DIKTERUK v. UNIFUND CCR LLC (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Unifund CCR, LLC, attempted to collect on a debt owed by Jonathan Dikteruk. Unifund obtained a default judgment against him in 2018 and, over the following years, initiated multiple proceedings supplemental against Dikteruk and possible garnishee-defendants. In 2025, the trial court issued an order to Dikteruk's employer, garnishing his wages.

[2] Dikteruk appeals from the trial court's denial of his motion to correct error following the court's denial of his motion to set aside the 2018 default judgment. He argues that Unifund failed to properly serve the complaint on him and failed to act with diligence after obtaining the default judgment. Concluding that Dikteruk has not demonstrated reversible error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] This case began on April 23, 2018, when Unifund filed a complaint against Dikteruk for unpaid debt. Copies of the complaint and summons were left at what Unifund believed was Dikteruk's residence, 5012 North Emerson Avenue, on May 21 and mailed to that address by first class mail. Appellant's App. Vol. II, pp. 3 (chronological case summary), 26 (Return of Service). Dikteruk did not respond to the complaint.

[4] On October 18, 2018, Unifund moved for default judgment. On October 31, the trial court entered a default judgment against Dikteruk for $2,030.21.

[5] On four occasions in 2021 through 2024, Unifund moved the court for proceedings supplemental. Three of the motions involved the State of Indiana, and the fourth involved a bank. The court granted each motion and scheduled evidentiary hearings but later vacated the hearings and released the garnishee-defendants at Unifund's request.

[6] In February 2025, Unifund filed a fifth motion for proceedings supplemental. The trial court granted Unifund's motion and scheduled a hearing. The hearing proceeded as scheduled, and the court issued an order of garnishment to Dikteruk's employer on June 26, 2025.

[7] On August 22, 2025, Dikteruk moved to stay the order of garnishment. He also moved to set aside the order, alleging that he never received the original complaint and that he had meritorious defenses to Unifund's complaint. Unifund filed a response in opposition to the motion to set aside. The trial court held a hearing and denied Dikteruk's motions. Next, Dikteruk filed a motion to correct error. The court denied that motion, and this appeal followed.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[8] “Generally, we review a trial court's ruling on a motion to correct error for an abuse of discretion.” McGee v. Kennedy, 62 N.E.3d 467, 470 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Similarly, we generally review the denial of a motion under Trial Rule 60(B) for an abuse of discretion. See Wilkerson v. Egan, 253 N.E.3d 1149, 1151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (discussing standard of review for motion for relief from judgment).

[9] In this case, Unifund has not filed an appellee's brief. We will not undertake the burden of developing arguments on Unifund's behalf and will reverse if Dikteruk establishes prima facie error. WindGate Properties, LLC v. Sanders, 93 N.E.3d 809, 813 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). “Prima facie, in this context, means at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Id. “Even where the appellee has not filed a brief, we review questions of law de novo.” Davidson v. Hammond, 269 N.E.3d 1219, 1221 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025).

[10] Dikteruk is litigating without an attorney. “Pro se litigants are held to the same standard as trained counsel and are required to follow procedural rules.” Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Yang, 238 N.E.3d 649, 653 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). We give self-represented litigants “no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.” Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014).¹

II. Service of Process

[11] Dikteruk argues that the trial court should have set aside the default judgment because Unifund failed to ensure that he was served with the complaint and summons, depriving him of due process. “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). “The reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any chosen method may be defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected[.]” Id. at 315.

[12] The sufficiency of service of process, which is intended to address the notice element of due process under the Constitution, raises a question of law. Cotton v. Cotton, 942 N.E.2d 161, 164 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Grabowski v. Waters, 901 N.E.2d 560, 563 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)), trans. denied.

[13] The Indiana Supreme Court has adopted rules governing service of process that are intended to comply with due process requirements. Indiana Trial Rule 4.1 provides, in relevant part:

(A) In General. Service may be made upon an individual, or an individual acting in a representative capacity, by:

(1) sending a copy of the summons and complaint by registered or certified mail or other public means by which a written acknowledgment of receipt may be requested and obtained to his residence, place of business or employment with return receipt requested and returned showing receipt of the letter; or

(2) delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to him personally; or

(3) leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at his dwelling house or usual place of abode; or

(4) serving his agent as provided by rule, statute or valid agreement.

(B) Copy Service to Be Followed With Mail. When service is made under subdivision (A)(3) or (A)(4), the person making the service also must send by first class mail, a copy of the summons and the complaint to the address on the summons of the person being served, and this fact must be shown upon the return.

