LEE v. LEE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] When Christopher Lee (“Father”) and Kristie Lee (“Mother”) divorced, they had one child (“Son”). In 2026, when Son was fourteen, Father filed a motion to modify the parenting time schedule previously set out in a mediated agreement. The parties submitted the case to a family law arbitrator, who held a hearing and entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon modifying some of the parenting time provisions of the mediated agreement. The trial court adopted the arbitrator's findings and conclusions as an order of the court. Father appeals, asserting the order is an abuse of discretion. We affirm in part and remand.

Facts and Procedural History 1

[2] Father and Mother divorced in 2013. The trial court awarded joint legal custody of then-one-year-old Son, with Mother having primary physical custody and Father having parenting time. In 2022, Mother filed a motion to modify Father's parenting time. The parties reached a mediated settlement agreement for the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines to apply with certain exceptions. One exception was that Father would have parenting time on alternating weekends from Saturday at 9:00 p.m. until Monday morning to accommodate his schedule as a truck driver. Another was that parenting time during Son's summer vacation would be exercised on a week on/week off rotation. Parents were to be present for all their parenting time. If it was necessary for someone other than a parent or responsible household family member to care for Son, the parent needing childcare was to offer the other parent the opportunity for additional parenting time. Under the agreement, “[a] cousin is not considered a household family member.” Mediated Settlement Agreement at 3 (Nov. 16, 2022).²

[3] At some point after the 2022 agreement, Father's driving schedule changed and his work obligations began on Sundays, so he was unable to exercise parenting time through Monday mornings as agreed. He also returned home on Fridays instead of Saturdays. Because of this “misalignment” between Father's scheduled parenting time and his work schedule, in February 2026, he filed a motion to modify parenting time. [Father's] Verified Motion to Modify Parenting Time at 1 (Feb. 3, 2026). He proposed his parenting time be modified to alternating Fridays from 6:00 p.m. to Sundays at 6:00 p.m. He requested parenting time “commence as scheduled and ․ not be forfeited solely because [his] work obligations delay his physical arrival at the commencement time[.]” Id. at 2. Father also proposed that Son's summer break be split in half, with Father exercising his parenting time continuously for the first half.

[4] The arbitrator held a hearing in March 2026 at which both Father and Mother appeared pro se. Father explained he picks up a load for deliveries on Sundays and returns home on Fridays. The timing varies, but he usually picks up on Sundays between 4:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. and returns on Fridays between 6:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. Father is typically told between 8:00 a.m. and noon on Friday what time his Sunday pickup will be. But as for the timing of his return home on Friday, Father explained how “sometimes [it] can be six [o'clock] and sometimes it won't be”:

[W]hen I have that load for Friday, there's delivery times․ Let's say [my last stop is] 3:00 p.m. But if I get there at 12:00 p.m. and that store receives that load, then ․ I can make it back [home] on time to do that 6:00 p.m. [drop off]․ I could probably provide [that information] to [Mother], [but] it would be on the fly-ish somewhat.

Tr. Vol. 2 at 25. He testified he moved to modify because the “current order [is] rigid, so it basically[ ] set me up ․ to be into forfeiture based off ․ my availability at that proposed time that was in the previous order” and he did not have an opportunity to make up that time. Id. at 8.

[5] Mother testified she agreed with shifting parenting time due to Father's new schedule: “Life happens. It's not an inconvenience.” Id. at 15. But she was concerned about setting parenting time to begin at 6:00 p.m. on Fridays because Son has activities on Fridays and because “to [her] understanding, [Father has] never returned before nine o'clock on a Friday night.” Id.³ She did not want Son to be dropped off at Father's house “on a Friday at a time when [Father] is not even [home],” hearkening back to the provisions in the mediated agreement that Father must be present for parenting time and Father's significant other could not care for Son in Father's absence. Id. at 13. She was willing to set a pickup time of 10:00 p.m. “if that will kind of cover the bases so then we have a structured schedule[.]” Id. at 12. In essence, Mother wanted a schedule that would ensure Father was at home during his parenting time and keep Son from being disappointed and feeling “a sense of rejection” if Father was unable to arrive on time. Id. at 11. Mother also questioned setting parenting time to end at 6:00 p.m. on Sunday, explaining she has had to pick up Son at 5:00 p.m. most weeks. Mother testified the existing summer parenting time arrangement “had worked really nice with [Father's] schedule” but she “was “not totally against” splitting the summer half and half. Id. at 13.

