that are clear from the face of the judgment imposing the sentence in light of the statutory authority.” Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783, 787 (Ind. 2004). Therefore, “[c]laims that require consideration of the proceedings before, during, or after trial may not be presented by way of a motion to correct sentence.” Id. We review rulings on this type of motion for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when the court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Felder v. State, 870 N.E.2d 554, 560 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). To the extent the ruling involves questions of law, our review is de novo. See id.

[7] In Paul, this court addressed the allocation of credit time to consecutive sentences. 177 N.E.3d at 475–78. There, the defendant challenged the trial court's decision to apply the credit time to the last sentence in a sequence of consecutive sentences. Id. This court generally observed that, “when it comes to consecutive sentences, credit time should be applied only once.” Id. at 476 n.3. This court also explained that “courts must allocate credit time to a specific sentence” rather than to the overall aggregate term.² Id. This court referred to definitions for the word “consecutive” and concluded that consecutive sentences are a sequence of sentences that must “run in order”— such that the first sentence in the sequence is the first sentence to be satisfied. Id. at 477. This court explained that it was error to “apply[ ] credit time to the last of the three sentences,” which “essentially allowed” the defendant to “partially serve [the last] sentence” in the sequence while “prolong[ing] the time” until the defendant would satisfy the first sentence in the sequence. Id. (noting that the trial court's approach “deviat[ed] from the proper sequence”). Therefore, the Paul Court reversed and remanded with instructions to apply the credit time to the first sentence in the sequence of consecutive sentences.

[8] Johnson cites Paul on appeal, claiming reversal is necessary to correct his facially erroneous sentence. See Appellant's Br. pp. 16–18. The State contends that Johnson waived his argument by failing to present the argument to the trial court. See Appellee's Br. p. 10. We disagree. Although Johnson did not cite Paul in his Motion to Correct Erroneous Sentence or supporting memorandum, he nonetheless argued that the sentencing order was facially erroneous because it improperly held the credit time “in abeyance” by applying it to the sentence in Case I, i.e., the last sentence in the sequence of consecutive sentences. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 50. We proceed to address whether the credit time aspect of each sentencing order is facially erroneous under Paul. See Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015) (explaining that we generally prefer to resolve cases on the merits instead of on procedural grounds like waiver).

[9] The State interprets Paul to require that credit time be applied to “the first case causing Johnson's incarceration.” Appellee's Br. p. 11. Therefore, the State claims that the sentence is consistent with Paul and not facially erroneous because the trial court applied the credit time to Case I, even though that sentence was last in the sequence of sentences.³ We disagree with the State's interpretation. The Paul Court expressly remanded with instructions “to calculate and allocate credit time consistent with th[e] opinion by focusing on the [f]irst [c]ause,” clarifying that the first cause meant “the first sentence in the sequence of sentences,” not merely the first case charged chronologically. 177 N.E.3d at 478 (emphasis added).

[10] Applying Paul, we conclude that the sentencing order is facially erroneous because it applied credit time to the last sentence in the sequence of consecutive sentences.⁴ Therefore, we reverse the denial of Johnson's Motion to Correct Erroneous Sentence and remand with instructions to the trial court to issue an amended sentencing order and abstract of judgment applying the credit time to the concurrent thirty-year sentences in Case III; under the Agreement, these sentences were to be served first in the sequence of consecutive sentences.⁵

[11] Reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The appellate record does not disclose the filing date of Case IV.

2.   Thus, Johnson is incorrect to the extent he seeks application of credit time to the overall aggregate term.

3.   At times, Johnson argues the sentences should be arranged so the sentence in Case I, together with all credit time, runs first in the sequence of consecutive sentences. However, the Agreement specifically required the sentence in Case I to be consecutive to the sentences in Cases II and III.

4.   Neither party claims the Agreement contained unenforceable terms regarding the sequence of sentences.

5.   Because these are concurrent terms of the same length, the credit time is effectively applied only once.

Foley, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Weissmann, J., concur.