In the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: J.A. (Minor Child), and L.Z. (Mother) and J.S.A. (Father), Appellants-Respondents v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] L.Z. (“Mother”) and J.S.A. (“Father” and, together with Mother, “Parents”) appeal the involuntary termination of their parental rights to their minor child J.A. (“Child”). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Parents are the biological parents of Child, born in September 2019. The Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) first became involved with the family when Child tested positive at birth for Methadone, Cocaine, Fentanyl and Opiates. Mother admitted to using heroin during her pregnancy, including using it three days prior to giving birth. Father refused to submit to a drug screen. Child experienced severe withdrawal symptoms and had to be transferred to another hospital for treatment. Neither Parent visited Child while he was in the hospital being treated for withdrawal. Accordingly, DCS took custody of Child. The court adjudicated Child to be a child in need of services (“CHINS”) and ordered Parents to participate in reunification services. Child remained outside of Parents’ care for approximately two years and was ultimately placed back in their care.

[3] In 2021, Mother pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine as a level 6 felony. In 2023, Mother was charged in separate causes with possession of cocaine as a level 6 felony and possession of paraphernalia as a class C misdemeanor. In February 2024, Mother was charged with possession of cocaine as a level 6 felony.

[4] On May 14, 2024, DCS received a report alleging that Child was a victim of neglect after police executed a search warrant on the hotel room where Parents were residing and found “heroin, cocaine, crack, narcotics, scales and a ledger” indicating that Parents “were using and dealing the drugs.” Exhibits Volume I at 20. Four-year-old Child “was residing in the hotel with [Parents] and the drugs were within his reach.” Id. Police arrested Parents, and the State charged them with numerous felony counts. DCS removed Child from Parents’ care and placed him with his previous foster parents.

[5] On May 15, 2024, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was a CHINS due to Parents’ illegal drug use, unstable housing, and recent arrests. On October 30, 2024, the trial court adjudicated Child a CHINS based on both Mother's and Father's admissions/stipulations. The court entered a dispositional decree ordering Parents to participate in reunification services including orders that they complete a parenting assessment and all recommendations, complete a substance abuse assessment and all recommendations, submit to random drug screens, attend visitation with Child, and participate in homebased case management.

[6] In June 2024, DCS referred Parents to compete a substance abuse assessment. Neither Parent successfully completed the assessment.¹ At some point, Parents informed DCS that they had moved from Lake County to Indianapolis with the intent to participate in drug rehabilitation. Parents refused to provide proof of such participation or to sign releases so that DCS could obtain records from any alleged treatment facilities. Father informed a family case manager that he did not plan to participate in a substance abuse treatment program because he did not believe that he had a substance abuse problem.

[7] As for ordered random drug screens, Parents each refused to submit to random screens through a testing center, ultimately only allowing nonrandom screens conducted by their family case manager. Mother submitted to only three drug screens, testing positive for cocaine and buprenorphine on September 6, 2024, and for fentanyl and buprenorphine on March 15, 2025. Father submitted to only five drug screens, testing positive for cocaine on March 16, 2025.

[8] Both Parents were inconsistent regarding visitation with Child. Mother did not participate in visitation for extended periods of time. Father was more consistent than Mother and eventually progressed to unsupervised overnight visits with Child. However, in late July 2025, this arrangement quickly reverted back to supervised visits after Father was arrested during one of his unsupervised visits with Child. The State charged Father with possession of cocaine as a level 5 felony and resisting law enforcement as a level 6 felony. Upon DCS's motion, the court suspended Father's overnight visits and, upon motion of the Court-Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”), the court subsequently changed Child's permanency plan solely to adoption. The court further ordered “DCS shall file the petition for termination of parental rights within the next 30 days.” Exhibits Volume I at 189.

[9] On September 17, 2025, DCS filed a verified petition to terminate Parents’ parental rights to Child. The court held a factfinding hearing on December 23, 2025. DCS presented the testimony of Family Case Manager Supervisor Haley McLean, Family Case Manager Danielle Casey, and Family Case Manager Karen Davis (“FCM Davis”). Mother and Father each testified on their own behalf. Father also presented the testimony of his sister.

[10] On January 6, 2026, the court entered its findings of fact, conclusions thereon and order terminating Parents’ parental rights. Specifically, the court found that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or continued placement outside Parents’ care will not be remedied; continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child's well-being; termination of Parents’ parental rights is in Child's best interests; and there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Child, that being adoption by his current foster care placement.

Discussion

[11] Parents each challenge the termination of their parental rights. Regarding petitions seeking the termination of parental rights, Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 ² provides in pertinent part that DCS must allege as follows:

(c) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

(d) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege the existence of one (1) or more of the following circumstances:

* * * * *

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

[12] If the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a). A finding in a proceeding to terminate parental rights must be based upon clear and convincing evidence. Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2. We do not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses but consider only the evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014). We confine our review to two steps: whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings, and then whether the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment. Id. We give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand. Id. “Because a case that seems close on a ‘dry record’ may have been much more clear-cut in person, we must be careful not to substitute our judgment for the trial court when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.” Id. at 640. To the extent Parents do not challenge the court's findings of fact, the unchallenged facts stand as proven. See In re B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (failure to challenge findings by the trial court resulted in waiver of the argument that the findings were clearly erroneous), trans. denied.

