IN RE: N.W. (Minor Child) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] H.W. (Mother) appeals the trial court's determination that her son, N.W. (Child), is a Child in Need of Services (CHINS). Mother presents two issues on appeal which we restate as (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the adjudication, and (2) whether the court violated Mother's due process rights by conditioning Mother's parenting time on her submitting to drug screens. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother is the biological mother of Child, born in May 2019. In December 2024, the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) received a report that Child was a victim of abuse and neglect due to Mother's illicit drug use and “concerns for [Child's] feeding.” Tr. p. 61. Family Case Manager (FCM) Britain Skinner met with Mother to discuss the allegations and observed “red marks all over” Mother's neck. Id. at 62. Mother stated that her boyfriend J.H. (Boyfriend) inflicted the marks while Child was present.¹ Mother told FCM Skinner that she would obtain a protective order against Boyfriend. However, the next day FCM Skinner learned the couple was living together again. During a follow-up visit, Mother refused to take a drug screen and ignored questions about Boyfriend living in the home. She did not allow FCM Skinner to see Child.

[3] DCS filed a CHINS petition on December 23, 2024, under Cause No. 48C02-2412-JC-567, and alleged Child was seriously endangered by his exposure to domestic violence. In January 2025, the trial court ordered that Child be removed from the home. Mother and Boyfriend submitted to a drug screen. Mother tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamine; Boyfriend tested positive for methamphetamine.

[4] When DCS removed then-five-year-old Child from Mother's care, he could not speak or eat solid food. Child was underweight and suffered from poor posture and muscle weakness in his core and legs; as a result, Child struggled to perform daily activities or walk. He also had calcified plaque and an oral infection which required medication to treat. His medical records indicated that he had not received medical care since he was eighteen months old, and he had never seen a dentist. Child was initially placed with his great-aunt (Great-Aunt) and later placed with his maternal aunt (Aunt) and uncle.

[5] Due to a delay in bringing Child's case to factfinding, DCS voluntarily dismissed its CHINS petition in March and refiled a second petition under Cause No. 48C02-2503-JC-165 on March 31. In its second petition, DCS alleged that Child was a CHINS because Mother was unable or unwilling to provide necessary medical care, supervision, or a safe living environment free of domestic violence and substance abuse. During the initial hearing, Mother refused to submit to a drug screen. She also claimed that she would not test positive for any substance. The trial court ordered Mother to “engage in drug screens based on the first failed screen ․ if [she] want[ed] to have visitations.” Id. at 15. Mother did not exercise parenting time or submit to additional drug screens throughout the remainder of the proceedings.

[6] Mother later filed several pro se motions requesting the trial court remove any precondition for visitation. The trial court held a hearing on Mother's outstanding motions on June 18. Mother did not appear. DCS recommended that Mother be ordered to participate in supervised visitation that is “not ․ contingent on drug screening.” Id. at 46. DCS stated that a third-party provider could terminate a visit if Child's wellbeing was threatened. The trial court denied Mother's request.

[7] A factfinding hearing was held on July 17 and 18. DCS presented evidence of the facts set forth above. Additionally, FCM Jessica Milliner testified that she submitted referrals for Mother to complete home-based casework and a substance abuse evaluation. Mother did not engage in these services. FCM Milliner stated that Boyfriend was recently arrested for illegal possession of a syringe. She did not believe that Mother's home was free of substance abuse or domestic violence.

[8] Great-Aunt and Aunt testified about how Mother's treatment of Child impacted his wellbeing. Great-Aunt testified that Child once “made a line with [baby formula] and snuffed [sic] it up his nose[.]” Id. at 134. She recalled Mother telling her that she could leave Child unsupervised in the shower “[f]or a few hours” if she needed to “do a few errands[.]” Id. at 95, 96. But Great-Aunt said Child was “fearful of showers” and “would literally shake uncontrollably.” Id. at 95. Aunt testified that Mother “would shove cupcakes in his mouth to keep him quiet” even though Child could not eat solid food. Id. at 101-02.

