PETERSON v. PETERSON (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Ashley Marie Peterson (“Ashley”) appeals the trial court's denial of her March 13, 2026, Trial Rule 60(B) petition to set aside the November 14, 2025, order that approved the final accounting in her closed guardianship. Ashley filed that Trial Rule 60(B) petition in the trial court three days after this Court issued a decision affirming the same November 14, 2025, order. See In re Guardianship of Peterson, 277 N.E.3d 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. March 10, 2026) (mem.). Because our Court's decision had not yet been certified, the trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain Ashley's petition on the merits of the order that was still pending on appeal. See Norris v. Norris, 275 N.E.3d 505, 511 (Ind. 2026) (“Only upon certification does jurisdiction over that subject matter return to the trial court.”). Because the trial court had no authority to address the merits of Ashley's petition to set aside, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion when it summarily denied her petition. We accordingly affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 7, 2014, the court approved a special needs trust for Ashley's benefit and appointed her father, Donald Craig Peterson (“Craig”), as guardian of her person and estate. (App. Vol. II at 6.) In the spring of 2016, Ashley and Craig jointly petitioned to terminate the guardianship, and they supported their petition with a physician's report concluding that Ashley was no longer incapacitated. On May 19, 2016, the court terminated the guardianship in an order that indicated Craig would “submit a final accounting for the Court's approval.” (Id. at 82.)

[3] The matter lay largely dormant until August of 2021, when Ashley filed a petition for contempt of court. Craig then filed an “Accounting Summary,” which the court did not approve at that time. (Id. at 84.)

[4] In 2025, Ashley moved to set aside the final accounting. The trial court set the matter for an evidentiary hearing and directed Ashley to file specific written objections in advance. Ashley filed an exhibit list with supporting bank records and deeds, and Craig filed an affidavit. On November 14, 2025, the trial court issued an “Order on Final Guardianship Accounting and Objections” in which the trial court “belatedly accept[ed] and approve[d]” the Accounting Summary as the final accounting for the guardianship. (Id. at 84, 85.)

[5] Ashley filed a direct appeal of that order. On March 10, 2026, this Court affirmed the trial court's acceptance of the Accounting Summary, after holding the issues Ashley attempted to raise on appeal were waived for failure to comply with Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A). Peterson v. Peterson, 277 N.E.3d 1264, 2026 WL 672379 at *2-*3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026).

[6] Three days later, on March 13, 2026, Ashley filed in the trial court a “Verified Petition to Set Aside and Vacate Final Order,” that invoked Trial Rule 60(B)(3) and Indiana Code section 29-1-1-21. (App. Vol. II at 59.) She also tendered a discovery subpoena. On March 16, 2026, the trial court denied relief, stating: “Court denies motion to vacate order and quashes subpoena. Ms. Peterson has no authority to issue subpoenas, and the court does not authorize any to issue, as this case is closed.” (Id. at 83.)

Discussion and Decision

[7] Findings and orders in guardianship proceedings are committed to the discretion of the trial court, Ind. Code § 29-3-2-4(a), and we review the trial court's decisions “for an abuse of discretion, with a preference for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters.” Matter of Guardianship of A.E.R., 184 N.E.3d 629, 638 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). The order before us denied relief under Trial Rule 60(B), and we likewise review the denial of a Rule 60(B) motion for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when the trial court's decision “is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances” before it. McGhee v. Lamping, 198 N.E.3d 730, 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). Because the trial court ruled without conducting an evidentiary hearing, our review of its decision is de novo, Holland v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 171 N.E.3d 684, 688 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), and because Craig has not filed an appellee's brief, we apply a less stringent standard of review and will reverse if Ashley establishes prima facie error – that is, error “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” WindGate Props., LLC v. Sanders, 93 N.E.3d 809, 813 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). Our relaxed “standard, however, ‘does not relieve us of our obligation to correctly apply the law to the facts in the record in order to determine whether reversal is required.’ ” Id. (quoting Wharton v. State, 42 N.E.3d 539, 541 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)).

[8] Ashley filed her Trial Rule 60(B) petition for relief from the trial court's order of November 14, 2025, on March 13, 2026, which was three days after this Court decided her direct appeal challenging the validity of the same November 14, 2025, order. See In re Guardianship of Peterson, 277 N.E.3d 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. March 10, 2026) (mem.). In Norris, our Indiana Supreme Court explained that Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E) “prohibits trial courts, administrative agencies, and parties from taking action based on published opinions or memorandum decisions (collectively ‘opinions’) before they are certified.” 275 N.E.3d at 511. Opinions are not certified by the clerk's office until all the time windows for other forms of appellate review have passed, and this “certification process prevents trial courts from interfering with the subject matter of a pending appeal.” Id. Because Ashley's direct appeal was still pending before this court, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to address her newly filed Trial Rule 60(B) motion.¹ We therefore cannot hold the trial court abused its discretion when it summarily denied her petition. Contra Norris, 275 N.E.3d at 512 (holding trial court erred by issuing a revised order based on an uncertified appellate opinion).

Conclusion

[9] Because Ashley's direct appeal had not concluded when she filed her Trial Rule 60(B) petition, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to entertain her petition, which challenged the same order being reviewed on direct appeal. We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in summarily denying a petition when the trial court had no jurisdiction to hear that petition. Accordingly, we affirm.

[10] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Our Indiana Supreme Court has also explained that a party that wishes to pursue Trial Rule 60(B) relief from a judgment that remains pending on appeal may file a verified application in this Court seeking leave, setting forth the grounds specifically, and only if this Court finds the grounds sufficiently meritorious will we remand for consideration of the motion – a remand that terminates the appeal. Logal v. Cruse, 368 N.E.2d 235, 237 (Ind. 1977). The record before us does not demonstrate that Ashley sought this Court's leave prior to filing her petition in the trial court.

May, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Scheele, J., concur.