[14] “What is or is not a party's dwelling house or usual place of abode within the context of T.R. 4.1 is a question that turns on the particular facts of each case.” Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied. Here, Unifund sent the complaint and summons to Dikteruk via first class mail at his last known home address of 5012 North Emerson Avenue in Indianapolis. In addition, Unifund left a copy of the complaint and summons at the same address on May 21, 2018. These methods of service comply with Rule 4.1’s requirements.

[15] Dikteruk concedes that he had lived at the North Emerson address, but he argues that Unifund's attempts at service were ineffective because he had moved out before Unifund left a copy at, and mailed a copy to, that address. The record before the trial court was mixed on that point. In Dikteruk's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, he said that service of process occurred after he had moved out. But in his Renewed Motion to Stay Garnishment Pending Ruling on Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, he said that he moved out of that address in June 2018, which was after service of process occurred. On these facts, Dikteruk has failed to demonstrate that Unifund's manner of service of process was constitutionally inadequate. Cf. Mills v. Coil, 647 N.E.2d 679, 681 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (trial court did not err in vacating default judgment; defendant was not properly served with complaint because record showed he had moved out three months prior to service), trans. denied.

III. Motion to Set Aside Judgment – Proceedings Supplemental

[16] Dikteruk argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to set aside default judgment because it took “nearly seven years” for Unifund to obtain a garnishment order against his employer. Appellant's Br. p. 10. He claims that Unifund was not diligent and that he was unfairly prejudiced by the delay.

[17] Dikteruk cites Smith v. Johnston, 711 N.E.2d 1259 (Ind. 1999), but that case involved different facts. In Smith, the Indiana Supreme Court determined that the trial court should have set aside a default judgment. The plaintiff who obtained the default judgment had served the civil complaint upon the defendant but not upon defendant's counsel, even though defendant's counsel had previously told the plaintiff in writing that they represented defendant. The Supreme Court determined that plaintiff's conduct was consistent with the Indiana Trial Rules but was “unacceptable under the Rules of Professional Conduct.” Id. at 1263.

[18] Here, it does not appear that Dikteruk had hired counsel to whom Unifund could have sent the complaint and summons. In addition, Unifund initiated repeated proceedings supplemental, trying to enforce the judgment against Dikteruk by garnishment. Unifund withdrew four of its motions for proceedings supplemental after learning the garnishee-defendants had no connection to Dikteruk, but Unifund succeeded on the fifth attempt. This record shows that Unifund acted with diligence in attempting to enforce the judgment. Further, Dikteruk does not explain how he was prejudiced by the seven-year delay. He has failed to demonstrate prima facie error in the trial court's denial of his motion to set aside default judgment.

IV. Motion to Correct Error

[19] Dikteruk, citing Whittaker v. Dail, 584 N.E.2d 1084 (Ind. 1992), argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to correct error, claiming that choosing not to vacate the default judgment was “a manifest injustice.” Appellant's Br. p. 10. Whittaker is procedurally dissimilar to this case because it did not involve a motion to correct error. In any event, Dikteruk's argument on this point refers to the due process and diligence issues we have already addressed. Dikteruk has failed to show prima facie error in the denial of his motion to correct error.

Conclusion

[20] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[21] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We note that Dikteruk has provided an Appellant's Appendix with significant gaps. The Appellant's Appendix is intended to present the Court with parts of the Record on Appeal “that are necessary to decide the issues presented.” Appellate Rule 50(A)(1). Dikteruk's Appendix does not contain any of Unifund's motions for proceedings supplemental that it filed from 2021 to 2024, or Unifund's motions to cancel those proceedings. This omission is notable because Dikteruk argues that Unifund failed to diligently enforce the default judgment. Appellant's Br. p. 10.In addition, Dikteruk did not include in his appendix: (1) his motion to stay the garnishment order; and (2) Unifund's response in opposition to his motion to set aside the default judgment. Indiana Appellate Rule 27 provides, in relevant part: “The Record on Appeal shall consist of the Clerk's Record and all proceedings before the trial court or Administrative Agency, whether or not transcribed or transmitted to the Court on Appeal.” In addition, Evidence Rule 201(a)(2)(c) provides that we may take judicial notice of “records of a court of this state.” As a result, we take judicial notice of documents from the trial court's proceedings that Dikteruk failed to include in his Appendix. See Horton v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1162 (Ind. 2016) (taking judicial notice of trial court records). We obtained those documents through the Odyssey Case Management system.

Crone, Senior Judge.

Felix, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.