[6] Father said 10:00 p.m. on Friday “would be a time that I would say is reasonable. I can get to that time. But, what happens when I get [home] at six? ․ That's just time I lost and I don't have a way to make up․ That's the thing you've got to consider. I'm still losing.” Id. at 18, 23. Despite saying earlier he picks up loads between 4:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. on Sundays, Father insisted he “can do the six. Especially if in the front half [he's] going to lose more time.” Id. at 23. He asked that Son “simply just be dropped off so the parenting time could commence” for “that 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. window” whether he was home or not. Id. at 28.

[7] The arbitrator made findings of fact and conclusions of law which the trial court adopted and entered as the court's judgment. The court found there has been a substantial change in Father's work schedule that makes the parenting time schedule in the Mediated Settlement Agreement “unworkable and therefore unreasonable.” Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Court Order Regarding Modification of Parenting Time at 1 (Mar. 23, 2026) (“Order”). The court found:

1.4 Father ․ is generally on the road starting Sunday evening between 4:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. and returning Friday evening between 6:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m.

1.5 Father is informed of his weekly driving schedule on Sundays between 8:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m.

Id. at 1.

[8] Accordingly, the trial court granted Father's petition in part, and modified parenting time as follows:

1.6 Father shall have access to [Son] on alternating weekends starting on Fridays between 6:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. until Sunday between 4:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. and at all other times and places as the parties may agree. Upon receipt of the driving schedule, Father[ ] shall immediately notify Mother of the driving schedule, not later than 12:00 p.m. on Sunday, and determine specific times for pick up/drop off of [Son] between the two (2) time frames set out above.

1.7 Should Father fail to notify Mother of his driving schedule by 12:00 p.m. on Sunday, Father shall have parenting time on alternating weekends from Friday at 9:00 p.m. through Sunday at 4:00 p.m.

1.8 Other provisions of the prior order are not modified: All other provisions of the prior prevailing Orders of the Court not specifically modified herein shall remain in full force and effect.

Id. at 1-2 (emphasis added) (capitalization omitted).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying parenting time, but the notice provision should be clarified.

[9] As mentioned, both parties are pro se on appeal. Father's opening brief contains no citations to caselaw, and the few statutory citations are to statutes that are not applicable.⁴ Mother's brief cites only three cases, all stating the standard of review.⁵ Neither party cites the statute directly applicable to modifications in this context; Indiana Code Section 31-17-4-2 states, “The court may modify an order granting or denying parenting time rights whenever modification would serve the best interests of the child.”. See Hazelett v. Hazelett, 119 N.E.3d 153, 161 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“In all parenting time controversies, courts must give foremost consideration to the best interests of the child.”). We will review the trial court's order through that lens.⁶

[10] Parenting time decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Perkinson v. Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ind. 2013). We do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses and we give latitude and deference to the trial court, as we do in all family law matters. See In re Paternity of C.H., 936 N.E.2d 1270, 1273 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. We will reverse only if the trial court abuses its discretion. Id. “If there is a rational basis for the trial court's determination, then no abuse of discretion will be found.” Id.

[11] Indiana recognizes the presumed right of a noncustodial parent to visit his child as a “precious privilege.” Duncan v. Duncan, 843 N.E.2d 966, 969 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. We also recognize a child's right to have parenting time with the noncustodial parent because that is presumed to be in the child's best interest. Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d at 764. Although the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines provide specific parenting times for a child of a given age, the purpose of the Guidelines “is to provide a model which may be adjusted depending upon the unique needs and circumstances of each family.” Ind. Parenting Time Guidelines, Preamble (2022).

[12] Neither party questions the need for modification in this case, as Father's availability no longer aligns with the existing parenting time order. The previous Saturday to Monday schedule meant Father was often unable to exercise the second overnight once his schedule changed. The modified Friday to Sunday parenting time schedule implicitly sets the baseline for Father's parenting time as 9:00 p.m. on Friday to 4:00 p.m. on Sunday and re-establishes the second overnight. Yet Father is not satisfied with the modification because he believes the order “perpetuates the loss of parenting time.” Appellant's Br. at 8. Without explicitly saying so, Father requested parenting time be modified to standard Guidelines weekend visitation—6:00 p.m. on Friday to 6:00 p.m. on Sunday. See Parenting Time G., Section II(D)(1)(a). But evidence from the modification hearing shows that schedule would not meet the “unique needs and circumstances” of this family for several reasons. Id., Preamble.