[13] We first address Parents’ challenge to the trial court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside their care will not be remedied.³ In determining whether the conditions that resulted in Child's removal will not be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. See E.M, 4 N.E.3d at 642-643. First, we identify the conditions that led to removal, and second, we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. Id. at 643. In the second step, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness as of the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions, balancing a parent's recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination. Id. Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that a parent's past behavior is the best predictor of future behavior. Id. The statute does not simply focus on the initial basis for a child's removal for purposes of determining whether a parent's rights should be terminated, but also those bases resulting in the continued placement outside the home. In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). A court may consider evidence of a parent's prior criminal history, drug abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, lack of adequate housing and employment, and the services offered by DCS and the parent's response to those services. Id.

[14] The record reveals that Child was removed from Parents’ care due to substance abuse, criminal activity, and housing instability. Throughout the pendency of the CHINS case, neither Mother nor Father was fully compliant with ordered services. Both Parents continued to abuse drugs, refused to submit to random drug screens, and tested positive for illegal substances in the spring of 2025 shortly before the filing of the termination petition. Mother and Father were both inconsistent with visitation, and although Father did eventually progress to unsupervised visitation, he engaged in criminal drug-related activity during one of those visits which resulted in his arrest. In light of the evidence set forth above and in the record, we cannot say the trial court clearly erred in finding that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside Parents’ care will not be remedied.

[15] Parents also challenge the trial court's conclusion that termination of their parental rights is in Child's best interests. In determining the best interests of children, the trial court is required to look to the totality of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). The court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children. Id. The court need not wait until children are irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. The recommendation of a case manager and child advocate, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the children's best interests. In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), reh'g denied, trans. denied; A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158-1159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[16] FCM Davis opined that termination of Parents’ parental rights and adoption by Child's current foster placement was in Child's best interests. She noted that, due to the two CHINS cases, Child had been out of Parents’ care and in the same foster placement for “almost two-thirds of his life.” Transcript Volume II at 71. She emphasized both Parents’ ongoing substance abuse and history of criminal behavior, observing that neither Mother nor Father had demonstrated the ability to provide for Child's “financial, emotional, medical, and ․ spiritual needs,” that neither had addressed any of the issues that led to Child's removal from their care, and that neither had demonstrated that they can provide Child safety, consistency, or stability. Id. at 72. The CASA agreed with DCS's opinion that termination was in Child's best interests, urging the court to “grant the [termination] petition.” Id. at 119. In light of the recommendation of the case manager and the child advocate to terminate parental rights, as well as the ample evidence in the record regarding Parents’ failure to remedy the conditions resulting in removal, we cannot say the trial court clearly erred in finding that termination of Parents’ parental rights is in Child's best interests.

[17] Finally, Father asserts that the court erred in denying him “the opportunity to present evidence as to potential guardianship as an alternative permanency plan” for Child. Appellant Father's Brief at 15.⁴ Our standard of review of a trial court's admission or exclusion of evidence is an abuse of discretion. A.L., 223 N.E.3d 1126, 1134 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing In re Des. B., 2 N.E.3d 828, 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)), trans. denied. A trial court abuses its discretion only if its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id.

[18] Here, Father requested to call Mother's aunt as a witness “for prospective guardianship purposes.” Transcript Volume II at 86. He further requested to question his sister for the same purpose. DCS objected to the testimony as lacking “relevance to the termination of parental rights proceeding,” stating that it was an “issue for the CHINS court.” Id. As observed by counsel for DCS, “the permanency plan is not what we're discussing here today ․ it's whether these [P]arents have done what they're supposed to do in order to prevent termination.” Id. at 81-82. The court excluded the testimony, stating that “whether or not there's a guardianship available has no necessary bearing or relevance to the termination of parental rights proceedings at this point.” Id. at 86.⁵

[19] It is well settled that termination proceedings are civil in nature and are therefore governed by the Indiana Trial Rules. Matter of A.W., 273 N.E.3d 1131, 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). Ind. Evidence Rule 401 provides that “[e]vidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Ind. Evidence Rule 402 provides that “[i]rrelevant evidence is not admissible.” We agree with the trial court that the excluded testimony was of no consequence in determining whether sufficient evidence supported the termination of Parents’ rights and it was therefore irrelevant. We cannot say the court abused its discretion in excluding the evidence.

[20] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's termination of Parents’ parental rights to Child.

[21] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother completed the written portion of the assessment but “refused the drug screen” claiming that she and Father were “checking themselves into rehab soon.” Exhibits Volume I at 82.

2.   We observe that Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 was amended March 11, 2024. Pub. L. No. 70-2024, § 4 (eff. March 11, 2024)). While each Parent appears to cite to the prior version of the statute in their briefs, as DCS filed the termination petition on September 17, 2025, there is no question that the amended version of the statute applies here.

3.   To the extent Parents challenge the trial court's conclusions regarding additional subsections of Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d), we need not address those arguments as the involuntary termination statute is written in the disjunctive and requires proof of only one of the circumstances listed.

4.   To the extent that Father's argument can also be interpreted as a challenge to the trial court's conclusion that DCS has a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Child, Father has not established clear error. Indiana courts have held that for a plan to be “ ‘satisfactory’ ” for the purposes of the termination statute, it “ ‘need not be detailed, so long as it offers a general sense of the direction in which the child will be going after the parent-child relationship is terminated.’ ” In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. and Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied), trans. denied. The record supports the trial court's finding that DCS has a satisfactory post-termination plan for Child, that being adoption by his current foster placement.

5.   The record indicates that the court permitted Father's sister to testify as a witness for the “limited purpose” of “contradicting some evidence already in the record” but that “anything related to the guardianship” was deemed “irrelevant” and was “barred.” Transcript Volume II at 88.

Brown, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.