[9] DCS presented evidence of Child's medical history and progress since removal. Child was diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder, which severely impacted his physical mobility and speech. He began attending weekly physical therapy to improve his poor posture and muscle weakness. He also participated in weekly speech and feeding therapy and was scheduled to undergo an occupational therapy evaluation. He is now able to eat solid food, walk and move “more independent[ly,]” and is making progress with potty training. Id. at 102.

[10] Mother presented no evidence on her behalf, and she did not attend the second day of the factfinding hearing. The court adjudicated Child a CHINS.

[11] The trial court held a dispositional hearing on October 15. During the hearing, Mother requested that the court amend its findings to incorporate new evidence of her scheduling medical appointments for Child before his removal. She also renewed her request to visit Child without taking a drug test. The court denied both requests and entered a dispositional decree. Mother was ordered to submit to random drug screens, participate in services, comply with all recommendations, complete substance abuse and parenting assessments, complete a psychological evaluation, and participate in home-based casework and domestic violence services. The court ordered Mother to participate in therapeutic visitation, which would not begin until she submitted to a drug screen. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. CHINS Adjudication

[12] Mother contends the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's determination that Child is a CHINS. Specifically, she challenges the trial court's conclusions that (1) her actions or inactions seriously endangered Child, and (2) Child's needs would go unmet without coercive intervention. In reviewing a trial court's CHINS determination, “we do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility” but consider only the evidence supporting the trial court's judgment and the reasonable inferences therefrom. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 577-78 (Ind. 2017). Where, as here, the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we consider “first, whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the judgment.” Id. at 578 (quotations omitted). We reverse only if the CHINS determination was clearly erroneous, which occurs if “the record facts do not support the findings” or the wrong legal standard is applied. Id. Furthermore, we accept as true any findings not challenged on appeal. In re B.W., 266 N.E.3d 744, 749 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied.

[13] The trial court found Child to be a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1.² This statute provides a child is a CHINS if that child is under eighteen and:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

[14] DCS has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the child is a CHINS. Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3 (1997). In sum, a CHINS adjudication “requires three basic elements: that the parent's actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child, that the child's needs are unmet, and (perhaps most critically) that those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014), reh'g denied.

[15] Mother does not challenge the trial court's findings of fact, so we accept them as true. See In re B.W., 266 N.E.3d at 749. Instead, she argues that DCS failed to show she seriously impaired or endangered Child and that Child's needs would not be met without coercive intervention. We disagree.

A. Seriously Impaired or Endangered

[16] First, Mother claims there is insufficient evidence that she seriously impaired or endangered Child. However, the record contains ample evidence to support the trial court's conclusion. Mother never took Child to a dentist, and she had not obtained medical care for him in several years. As a result, Child's oral infection and built-up plaque went untreated until his removal. By neglecting Child's physical mobility, speech, and eating issues, Mother allowed Child to languish. Mother endangered Child by forcing solid food into his mouth that he could not eat to “keep him quiet[.]” Tr. p. 102. Additionally, she displayed a disregard for Child's wellbeing when she encouraged Great-Aunt to leave Child unattended in the shower for hours at a time. The trial court “infer[red]” from Great-Aunt's testimony that Mother “previously left [Child] unsupervised in the shower[.]” App. Vol. II p. 69. The court found leaving Child unsupervised in the shower was “physically dangerous and mentally harmful, the latter of which is evidenced by the Child's uncontrollable fear of the shower[.]” Id. All these actions seriously endangered Child.

[17] Second, the trial court's findings support a conclusion that Mother endangered Child by using drugs in his presence. Mother tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamine in January 2025, and she has since refused to test. Mother's refusals and Boyfriend's recent arrest indicate that she has not eliminated drug use in the home. Child even mimicked drug use by making a line of baby formula and sniffing it up his nose. From all this, the court could reasonably infer that Mother exposed him to illegal substances and deprived him of sober supervision. See In re J.L., 919 N.E.2d 561, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (finding evidence that child was present while her parent used drugs demonstrated the parent failed to provide responsible supervision and endangered the child). And Child's need for appropriate supervision was especially important here due to his physical condition, developmental issues, and young age.