[13] First, by his own admission, Father cannot reliably exercise parenting time beginning at 6:00 p.m on Friday and continuing until 6:00 p.m. on Sunday. Contrary to Father's assertions, he is not losing or forfeiting any time under the modified schedule because he is not exercising parenting time if he is not actually available to parent.⁷ Second, the provisions of the previous order that Father must be present for all of his parenting time and Father's significant other cannot care for Son in his absence remain in effect. See Order at 2, ¶ 1.8. We are not privy to the full context behind these provisions, but the parties previously agreed it was in Son's best interests to include these parameters and the trial court ordered they should continue. Third, Mother testified that Son felt a sense of rejection when he expected to be with Father at a certain time, but Father was unable to be there. It is in Son's best interests to have a schedule that assures Father's presence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting a different parenting time schedule than Father requested.

[14] The trial court also tried to accommodate the variability of Father's work obligations by allowing parenting time to begin as early as 6:00 p.m. on Friday and/or end as late as 6:00 p.m. on Sunday. That extra time with Father is also in Son's best interest as long as the schedule is appropriately communicated in advance. However, the notice provision triggering this extra time is incompatible with the evidence. Father testified he would learn between 8:00 a.m. and noon on Friday what time he had to leave on Sunday. But he would only know what time he would return home on Friday “on the fly-ish” that day. Tr. Vol. 2 at 25. Paragraph 1.5 of the Order states Father will know his schedule for the week (both pick up and return) on Sundays between 8:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m. Based on this finding, Paragraph 1.6 of the Order seems to require Father to give notice before he knows his schedule. We therefore remand for the trial court to clarify the notice provision based on the evidence already presented.

[15] Father also claims the trial court abused its discretion by failing to address make-up time and extended parenting time in the summer. But the trial court did not fail to address those issues; it essentially denied Father's request to modify them. See Order at 2, ¶ 1.8 (stating all issues “not specifically modified herein remain in full force and effect”). With respect to make-up time, the Guidelines address that issue, and the mediated settlement agreement incorporates the Guidelines “not inconsistent with” the parties’ agreement. Mediated Settlement Agreement at 3. As to extended parenting time, Father requested a modification but offered no reason in Son's best interest to do so. The parties previously agreed to a deviation from the Guidelines’ summer parenting time, and the trial court chose to leave that agreement in place. We discern no abuse of discretion in this regard.

Conclusion

[16] We affirm the trial court's modification of parenting time but remand for the trial court to clarify the notice provision of the Order.

[17] Affirmed in part and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Testimony from the arbitration hearing reveals Father's significant other is his first cousin. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 25–26. It appears this relationship has created some conflict between the parties and is apparently the reason behind this provision.

3.   Mother explained the parties live within a quarter mile of each other and she can see Father's car from her backyard.

4.   Father cites statutes regarding modification of custody instead of modification of parenting time. Father and Mother both cite a statute providing exceptions to the general rule that a non-custodial parent is entitled to parenting time.

5.   Father's Reply Brief contains citations to the same three cases Mother cites, but no others.

6.   Any issues not discussed herein are waived for failure to present an argument supported by cogent reasoning and citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the Record on Appeal relied on. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a); see also Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983–84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (noting we hold pro se litigants to the same standard as licensed attorneys, requiring them to follow the established rules of procedure and imposing the same consequences for failure to do so, including waiver for failure to present cogent argument).

7.   Father interprets the order to mean that if he cannot be present by 9:00 p.m. on Friday at the latest, his parenting time for that weekend will be “entirely lost.” Appellant's Br. at 8. Based on Father's assurances at the hearing, he should be available for parenting time by that time. If occasionally he is not available because of events outside his control, the Guidelines provide for adjustments to the schedule. Parenting Time G., Section I(C)(2). Mother's willingness to set the pickup time as late as 10:00 p.m. demonstrates her ability to be flexible and “exercise reasonable judgment” in her dealings with Father about parenting time issues. Parenting Time G., Section I(C).

Kenworthy, Judge.

Mathias, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.