[18] Finally, the evidence supports the trial court's finding that Child was harmed by exposure to domestic violence. “[A] child's exposure to domestic violence can support a CHINS finding. Additionally, a single incident of domestic violence in a child's presence may support a CHINS finding, and it need not necessarily be repetitive.” K.A.H. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 119 N.E.3d 1115, 1120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quotations and citations omitted). Here, Boyfriend inflicted “red marks all over” Mother's neck while Child was present. Tr. p. 62. This single incident could support the court's adjudication. Further, the record shows Mother has done nothing to alleviate the risk of future domestic violence episodes. She has not participated in domestic violence services, and she still allows Boyfriend access to the home. Given this, we cannot say the trial court erred in determining Child was seriously impaired or endangered by Mother's conduct.

B. Coercive Intervention

[19] Next, we turn to Mother's contention that the findings do not support the conclusion that Child's needs are unlikely to be met without coercive intervention. This “guards against unwarranted State interference in family life, reserving that intrusion for families ‘where parents lack the ability to provide for their children,’ not merely where they ‘encounter difficulty in meeting a child's needs.’ ” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287 (quoting Lake Cnty. Div. of Family & Children Servs. v. Charlton, 631 N.E.2d 526, 528 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)) (emphasis in original). The question is whether parents must be coerced into providing or accepting necessary treatment for their child. See id. at 1289-90 (reversing CHINS determination where there was a lack of evidence that mother would need to be coerced to take training to address child's special medical needs).

[20] The record shows Mother was unable or unwilling to address Child's needs for medical care and sober supervision. Mother tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamine in January 2025. Her refusal to participate in substance abuse services or submit to drug screens—even at the cost of visiting with Child—indicates that she will not address her drug habit absent an order from the court. See In re A.B., 924 N.E.2d 666, 671 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (finding a parent's refusal to submit to drug testing and failure to participate in services indicated that she had not remedied her drug abuse issue).

[21] Turning to Child's medical needs, Mother did not provide any medical care for Child past the age of eighteen months. As a result, Child received no treatment or therapy to improve his wellbeing and quality of life. He did not make progress speaking, eating solid food, and moving independently until after his removal. The record indicates that Child would languish without the court's intervention. Mother is unlikely to provide medical care or take Child to his weekly therapy appointments on her own.

[22] Still, Mother contends that she demonstrated a willingness to address Child's medical needs by scheduling appointments for him. But her argument amounts to an improper invitation for us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 577-78. Moreover, Mother did not present this evidence at the factfinding hearing. She cannot rely on unsubstantiated claims that were not presented to the trial court. See In re G.P., 4 N.E.3d 1158, 1164 (Ind. 2014) (“[A] pro se litigant is held to the same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.”). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that Mother was unlikely to meet Child's needs without coercive intervention. The evidence sufficiently supports Child's CHINS adjudication.

II. Parenting Time Restriction

[23] Mother claims that the trial court violated her substantive and procedural due process rights by conditioning her parenting time on her submission to drug screens.³ DCS argues that Mother's argument simply alleges a violation of DCS's statutory obligation to provide reasonable efforts but does not amount to a due process violation. Because we view a restriction on Mother's parenting time as an interference with her fundamental right to parent, we address Mother's due process claim.⁴

[24] “To advance a child's best interests during CHINS proceedings, our trial courts are vested with broad discretion. But this discretion is not unbounded. Courts must uphold the parties’ due process rights and take into account recommendations and input from DCS, parents, children, and others.” In re E.K., 260 N.E.3d 901, 909 (Ind. 2025) (quotations and citations omitted). “[D]ue process protections at all stages of CHINS proceedings are vital because every CHINS proceeding has the potential to interfere with the rights of parents in the upbringing of their children.” In re G.P., 4 N.E.3d at 1165 (quotations and citations omitted). The process due in a CHINS proceeding is the same as what is due in a termination of parental rights proceeding. Id.

[25] To determine whether a parent was afforded due process, “we balance the three factors laid out by the U.S. Supreme Court in Mathews[ v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976)]: ‘(1) the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the State's chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure.’ ” Id. at 1165-66 (quoting In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1257 (Ind. 2012)). “[T]he resulting balance of those factors must provide ‘the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” Id. at 1166 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333). Because the State and the parent have substantial interests affected by the proceeding, we focus on the risk of error created by the trial court's actions. In re T.W., 135 N.E.3d 607, 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

[26] At issue here is whether the trial court's requiring Mother to take a drug test before visiting Child created a risk of error such that a due process violation occurred. The trial court was required to enter a dispositional order that was in the best interests of Child while imposing the least restraint on the freedom of Child and Mother. Ind. Code § 31-34-19-6(a)(4) (2023). While there is no statute specific to the CHINS context related to parenting time, our courts have found the parenting time statute applied in family law contexts, Indiana Code section 31-17-4-2, to be instructive. See In re E.W., 26 N.E.3d 1006, 1009 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (applying Indiana Code section 31-17-4-2 in addressing a parent's challenge to the CHINS court's order regarding visits with her child). Indiana Code section 31-17-4-2 allows a court to modify parenting time “whenever modification would serve the best interests of the child” and to restrict parenting time if “the court finds that the parenting time might endanger the child's physical health or significantly impair the child's emotional development.”

[27] Here, the trial court entered the following relevant findings and conclusions that support requiring Mother to test for drug use before visitation:

17. At [the detention] hearing, [Mother] submitted to a drug screen that returned a positive result for amphetamine and methamphetamine.

***

19. While this drug use in and of itself is concerning, worse yet is that the Child was exposed to substance abuse while [Mother] was responsible for his care.

20. After the Court continued its detention order following the January 10, 2025 hearing, the Child was placed with [Great-Aunt], at which time the Child arranged baby formula into a line and attempted to snort it, an act consistent with having observed substance use and attempting to mimic it.

***

48. Additionally, despite [Mother's] history of substance use, [Boyfriend's] substance use, and the history of domestic violence between the two of them, [Mother] continues to have contact with [Boyfriend].

***

52. Although DCS has made services available to [Mother] to remedy these safety issues and reunite her with her child, including family preservation services, home-based case management, domestic violence classes, drug screens, and a substance use assessment, [Mother] has failed to engage in any of them.

***

6. The Child's physical and mental conditions are seriously endangered and seriously impaired by [Mother's] inability, unwillingness, and failure to provide the child with a safe and stable home environment free of domestic violence and substance use․

App. Vol. II pp. 67-74.

[28] These unchallenged findings establish that Mother cannot provide a drug-free home. Allowing Child to return to Mother would place his physical condition in jeopardy. Accordingly, restricting Mother's visitation with Child was in his best interests. Mother claims this decision “effectively terminated the parent-child relationship[;]” but she was free to begin therapeutic visits with Child if she complied with the court's order to submit to drug screens. Appellant's Br. p. 14. Her inability to see Child was a consequence of her own decision not to screen. We are also unpersuaded by Mother's argument that the court erred by not following DCS's recommendation for supervised visitation. It was within the trial court's discretion to determine what was in Child's best interests. We cannot say the court's decision created a risk of error such that a due process violation occurred. We affirm.

[29] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   DCS refers to Boyfriend as “Father” throughout its brief, but the record indicates that E.L. is Child's alleged father. E.L. does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1 was amended effective July 1, 2026. The relevant portions of the statute remain unchanged.

3.   To the extent that Mother challenges the trial court's rulings regarding parenting time that occurred prior to the CHINS adjudication, there is no relief available because the restriction on Mother's parenting time is now based on the CHINS adjudication and dispositional order. Cf. In re A.C., 198 N.E.3d 1, 9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (finding no relief available for parents challenging the court's removal of child in initial order when a dispositional order had since been issued). Accordingly, we focus our review on where we may afford relief.

4.   DCS also alleges that Mother waived her procedural due process claim for lack of cogency. But Mother cited relevant authority to raise a due process claim and tied her contentions to the facts of the case. As such, she has not waived our review of this issue.

Scheele, Judge.

May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.